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24-35% in the Murray-Darling Basin. 
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Australian Governments (COAG), to increase the efficiency of 
Australia's water use, leading to greater certainty for investment and 
productivity, for rural and urban communities and for the environment.  
Over-allocation  The total volume of water able to be extracted by the holders of water 
(access) entitlements at a given time exceeds the environmentally 
sustainable level of take for a water resource.  
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Rivers regulated by major water infrastructure, such as dams, to supply 
water for varies uses. 
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Unbundling The legal separation of rights to land and rights to access water, have 
water delivered, use water on land or operate water infrastructure, all of 
which can be traded separately. 
Unregulated river 
system 
Rivers without major storages or rivers where the storages do not release 
water downstream. 
Water Act 2007 An Act to make provision for the management of the water resources of 
the Murray-Darling Basin, and to make provision for other matters of 
national interest in relation to water and water information, and for 
related purposes. 
Water allocation A specific volume of water allocated to water (access) entitlements in a 
given season, according to the relevant water plan and the water 




Principal government market-based instrument in Australia to produce 
environmental benefits in deteriorated sites across the Murray-Darling 
Basin by purchasing water entitlements from willing irrigators. In other 
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The impacts of water scarcity and climate change, such as a drier future with increased 
frequency of extreme events, have resulted in increasing pressure on already over-allocated 
Murray-Darling Basin (MDB) water resources. Therefore, understanding how irrigators adapt 
to future uncertainty is important for both economic, social and environmental reasons in the 
MDB. This thesis examines the key drivers for different types of MDB irrigators’ planned 
future adaptation. One key mechanism that irrigators have used for adapting and mitigating 
water shortage includes participating in water markets. The evolution of water markets in the 
MDB, and the implementation of unbundling from the 2000s onwards, has seen both a) the 
emergence of new water products, and b) increasing involvement of environmental and non-
landholder stakeholders. However, little is known about non-landholder behaviour and 
involvement in water markets. This thesis extends the current literature by exploring water 
ownership and trading strategies of all major MDB water market stakeholder groups, 
including environmental and non-landholder actors, and gives special focus to “derivative-
type” temporary trading products. 
The first analytical chapter used a quantitative data set of 1,000 sMDB irrigators to 
investigate irrigators’ planned adaptation strategies and their drivers. Seemingly unrelated 
regressions, recursive biprobit, and multivariate probit modelling found that while all types of 
capital (e.g. farm, physical, etc.) are significant drivers of planned future adaptation, financial 
capital (e.g. debt, net farm income) is one of the most important. Other drivers vary in 
importance across types of adaptation and industry.  
The second analytical chapter explores MDB stakeholders’ water ownership and trading 
strategies, with special attention given to agri-corporate and non-landholder stakeholders, and 
new water products such as water futures and leases. Three different data sets are drawn 
upon: 1) the quantitative sMDB irrigator survey; 2) quantitative water forward and parking 
trade data provided by a private broker; and 3) qualitative in-depth interview data from 63 
experts representing a variety of stakeholders. It was found that agri-corporates and non-
landholders hold more diverse water portfolios, and engage more in derivative-type water 
product trading. Three areas of water policy reform are identified: data, rules and regulations, 
and new institutional development. 
The third analytical chapter explored valuation and accounting methods used to estimate the 
financial asset value of MDB water entitlements. Drawing mainly upon the qualitative 
interview dataset, a wide divergence in methods was found with comparative valuation the 
most common valuation method used. Most MDB stakeholders account for water entitlement 
value at historic cost, while financial investors use fair market accounting to represent current 
market values. Historical cost accounting undervalues entitlements compared to fair value 
accounting. The case study of the environmental strategic purchase of Kia Ora overland-flow 
entitlements in southern Queensland illustrates the impact of valuation discretion on water 
entitlement values, leading to value differences for the same entitlement, of up to 97%.  
As the need to adapt to climate change and future uncertainty increases, it is important to 
utilise all tools available to incentivise more irrigator adaptive behaviour. Water markets will 
remain an important adaptation tool, but along with their increased adoption there must be a 
similar evolution in the design of water markets for their efficient and equitable functionality 
for all stakeholders.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Chapter 1 summarises the literature reviews of the individual thesis chapters, introduces the 
objectives and research questions, the research design and methodology, and provides a road-
map of the thesis structure.  
 
1.1 Water and irrigation in the world 
Water scarcity and the failure to adapt to climate change have often been named as two of the 
biggest global risks (WEF 2019). These factors, combined with changing economic 
circumstances and variable markets, are major sources of uncertainty for farmers, especially 
irrigators, as many agricultural regions will have to deal with drier and more volatile climates 
in the future (IPCC 2019). This requires continuous adaptation well into the future, needing 
the employment of a wide range of diverse established and emerging strategies. A traditional 
approach that has been employed by irrigation farmers historically includes utilising 
economies of scale and irrigation technology to make farms more productive and to deal with 
uncertain economic circumstances and drier climates (de Roest et al. 2018; Turral et al. 
2010). Although the drive to increase farm productivity through economies of scale will 
likely need to continue to satisfy the increasing demand for food associated with global 
population growth, continued increases in water extraction and decline in the quality and 
quantity of water resources requires the production of more crops with less water (Perry et 
al., 2017) without compromising ecosystems. Irrigators’ plans for future adaptation include a 
choice of strategies which expand, but also those which contract the irrigation component of 
the farm, or those that accommodate changes to production systems without significantly 
altering the size of irrigated production. Increasingly, water markets are considered a key 
demand management strategy to address water scarcity (Rey et al. 2019; Wheeler et al. 
2013a).  
Australia plays a leading role in this space, with the most advanced water market system in 
the world; the Murray-Darling Basin (MDB) (Grafton et al., 2011). 
 
1.2 Water in the MDB 
Chapter Two provides a detailed analysis of water issues in the MDB. The MDB is 
Australia’s largest and most important river system, spanning 1,055,600 km2. It contains parts 
of the states of New South Wales (NSW), Queensland (QLD), South Australia (SA), Victoria 
(VIC) and the entire Australian Capital Territory (ACT). The MDB contains two regions: 1) 
the southern Basin (sMDB), and 2) the northern Basin (nMDB). The nMDB is characterised 
by high rainfall and runoff variability, low storages and mainly unregulated and ephemeral 
rivers on extensive floodplains (BOM 2020e). In contrast, the sMDB is highly regulated, 
contains the majority of MDB irrigators (ABS 2019c), and contains a large number of 
nationally and internationally significant wetland and environmental assets (BOM 2020e). 
The sMDB is hydrologically connected, allowing for water trading between different 
stakeholders across different states, including irrigators and the environment and has one of 
the longest and most adopted water markets in the world (Wheeler et al. 2014a). Due to these 
factors and data availability, the sMDB is the focus of this thesis.  
Rainfall is highly variable in the MDB, with annual average rainfall as much as 2,100 mm in 
the south-east to only around 300 mm in the semi-arid areas of the west. The northern parts of 
the nMDB have a subtropical climate, leading to higher stream flows in January-March, 
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following the summer rainfall period, whereas the sMDB has a more temperate climate with 
higher flows in August-October, following winter rainfall (BOM 2020f). With the majority of 
rainfall evapotranspiring, only about 6% of rainfall is available for consumptive use (MDBA 
2018). 
The MDB has historically been subject to high runoff variability, including extreme flooding 
and drought. Apart from the current drought in south-eastern Australia (BOM 2020c), the 
most recent was the Millennium Drought (2001/02-2009/10), which resulted in 20% less 
rainfall, corresponding to a reduction in inflows of about 50% of the long-term annual 
inflows in parts of the basin (Prosser 2011). Unparalleled in its severity and longevity, the 
Millennium Drought proved to be a catalyst for major water policy reform, ultimately leading 
to the most extensive reform process in Australian water policy history through the Water Act 
2007 and the Basin Plan 2012. 
Climate change is expected to materially impact MDB water resources. Surface-water 
availability is expected to decrease by a median amount of 11% by 2030, under a median 
climate change scenario (CSIRO 2008, 2012), and rainfall may decline up to 13-48% by 2090 
under a high global emission (RPC 8.5) scenario (Timbal et al. 2015). The sMDB is projected 
to experience greater reductions in annual runoff, with up to 15% possible in the southern 
most catchments. Additionally, future droughts are predicted to be more frequent and severe 
(Chiew et al. 2011), arguably making the Millennium Drought an example of future climate 
change in the MDB (Grafton et al. 2014a). Reduced surface-water availability also has other 
implications, such as increased salinity (Beare and Heaney 2002), water quality deterioration 
(e.g. algae blooms) (MDBA 2020b), and increased variability of supply (Connor et al. 2012). 
Future water scarcity and variability highlight the need for irrigators’ ongoing adaptation and 
for continuous policy reform, to enable flexible arrangements to support irrigators’ 
livelihoods while also supporting healthy MDB environments and ecosystems. 
 
1.2.1 Irrigated agriculture and MDB water Resources 
Chapter Two provides a detailed analysis of irrigation issues in the MDB. Irrigated 
agriculture only covers about 3% of the MDB’s area (BOM 2020e) but uses the majority of 
available water - 69% of all water diversions in 2017/18 (ABS 2019c). Cotton, irrigated 
pasture, and rice consumed the largest share of MDB water in 2017/18, with cotton dominant 
in the nMDB and pasture dominant in the sMDB (Wheeler and Garrick 2020). MDB water 
consumption contracted during the Millennium Drought, but subsequently increased until 
2013/14 with higher rainfalls and the end of the drought, followed by drier conditions and 
falling consumption thereafter (ABS 2019a). 
First established mainly along the MDB rivers, during European colonisation of Australia in 
the 19th and 20th centuries (Connell 2007; Guest 2016), irrigated agriculture is now of major 
importance in the MDB, with the region contributing 40% of Australia’s gross value irrigated 
production in 2017/18 (ABS 2019c). Since its inception, MDB irrigated agriculture has 
adapted to changing circumstances and various extreme events, such as over-allocation of 
water resources, droughts, economic depressions, increasing water prices and rising water 
tables and salinity levels (Hallows and Thompson 1995). As such, MDB irrigators have 
proven extremely resourceful and adaptive; qualities needed more than ever for facing a drier 
and more variable climate. 
Water trading and water markets, informally operating since the 1960s (Connell 2007), have 
been one of irrigators’ most effective adaptation tools. For example, real adjusted gross value 
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of irrigated production only decreased by 10% during the Millennium Drought, despite a 70% 
decline in irrigated water use (Kirby et al. 2014a, pp. 157, table 1). This was possible through 
water markets facilitating the reallocation of scarce water resources to higher value crops, 
while lower value industries generated income through water sales, enabling continued 
business survival and substituting fodder for pasture in the livestock sector (Kirby et al. 
2014a). Water entitlement sales to the government further enabled irrigators to keep farming, 
reduce farm debt, and restructure their farm enterprises (Haensch et al. 2019; Wheeler and 
Cheesman 2013; Wheeler et al. 2012b). Water trading continues to provide irrigators with 
efficiency benefits for adaptation in response to a range of challenges, such as variable water 
supply or water shortage, financial issues and farm debt, and business restructure. It will 
remain at least as important, if not more, under future climate change: Kirby et al. (2014b) 
estimated that a climate change induced 25% reduction in future annual average water 
availability, translates to only a 10% contraction of GVIP, mainly because of adaptation 
through water trading between different irrigation activities. 
 
1.2.2 Water Policy reform history and the Basin Plan 
Chapter Two provides a detailed analysis of water policy reform issues in the MDB. Since 
Australian Federation, water policy in the MDB has undergone numerous and significant 
reforms, both at the state and the national level. While equity of water sharing arrangements 
were the main concerns in the early days of MDB water reform, addressing over-allocation, 
environmental damage and the balance between consumptive and environmental water use 
were the main focus from 1994 onwards (Guest 2016). 
Beginning with the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) reforms in 1994, water 
policy led to ever increasing water market and trade liberalisation, strong commitments to 
interstate trading and reducing monopolistic behaviour of irrigation infrastructure operators 
(IIOs). The National Water Initiative (2004) and the Water Act (2007) are arguably the most 
important reforms in regards to enabling MDB water markets: unbundling water and land 
ownership and creating a federal framework for water trading, trading rules and harmonising 
water market products (Wheeler et al. 2014a). The Water Act saw the creation of the Murray-
Darling Basin Authority (MDBA), which is charged with developing the Basin Plan to 
readjust the balance between consumptive water use and the environment, the creation of the 
Commonwealth Environmental Water Holder (CEWH), and the Commonwealth 
Environmental Water Office (CEWO). Tasked with acquiring and managing environmental 
water recovered from irrigation to achieve positive ecological outcomes utilising the MDB 
water market trading system, the CEWH formally enshrines the environment as a water 
market participant in its own right (Loch et al. 2011). 
Passed into law in 2012 after multiple attempts to disallow it (Loch et al. 2014b), the Basin 
Plan has since been the framework determining the relationship between consumptive and 
environmental use of MDB water resources. The Plan is to “promote the use and 
management of the Basin water resources in a way that optimises economic, social and 
environmental outcomes” (Water Act 2007, Part 2, Subdivision B, 20(2)) by specifying basin-
wide long-term levels of sustainable water use— the sustainable diversion limits (SDLs). 
After a lengthy process and much controversy about around the Guide to the Proposed Basin 
Plan 2010, the Basin Plan in 2012 stipulated the recovery of 3,200GL of consumptive water 
for environmental purposes, comprised of 2,750GL to be recovered directly from willing 
water user sellers (irrigators and Irrigation Infrastructure Operators (IIOs)). A further 450 GL 
from improving water infrastructure efficiency by so-called efficiency and supply measures 
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was also struck as an agreement (Grafton and Wheeler 2018; Parliament of Australia 2012). 
In 2018, legislative amendments under the Northern Basin Review reduced entitlement 
recovery to 2,680GL; this figure was revised down by a further 605GL (subject to the 
implementation of 36 ‘supply measure’ projects that are meant to offset water in exchange for 
‘equivalent environmental outcomes’), bringing the total amount to 2,075GL (Grafton 2019; 
Productivity Commission 2018). The acquired water is held in trust by the CEWO and 
managed by the CEWH, who is able to trade water to undertake environmental watering 
(CEWO 2014) in order to achieve the environmental outcomes defined under the Basin Plan 
(MDBA 2014a). As of 31st December 2019, a total of 2,103.8GL of long-term average annual 
yield (LTAAY) of water entitlements has been recovered by the Commonwealth, which is 
about 77% of the original 2750GL water recovery target under the Basin Plan (DAWE 
2020b). 
Water recovery under the Basin Plan utilised three main mechanisms: 1) a market-based 
approach called Restoring the Balance (RtB), which buys water entitlements from willing 
sellers through competitive tenders (Wheeler and Cheesman 2013); 2) subsidising irrigation 
infrastructure efficiency upgrades in exchange for 50% of achieved water savings— the 
Sustainable Rural Water Use Infrastructure Program (SRWUIP) (Grafton and Wheeler 2018); 
and 3) the strategic purchases of water entitlements through direct negotiation with the seller 
(DAWR 2018). 
All three mechanisms are highly contentious, albeit for different reasons. Irrigators and rural 
communities routinely blamed the buyback of water entitlements under RtB for increased 
water prices, farm exit and decline in communities, although these factors are mainly caused 
by drought and low agricultural output prices (Wheeler et al. 2020b; Wittwer 2011). Indeed, a 
rare scientific consensus considers water buybacks the most effective, low-cost way to 
recover environmental water, which has the least third-party impacts (Dixon et al. 2011; 
Grafton and Wheeler 2018; Productivity Commission 2010; Wheeler and Cheesman 2013; 
Wheeler et al. 2013a; Wheeler et al. 2014c; Wheeler et al. 2012b). Despite this, buyback was 
capped at a maximum volume of 1,500GL in 2015, due to political and social pressure from 
irrigators and interest groups (Parliament of Australia 2015), and strategic purchases involve 
the only buyback of entitlements currently happening. 
Irrigators’ preferred option for water recovery and, since 2015, the focus of recovery efforts, 
is irrigation and water infrastructure efficiency upgrades under the SRWUIP program. 
Efficiency upgrades have drawn extensive criticism from the scientific literature for, boiling 
down to nine main arguments (Wheeler et al. 2020a): 1) cost-effectiveness (Grafton and 
Wheeler 2018); 2) governance and transparency (Victorian Ombudsman 2011); 3) impacts on 
return flows (Williams and Grafton 2019); 4) rebound effects increase irrigated planting area 
(Adamson and Loch 2018); 5) increased utilisation of water entitlements (Wheeler et al. 
2014c); 6) groundwater substitution (Wheeler et al. 2014c); 7) equity (Wheeler et al. 2020a); 
8) flood-plain harvesting (Four Corners 2019; Slattery et al. 2019); and 9) reduced resilience 
through substitution to permanent crops (Adamson and Loch 2018; Adamson et al. 2017). 
Strategic purchases recover water through direct negotiations with potential sellers and are 
argued to be superior to competitive tenders in thin water market conditions (Reeson and 
Whitten 2015). In practice, strategic purchases have proven a lack of transparency about 
prices paid and water volumes recovered, casting serious doubts about their “value for 
money” (Slattery and Campbell 2018a, 2019). There have also been allegations of collusion 
and rent seeking by vested interests in regard to strategic purchases (Grafton and Williams 
2019; Slattery and Campbell 2018b, 2020).  
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As of 31st December 2019, the Commonwealth has recovered around 1,231GL of long-term 
average annual yield (LTAAY) water through buyback, around 694GL through infrastructure 
upgrades (DAWE 2020b)1, and spent roughly AUD$148,280,000 on 10 strategic purchases 
between May 2016-August 2017 to recover an undisclosed amount of water (DAWE 2019a). 
However, due to NSW not completing their water resource plans on time, and therefore not 
specifying their catchment level SDLs, Basin Plan implementation and water recovery was 
extended from 2019 to 2024 (Grafton et al. 2020b). 
The Basin Plan also included a further suite of water market liberalisation trading rules 
measures. They require mandatory price reporting for all allocation and entitlement trades, 
transparent trading rules and delivery rights conditions for Irrigation Infrastructure Operators 
(IIOs), mandate reduced barriers to surface-water and delivery rights trading, and make all 
water trade subject to water trading rules, including tagged allocation trades, provided the tag 
was established on or after 10th October 2010 (MDBA 2019f). Due to implementation issues, 
mandatory price reporting and subjecting tagged trades to trading rules and restrictions has 
not been fully implemented at time of writing (DELWP 2020a; MDBA 2019m). 
 
1.2.3 Current issues and policy initiatives 
Chapter Two provides a detailed analysis of current water issues and policy initiatives in the 
MDB. Although legislative water policy reform has been undertaken since the Basin Plan, 
some current issues have emerged. In July 2017, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation’s 
Four Corners aired a report alleging water theft and non-compliance with the Basin Plan in 
the Barwon-Darling region of northern NSW (Four Corners 2017). The program alleged 
unlawful water extraction, meter tampering, and collusion between the NSW water regulating 
authority and irrigation interests. In response, the NSW government commissioned a review, 
which substantiated the allegations (Matthews 2017). NSW subsequently established the 
Natural Resource Access Regulator (NRAR) to review and enforce compliance with water 
management rules (Parliament of NSW 2017), while there were also three additional 
compliance reports tabled by the NSW Ombudsman between 2017 and 2018 (Carmody 
2018). Furthermore, the courts found the irrigators incriminated by Four Corners guilty of 
unlawful water take and issued substantial fines (Water NSW v Barlow  2019; Water NSW v 
Harris (No 3)  2020). The programme also prompted the instigation of the Commonwealth’s 
‘Murray-Darling Basin Compliance Review’ (MDBA 2017b), and the creation of the South 
Australian Murray-Darling Basin Royal Commission. 
The South Australian Murray-Darling Basin Royal Commission under Commissioner Bret 
Walker SC found, among other issues, that the process chosen by the MDBA to set the SDL, 
under the Basin Plan, was not in compliance with the Water Act and is unlawful. It rejected 
the MDBA’s approach of how to incorporate climate change in the Basin Plan, and the 
authority’s infamous “triple bottom line” approach of balancing economic, social and 
environmental targets for recovering environmental water, instead mandating a higher 
environmental recovery target. However, the Royal Commission has seemingly had little 
policy impact, arguably due to political cooperation between the Liberal SA and 
Commonwealth governments. 
A series of mass fish kill events in the Lower Darling (NSW) in late 2018 and early 2019 has 
prompted two competing scientific reviews exploring the causes of the events; one by the 
Australian Academy of Sciences (AAS 2019) and one by a team led by Professor Rob 
                                                 
1 With a further 15GL gifted by the Queensland government, and 163.4GL recovered by state governments 
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Vertessy (Vertessy et al. 2019). While both reports agree on the main causes— stratification 
and subsequent mixing of oxygen-depleted water layers— they differ in their judgement 
about water management impacts. The AAS (2019) identified changes to the Barwon-Darling 
water sharing plan, over-extraction and the operation of the Menindee Lakes storage system 
under the Menindee Lakes Water Saving Project (DPIE 2020) as contributing factors, while 
the Vertessy report makes no such attribution (Vertessy et al. 2019). Together with the 
controversy around the Broken Hill pipeline business case (DPI 2016), which shows the main 
project beneficiaries are irrigators upstream of the Menindee Lakes System, this has 
contributed to the impression in some local communities that town water supply, indigenous 
and environmental considerations take second place to powerful and vested-irrigation 
interests (Hannam 2019), with claims the MDBA and state regulatory authorities having been 
institutionally captured (Grafton and Williams 2019). 
Fuelled by the current drought and irrigators’ vocal protests, the Commonwealth has 
undertaken a number of initiatives. For example, On 1st October 2019, the role of Interim 
Inspector-General of Murray-Darling Basin Water Resources was created, appointing Mick 
Keelty, a former Australian Federal Police commissioner (IIGMDBWR 2020). The 
Inspector-General is to support the implementation of the Basin Plan by undertaking an 
inquiry into the management of Murray–Darling Basin water resources, including the 
Murray-Darling Basin Agreement (1992) which governs the sharing of MDB water resources 
between the states. As the role has no enforcement or legislative powers and given the states’ 
lack of interest in changing water sharing arrangements (excluding NSW), policy impacts 
resulting from the Inspector-General’s inquiry are unlikely at this stage. 
The “Independent Panel for the Assessment of Social and Economic Conditions in the 
Murray–Darling Basin”, chaired by Robbie Sefton, was established in June 2019. Its terms of 
reference include: 1) review economic conditions in rural and regional communities across 
the MDB; 2) assess (positive and negative) impacts of water reforms on the vulnerability, 
resilience and adaptive capacity of MDB, including the impacts of environmental water 
reforms; 3) investigate structural changes in the MDB, separating the effects of drought and 
structural changes from the effects of water reform; 4) support longer-term efforts to monitor 
and understand social-economic conditions and the impacts of water reform; and 5) explore a 
range of options that stimulate, support and promote healthy and sustainable rural and 
regional communities in the MDB (MDB Socio-economic Panel 2020). The Panel submitted 
a draft report on 16th March 2020 and is expected to deliver its final report by 30th April 
2020. The draft report made 20 draft recommendations, grouped in five broad areas: 1) better 
community involvement and consultation; 2) meeting the needs of First Nations; 3) 
implementing water reforms with greater care to minimise potential negative externalities; 4) 
supporting communities’ adaptive capacity to change; and 5) addressing critical gaps in 
community wellbeing, infrastructure and services (MDB Socio-economic Panel 2020). 
The Commonwealth implemented the Water for Fodder program in 2019/2020. This was an 
agreement to use the Adelaide desalination plant to produce an extra 100GL of water for SA 
water consumption in exchange for Commonwealth funds (DAWE 2020a). In turn, 100GL of 
Murray water (40GL in 2019/20 and 60GL in 2020/21) from the SA state entitlement will be 
made available to irrigators, in blocks of 50ML for $5000 per water allocation account, to 
produce fodder at a discounted price of AUD$100/ML (DAWE 2019d). At the time of 
writing, of the 40,000ML available in round one, 14,250ML were delivered to irrigators in 
NSW, 25,100ML to irrigators in VIC, and 650ML to irrigators in SA (DAWE 2020c). 
Another initiative was the Australian Competition & Consumer Commission was tasked to 
review of water market functionality and unethical behaviour of water market intermediaries 
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(ACCC 2019a; Frydenberg 2019). The recent increase in water market prices and non-
landholder investor market participation has galvanised irrigators’ concerns about water 
market functionality, resulting in political action. The ACCC is expected to present its final 
report on 20th November 2020.  
 
1.2.4 Water markets 
Chapter Three provides a detailed analysis of water market issues in the MDB. Water 
markets effectively allocate scarce resources by enabling water to move from low to high 
value uses through trade (Grafton et al. 2016; Howe et al. 1986; Wheeler et al. 2014a). Water 
markets exist in a number of different countries (O'Donnell and Garrick 2019) and with 
different degrees of formality (Bjornlund 2004). However, implementation of robust water 
markets is limited (Wheeler et al. 2017b) and water market impacts and functions are 
frequently misunderstood (Grafton et al. 2016). Water policy reform in the MDB has 
continuously advanced water market development over the last 30 years. It is therefore no 
surprise that MDB water markets are globally recognised as the most advanced (Grafton et al. 
2011), having significant value in fostering understanding of water markets.  
There are two main water markets in the MDB, a market for water entitlements (permanent 
water) and a market for water allocations (temporary water). The COAG reforms define 
water allocations and entitlements as (COAG 2004a, p. 30): 
Water (access) entitlement: a perpetual or ongoing right to exclusive access to a share of 
water from a specified consumptive pool as defined in the relevant water plan. 
Water allocation: the specific volume of water allocated to the water entitlement in a given 
season, defined according to rules established in the relevant water plan. 
Water markets have been an integral part of water policy initiatives since the 1994 COAG 
reforms and are an established water management tool (Bjornlund 2006). Although operating 
locally within IIOs in the 1980s (Wheeler et al. 2014a), water trading became more common 
only after unbundling of water and land ownership in the early 2000s (Crase et al. 2014). 
Water markets were also a major tool for environmental water recovery under the Water Act 
and Basin Plan (Wheeler and Cheesman 2013). MDB water markets have had a range of 
positive externalities and efficiency benefits, such as delivering environmental benefits 
through water recovery and environmental watering, enabling irrigator’s climate change and 
drought adaptation and increasing the gross value added to farming activities (Grafton et al. 
2016). On the other hand, there have been recorded negative externalities and impacts from 
imperfect competition and information (Wheeler and Garrick 2020). 
Although water markets exist both in the nMDB and sMDB, trading has predominantly 
occurred in the sMDB, due to stronger institutions, more diverse stakeholders, highly 
regulated systems and the presence of major water storages (Wheeler and Garrick 2020). 
MDB water markets are worth around AUD$2 billion annually (MDBA 2019l), with 
commercial allocation and entitlement trade values for 2018-19 estimated at AUD$566 
million for allocations and AUD$699 million for entitlements (Wakerman Powell et al. 
2019). Water trading activity in the sMDB represented over 80% of total Australian water 
trades and sMDB irrigators were 4.8 times more likely to have conducted an allocation, and 
7.9 times more likely to have conducted an entitlement trade, based on the average 




Although it was estimated that the majority of irrigators in the sMDB had participated at least 
once in allocation and entitlement markets by 2015/16, allocation trade is the most common 
form of trading (Wheeler and Garrick 2020), due to its simplicity. Entitlement trading, by 
contrast, particularly inter-state trading, remains more complex. While allocation trade is 
often used as a risk management tool by irrigators (Zuo et al. 2015a), entitlement trading is 
more strategic, often facilitating farm restructure, relocation, or reduction of farm debt 
(Haensch et al. 2016b; Wheeler et al. 2012b). Entitlement trade increased with environmental 
water recovery during the Millennium Drought, and has since not subsided to pre-drought 
levels, despite the cap on buybacks in 2015 (ABARES 2018). 
Finally, although theorised in the academic literature for some time (Bayer and Loch 2017; 
Brennan 2008; Wheeler et al. 2013a), new temporary water market products, such as water 
leases, water forwards and parking contracts, have only recently emerged. Trading volume 
and prices for these products are practically unknown, because they employ standard 
entitlement and allocation trade mechanisms and are therefore masked in the water register 
data (ABARES 2018; Seidl et al. 2020b). Since 2009, non-landholder water market 
participants, such as financial investors and superannuation companies, have also emerged. 
Their water trading behaviour and entitlement ownership is largely unknown, given the lack 
of publicly available water entitlement ownership register specifying stakeholder types. The 
closest approximation of ownership is 12% of high reliability water entitlements in northern 
Victoria in 2017/18 held by the “non-user” group (DELWP 2019a). However, as the non-user 
group also includes irrigators’ self-managed superannuation funds, the volume owned by 
“true” investors is likely smaller. Chapter 6 provides more analysis and detail on this. 
 
1.3 Literature Review 
The following section provides a brief overview of key literature concerned with irrigators’ 
adaptation behaviour and MDB water market stakeholders’ water ownership and trading 
strategies, in order to highlight current gaps in the literature and to contextualise the research 
questions addressed by this thesis. 
 
1.3.1 Irrigator adaptation and adoption behaviour 
Chapter Two, Three and Five provide a detailed analysis of irrigation issues in the MDB. The 
literature on farmers’ adoption behaviour is vast, starting with the famous study on hybrid 
corn diffusion by Ryan and Gross (1943). Adoption research has endeavoured to understand 
the drivers and personal characteristics impacting farmers’ decisions to adopt new 
technology, and the adoption literature in agricultural economics is vast. Adaptation is a sub-
area of the wider concept of adoption: adaptations are changes in public and private decision 
making and resource allocation in expecting, or responding to, the prospect, or reality, of 
large-scale and long-lasting changes (Zilberman et al. 2012).  
Contributing to the size of the adoption literature is the number of different research 
disciplines involved, the large diversity of research questions and heterogeneous contexts of 
farming systems (Pannell and Zilberman 2020). While earlier adoption studies focused on 
socio-economic characteristics of utility-maximising, perfectly rational farmer decision-
makers, more recent work gives more weight to uncertainty and risk preferences, investigates 
social aspects (i.e. social group membership) and bounded rationality concepts (Chavas and 
Nauges 2020). However, the majority of studies have focused on explaining ex-post 
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adoption, rather than endeavouring to understand future adoption plans (Llewellyn and 
Brown 2020). 
In contrast, adaptation is adoption in response to an external force or stressor. The most 
important external stressor is arguably climate change, leading to an extensive literature on 
farmers’ climate change adaptations. As such, adaptation is the focus of this thesis. Given the 
multi-dimensionality of adaptation and adoption, Smit and Skinner (2002) suggest grouping 
adaptation strategies around shared characteristics or research interests to reduce complexity. 
For example, adaptation strategies can be planned or autonomous (Adger et al. 2005), 
incremental or transformative (Park et al. 2012), anticipatory or reactive (Fankhauser et al. 
1999), hard or soft (Wheeler et al. 2017c), and short- or long-term (Smit and Skinner 2002). 
Considerable work has been done on the adoption of individual adaptation strategies 
(Bradshaw et al. 2004; D'Emden et al. 2006; de Sousa et al. 2017; Deressa et al. 2009; 
Moniruzzaman 2015; Pannell et al. 2006; Wang et al. 2015b), whereas a smaller number of 
studies explore multiple different adaptation strategies simultaneously (Below et al. 2012; 
Dinh et al. 2017; Nicholas and Durham 2012; Wheeler et al. 2013b). 
Potential drivers for adaptation are numerous, but certainly include socio-economic factors, 
as well as climatic and environmental characteristics. To simplify these influences, Ellis 
(2000) suggests grouping them in relation to five different types of capital: financial, human, 
natural, physical, and social capital. Financial capital includes, for example, farm income and 
wealth, human capital encompasses farmer education and age, natural capital considers 
rainfall and temperature, physical capital includes farm technology and machinery, and social 
capital entails factors such as membership in social groups. Chapter 5 provides more analysis 
and detail. 
 
1.3.2 Adaptation gap 
Although there has been extensive research on general farmer adaptation and adoption 
behaviour, empirical quantitative analysis of farmers’ planned adaptation decisions, 
addressing complex, forward-looking and site-specific characteristics of adaptation processes 
(Below et al. 2012; Wheeler et al. 2013b) has been less common. In particular the role of 
social influences and farmers’ beliefs for future adaptation is under-explored (Pannell and 
Zilberman 2020). 
MDB irrigators have historically employed a range of adaptation tools, with water trading as 
an integral part (Dinh et al. 2017; Kirby et al. 2014a), but their future adaptation behaviour in 
the face of increasing uncertainty, due to climate change and other factors such as industry 
restructure, is largely unexplored. To our knowledge, Wheeler et al. (2013b) is the only study 
exploring MDB irrigators’ planned behaviour in relation to their beliefs using 2010 data, 
albeit with a narrow focus on only eight potential adaptations in total.  
There is a clear gap in understanding MDB irrigators’ planned adaptation of a wide range of 
strategies, and the impact of attitudes and beliefs, other than climate change belief, on drivers 
of planned adaptation. Addressing this gap is of particular importance as uncertainty about 
climate change impacts increases and policy incentivising adaptation will increasingly need 
to tackle the risk of insufficient adaptation to climate change (WEF 2019). This is further 




1.3.3 Water market trading behaviour and stakeholders 
Chapter Three provides a detailed analysis of stakeholders’ water market trading behaviour. 
Given that water trading is an essential tool for MDB irrigators, a number of studies have 
analysed the determinants of MDB irrigators’ water trading decisions. However, there are 
important differences between water allocation and water entitlement trading behaviour. 
Water allocation trading is more associated with short-term risk management; for example in 
response to seasonal fluctuations of water prices or availability (Bjornlund 2002, 2006; Loch 
et al. 2012; Nauges et al. 2016; Zuo et al. 2015a). There are also institutional drivers for 
allocation trade, such as the needs to balance water allocation accounts at the end of the water 
year (Wheeler et al. 2008b), or to manage carry-over (Brennan 2008). 
Irrigators’ entitlement trading is more strategic and based on long-term considerations, such 
as farm finances, restructure or farm exit, but also social factors such as community 
acceptance (Haensch et al. 2019; Haensch et al. 2016b; Wheeler and Cheesman 2013; Zuo et 
al. 2015b). 
Since the Water Act, the environment is an active water market participant through 
environmental water holders (EWHs) such as the CEWH. EWH trading behaviour is 
markedly different from irrigator trading behaviour. When allocations are traded by EWHs, 
they are mainly a transfer of a volume of water to be used for environmental watering events 
and are therefore non-commercial (MDBA 2014a). Most EWHs follow the trading strategy 
set out by the CEWH (CEWO 2014), only allowing commercial water trading under very 
specific conditions. At the time of writing, the CEWH and other EWHs have mostly acted as 
allocation sellers (VEWH 2018b), and even that in a limited capacity because unused water 
allocations generally are carried over. However, as at March 2020, the CEWH was 
considering purchasing water allocations (AUD$2 million worth) in the nMDB from 
Queensland agribusiness Eastern Australia Agriculture (Davies 2020). To the author’s 
knowledge, this is the first time the CEWH has bought water allocations. 
With further environmental water recovery through buyback capped since 2015 (Parliament 
of Australia 2015), EWH entitlement trades are mainly in order to rebalance existing water 
holdings.  
It has to be noted that there is limited activity of private EWHs in the MDB. As private non-
governmental entities, they are not directly bound by political and policy considerations. 
They are able to act more akin to irrigators in the market and undertake commercial water 
trading for profit. The most prominent example of these EWHs is the Murray-Darling Basin 
Balanced Water Fund, which employs a trading strategy of selling water allocations at high 
prices (in drought) and buying at low prices (in wet periods) to both maximise environmental 
outcomes and shareholder financial returns (Carr et al. 2016). This is explored in more detail 
in Chapter 3. 
 
1.3.4 Water market gaps 
Hence, to date, no study has explored how irrigators and EWHs make use of emerging 
derivative-type2 temporary water products, such as leases, forwards and parking contracts. 
                                                 
2 Pirrong (2011, p. 6) defines derivatives contracts as “promises to pay amounts that depend on some market 
price or event”, with the risk that the party obligated to make a payment under the contract will be unable to pay. 
Applied to the water market, “payment” can also mean the delivery of a volume of water instead of money. This 
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Although some studies discuss the theoretical foundations (Bayer and Loch 2017; Brennan 
2008; Wheeler et al. 2013a), the practical application and trading behaviour of these water 
market products across MDB stakeholders is unexplored, despite anecdotal and evidence 
from the grey literature suggesting their increasing popularity.  
Unbundling and subsequent water policy reform have led to sufficient trust in water 
entitlements’ legal security that they have become a mortgageable asset (Waterfind 2019a), 
significantly contributing to irrigators’ asset bases. Whether that has instigated a paradigm 
shift towards water entitlements being perceived as an investment asset, rather than a 
production input, and how financial institutions value entitlements for mortgage purposes, is 
currently unknown. 
Finally, there has been an increase in non-landholder and financial investor water market 
activity and ownership since 2009. Although a small number of studies suggest investors may 
seek diversification benefits (Roca et al. 2015) and competitive returns from investing in 
water entitlements (Wheeler et al. 2016a), financial investors’ motivations to enter the water 
markets are ultimately unexplored in practice. Similarly, as publicly available data neither 
tracks water ownership nor water trading behaviour by stakeholder type (e.g. EWH, Irrigator, 
IIO), non-landholders’ water ownership and trading strategies are also unknown. 
Addressing these gaps is important and timely, with non-landholder investment and trading in 
new water market products increasing, and irrigators’ concerns about these developments 
galvanised by the current drought and its distributional impacts on water availability and 
water prices. Chapters 6 and 7 provide more analysis and detail. 
 
1.4 Objectives and research questions 
The aim of this thesis is to explore how irrigators adapt to future uncertainty and risk, using 
the water market as a key strategy. Given the evolution of water markets in terms of new 
temporary products and non-landholder stakeholders, as well as water entitlements being a 
mortgageable and financial asset, this thesis also explores how these changes manifest in 
water ownership and trading strategies for different stakeholder groups, whether water is seen 
as a financial asset and how it is valued as such, and, finally, how current water market 
institutions and policy need to change in order to adapt to these new water market 
developments. To achieve these objectives and to fill the gaps previously identified, a number 
of research questions are formulated. The questions ask how irrigators plan to adapt to future 
uncertainty, what are the influential factors in this decision and how they are impacted by 
different world views? Research questions relating to new and recent developments in MDB 
water markets ask what new temporary water market products, ownership and trading 
strategies are used and by whom; is water seen as a financial asset and how is it valued? 
Specific questions include: 
  
                                                 
thesis refers to derivatives on water as “derivative-type” temporary water products to acknowledge that they are 
not derivatives in the true financial sense. 
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1) What type of strategies do MDB irrigators plan to use to adapt in the future? 
a. What strategies are favoured by different irrigator groups? 
2) What influences are associated with irrigators’ planned adaptation? 
a.  Do influences on adaptation strategies vary by irrigator group? 
3) What different water entitlement ownership and water trading strategies are used by 
MDB irrigators? 
a. In particular, what are the entitlement and water trading strategies of agri-
corporates, EWHs and non-landholder financial investors in the MDB? 
4) How are water leases, forwards and parking, used by various MDB water market 
stakeholders? 
5) What are the views of MDB stakeholders towards whether water entitlements are 
seen as a financial investment asset? 
a. How are water entitlements valued by banks for financial purposes, such as 
mortgaging? 
b. Are there significant differences by stakeholders in water asset valuation in the 
MDB and does this materially affect water entitlement financial values? 
Using insights derived from the findings of the above investigations, the thesis also seeks to 
make suggestions about how water market institutions and water policy can be improved. 
 
1.5 Research design and methodology 
To answer these research questions and address the gaps in the literature, this thesis uses 
mixed-methods research. Mixed-methods involves mixing qualitative and quantitative 
approaches, concepts and techniques in one research study (Creswell 1998, 2003). The use of 
mixed method approaches is motivated by combining the insights gained by qualitative and 
quantitative approaches to address interacting or complex research topics (Creswell 2003; 
Palinkas et al. 2011; Tashakkori et al. 2015). This approach is particularly appropriate for 
water resource research due to the different, but legitimate, perspectives on water-use, water 
management, and water trading both as adaptation and as risk management, as well as the 
complex nature of water as an economic commodity and common pool resource.  
This thesis combines two main methodologies, quantitative and qualitative: 1) an 
econometric analysis of a survey of 1,000 sMDB irrigators, supported by water broker 
individual forward and parking trade data (quantitative), and 2) a large number of semi-
structured interviews with experts from agri-corporates, banks and EWHs (n=63), or who are 
financial investors, property and water evaluators, and water brokers (qualitative). These 
methodologies are supported by a range of case studies, private water market broker, water 





Figure 1.1 Research design 
 
 
1.6 Thesis structure 
This thesis is organised into eight chapters and combines published and unpublished work. 
Following this introduction, Chapter 2 introduces the study area (the sMDB) and provides an 
overview of physical and climatic conditions, and water policy and reform history in the 
MDB from Australian Federation to the present day. 
Chapter 3 provides a detailed discussion of MDB water markets, trading volumes and 
restrictions, as well as irrigators’ and EWHs’ allocation and entitlement trading behaviour 
and motivations. This chapter concludes by introducing the gaps in the water market related 
literature. 
Chapter 4 gives some extra justification on the mixed methods approach chosen and more 
details on each of the data sources used in this thesis. It gives special attention to the 
sampling, recruitment and interview processes applied to collect data from the qualitative 
expert interviews. 
The following three analytical chapters provide the analyses and results answering this thesis’ 




Table 1.1 Summary of analytical chapters 
Chapter Topic Data sources Time period Methods 


















water register and 
water broker data 
2015/16 - 
2018/19 
Survey analysis, mean 
and frequency analysis, 
thematic and 
qualitative analysis 




water register data 




Chapter 5 provides a literature review of irrigators’ planned adaptation strategies and their 
drivers, as well as an econometric analysis of an irrigator survey (n=1,000 in the sMDB in 
2015/16) to determine irrigators’ planned adaptation behaviour and its drivers. This chapter is 
written in manuscript style but has not yet been submitted to a journal. Note that some 
repetition (i.e. study area) will be encountered due to the format of this chapter. 
Chapter 6 presents a published journal article: 
Seidl et al. (2020b), ‘Treating water markets like stock markets: Key water market 
reform lessons in the MDB’, Journal of Hydrology, vol. 581, p. 124399. 
This chapter comprises a literature review on water investment and non-landholder 
engagement in MDB water markets. It employs qualitative and quantitative data to explore 
water ownership and trading strategies by different MDB stakeholders, their views on water 
entitlements as an investment asset and suggested water market policy improvements and 
reforms. Again, some repetition (i.e. study area and water market gaps) will be encountered 
due to the format (i.e. publication) of this chapter. 
Chapter 7 presents a published journal article: 
Seidl et al. (2020a), ‘High turbidity: water valuation and accounting in the Murray-
Darling Basin’, Agricultural Water Management, vol. 230, p. 105929. 
This chapter includes a review of relevant water entitlement valuation and accounting 
frameworks. It employs qualitative data and a case study to explore the predominant water 
accounting and valuation approaches used for MDB water entitlements. It also illustrates the 
impact of different valuation methods on water entitlement financial values. Again, some 
repetition (i.e. study area) will be encountered due to the format (i.e. publication) of this 
chapter. 
Chapter 8 summarises the thesis’ findings, discusses limitations of the thesis and its policy 
implications, while also making recommendations for further research. 




Chapter 2 The Murray-Darling Basin: Physical setting and water policy 
history 
 
This chapter introduces the study area—the Australian Murray-Darling Basin (MDB)—
describes its physical and climatic characteristics and outlines some important socio-
economic characteristics. It provides an overview of water policy development from the 
1990s to today and concludes by sketching some current policy issues. Each phase of water 
policy reform has led to a maturing of the water market, increased irrigator participation, has 
enabled non-irrigator stakeholders to own and trade water, and led to the trading of new water 
trading products (discussed in Chapter 3). 
 
2.1 The study area 
 
2.1.1 The Murray-Darling Basin 
The Murray-Darling Basin is Australia’s largest agricultural region, an area of great 
environmental, economic, cultural, social and touristic significance. Agricultural production 
in the basin is diverse, ranging from primarily broadacre farming and grazing livestock in the 
north, to dairy and horticulture in the south. Routinely referred to as Australia’s ‘food bowl’, 
it generated 40% of Australia’s AUD$58.9 billion gross value agricultural production 
(GVAP)3 in 2017/18 (ABS 2019b). The Basin encompassed 64% of Australia’s irrigated area 
in 2017/18 and is home to about around 42% of all irrigating businesses (ABS 2019c). 
Overall, the region contributed AUD$8.6 billion of the gross value of irrigated agricultural 
production (GVIAP)4 in 2017/18, constituting more than 48% of Australia’s GVIAP that 
year. Irrigation activities used 6.8 million megalitres5 (ML) of irrigation water on 1.5 million 
hectares of land, with irrigated pasture and cotton accounting for more than half of the water 
used (ABS 2019b, 2019c). Despite lower water extractions and a smaller area under 
plantation, the GVIAP of horticultural crops has increased over time, from AUD$2.05 billion 
in 2013/14 to AUD$2.85 billion in 2017/18, driven by high demand and attractive prices for 
almonds, citrus and grapes. 
The following features highlight the MDB’s importance as a region, demonstrating that it: 
- Spans 1.06 million square kilometres (14% of Australia’s landmass) 
- Is home to more than 2.6 million Australians 
- Provides drinking water for over 3 million people 
- Encompasses 41% (more than 35,000) of all Australian farms 
- Is home to almost 9,500 irrigators 
- Creates tourism revenue of AUD$8 billion annually 
- Is home to forty Aboriginal nations 
- Provides critical habitat for more than one hundred and twenty water bird and forty-
six native fish species 
                                                 
3 GVAP is calculated by multiplying the wholesale price and quantity of agricultural commodities produced 
(ABS 2019b) 
4 GVIAP is calculated by multiplying the wholesale price and quantity of agricultural commodities produced by 
irrigation (ABS 2019b). 
5 1 ML = 1 million litres 
16 
 
- Has 77,000 km of rivers and 30,000 wetlands, sixteen of which are internationally 
recognized (ABS 2019c; MDBA 2019k). 
Figure 2.1 shows the boundaries of the nMDB and sMDB in south-eastern Australia, 
spanning parts of Queensland (QLD), New South Wales (NSW), Victoria (VIC), South 
Australia (SA) and the Australian Capital Territory (ACT). 
Figure 2.1 Map of the Murray-Darling Basin 
 
Source: MDBA (2016a) 
The MDB is comprised of twenty-two catchments and river valleys; nine in the northern part 
of the basin and thirteen in the southern part. The MDB is Australia’s largest and most 
complex river system, with the River Murray the most important water source for the 
southern, and the Darling River for the northern part of the Basin. The Basin’s northern 
section is subtropical, but the southern reaches are mainly temperate, with marked variability 
in temperature, climate and rainfall. Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3 shows the mean temperature 
anomaly6 and the rainfall anomaly for the financial years (water years) 1900/01-2018/19 in 
the Basin. 
                                                 
6 A mean anomaly shows the difference of a yearly mean (temperature or rainfall) and the long-term mean of the 
whole data period. 
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Figure 2.2 MDB historic mean temperature anomaly and five year moving average 
from 1900/01-2018/19 
 




Figure 2.3 MDB historic mean rainfall anomaly from 1900/01-2018/19 
 
Source: Adapted from BOM (2020b) 
Rainfall in the eastern part of the MDB can be as high as 2,100 mm, whereas the western side 
is hotter and drier, only receiving mean annual rainfall of less than 300 mm (BOM 2019b). 
With an annual average rainfall of 470 mm throughout the whole basin and 94% of rainfall 
being evapotranspired by plants, 86% of the basin contributes no water to river runoff, except 
in times of flood (MDBA 2018). 
Large-scale climatic drivers, including the El Nino – La Nina Southern Oscillation, the Indian 
Ocean Dipole and the Southern Annular Mode (Neave et al. 2015) contribute to and 
exacerbate rainfall variability. These climatic phenomena drive large annual and decadal 
changes in the MDB’s climate, with droughts and bushfires in south-eastern Australia largely 
a result of the El Nino- La Nina Southern Oscillation (Baines 1998). To deal with this 
variability, an extensive network of irrigation infrastructure and water storages have been 
established; able to store a maximum of 22,746 gigalitres7 (GL). Storage capacity in the 
nMDB is only around 32% of the sMDB’s capacity, which has a storage capacity of 
16,296GL. The most important storages in the sMDB are the upstream storages of Hume and 
Dartmouth dam in the east, with capacities of 3,005GL and 3,856GL respectively. Although 
smaller, Lake Victoria (677 GL) and the Menindee Lakes system (1,731GL) in the west are 
important for managing water supply to SA (MDBA 2020a). 
                                                 
7 1 GL = 1 billion litres 
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The MDB’s water resources are diverted for a variety of uses, such as irrigation, industrial, 
municipal and potable water supply, but irrigated agriculture accounts for the lion’s share of 
water extraction— 69% of total MDB diversions in 2017-188 (ABS 2019c; BOM 2019b). 
The MDB also has substantial groundwater resources, with groundwater extraction of 1,412 
GL/y on average from 2002/03 to 2017/18 (MDBA 2019j). Water extraction in the MDB is 
governed by a system of proportional water extraction rights called water entitlements (see 
Chapter 3), and therefore corresponds to the variability of overall water availability, as 
illustrated in Figure 2.4. The period of the Millennium Drought (2001/02-2009/10) and the 
current drought since 2013/14 are clearly visible in the declining volume of water diversions. 
Figure 2.4 MDB diversions from 1983/84 - 2017/18 
 
Source: MDBA (2019j, p. 97) 
 
2.1.2 The southern Murray-Darling Basin (sMDB) 
The sMDB covers parts of SA, VIC and NSW, and the whole of the ACT. Figure 2.5 shows 
the sMDB and its catchments, including its significant water storages. The sMDB is a highly 
regulated and interconnected river system, comprising the majority of the MDB’s irrigated 
farms and a number of its significant irrigation districts (ABARES 2014). 
                                                 
8 Calculated by dividing 7,065,319 ML irrigation water use (ABS 2019c) by the sum of all diversions, 
10,305,260 ML, in the MDB in 2017/18 (BOM 2019b). 
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Figure 2.5 The sMDB and its significant storages 
 
Source: ABARES (2018, p. 16) 
Due to its long history of irrigation, beginning in 1887 with Australia’s oldest irrigation trust, 
established by the Chaffey brothers, and subsequent extensive water resource development, 
the sMDB has long suffered from water overallocation and environmental degradation 
(Connell 2007; Kingsford 2000; Quiggin 2001). Together with a series of droughts, these 
factors have made the region the focal point of water policy reform and government 
regulation (Grafton and Jiang 2009; Quiggin 2012; Thampapillai 2009). 
The sMDB has a temperate climate, with most rainfall occurring in the south-eastern part, 
and becoming progressively drier and hotter in the west, particularly in SA. Irrigation 
supports a wide range of crops in the sMDB, ranging from cotton and rice, vegetables and 
irrigated pasture, dairying, citrus, grapes, stone fruit and nuts. The highly variable climate, 
combined with water storage capacity, the diversity of agricultural production and 
corresponding GVIAP per crop, provides the basic foundation making water trading possible, 
leading to the development of a highly dynamic water market in the sMDB (ABARES 2017). 
However, the sMDB and the MDB at large is expected to experience the adverse effects of 
climate change. 
 
2.1.3 The MDB and climate change 
The localised impacts of climate change are highly uncertain and heterogeneous, making 
predictions about temperature or rainfall patterns challenging. Yet, many agricultural regions 
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are expected to be adversely affected, both through higher temperatures and less rainfall, but 
also by an increased incidence of extreme events, such as floods and droughts (IPCC 2019). 
Climate change is likely to manifest in decreased water quality and quantity in the MDB 
(Pittock and Finlayson 2011; Quiggin et al. 2010). Despite mounting global evidence of 
climate change (IPCC 2014, 2019), available predictions and forecasts for the MDB are now 
somewhat dated, following the withdrawal of research funding by the Australian government 
in 2017 (Karp 2020). Surface water availability is expected to decrease by a median amount 
of 11% by 2030, under a median climate change scenario (CSIRO 2012). This will likely lead 
to increased salinity (Nielsen and Brock 2009), deterioration of water quality (e.g. algae 
blooms) (Davis and Koop 2006), and more variable supply (Connor et al. 2012). Although 
the highest mean reductions of water availability are expected in the sMDB (CSIRO 2012), 
irrigated agriculture might be able to tolerate a median climate change scenario as 
agricultural profits would only decrease by a small amount (Jiang and Grafton 2012). 
However, an extremely dry climate in the future would substantially reduce profits. 
Projections also suggest droughts will become more frequent and extreme (Chiew et al. 
2011), with the Millennium Drought (2001/2-2009/10) providing an example of potential 
future drought conditions and necessary adaptations (Grafton et al. 2014a). Table 2.1 shows 
the CSIRO’s (2008) projected rainfall and runoff changes for future climate change 
scenarios.  
Table 2.1 Annual rainfall and runoff averaged across historic, recent and future MDB 
climate scenarios 










Historic (1895-2006) 457 0 27.3 0 
Recent (1997 -2006) 440 -4 21.7 -21 
Future – median (2030) 444 -3 24.7 -9 
Future – extreme dry (2030) 396 -13 18.3 -33 
Future – extreme wet (2030) 495 8 31.7 16 
Source: CSIRO (2008, p. 21) 
More recent climate change projections for the Murray Valley demonstrate that the sMDB 
will become warmer and drier by 2030 (Table 2.2), while also experiencing more frequent 
and prolonged droughts, under all models of standard greenhouse gas emission pathways 
(Timbal et al. 2015).
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Table 2.2 Projected mean annual maximum temperature and mean annual rainfall in 
the Murray catchment by 2030 















Baseline concentration (1995) 21.3 0 549 0 
Medium concentration pathway 
(RCP 4.5) 
22.6 +6 472 -14% 
High concentration pathway 
(RCP 8.5) 
22.5 +6 488 -11% 
* For definitions of greenhouse gas emission pathways see (IPCC 2014) 
Source: Timbal et al. (2015, p. 34) 
These reductions in water availability will not homogeneously affect irrigation and 
environmental water users; their impact rather depends on the location and the relative 
reliability of the stakeholders’ water entitlements. However, the adverse impacts on the 
environment will likely increase with a drier future, given that it is already disproportionately 
disadvantaged in drought periods, due to the nature of its water entitlements and the presence 
of environmental and ecosystem thresholds and tipping points (Pittock 2013). 
Although current water regulation in form of the Basin Plan 2012 (see section 2.2.5) offers 
the potential to include climate change analysis and associated water resources impacts into 
allocative decision-making frameworks, this is not fully realised (Cosier et al. 2017; Pittock 
et al. 2015). Climate change in the Basin Plan ought to be addressed on a catchment by 
catchment basis through the states’ water resource plans, determining the relative allocation 
of water to environmental and consumptive uses, and their periodic 10-year reviews (MDBA 
2019g). This 10-year review approach is widely seen as inadequate: 1) to address ecosystem 
thresholds and tipping points; 2) to incorporate new climate science in a timely manner; and 
3) is criticised for condensing an environmentally sustainable level of water extraction under 
changing climatic conditions for every catchment into one static number: the sustainable 
diversion limit (Grafton 2019; Hart 2016; Pittock et al. 2015; Walker 2019). Failure to 
adequately incorporate climate change presents material risks to environmental water 
recovery and associated outcomes, as required by the Basin Plan (Kirby et al. 2014b). 
Maintaining and restoring the health of the Lower Lakes and Murray mouth, important 
RAMSAR listed wetlands assets, will be particularly challenging (Pittock and Finlayson 
2013; Settre and Wheeler 2017). 
Climate change also poses risks for consumptive water users. With rural communities 
running out of drinking water in the current drought (Vincent 2018), and a series of mass fish 
kill events in 2018/19, the consequences of the interplay of climate change and water sharing 
arrangements skewed towards irrigated water extraction in the MDB are being dramatically 
displayed (AAS 2019; Natural Resources Commission 2019). 
 
2.2 Water policy and reform history in the MDB 
Given the MDB’s variable climate and the fact it is a river system crossing state boundaries, 
there is a long history of water policy and water sharing agreements for the Basin. This 
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section outlines the historic water reform process in the MDB, beginning with Australian 
Federation, but its main focus is on policies from the 1990s onwards. 
 
2.2.1 From Federation to the ‘Cap’ 
With the colonisation of Australia, including the MDB, water sharing and management in the 
Basin followed the riparian rights system, called the riparian doctrine, based on British 
common law (Guest 2016). The legal decision to regard Australia as terra nullius (land 
belonging to no one) meant that Aboriginal water rights and management practices were not 
recognised, despite Aboriginal peoples having used the Basin’s water resources for thousands 
of years. Despite the Mabo ruling on Native Title, providing a pathway for Aboriginal 
ownership of customary waters, the question of Native Title over MDB water resources has 
not yet been settled (Jackson 2011; Marshall 2016; O'Bryan 2016). 
The riparian doctrine allows landholders owning land adjacent to a stream to extract water, 
given this does not interfere with the rights of other riparian rights holders. While working 
well in the British context of abundant and fairly reliable rainfall, this system did not translate 
well to variable and drought-prone Australia, where rights holders had incentives to 
maximise water use when water was available, often to the detriment of downstream users 
(Guest 2016). With litigation as the only pathway to rectify this, there was real danger of the 
court system being overwhelmed with cases about water sharing and extraction. To mitigate 
this problem, the Irrigation Act was enacted in 1886, placing water firmly within state 
control, managed by state irrigation trusts, rather than the courts (Crase and Cooper 2015). 
Water sharing in the River Murray was a major obstacle to Federation in 1901 and the 
forming of an Australian constitution. South Australia emphasized a need to vest water in 
federal control to protect the interests of downstream water users, and to guarantee a 
minimum flow at all times to allow for river navigation (Wheeler 2014). New South Wales 
(NSW) and Victoria were not willing to accept such a provision, preferring state-based 
control, with NSW disagreeing in principle over reducing states’ powers, and Victoria aiming 
to maintain sovereignty over issuing generous extraction rights to support its important 
irrigation sectors. Ultimately, NSW and Victoria prevailed, with the Australian Constitution 
under section 100 prohibiting the Commonwealth’s right to interfere with states’ water 
management (Guest 2016). 
Extensive irrigation development in Victoria and drought in the 1910s galvanised the need 
for a water sharing framework between the states. With negotiations starting in 1902, the 
states ultimately signed the River Murray Waters Agreement in 1914, with South Australia 
receiving a guaranteed water entitlement of 1,547 GL a year, equally provided for by NSW 
and Victoria, in exchange for South Australia and the Commonwealth contributing funds to 
the construction of locks, weirs and upstream storages (Guest 2016; Quiggin 2001; Wheeler 
2014).  
The River Murray Waters Agreement started a prolonged period of extensive water and 
irrigation infrastructure development lasting well into the 1970s, ultimately leading to the 
present storage and irrigation district configuration. The period from 1914-1970s saw the 
construction of a number of weirs and locks along the Murray (1922-1939), the Hume Dam 
(1934), the barrages at Goolwa (1940), the Dartmouth Dam (1979) and the Snowy Mountains 
Scheme (1974). The South Australian entitlement was increased to 1,850 GL in 1970, in 
order to convince South Australia (SA) to defer building a dam in Chowilla and agree instead 
to the construction of the Dartmouth Dam (Guest 2016). 
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One result of these activities were water quality problems in the river, particularly salinity, 
prompting the Commonwealth and the states to revisit the 1914 River Murray Waters 
Agreement. This led to the Murray-Darling Basin Agreement 1987, which widened the scope 
of the 1914 agreement to include the whole MDB, making provision for Queensland to join. 
The agreement established a new organisation—the Murray-Darling Basin Commission—
tasked with improving water quality, salinity management, responding to land degradation, 
and equitable management of water resources between the states (Guest 2016; Quiggin 
2001).  
MDB water extraction more than tripled between 1944 to 1994, mainly driven by irrigation 
development in NSW, leading to the largest ever recorded blue-green algae bloom in the 
Darling River in 1992. This expanded the focus from salinity management to environmental 
health and the proper balance between irrigation and the environment. Ultimately, a cap on 
extractions (the ‘Cap’) at 1993-94 levels of extraction (except Queensland, set at 1999-2000 
levels and South Australia where the Cap was set at an average use of 90% of entitlements) 
was established in 1995 (AAS 2019). The Murray-Darling Basin Agreement replaced the 
River Murray Waters Agreement as the document governing water sharing between the states 
in 1992, with Queensland and the Australian Capital Territory officially joining in 1992 and 
1998, respectively (Guest 2016; Quiggin 2001).  
 
2.2.2 The Council of Australian Governments reforms and the ‘Cap’ on extraction 
Established in 1993, the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) has played a major role 
in MDB water reform. A product of the time of liberalisation and market based instruments, 
the COAG agreed to a water policy framework facilitating the separation of water and land 
ownership (COAG 1994). With water entitlements recognized as tradeable property rights, 
the objective was to achieve an efficient allocation of the common-pool resource water via a 
private market, in the spirit of Coase (1960). This included formally recognising the 
environment as a water user (Loch et al. 2011).  
Environmental degradation and over-allocation of the MDB was apparent in the early 1990s, 
leading to ongoing concern about the balance of water use between irrigation and the 
environment. The COAG reforms included an audit of MDB water resources by the Murray-
Darling Basin Commission, which found that extractions had increased significantly since 
1988 and would continue to increase unsustainably (MDBMC 1995). This led to a cap of 
water extraction at 1993/94 levels; first introduced temporarily in 1995, but then made 
permanent in 1997 (Connell 2007). The Cap’s primary objectives were to: 1) maintain and 
improve existing MDB flow regimes to protect and enhance the environment; and 2) achieve 
sustainable consumptive use by managing and developing water resources to meet ecological, 
economic and social needs (Guest 2016). 
However, the Cap still prioritised existing consumptive extraction over environmental uses 
(Loch et al. 2011) and even led to a short-term increase in water extractions as irrigators 
increased their use of groundwater, which was not covered by the Cap, and activated 
previously under- and unused entitlements, called dozer and sleeper licences (Bjornlund 
2007). Additionally, cap monitoring in unregulated systems was challenging due to a lack of 
gauges (Lee and Ancev 2009), and irrigators made increased use of farm dams to intercept 
run-off, which further reduced water availability in the MDB (Kendall 2013). 
Cap implementation remained slow and challenging for both technical and political reasons. 
The COAG reforms required implementation by the states and the ACT, but they were given 
25 
 
complete autonomy on how to do this. This resulted in a varying level of water extractions 
and management impacts across the states (Bjornlund and McKay 2002). The Cap also faced 
strong political opposition, particularly from the National Party and irrigation groups. While 
SA’s diversions were within the Cap, NSW and Victoria exceeded it in some catchments, 
with the then status quo of Cap non-compliance in some catchments very resistant to change, 
particularly in NSW. Queensland, while supporting the Cap in principle, argued that, given 
its late participation in the Murray-Darling Basin Agreement, low levels of MDB water 
resource development and extraction, and no statutory mechanisms to restrict overland flow 
diversions, it could not fully implement the Cap. Consequently, at the time of the five year 
review of Cap compliance, NSW was still not compliant in three catchments, while 
Queensland and the ACT had yet to establish their Cap levels (MDBC 2000). Ultimately, 
Queensland only fully adopted the Cap in 2010 (Guest 2016). 
Despite its initial negative effect on water extractions and return flows9, and its 
implementation challenges, the Cap did attempt to commit all states to ending unfettered 
irrigation development and also established environmental concerns as a core consideration 
for water management in the MDB (Wheeler 2014). Setting the Cap at historic extraction 
levels might not have been the best way to achieve substantial environmental outcomes, but it 
was necessary to overcome political opposition and to establish collaboration between the 
states (Guest 2016). Finally, although the Cap did not immediately provide sustainable use of 
water resources in the MDB, environmental degradation would have been much worse 
without this crucial first step (MDBC 2000). 
 
2.2.3 The National Water Initiative 2004 
Given the shortcomings of the Cap, increasing water scarcity and water quality challenges, 
the National Water Initiative (NWI), was legislated to be the instigator of a second wave of 
water reforms (COAG 2004a). This included a commitment to rebalance water extractions 
towards environmental objectives in the form of the Intergovernmental Agreement on 
Addressing Water over-allocation and Achieving Environmental Objectives in the Murray-
Darling Basin (COAG 2004b). 
The NWI introduced a system of water resource management based on bipartisan agreements 
between the Commonwealth and the states, spelling out federal objectives and state 
responsibilities and commitments (Foerster 2011). This management system was based on 
water sharing plans, defining environmental flow requirements and then determining a fixed 
share of available water for consumptive use, with no initial compensation for reduced water 
entitlements (Loch et al. 2011). 
Another important reform under the NWI was the establishment of a common water 
accounting framework for all Australian water resources, in order to facilitate planning, 
monitoring, trading, and environmental and farm management (COAG 2004a). This 
ultimately led to ‘General Purpose Water Accounting’, which is based on accrual financial 
accounting methods, consisting of accounts for water assets and water liabilities (Water 
Accounting Standards Board 2012a). These water accounts are published annually by the 
Bureau of Meteorology (BOM 2020d). 
                                                 
9 Return flows are the proportion of water extracted for irrigation which is not consumed and returns through 
either seepage to groundwater and/or surface runoff to streams. Return flows that are later recovered and reused 






The NWI aimed to remove barriers to water trade by changing the definition of water 
entitlements; from a volumetric right to a share of a common pool resource. Removal of 
further trade barriers, such as the unbundling of land and water ownership, were also a key 
objective, enabling them to be sold separately (Crase et al. 2014). Additionally, other aspects 
of water ownership were also unbundled into four different rights: 1) a water entitlement, 
granting the right to extract a share of available water into perpetuity; 2) a water use licence, 
allowing irrigators to use the water on their land; 3) a water allocation account, tracking water 
extracted against allocation volume available under an entitlement; and 4) a delivery share, 
which is an irrigator’s right to have water delivered to their property using the infrastructure 
of their irrigation district (Wheeler 2014). Figure 2.6 gives a graphic representation of 
unbundling by the NWI. 
Figure 2.6 Unbundling of water rights under the NWI 
 
Source: NWC (2011b, p. 83) 
Unbundling of water from land was an emotionally and politically charged issue; many 
irrigators and rural communities feared it would lead to an exodus of water rights from 
upstream to downstream catchments, particularly in Victoria. Another public concern was the 
emergence of so-called water barons, investors without landholdings or agricultural 
production, who would, it was feared, withhold water from irrigators in order to drive up 
prices (Bjornlund et al. 2011; Loch et al. 2013). As a response, Victoria implemented a suite 
of trading restrictions, aiming to circumvent the dangers and impacts of these issues. The ‘4% 
rule’ limited annual water entitlement trading out of an area to 4% of the total entitlements on 
issue in a given catchment. A ‘10% rule’ was also established, limiting water entitlement 
ownership by the non-water user group10 to 10% of entitlements on issue (DELWP 2020b). 
Although these concerns were ultimately unfounded, and the corresponding trading 
                                                 
10 The non-user group are water allocation accounts without a water use licence attached (DELWP 2019a). 
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restrictions removed (see section 2.2.5.3), distrust and suspicion towards non-landholder 
water ownership has never fully dissipated in rural and irrigation communities.  
Additional concerns surrounded potentially negative impacts of water markets on the 
environment, by changing the location and timing of natural flows (Wheeler et al. 2014a). 
However, evidence suggests that compared to drought and river regulation (i.e. weirs and 
locks), the impact of water trading is small, while also not affecting key ecological assets 
(NWC 2012). 
 
2.2.3.2  The Living Murray 
To improve river and environmental health, the NWI sought to address over-allocation of 
MDB water resources by an initiative to reallocate water to the environment - The Living 
Murray. The program aimed to recover consumptive water from irrigation using two 
approaches: 1) buying water from irrigators through the market; and 2) by increasing water 
use efficiency through infrastructure. A budget of AUD$500 million was allocated to buy 
water entitlements from irrigators to contribute to additional environmental flows (around 
500 GL per year) for six environmental ‘icon sites’ on the Murray until 2009. An additional 
AUD$150 million was earmarked to construct the extra water delivery infrastructure to 
access the environmental assets. Funding to The Living Murray was increased in 2009 to 
AUD$700 million for entitlement purchases and AUD$270 million for infrastructure 
expenditure (Lee and Ancev 2009; MDBA 2011b). 
The states were tasked with both the details of implementing the NWI reforms, and defining 
and recovering an adequate water volume to provide environmental flows. However, due to a 
lack of coordination and tensions between the states (Connell and Grafton 2011), it became 
evident that individual states were not able to manage and improve the material and ongoing 
environmental issues plaguing the MDB. At the time a multi-year deep drought (later to be 
known as the Millennium Drought 2001/2-2009/10), and record low inflows in 2006, pushed 
the NWI objectives to the brink of collapse and the Commonwealth decided to step in, in 
coordination with the states, to progress what had been incompletely realized objectives 
through a new policy; the Water Act 2007 (Loch et al. 2011). 
 
2.2.4 The Water Act 2007 
The Water Act aimed to achieve extensive legislative, regulatory, and stakeholder reform 
through coordinated efforts between the Commonwealth and the states and was passed into 
law in 2007. As many-a-time previously, drought proved to be a catalyst for political will and 
enabled the implementation of new water policy tools, amongst them buying water for the 
environment from willing sellers, and creating the Murray-Darling Basin Authority (MDBA), 
a new administrative entity replacing the Murray-Darling Basin Commission (Wheeler 2014). 
Water recovered for the environment was to be managed by the Commonwealth 
Environmental Water Holder (CEWH), supported by a new statutory body, the 
Commonwealth Environmental Water Office (CEWO). Furthermore, the Water Act allows 
the Commonwealth water minister to make water market rules, on advice from the Australian 
Competition & Consumer Commission (ACCC), which is tasked with monitoring market 
behaviour and water charges (ACCC 2011). Furthermore, the Bureau of Meteorology was 
made the custodian and collector of water resource information (Parliament of Australia 
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2007). Carry-over was also introduced, a mechanism by which irrigators are able to store 
unused water allocations in system storages for the next year (Grafton and Wheeler 2018). 
The MDBA was charged to develop a strategic plan facilitating sustainable water 
management and to overcome legal barriers to integrated management of the MDB’s water 
resources by the states. Sustainable water management was to be achieved by the MDBA 
producing a 10-year Basin Plan, specifying a “sustainable limit of take” from the basin, in the 
form of one number— the sustainable diversion limit (SDL) (Kendall 2013). 
The Water Act is a complicated legal balancing act; the Commonwealth is forbidden from 
interfering with states’ water management under the Constitution (see section 2.2.1), yet the 
Water Act does just that. The Commonwealth justifies its legal standing by its jurisdiction 
and commitments in matters of foreign policy (the external affairs power), by arguing that it 
is a signatory to the RAMSAR convention, and the MDB contains a number of RAMSAR-
listed wetlands. However, conferral of power by the states was still necessary (Walker 2019). 
Public opinion strongly supported action on water reform, galvanised by the drought and 
related extensive environmental degradation. The Commonwealth also promised substantial 
financial resources to support water efficiency improvements and environmental water 
recovery; initially AUD$10 billion over 10 years (Grafton and Wheeler 2018; Guest 2016). 
This ultimately brought the states to the table. 
 
2.2.4.1 Water for the Future 
The AUD$10 billion over 10 years promised to the states under the Water Act became part of 
the Water for the Future (WFF) program, which was expanded to AUD$12.9 billion in 2008 
(Parliament of Australia 2010). The WFF employed market-based instruments such as 
entitlement buybacks, and infrastructure upgrades, to achieve environmental watering goals 
and made explicit mention of climate change impacts and adaptation strategies. Irrigators 
received large subsidies to modernise their irrigation infrastructure, with AUD$5.8 billion 
provided for projects increasing on-farm water use efficiency (DEWHA 2010). An additional 
AUD$3.1 billion was used to buy water entitlements from willing sellers via the water market 
(Grafton and Wheeler 2018). 
The buyback part of the WFF was labelled Restoring the Balance in the MDB (RtB). It aimed 
to recover entitlements from willing sellers, mostly through a series of competitive tenders 
from 2008 onwards (Wheeler and Cheesman 2013). Water allocations received from the 
purchased entitlements are used to water key environmental assets like significant wetlands 
and floodplains to improve the MDB’s environmental health. Under the Basin Plan, the RtB 
became one of the mechanisms to recover water for the environment (see section 2.2.5). 
Buybacks were successful in recovering water for relatively low costs (compared to 
infrastructure programs), not least due to the competitive auction mechanism employed 
(Tisdell 2011). While water was only purchased through completely voluntary transactions 
from willing sellers, buyback was met with hostility in rural communities, by parts of the 
media and some politicians, many of whom claimed that, rather than being willing sellers, 
financial difficulties faced by irrigators during and after the drought ‘forced’ them to sell 
entitlements. Buybacks were routinely blamed for loss of employment and farm enterprises 
resulting from the impact of drought (Bjornlund et al. 2011; Wittwer 2011). Despite negative 
perceptions, buybacks enabled desperate and highly indebted sellers to receive good income 
from high entitlement prices at a time when production income was often low, and they 
allowed for a rebalancing of farm finances or personal retirement (Wheeler et al. 2014b, 
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2014c). Wheeler and Cheesman (2013) found that the majority of irrigators participating in 
buybacks did so to reduce debt, restructure the farm or retire from agriculture. Many sold 
only a portion of their water holdings, or sold surplus water entitlements, and remained in 
production. Despite a wealth of scientific economic evidence, grievances and hostility 
towards buyback remains strong in many rural communities and irrigation industries. 
 
2.2.4.2 The Commonwealth Environmental Water Holder 
The Water Act legislated the Commonwealth Environmental Water Holder (CEWH) to be the 
custodian of water recovered under the WFF program. The CEWH, Jody Swirepik at the time 
of writing, has complete water trading and management decision powers (CEWH 2018). She 
is supported by a statutory authority, the Commonwealth Environmental Water Office 
(CEWO), which legally holds the water portfolio, executes water trading decisions and 
administers environmental watering. Unlike water recovered under The Living Murray, which 
is held jointly by the MDBA and the states, water stemming from recovery under the WFF is 
managed by an organisation solely dedicated to maximising environmental outcomes and 
which is designed to be an independent and active participant in the water market. The 
formation of the CEWH thus represents the advent of a completely new type of water market 
actor; Environmental Water Holders (EWH).11 The CEWH/CEWO fund their management 
activities, but not staff, through the ‘Environmental Water Holdings Special Account’ 
(Parliament of Australia 2018). The special account ensures that the CEWH does not need to 
sell environmental water to fund CEWO’s and their own expenses, and it covers statutory 
fees to state water authorities, the management of credits/debits resulting from the 
sale/purchase of environmental water, and the costs of monitoring and evaluating 
environmental watering outcomes. 
Environmental watering activities are governed by the Framework for Determining 
Commonwealth Environmental Water Use (CEWO 2013), the Basin-wide environmental 
watering strategy (MDBA 2014a) and annual environmental watering priorities (MDBA 
2019d). Figure 2.7 illustrates Commonwealth environmental watering objectives in relation 
to water availability. Environmental watering is not done by the CEWO directly, but rather 
delegated to third parties, such as state governments or environmental NGOs, who will 
receive a transfer of necessary allocation water and sometimes funds from the CEWH to 
cover operations (Parliament of Australia 2018).  
                                                 
11 Environmental water holders can be public or private. Victoria is the only other state which has a dedicated 
statutory body to manage its environmental water, the Victorian Environmental Water Holder founded in 2010 
(O'Donnell 2012). The other states manage their water as part of other departments: South Australia’s 
Department of Environment and Water, Queensland’s Department of Natural Resources, Mines and Energy, and 
New South Wales’ Department of Planning, Industry and Environment. An example of a private environmental 
water holder is the Murray-Darling Basin Balanced Water Fund (Carr et al. 2016). 
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Figure 2.7 Purpose of Commonwealth environmental water management 
 
Source: CEWO (2019, p. 10) 
The CEWH is independent insofar as they are not subject to direction from Commonwealth 
ministers or departmental secretaries. The CEWO has no decision-making powers. However, 
ministers can still direct the CEWH to make Commonwealth environmental water available, 
or make legally binding operating rules in relation to how the CEWH deals with water 
allocations and entitlements (Parliament of Australia 2018). This arguably makes the CEWH 
less independent than other public environmental water holders which have better safeguards 
from political interference (O'Donnell 2013). 
At 31st December 2019, the CEWH holds 2,103.8GL of long-term annual average yield 
(LTAAY)12 of entitlements (DAWE 2020b), recovered mainly through RtB and initiatives 
under the Basin Plan (see section 2.2.5). 
 
2.2.5 The Basin Plan 2012 
As mandated by the Water Act, the MDBA engaged in a process of creating the Basin Plan 
which would determine the balance between environmental water use and sustainable human 
consumption via the ‘sustainable diversion limit’ (SDL), which is defined as the maximum 
amount of consumptive water extraction. This was to be determined by “the best available 
science” (Water Act, para 21(4)(b)). Every state is supposed to provide a water resource plan 
for every catchment by 2019, determining a local SDL and therefore the balance between 
water consumption and the environment. These water resource plans need to be approved by 
                                                 
12 The long-term annual average volume of water permitted to be taken for consumptive use under a water 
access entitlement. Currently all LTAAY figures are calculated using the long-term diversion limit equivalent 
factors, with these factors to be accredited in finalised state water resource plans (Cheesman and Wheeler 2012). 
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the MDBA. With all water resource plans approved, these new SDLs would ultimately 
replace the 1993/94 Cap (Kendall 2013). Figure 2.8 shows a timeline of Basin Plan 
implementation. 
Figure 2.8 Basin Plan implementation timeline; red lines indicate delayed or partly 
implemented activities 
 
Source: Grafton et al. (2020b, p. 5)  
However, the development and implementation phase of the Basin Plan was highly 
contentious almost from the outset. The MDBA gave strong weighting to the requirement of 
“best available science”, and quietly compiled models and simulations to inform a first draft 
of the plan. This was done largely in-house and in collaboration with experts, but without 
substantial engagement with, or information for, the community (Walker 2019). In 2010, the 
MDBA released the Guide to the proposed Basin Plan (MDBA 2011a), which stated that 
3,000-7,600GL of water would need to be recovered from consumptive use to achieve a 
sustainable balance with the environment. The document was viewed by irrigation 
communities with such a degree of hostility that copies of the Guide were publicly burned by 
farmers (Bowmer 2014; Quiggin 2012). Recovering these amounts of water was perceived as 
unattainable without major negative impacts for communities and the irrigation sector; and 
the Guide was seen as failing to balance social and environmental needs (Loch et al. 2014a). 
Another aspect of contention was the lack of community consultation while the Guide was 
being developed (Crase 2011). 
The public burning of the Guide and its hostile reception by stakeholders was described as a 
traumatic experience for the staff of the MDBA. It subsequently adopted the notion of a 
‘triple bottom line’, maximising environmental outcomes so long as they did not adversely 
impact economic and social outcomes. Many have described this as an essential paradigm 
shift within the MDBA, away from an ‘environment first’ to an in practice ‘irrigation first’ 
approach in setting the SDL (Walker 2019). The Basin Plan was ultimately passed into law in 
2012, mandating an SDL of 10,873GL/y, and requiring 3,200GL/y to be recovered for the 
environment by 1st July 2019. These 3,200GL/y consisted of an initial recovery target of 
2,750GL/y, with an additional 450GL/y to be achieved via supply infrastructure efficiency 
upgrades (Parliament of Australia 2012). 
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However, this recovery amount has not been achieved so far for a number of reasons. At the 
time of writing: 1) not all water resource plans have been completed and approved by the 
MDBA (MDBA 2019e), with NSW refusing to finalise the task in the on-going drought 
(Davies 2019a); 2) river flows may have decreased by 700GL/y (Williams and Grafton 2019) 
because return flows may have reduced, and previously underutilised existing water 
entitlements are fully used (Wheeler et al. 2014c); 3) groundwater extractions have increased, 
by around 400GL/y between 2012/13-2017/18 (MDBA 2019a); 4) increased interception and 
capture of flood or overland flow water with farm dams and levees in the nMDB (AAS 2019; 
Slattery et al. 2019); 5) incomplete or inadequate monitoring, compliance and water metering 
enabling unlawful extraction of water (Matthews 2017); 6) in the wake of the ‘Northern 
Basin Review’, environmental water to be recovered in the nMBD was reduced by 70GL/y 
(MDBA 2016b); and, finally, 7) the SDL adjustment mechanism, allowing states to reduce 
environmental water by 605GL/y if equivalent outcomes can be achieved through 
infrastructure (Grafton et al. 2020b). This ultimately reduced the overall amount of 
environmental water recovery to 2,075GL/y (Grafton 2019). 
 
2.2.5.1 Restoring the Balance in the MDB 
The initial volume of 3,200GL/y of environmental water recovery was also to be achieved by 
a mix of water entitlement buyback and infrastructure efficiency upgrades. Water bought 
back under the RtB was repurposed towards achieving the Basin Plan recovery targets. 
Although buybacks are more effective in recovering water and the preferred option by the 
vast majority of Australia’s water economists (Adamson and Loch 2018; Connor et al. 2013; 
Crase and O'Keefe 2009; Grafton 2010; Grafton and Wheeler 2018; Iftekhar et al. 2013; Lee 
and Ancev 2009; Loch et al. 2014b; Productivity Commission 2010; Quiggin 2012; Wittwer 
and Dixon 2013), emphasis increasingly shifted towards water recovery through 
infrastructure under the Basin Plan, in response to community pressure and preferences 
(Loch et al. 2014a). Figure 2.9 illustrates the shift in environmental water recovered by 
infrastructure or buyback over time. 
33 
 
Figure 2.9 Commonwealth environmental water recovery and expenditure 2007/8 - 
2017/18 
 
Source: Own Figure, adapted from Grafton and Wheeler (2018) 
The Commonwealth spent about AUD$6 billion of the initial funding to recover 1,931GL of 
LTAAY environmental water by 30th September 2017. Of this, AUD$0.72 was spent on RtB 
for every AUD$1 spent on infrastructure. RtB water cost an average of $2,026/ML, whereas 
infrastructure recovery was at least 2.5 times more expensive, at an average cost of 
$4,970/ML (Grafton and Wheeler 2018), and this relative difference is increasing. 
In the early days of the Guide and the Basin Plan, an additional argument was used against 
buybacks: stranded assets. A stranded asset is any component of the water delivery system 
(e.g. meter, off-take wheel, channel diversion box etc.) that reduces in value on the market as 
compared to its value on a balance sheet because it has become obsolete (or unused) before 
being fully depreciated by an IIO. The argument was as follows: if an irrigator in an irrigation 
trust sells all their water to buyback and then quits farming, the irrigation infrastructure 
connecting their farm is unused, because without water the paddock will not be used. When 
there is a permanent decrease in the demand for water delivery services the assets of IIO can 
become unused or underused (or stranded). Other irrigators in the trust subsequently have to 
shoulder a larger share of operation and maintenance costs as there are fewer people in the 
network. This is sometimes also called the ‘swiss cheese effect’ (Loch et al. 2014a). The 
conviction was that this stranded asset effect would not happen with irrigation infrastructure 
upgrades because they keep irrigators on the land, rather than them exiting the industry 
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However, Wheeler and Cheesman (2013) found that 94% of partial entitlement sellers in an 
irrigation district kept their water delivery rights, while 83% of irrigators who sold all their 
entitlements still kept their delivery rights. Stranded assets did not seem to be an issue early 
on because irrigators who chose not to terminate delivery rights did so because they expected 
to continue farming by buying either allocations or buying entitlements in the future. Another 
reason was the wish to ensure that their farm could be resold as an irrigation property. 
IIO areas now impose termination or exit fees to cover the ongoing costs associated with 
maintaining the delivery infrastructure and stranded assets. These are a charge imposed on 
entitlement trade and subsequent loss of a water access entitlement out of an irrigation district 
or area, typically ten times the annual total network access fees (ACCC 2016). 
Given its unpopularity, buyback was capped at a total volume of 1,500GL in 2015 
(Parliament of Australia 2015), with recovery efforts thereafter focussing strongly on 
infrastructure programs from 2013 onwards, and only ‘strategic’ closed tender purchases 
followed thereafter. Despite this, fifty-nine percent13 of the 2103.8GL of LTAAY of water 
entitlements recovered as of 31st December 2019 has been recovered through the RtB 
program, with the remainder through infrastructure upgrades (DAWE 2020b; Grafton and 
Wheeler 2018). 
 
2.2.5.2 The Sustainable Rural Water Use and Infrastructure Program, the sustainable 
diversion limit adjustment mechanism, and strategic purchases 
The infrastructure component of environmental water recovery under the Basin Plan— the 
Sustainable Rural Water Use Infrastructure Program (SRWUIP)— investing AUD$5.8 
billion, aims to recover water by increasing on-farm irrigation efficiency and the efficiency of 
off-farm infrastructure (Crase and O'Keefe 2009). This follows the view that leakage and 
seepage causes water loss, with this loss able to be recovered through more efficient 
infrastructure (Quiggin 2010). The government subsidises upgrades to on-farm irrigation 
infrastructure (e.g. furrow to drip irrigation) in return for 50% of the achieved water ‘savings’ 
(Grafton and Wheeler 2018). Part of SRWUIP is the ‘Environmental Work and Measures 
Feasibility program’, which aims to reduce the amount of water needing to be recovered by 
increasing the efficiency of environmental watering through additional infrastructure14 
(DAWE 2019b). As per 31st December 2019, 694.2GL have been recovered by the 
Commonwealth through infrastructure upgrades (DAWE 2020b; Grafton and Wheeler 2018). 
Water recovery through infrastructure upgrades faces a range of criticisms in the academic 
literature, boiling down to nine main arguments: 1) cost-effectiveness; 2) governance and 
transparency; 3) impacts on return flows; 4) rebound effects trough increased planting area; 
5) increased utilisation of water entitlements; 6) groundwater substitution; 7) equity; 8) flood 
plain harvesting; and 9) reduced resilience through substitution to permanent crops (Wheeler 
et al. 2020a). 
Many studies have demonstrated that water recovery through infrastructure is more expensive 
than buyback (Adamson and Loch 2018; Productivity Commission 2010; Wittwer and Dixon 
2013). One feature of this is the diminishing marginal return of water recovered through more 
efficiency when irrigation infrastructure is already quite efficient (Adamson and Loch 2018; 
                                                 
13 1231 GL of LTAAY recovered by RtB, divided by 2103.8GL LTAAY of entitlement holdings at 31st 
December 2019. 
14 For example, flow regulators, weirs and channels for environmental watering, and low-flow bypasses 
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Loch et al. 2014b). Transparency of programs has also been problematic, with some projects 
subject to corruption charges (Victorian Ombudsman 2011). 
The third argument centres around the fact that increased irrigation efficiency reduces return 
flows, as a higher percentage of the water applied on the field is used by crops (Grafton and 
Wheeler 2018; Perry et al. 2017). These return flows were previously available to the system 
in form of increased base flows, which are at their core free environmental flows (Williams 
and Grafton 2019). On a basin scale, water efficiency upgrades can in fact lead to increased 
water consumption through reduced return flows, changed crop mix and an increased area of 
agricultural plantings (Adamson and Loch 2018; Grafton et al. 2018; Loch and Adamson 
2015). The increase of planted area as a result of irrigation infrastructure subsidies is often 
referred to as the ‘rebound effect’ (Loch and Adamson 2015; Wheeler et al. 2020a). 
Wheeler et al. (2014c) found that irrigation infrastructure subsidies increase the utilisation of 
previous un- or underutilised water entitlements and contribute to a substitution of surface 
and groundwater. This is problematic given that surface and groundwater in the MDB is often 
interconnected (Quiggin 2010), but regulated and accounted for separately. Criticism also 
surrounds equity implications of irrigation infrastructure subsidies, as benefits are not evenly 
spread, but rather large corporate entities have a much higher probability of receiving 
irrigation subsidies than family farms (Wheeler et al. 2020a). Subsidising infrastructure in the 
nMDB often means new farm dams to increase flood plain harvesting, in effect diverting 
water which would have benefitted streams and rivers (Four Corners 2019; Slattery et al. 
2019). 
More efficient irrigation infrastructure typically requires the use of pumps, increasing 
electricity costs (Mushtaq et al. 2015), a key contributor to farmers’ psychological stress 
(Wheeler et al. 2018). Infrastructure subsidies also incentivise irrigators to switch to perennial 
production, which reduces flexibility to adapt to climate change or drought, as plant assets 
need to be kept alive to stave off catastrophic capital loss (Adamson and Loch 2018; 
Adamson et al. 2017). This will also lead to a hardening of water market demand, driving up 
allocation prices during drought (Adamson and Loch 2014; Loch and Adamson 2015). 
Prioritising water infrastructure programs over buybacks for water recovery can be seen as a 
short-term strategy to address political risk and the preferences of vested interests (Grafton 
and Williams 2019), but may ultimately cause substantial, long-term negative effects, 
particularly in prolonged drought scenarios and a drier and more variable climatic future 
driven by climate change. 
The 450GL of additional water in the Basin Plan, to be recovered by infrastructure 
efficiency, is part of the sustainable diversion limit adjustment mechanism laid out in the 
Water Act 2007. Relevant infrastructure includes a suite of efficiency, supply and constraint 
measures endorsed by the Murray-Darling Basin Ministerial Council in 2016, referred to as 
‘efficiency projects”. These are funded to the tune of AUD$1.775 billion by the 
Commonwealth for 10 years beginning in 2014/15 (DAWE 2019c). However, the timeframe 
for project completion has been extended from 2019 to 2024 (Adamson and Loch 2014). In 
2018, the Basin Plan Amendment (SDL Adjustment) Instrument 2017 allowed for a further 
adjustment of 605GL through so-called ‘supply measures’, which reduce evaporation from 
storages or enable more effective environmental watering through infrastructure, with the 
Commonwealth contributing an extra AUD$1.3 billion of funding. Including the adjustments 
made through the Northern Basin Review (where water recovery was reduced by 70GL), 
efficiency, and supply projects reduce the amount of water needed to be recovered for the 
environment from 3,200GL to 2,075GL by 2024 (DAWE 2019c; MDBA 2017c). 
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The Commonwealth uses not only buybacks and infrastructure investment to recover water, 
but from 2013 onwards relied on strategic purchases of water. The difference between a 
buyback under RtB and a strategic purchase is that buyback employs a competitive tender 
process, whereas strategic purchases are directly negotiated between the Commonwealth and 
the seller. Strategic purchases are claimed to be superior to buyback if the market is thin (e.g. 
a limited number of sellers), as is the case in northern NSW and southern QLD, and if there is 
concentration of market power, allowing market participants to manipulate prices (Reeson 
and Whitten 2015; Tisdell 2011). The Commonwealth uses strategic purchases in cases 
where a substantial volume of water needs to be recovered in a thin market, but also generally 
prefers strategic purchases over buybacks as they are seen to have less socio-economic 
impact and face less community resistance (DAWR 2018). By 16th December 2019, 
AUD$148,279,090 had been spent on ten strategic purchases between May 2016 to August 
2017 (DAWE 2019a), to recover an undisclosed amount of water. Strategic purchases are 
contentious for a number of reasons: they are seen to not demonstrate value for money, and to 
suffer from a lack of transparency, both about water volumes recovered and terms and 
conditions of the sale (Grafton 2019; Slattery and Campbell 2018a, 2018b, 2019, 2020). 
 
2.2.5.3 Basin Plan water trading rules 
As part of an ongoing effort to increase market efficiency and functionality, beginning with 
the NWI, the MDBA implemented new water market trading rules under the Basin Plan in 
2014 (MDBA 2019f). Although a number of water trading restrictions have already been 
removed since the Water Act, such as the Victorian ‘10% rule’ in 2009, others only fell with 
the introduction of the Basin Plan trading rules, for example the ‘4% rule’ which was 
removed in 2014 (DELWP 2020b). The new rules require mandatory price reporting for all 
allocation and entitlement trades in all states. They also mandate no barriers to surface water 
trade, except when trade is physically constrained, catchments lack connectivity, or where the 
environment may be harmed (MDBA 2019f). Examples of restrictions attributed to these 
conditions are the Barmah Choke constraint, the Goulburn-Murray intervalley trade 
restriction (IVT), and the Murrumbidgee IVT (DPI 2018; MDBA 2010c, 2019c). Similarly, 
IIOs must not unreasonably restrict water delivery rights trading, and communicate their 
trading rules and delivery rights conditions transparently under the Basin Plan trading rules. 
Water allocation and carry-over announcements need to be made available to stakeholders in 
a timely manner, while trading on classified information is forbidden (i.e. based on allocation 
announcements not yet publicly available). There is quantitative evidence that insider trading 
reduced following the implementation of this rule (de Bonviller et al. 2019). 
Exchange rates were commonly used in the early days of the water market to facilitate the 
conversion of entitlements between catchments and to calculate the corresponding impacts on 
the Cap (MDBA 2010a, 2010b). Over time, this practice was phased out and replaced by 
allocation trading or tagging. Irrigators can simply transfer allocations received on an 
entitlement between catchments, or ‘tag’ the extraction of an entitlement to a different 
catchment (MDBA 2010d). The Basin Plan trade rules restrict the use of exchange rates, 
while also making tagged allocation subject to all trading rules for normally traded allocation 
(i.e. IVTs), provided the tag was established on or after 10th October 2010 (MDBA 2019f). 
Despite the new trading rules, implementation challenges remain, because it is the states’ 
responsibility to implement and enforce the changes mandated by the Basin Plan trading 
rules. A recent review of price reporting by the MDBA found that mandatory price reporting 
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is not enforced in all states, contributing to poor data quality and a large number of trades 
misreported as AUD$0 (Deloitte 2019; MDBA 2019m). 
 
2.3 Recent developments 
With a substantial number of water resource plans not yet complete, and the timeline for 
environmental water recovery and the Basin Plan review extended to 2024, no major 
Commonwealth-state policy development has taken place since 2012. However, given a large 
number of reviews on various topics of water management in the last two to three years, a 
number of current issues have emerged, which are discussed in this section. 
 
2.3.1 ABC Four Corners, water theft and compliance 
In July 2017, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation’s flagship investigative journalism 
program, Four Corners, aired a report alleging water theft and non-compliance with the Basin 
Plan in the Barwon-Darling region of northern NSW (Four Corners 2017). The piece claimed 
water had been taken without a permit, in violation of a ‘no-pump’ embargo, meters had been 
tampered with, and that high-ranking officials of the NSW water regulating authority 
colluded with large irrigation interests, passing on confidential government information to 
them.  
The program received extensive nation-wide attention and dominated news headlines for 
weeks. While immediately sacking the officials incriminated by Four Corners (Begley 2017), 
the NSW government also commissioned a review, substantiating the allegations of 
compliance shortcoming and conflict of interest within the responsible NSW regulator, on the 
one hand tasked with monitoring compliance and on the other hand having an entrenched 
pro-irrigator organisational culture (Matthews 2017). As a consequence, the new Natural 
Resource Access Regulator was established and tasked with reviewing and enforcing 
compliance with water management rules in NSW (Parliament of NSW 2017). In addition, 
there were three compliance reports into water management tabled by the NSW Ombudsman 
between 2017 and 2018 (Carmody 2018). The claims of water theft have also been 
substantiated, with one of the irrigators in question fined around AUD$190,000 in penalties 
plus court costs (Water NSW v Barlow  2019; Water NSW v Harris (No 3)  2020). 
Outside NSW, the Four Corners episode led to the Commonwealth ‘Murray-Darling Basin 
Compliance Review’ (MDBA 2017b), which found significantly different levels of 
compliance monitoring and prosecution between the states. This finding was replicated by the 
South Australian Murray-Darling Basin Royal Commission (Walker 2019) described in the 
following section. 
 
2.3.2 The South Australian Murray-Darling Basin Royal Commission 
Established by the Weatherill government on 23rd January 2018, the South Australian 
Murray-Darling Basin Royal Commission under Commissioner Bret Walker SC examined, 
amongst other issues: 1) whether the water resource plans as defined by the Water Act and 
Basin Plan will be compliant and operative by 30th June 2019; 2) if the Basin Plan will be 
able to deliver the mandated 450GL of environmental water; 3) the impact of water theft and 
compliance on the 450GL; and 4) whether the Basin Plan takes climate change into account. 
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Hearing evidence from over 70 witnesses, including a number of Australia’s most eminent 
MDB researchers, and with the final report reaching an impressive size of 756 pages, the 
South Australian Murray-Darling Basin Royal Commission arguably represents the most 
comprehensive and detailed review of the Basin Plan and related issues. Remarking that the 
Basin Plan is an exceptionally poorly drafted and executed legal document, Commissioner 
Walker (2019) found that the SDL in the Basin Plan is not based on ‘the best available 
science’, is not prioritising environmental health as required by the Water Act, but is rather 
dictated by economic and political pressures, partly as a result of the MDBA’s experience 
with the burning of the Guide (see section 2.2.5). Witness evidence stated that the consensus 
of the MDBA staff at the time was that the ‘SDL had to be a number beginning with 2’ 
(Walker 2019, p. 216), indicating that environmental water recovery had to be below 
3,000GL. The Royal Commission completely rejects the MDBA’s interpretation of the Water 
Act that lead to the infamous “triple bottom line”: the Water Act mandates an SDL to be set in 
a way that gives priority to environmental outcomes, before balancing social and economic 
outcomes. As such, the Basin Plan is in violation of the Water Act. 
Walker (2019) also found that the 450GL of environmental water recovery through efficiency 
measures will not eventuate, dramatically expressed in evidence given by a former CEWH 
who stated that ‘(I) would put my house on it that there won’t be 450 gigalitres’ (Walker 
2019, p. 414).  
While the Commission refrained from making comments on the impact of water theft 
because it was the subject of ongoing criminal investigation at the time, it found the Basin 
Plan does not incorporate climate change in a satisfactory manner. While the MDBA argues 
that climate change is incorporated through the 10-year review process of the Basin Plan 
(MDBA 2019i), the Royal Commission regards this process as inadequate, determining that a 
focus on 110 years of climate averages and a 10-year review process do not constitute 
adaptive management and ’best available science’ (Walker 2019). 
South Australia experienced a change in government while the Royal Commission was in 
progress. The MDBA forbade its staff answering Commission summonses, arguing that a 
state royal commission cannot summon federal bureaucrats, referring the matter to the High 
Court. The new SA Liberal Government did not grant Commissioner Walker a requested 
extension to settle this matter, leading to a public stoush between the SA government and 
Walker. Another extension request in order to explore a massive fish kill event in the Darling 
River System at 15th December 2018 was also not granted (MacLennan 2019). Despite its 
comprehensive assessment, the South Australian Murray-Darling Basin Royal Commission 
has instigated little policy change, arguably due to the new South Australian Liberal 
Government not wanting to alienate the Federal and New South Wales Liberal Governments. 
 
2.3.3 Fish kills and the Menindee Lakes Water Saving Project controversy 
A series of four major fish kills in the Darling-Menindee Lakes System (NSW) took place 
between 15th December 2018 and 4th February 2019, leading to millions of dead fish, 
including native species like the iconic Murray Cod and/or Golden Perch (AAS 2019). Two 
competing reviews were commissioned to explore their cause; one commissioned by the 
Labour party and conducted by the Australian Academy of Sciences, and the second 
commissioned by the Liberal Commonwealth Government and conducted by a team led by 
Professor Rob Vertessy. 
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Both reports agree on the immediate cause of the fish kills: stratification and then mixing of 
oxygen-depleted bottom water with the smaller oxygenated surface layer. At that time hot 
temperatures and low- and no-flows conditions favoured the growth of large blue-green algae 
blooms and the separation of water layers. When the blooms died, the organic matter fed 
bottom layer microorganisms, which used all available oxygen. A subsequent drop in 
temperature then triggered mixing of the surface and bottom layers, lowering the water’s 
oxygen levels below the ability to support fish respiration (AAS 2019; Vertessy et al. 2019). 
A notable difference between the reports is their stance on the contribution of MDB water 
management. While Vertessy et al. (2019) attribute the events purely to the ongoing drought 
and weather conditions, the AAS (2019) directly links changes in the 2012 Barwon-Darling 
water sharing plan, allowing irrigators to extract more water at lower river flow levels, and 
the changed operation of the Menindee Lakes system as important factors contributing to the 
fish kills. The Lakes were drained in 2016-17 to trigger widespread Murray Cod and Golden 
Perch spawning, while there were no inflows from the Darling river. In 2017, the MDBA 
released large volumes of water from the Menindee Lakes to supply South Australia’s water 
requirement under the Murray-Darling Basin Agreement, further lowering lake levels. With 
ongoing drought severing river connectivity and lowering lake levels, large numbers of fish 
congregated in the remaining available water bodies. These water bodies were the sites of the 
fish kills (AAS 2019), and the high concentration of fish significantly contributed to the 
magnitude of the fish kill events. 
The Menindee Lakes Water Saving Project, part of NSW’s contribution to the SDL 
adjustment mechanism, aims to operate the lakes at lower storage levels to reduce surface 
evaporation, given the flat topography of the region (DPIE 2020). The local community 
believes implementation of the Menindee Lakes Water Saving Project will enable the lakes to 
be drained in two months rather than nine, leaving Menindee with only 80GL, jeopardising 
town water supply and enabling conditions (like the present ones) for fish kills to occur more 
often (AAS 2019). Significant contention also surrounds the Broken Hill Pipeline15 business 
case, which openly admitted the main benefactors of the pipeline were irrigators upstream of 
the Menindee Lakes (DPI 2016). While in the grip of the drought, communities consider that 
town drinking water supply, Indigenous, and environmental considerations take second place 
to powerful irrigation interests (Grafton 2020; Hannam 2019), supporting claims of 
widespread institutional capture of governments, the MDBA, and regulatory authorities by 
vested interests (Grafton and Williams 2019). 
 
2.3.4 The Independent Socio-economic Panel and the Water for Fodder Program 
To address contention about the economic impacts of water recovery, the “Independent Panel 
for the Assessment of Social and Economic Conditions in the Murray–Darling Basin”, 
chaired by Robbie Sefton, was established in June 2019. Its terms of reference include: 1) 
reviewal of economic conditions in rural and regional communities across the MDB; 2) 
assessing (positive and negative) impacts of water reforms on the vulnerability, resilience and 
adaptive capacity of MDB, including the impacts of environmental water reforms; 3) 
investigating structural changes in the MDB, separating the effects of drought and structural 
changes from the effects of water reform; 4) supporting longer-term efforts to monitor and 
                                                 
15 The Broken Hill pipeline supplies the town with water from the 270 km away Murray River at Wentworth, 
instead of from the 100 km away Menindee Lakes (DPI 2016). This is essential for the Menindee Lakes Water 
Saving Project to be viable, as the needs to provide reliable water supply to Broken Hill would make operation 
of the lakes below a certain level impossible.  
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understand social-economic conditions and the impacts of water reform; and 5) exploring a 
range of options that stimulate, support and promote healthy and sustainable rural and 
regional communities in the MDB (MDB Socio-economic Panel 2020). The Panel submitted 
a draft report on 16th March 2020 and is expected to deliver its final report by 30th April 
2020. The draft report made 20 draft recommendations (see Table 2.3), grouped in five broad 
areas: 1) better community involvement and consultation; 2) meeting the needs of First 
Nations; 3) implementing water reforms with greater care to minimise potential negative 
externalities; 4) supporting communities’ adaptive capacity to change; and 5) addressing 











• Find better and more effective ways to engage with rural and regional communities, empowering 
communities, keeping government accountable, and making the case for reform (Draft 
recommendation 1). 
• Provide greater clarity and certainty around long term policy, drive greater accountability and 
improved delivery of outcomes, building trust and ensure more people share the benefits of water 
reforms (Draft recommendation 1) 
• Ensure local leadership capacity and government are part of the solution, tailoring policies to 
community needs (Draft recommendation 1) 
• Governments should invest in the ongoing development of effective water markets and improving 
the water literacy of market participants. (Draft recommendation 1) 
• Extend the MDB Economic Development Program beyond 2023 until 2030, and increase its 
scale. This extension will empower communities to make longer term investments in their future 
(Draft recommendation 3) 
• Recognise that the benefits of water reforms have been uneven, and ensure future dividends are 
shared more evenly. The future investment in the MDB Economic Development Program should 
be refocused into vulnerable and disadvantaged communities most negatively impacted by Basin 
water reforms (Draft recommendation 4) 
• Allow flexibility for the socioeconomic neutrality test to be supplemented, empowering 
communities to move to a less water dependent future. (Draft recommendation 5) 
First Nations • Increase First Nations communities’ access to water for cultural and economic purposes (Draft 
recommendation 9). 
• Fund First Nations groups to work with experts in valuing ecosystem services at culturally 
significant sites (Draft recommendation 10). 




• Time further water recovery to match the capacity to deliver water to where it is needed. This 
approach means slowing further recovery in the Basin, and accelerating delivery constraints 
relaxation (Draft recommendation 2). 
• Address deliverability constraints as a priority, reflecting community concerns (Draft 
recommendation 6). 
• Fund efforts to monitor and evaluate environmental benefits, and research to improve the 
efficiency and effectiveness of environmental watering (Draft recommendation 14). 
• Increase research and innovation funding, focusing on farm system diversification and translating 
into on-ground application (Draft recommendation 15). 
• Make transparent the future obligations of government, water users and utilities to provide and 
maintain water infrastructure (Draft recommendation 18). 
Adaptive 
capacity 
• Improve water security planning and investment for towns and cities (Draft recommendation 7). 
• Develop regional pilot programs for alternative urban water supply sources (Draft 
recommendation 8) 
• Agree on a framework to develop better indicators of community wellbeing (Draft 
recommendation 12). 
• Fund a program for First Nations groups to build a baseline, tracking social and economic 
conditions and outcomes of water reform (Draft recommendation 13). 
• Create a baseline to track environmental and community socio-economic outcomes from water 
reform (Draft recommendation 14). 





• Address gaps in service and infrastructure provision for outer regional and remote MDB (Draft 
recommendation 16). 
• Attract and retain frontline service providers, specialising in household distress, mental health 
issues, and financial hardship (Draft recommendation 19). 
• Work with communities with acute social and economic issues, developing action and outcome 
plans that address these issues. Plans should build on any existing plans and be driven by local 
communities (Draft recommendation 20) 




To aid livestock irrigators, the Commonwealth also implemented the Water for Fodder 
program in 2019/2020: an agreement to use the Adelaide desalination plant to produce an 
extra 100GL of water for SA water consumption in exchange for Commonwealth funds 
(DAWE 2020a). In turn, 100GL of Murray water (40GL in 2019/20 and 60GL in 2020/21) 
from the SA state entitlement will be made available to irrigators, in blocks of 50ML for 
AUD$5,000 per water allocation account, to produce fodder at a discounted price of 
AUD$100/ML (DAWE 2019d). At the time of writing, of the 40,000 ML available in round 
1, 14,250 ML were delivered to irrigators in NSW, 25,100 ML to irrigators in VIC, and 650 
ML to irrigators in SA (DAWE 2020c). This program has been widely criticised, including its 
third-party impacts and high cost of AUD$82.6-100 million, and indeed, the current 
announcement of carryover allowed within the program (Miller 2020) has potentially 
signalled its lack of usefulness and waste of money as a policy (Crase 2019; DAWE 2020a). 
 
2.3.5 The Interim Inspector-General of Murray–Darling Basin Water Resources 
On 1st October 2019, the Commonwealth created a new role, the Interim Inspector-General of 
Murray-Darling Basin Water Resources, appointing Mick Keelty, a former Australian Federal 
Police commissioner, who previously served as the Northern Basin commissioner 
(IIGMDBWR 2020). His role is to support the implementation of the Basin Plan by engaging 
stakeholders on critical issues and undertaking an inquiry into the management of Murray–
Darling Basin water resources. Mr Keetly’s terms of reference for investigation changed as a 
direct consequence of a protest convoy of approximately 1,000 irrigators, mainly from NSW, 
to Canberra on 3rd December 2019 (Sullivan and Jasper 2019). His current terms of reference 
include assessing whether the water sharing arrangements between the basin states, namely 
the Murray-Darling Basin Agreement, are still appropriate, with a report due soon. 
While at face value water sharing arrangements are worthwhile to question, answers and 
insights that may be provided by Mr Keelty are arguably inconsequential for future water 
policy. Contention between states, and Basin communities, about transboundary water 
sharing dates back to pre-federation times (see section 2.2.1). A reformulation of the Murray-
Darling Basin Agreement is only possible if agreed-on by all states, which is highly unlikely. 
NSW’s interest, and indeed that of the aforementioned protestors, would be a renegotiation 
towards better terms and more water for NSW. SA has zero interest in revisiting water-
sharing to its detriment, given a) its historic experiences (Guest 2016); b) its already 
precarious situation at the end of the river; and c) concerns about further deterioration in the 
environmental health of the Coorong and Lower Lakes system. Likewise, Victoria, 
experiencing environmental damage from over-extraction and high water delivery 
requirements, would be unlikely to give up water, nor agree to changing the 50:50 split with 
NSW in order to provide SA’s entitlement under the Murray-Darling Basin Agreement and 
towards a more favourable split for NSW. Finally, that Queensland is not inclined to extract 
less water for NSW’s sake is reflected by the latest conflict over overland flow harvesting in 
southern Queensland (Gooch et al. 2020). 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a comprehensive overview of MDB water resources, physical 
characteristics, historic, and current water policy reform. Importantly, the reform processes 
and initiatives presented in this chapter have enabled, shaped and still dictate current MDB 
water market systems, which are described in more detail in the next chapter. This chapter 
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has illustrated that conflict over water sharing has been a dominant feature of MDB water 
reform. States’ self-interest and powerful irrigation interests have shaped environmental 
water recovery volumes and preferences, resource expenditure and allocation, and tilted the 
balance of power to an ‘irrigation first’ paradigm. Despite this, significant effort has been 
undertaken to address over-allocation in the Basin through a variety of infrastructure and 
market-led solutions, notably the Commonwealth buyback of water entitlements through the 
RtB program. Given current policy developments, and the continuous attempts of certain 
groups to calculate away environmental water recovery volumes required under the Basin 
Plan, there is real danger of a backsliding towards yet higher consumptive extraction and 
reduced environmental sustainability. The current drought has emphasised distributional 
issues in water sharing, both between consumption and environment, and town water supply 
and irrigation. Adapted to emerging challenges, the MDB water market system presented in 
the next chapter can provide solutions and avenues to allocate ever-scarcer water resources. 
However, the challenges of equity and distributional fairness are firmly in the realm of strong 









Chapter 3 The MDB water market 
This chapter introduces and describes the MDB water market system, with a special focus on 
the sMDB water markets. 
 
3.1 The economics of water and market-based allocation 
Water allocation is a classic common-pool resource problem in the spirit of Hardin (1968): 
access to water is non-exclusive, in the sense that one cannot easily be hindered from 
extracting water from a river or groundwater aquifer. It is also rival in its use: if too much of 
the resource is extracted/used, its availability and or quality is diminished for all water users. 
This leads to over-extraction of the resource, as water users aim to maximise private benefit, 
and will likely generate negative externalities for all other users (Ostrom 2008). Reducing the 
externalities from over-extraction may come with the trade-off of limiting resource access for 
all, or for one user group. Both water access (e.g. in form of infrastructure) and externalities 
(e.g. lower water quality) can be costly. Water economics aims to measure and effectively 
manage trade-offs and costs associated with competing water uses across time and different 
locations. In this context, effective management aims to meet societal water use objectives by 
facilitating water allocation to higher value uses, while simultaneously maintaining basic 
water needs (Grafton et al. 2014b). Applying economic instruments to water management 
therefore contributes to addressing key global water challenges: water scarcity and over-
extraction of resources, deteriorating water quality, and conflict over allocation between 
competing water uses. By identifying and quantifying trade-offs and costs associated with 
water management and allocation, economic analysis plays an important role in improving 
water decision-making (Grafton and Wheeler 2015). 
However, water has several unique characteristics, setting it apart from other common-pool 
resources. Water can be a private good (e.g. potable household water), and a public one (e.g. 
environmental water), corresponding to the specific type of water use (Hanemann 2006). 
Private good water use is subject to competing and excludable use. Public good water use has 
elements of being non-rival and non-exclusive: one individual’s water consumption does not 
limit others’ consumption and excluding individuals from using water is excessively 
expensive or impossible (Grafton and Wheeler 2015; Griffin 2016). Public good 
characteristics make water value assessment more complex and may lead to free-riding 
behaviour (Grafton et al. 2020a; Grafton and Wheeler 2015). Although water can be stored 
and transported, this involves infrastructure that typically requires large capital expenditures. 
Together with economies of scale inherent in water infrastructure, this may result in 
monopolies and socially inefficient water allocation (Dinar et al. 1997). With free-riders often 
difficult to identify, and political pressures to keep water prices low, water tariffs charged to 
water users typically do not recover the costs of provision (Grafton et al. 2020a). 
Consequently, under-investment in water infrastructure, over-allocation of water resources 
and corresponding negative externalities are common. To encapsulate the value of water’s 
public good components, non-market valuation techniques are often used (Hanemann 2006). 
In particular, water resources are characterised by an inherent set of diverse public good 
values, such as recreational, environmental, cultural, social and ecosystem services. These 
tend to go unnoticed by private water market participants, who maximise private rather than 
societal benefits (Howe 1999). The concept of total economic value has often been employed 
to highlight the diversity of values attached to water. This comprises direct values, for 
example benefits from consumption and use of water and indirect values, for example non-
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use values, such as bequest values (Bark et al. 2011; Grafton and Wheeler 2015). The 
existence of these characteristics means there is therefore a need for government 
involvement, in the form of regulation, the creation of water management institutions and by 
minimising transaction costs (Easter et al. 1999). 
The previous chapter described the climatic variability and water scarcity physically inherent 
in the MDB. Combined with irrigation development and historic water management policies, 
this has led to over-allocation, environmental degradation and water quality deterioration of 
MDB water resources. Water policy from 1994 onwards (see section 2.2.2) attempted to 
address this increasingly introducing a suite of water demand management strategies, with 
water markets one of these most important economic instruments (Grafton et al. 2016). 
Water markets provide a flexible, efficient and voluntary allocation of a scarce resource 
(Howe et al. 1986; Randall 1981), and are able to provide an efficient allocation of common 
pool resources, as long as property rights are well defined and transaction costs are low 
(Coase 1960; Ruml 2005). Consequently, water markets have been proposed and advocated 
widely for many decades (Gardner and Fullerton 1968; Howe 1999). Indeed, a substantial 
number of scientific studies point towards material public gains stemming from the 
reallocation of water resources through markets (e.g. (Easter et al. 1999; Knapp et al. 2003; 
Vaux and Howitt 1984). Water markets use the price mechanism to allocate water to its 
highest value use. Optimal allocation therefore requires the assessment of water value for all 
types of competing uses, including environmental and non-consumptive uses (Grafton and 
Wheeler 2015).  
Water markets can be formal or informal, but typically involve water users in the same region 
or catchment sharing the same water source. Informal water markets generally sit outside 
publicly regulated institutions, operate directly between private parties, and can take many 
different forms: the trade of water between neighbouring farmers, small private enterprises 
drilling for groundwater and on-selling to capital-poor farmers, or private water vendors of 
potable water from trucks when municipal water infrastructure is inadequate or incomplete 
(Bjornlund 2004; Kariuki and Schwartz ; Mukherji 2008; Stoler 2017; Venkatachalam 2015). 
Formal water markets are less common; they allow the legal transfer of water rights on a 
perpetual basis, require complex institutions and a greater degree of administration 
(Bjornlund 2004). One key prerequisite for well-functioning formal water markets are 
enforceable, transferrable and well-defined water use rights (Wheeler et al. 2017b). 
Consequently, transboundary water markets are less common, mainly due to the complexity 
of defining and enforcing rights across borders. 
In comparison to other water allocation systems16, water markets have a number of key 
advantages: they: 1) involve only willing sellers and buyers; 2) allow for flexible and swift 
reallocation in response to demographic, economic, climatic and social-value changes; 3) 
provide security of tenure through property rights; 4) confront water users with the real 
opportunity cost of water through values and prices; and 5) allow for policies and measures to 
reduce and limit transaction costs (Howe 1999). 
Typically, water markets and other water allocation regimes aim to be economically efficient 
(wealth creation through resource use) while maintaining social equity principles, which take 
account of wealth distribution across individuals and sectors (Dinar et al. 1997). To guarantee 
optimal resource allocation, water allocation systems, including water markets, can be 
evaluated in relation to flexibility, security, opportunity cost, predictability, equity, and 
                                                 
16 Such as marginal cost pricing, administrative water allocation and user-based allocation [e.g. water user 
groups, irrigation trusts] (Dinar et al. 1997). 
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political and public acceptance (Howe et al. 1986), but also administrative sustainability and 
efficacy (Winpenny 2005). Key assessment criteria, specifically tailored to water markets are: 
1) the shape and strength of water property rights and institutions; 2) knowledge and 
incorporation of hydrological and climatic realities into the market and trading system; 3) 
strong governance arrangements in regards to monitoring, enforcement and externalities; 4) 
efficient and sustainable water trade; and 5) transparent and accurate market information 
systems (Wheeler et al. 2017b). 
While water markets are in principle not limited to a particular sector or user group, most 
water market systems and their participants are in (irrigated) agriculture. This is evident in 
agriculture’s high use of available water resources (up to 70% in some countries) (Wheeler et 
al. 2014a). Although formal water markets can be slow to develop, often due to political 
circumstances or the complexities of water use [e.g. return flows or hydropower] (Vaux and 
Howitt 1984; Young 1986), water markets now exist in many countries around the world, 
such as Spain, India, Chile and the United States, albeit with different levels of sophistication 
and development (Grafton et al. 2011; O'Donnell and Garrick 2019; Palomo-Hierro et al. 
2015). The water market of the sMDB is internationally regarded as the most advanced 
(Grafton et al. 2011), with its current and emerging circumstances often foreshadowing future 
developments in other water markets. 
There are three broad types of water trading: 1) short-term transfers of already allocated 
water that is available for immediate use (e.g. allocation trade); 2) medium-term leasing of 
water allocations that enables secure water access for a period of time as specified via a 
contract (e.g. water leasing); and 3) permanent transfers of the on-going property right to a 
proportion or fixed quantity of the available water at a given source (i.e. water entitlement 
trading). These can exist for surface and groundwater (Wheeler and Garrick 2020). 
 
3.2 MDB water trading development over time 
Although water trading happens all across Australia (see Figure 3.1), the most active and 
advanced water markets are situated in the MDB, which accounted for 97% of allocation 
trade and 77% of entitlement trade in 2016/17 (Goesch et al. 2019). 
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Figure 3.1 Australian water systems with water allocation trade activity in 2015–16 
 
Source: ABARES (2019a) 
Informal water trading has existed in the MDB since the 1960s (Connell 2007), with formal 
water trading introduced in the 1980s (Wheeler et al. 2014a). Successive policy reforms (see 
section 2.2) have fostered water market development by facilitating interstate trading, 
reducing barriers to trade and building stakeholder confidence through overarching water 
market trading rules (Grafton et al. 2016). Irrigator participation in water allocation and 
entitlement trading has increased over time. Although water markets have been in operation 
for almost 20 years, less than 10 per cent of irrigators had conducted a water market trade by 
2000 (Wheeler 2014). Water market participation strongly increased during the Millennium 
Drought, particularly in trading of allocations as irrigators employed allocation trading as a 
risk management and drought adaptation tool (Kirby et al. 2014a). Increased scarcity drove 
participation, which was enabled by water policy reform bringing about water market 
liberalisation (e.g. the NWI and the Water Act), and increased government involvement 
buying water entitlements as a result of the RtB program [see section 3.5.2 for more detail] 
(Loch et al. 2012). Participation continued to grow even after the drought broke, signifying 
that water trading is now an established and actively used management tool for irrigators. 
Figure 3.2 tracks the percentage of irrigators that have conducted at least one water market 
trade over time. The columns represent the volume of trade within the market. 
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Figure 3.2 Adoption (and trade volumes) of temporary and permanent markets in the 
sMDB over time 
 
Source: Wheeler and Garrick (2020, p. 140) 
 
Today’s MDB water markets are worth around AUD$2 billion annually (MDBA 2019l), with 
the majority of trades, both in allocations and entitlements, involving surface water trades in 
the sMDB. Commercial allocation and entitlement trade values for 2018-19 in the MDB were 
estimated at AUD$566 million and AUD$699 million respectively (Wakerman Powell et al. 
2019).  
 
3.3 Trading products 
There are two main parallel water markets in the MDB, trading two main products: 1) the 
market for permanent water (access) entitlements; and 2) the market for seasonal allocations. 
Additionally, there is a range of other water market products traded, such as delivery shares 
(right to deliver water in an irrigation system (Crase et al. 2015)), parking (right to use carry-
over space owned by a different entitlement holder), water leases, water forwards and water 
options. These are described in more detail later in this section. Under the COAG reforms 
(see section 2.2.2) water allocations and entitlements are defined as (COAG 2004a, p. 30): 
Water (access) entitlement: a perpetual or ongoing right to exclusive access to a share of 
water from a specified consumptive pool as defined in the relevant water plan. 
Water allocation: the specific volume of water allocated to the water entitlement in a given 
season, defined according to rules established in the relevant water plan. 
Although the Water Act and other reforms were intended to standardise inter-state water 
trading and trading products, there is still considerable difference between the states; a 
consequence of the history of state-based growth of water management systems (see section 
2.2). For example, there are more than 150 different entitlements traded in the MDB (MDBA 
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2019l). Table 3.1 illustrates the main entitlement and allocation products, their naming 
conventions and the cap factors across different states. 














































VIC Water allocation Water share High 
reliability 
(95-95%) 
n/a Low reliability (24-
49%) 
* Unsupplemented entitlements are over-land flow harvest licences. They allow for harvesting full licence 
amounts during floods, leading to a cap factor of 100%. However, outside flood conditions, these licences yield 
no water. 
Source: Adapted from BOM (2020a) and Cheesman and Wheeler (2012) 
To avoid confusion and ambiguity, this thesis refers to the perpetual right to access a share of 
water from a consumptive pool as a “water entitlement”, and to the volume allocated to a 
specific entitlement in a given season as a “water allocation”. 
Water entitlements can be regulated or unregulated, supplementary, supplemented or 
unsupplemented. They also come in three general securities (also called reliability), high, 
general, and low security, indicating how often a specific entitlement receives a full 
allocation. For example, a high security entitlement receives a full allocation 90-95 out of 
every 100 years (Zuo et al. 2016). Regulated entitlement refers to regulated river systems, 
with major dams and water delivery infrastructure in place, as is predominantly the case in 
the sMDB (Wheeler et al. 2014a). The nMDB has a much higher volume of unregulated 
entitlements, meaning they are not part of a catchment or river system with major water 
infrastructure. Supplementary entitlements allow water extraction only in the case that the 
government (or regulator) has announced a supplementary event— a flood event (DPIE 
2019). This is not to be confused with supplemented and unsupplemented entitlements, which 
refer to whether extraction from a water system is supplemented by water releases from 
upstream water storages (Hargraves et al. 2013). 
Water allocation trade is significantly larger, both in volume and number of trades, than 
entitlement trade in the MDB (see Figure 3.3). Furthermore, the majority of trading activity is 
in surface water, with ground water trading more limited. 
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Figure 3.3 MDB annual allocation and entitlement trade: number and volumes 2007/08-
2018/19 
 
Source: Own figure, data sourced from BOM (2020g) 
Delivery shares in Irrigation Infrastructure Operator (IIO) systems (e.g. irrigation trusts) are 
also traded, but MDB-wide trade numbers are not available. The terms and conditions of 
these delivery shares varies widely between different IIOs: for example, one delivery share in 
the Murrumbidgee Irrigation District guarantees the delivery of 1.2 ML and it can be traded 
annually (MI 2015). By contrast, one delivery share in the Goulburn-Murray Irrigation 
District (GMID) guarantees the delivery of 270 ML17 and is transferred in perpetuity (GMW 
2018). These differences have a strong impact on the price and trading activity of the 
particular delivery share: Murrumbidgee delivery shares are traded quite regularly with the 
buyer paying a price, whereas Goulburn delivery shares are traded infrequently and the seller 
pays the buyer to take on the delivery share (around AUD$10,000 per share), due to the 
extremely high administration and termination fees incurred (Seidl et al. 2020b). 
In recent years, new water trading products have emerged in the sMDB, such as water 
forward and options contracts (Bayer and Loch 2017), water leases and parking (ABARES 
2018; Brennan 2008; Wheeler et al. 2013a), often driven by new types of water market 
participants (see section 3.7). These products follow ideas and concepts commonly observed 
in financial and derivative markets; this thesis therefore refers to them as “derivative-type 
temporary” water products. Table 3.2 provides an overview of derivative-type temporary 
products. 
                                                 



















Number of trades ML traded
MDB allocation trades (ML) MDB entitlement trades (ML)
MDB allocation trades (no) MDB entitlement trades (no)
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Table 3.2 Derivative-type temporary water market products and data visibility 
Water product Definition Identifiable in water 
registers 
Water forwards A contractual arrangement whereby the seller 
guarantees to deliver a defined volume of allocation, 
for a predetermined price, at a predetermined point 
future time to the buyer. The buyer guarantees to 
honour the contract. 
Indistinguishable 
from allocation trades 
Water leases A contractual arrangement whereby the lease taker 
(lessee) receives all allocation attributed to a leased 
water entitlement. The entitlement remains the 
property of the lease giver (lessor). 
Some visibility in 
NSW register data as 
“Temporary 
Transfers” 
Water options A contractual arrangement whereby the buyer has the 
option, but not obligation, to deliver/have delivered a 
defined volume of allocation, for a predetermined 
price, at a predetermined point in time the future to/by 
the seller. 
Indistinguishable 
from allocation trades 
Water parking A contractual arrangement permitting the buyer to 
store their water allocation on the carry-over of the 
seller, usually from one water accounting period to the 
next. 
Indistinguishable 
from allocation trades 
Source: Own figure, adapted from ABARES (2018) and H2OX (2019b) 
Derivative-type products are usually indistinguishable from allocation trades in water register 
data (ABARES 2018; Seidl et al. 2020b). There is limited potential to identify lease trades in 
the NSW water register, reported as “temporary transfers”, but actual reported trade numbers 
are very low, pointing towards trades either not being registered as leases, or errors in water 
register data entry. Consequently, price discovery and assessing traded volumes of these 
products is at best very challenging. Some consultancies have claimed that clusters of 
allocation trades significantly deviating from the median/mean market price are probably 
forward contracts (Baker et al. 2017) but, without contractual data, that claim cannot be 
verified. 
 
3.4 Trading zones and restrictions 
There are a number of hydrologically connected catchments in the MDB allowing for inter-
region and inter-state water trading. Water trade is structurally administered within and 
between trading zones, which represent hydrological catchment areas. Each water resource 
plan18 under the Basin Plan typically represents one trading zone, although in the nMDB, 
water resource plans may include multiple zones. Figure 3.4 shows a map of the main trading 
regions in the MDB. 
                                                 
18 Water resource plans is the general term since the Basin Plan. NSW and pre-Basin Plan legislation refers to 
them as water sharing plans. 
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Figure 3.4 Water trading regions in the MDB 
 
Source: MDBA (2017d) 
Water trading between catchments is possible within the nMDB and sMDB themselves, 
however, trading between nMDB and sMDB is not, because the two areas are hydrologically 
not connected (apart from very high flood years). Schedule D of the Murray-Darling Basin 
Agreement outlines permissible transfer between different catchments and trading zones 
(MDBA 2010c). A table of permissible transfers can be found in the appendix (Table A.1). 
Water trade also occurs between irrigators within the same IIO, although these trades are 
subject to the IIO’s trading rules and may therefore be subject to very different conditions 
than trades between participants outside IIOs. Figure 3.5 shows the location of IIOs in the 
MDB, while Table 3.3 provides an overview over the main IIOs’ water holdings and their 
corresponding trading zones. 
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Figure 3.5 Infrastructure operators in the MDB 
 
Source: ACCC (2017, p. 14)
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Table 3.3 Important IIOs, their entitlement ownership and serviced trading zones 
State IIO  River valley Trading zones Volume of water 
entitlements owned 
(ML) in 2017/18 





Murrumbidgee Zone 13 504,820 
Coleambally Irrigation 
Corporation Ltd 
Murrumbidgee Zone 13 849,099 
Jemalong Irrigation 
Limited 












Zone 1A, Zone 
1B, Zone 2, Zone 
2a, Zone 2b, 
Zone 3, Zone 4a, 
Zone 4c Zone 5a, 
Zone 5b Zone 6, 
Zone 6b, Zone 7 
1,389,157 (based on 
2015-16) 
Lower Murray Water VIC Murray, 
Goulburn 
Zone 1A, Zone 7 129,160 
SA Central Irrigation Trust SA Murray Zone 12 109,995 
Renmark Irrigation 
Trust 
SA Murray Zone 12 37,039 
Source: Own Figure, adapted from (ACCC 2019b) and (ACCC 2017) 
 
3.4.1 The northern Basin 
The nMDB encompasses the Macquarie, Namoi, Gwydir, Border Rivers, Condamine-
Balonne, Warrego, intersecting streams and the Barwon-Darling regions of northern NSW 
and southern QLD. Although water trades take place in the region (see Figure A.1 for a map 
of trading zones), it is characterised by rather thin water markets and low numbers of trades. 
Figure 3.6 shows nMDB allocation and entitlement trades over time. 
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Figure 3.6 Allocation and entitlement trades in the nMDB 
 
Source: Own Figure, data sourced from BOM (2020g)  
Thin markets are characterised by relatively few market participants and low number of 
trades or transactions (Tisdell 2011). In the nMDB, Wheeler and Garrick (2020) outline why 
markets are thin because of the following:  
1) limited hydrological connectivity between catchments and a high number of 
unregulated entitlements— 32% of entitlements on issue and limited storage capacity 
in the North.  
2) Lower number of IIOs compared to the sMDB, making water a less valuable 
commodity.  
3) Fewer, but larger, irrigators, reducing potential gains from trade between users.  
4) Greater reliance on ground water and on-farm storage, including for floodplain 
harvesting, which limits incentives to trade.  
5) Less water extraction measuring and monitoring, combined with weaker accounting 
systems and less regulation, leads to insecurity about water rights protection. These 
factors provide less incentive to trade. And  
6) Fewer heterogeneous water users in the nMDB, limiting flexibility of agricultural 
production and associated water trade between industries. 
Cotton is by far the most dominant crop in the nMDB (see Figure 3.7), generally planted on 
large farms by corporatized agri-businesses. These actors have the financial means to 
construct on-farm infrastructure for floodplain harvesting to minimise the need to trade. They 
often own enough water in a given reach to exert market power or even monopolistic 
behaviour, disincentivising water trade for other actors (Sheldon 2019). Without mandatory 
price reporting, water trading data are fragmented and incomplete, with particular issues 
surrounding combined water and land transactions in the Queensland water register (Deloitte 
2019; MDBA 2019m). The lack of trading data contributes to price insecurity, further 
disincentivising water trading. However, where institutional conditions are not in place to 
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govern trade properly, it is best in many situations that trade is limited (Wheeler and Garrick 
2020; Wheeler et al. 2017b)  
Figure 3.7 Water volumes applied by various irrigation activities in the nMDB 
 
Source: Wheeler and Garrick (2020, p. 147) 
As discussed in the previous chapter (see sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.3), water institutions and 
compliance are weak in the nMDB (Matthews 2017; MDBA 2017b). NSW and QLD have 
also been uncapable of, or unwilling to, meaningfully regulate overland flow licences 
(Walker 2019), contributing to the delay of water resource plans and to over-extraction of 
nMDB water resources (Wheeler and Garrick 2020). With alleged favouritism (DPI 2016) 
and rent-seeking behaviour by the irrigation lobby [i.e. cotton] (Grafton and Williams 2019), 
water market development in the nMDB has been slower due to insecurity about water rights, 
weak institutions and poor water extraction limit enforcement (Wheeler and Garrick 2020). 
Given its thin markets and concentration of market power, the region has also been the 
primary focus of strategic purchases under the Basin Plan, with eight of ten strategic 
purchases in the nMDB (DAWE 2019a). 
 
3.4.2 The southern interconnected MDB 
In contrast, the sMDB has the most active water markets in Australia (Grafton and Horne 
2014b), and the most sophisticated water markets in the world (Grafton et al. 2011). 
Agricultural production is very diverse (see Figure 3.8), including major annual and perennial 
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cropping systems, with many different stakeholders, providing one of the prerequisites for 
gains from water trading (Wheeler et al. 2017b). 
Figure 3.8 Water volumes applied by irrigation industry in the sMDB 
 
Source: Wheeler and Garrick (2020, p. 146) 
The presence of major infrastructure and storages, combined with a number of important 
irrigation districts (see Figure 3.5), makes water a valuable commodity. Storages enable 
higher security entitlements, because they smooth out the seasonal variability of rainfall, and 
infrastructure allows for more efficient water management and delivery, making entitlements 
in regulated systems superior to those in unregulated systems. The different amounts of 
entitlements on issue across catchments (see Figure 3.9) and their multiple storages, 
contribute to supply of water market products from different sources, and increases trade 
options. The regions with a long history of major irrigated production are also the ones where 
states issued the most entitlements. It is therefore not surprising that these same regions are 
the most active water trading zones, given both diversity and volume of water entitlements, 
and concentration of agriculture (Bjornlund 2004; Connor et al. 2013; Wheeler et al. 2008b; 
Wheeler et al. 2014a).  
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Figure 3.9 Entitlements on issue in the sMDB in 2018/19 
 
Source: Own figure, data from BOM (2020g) 
Dam infrastructure also allows water to be carried-over from one season to the next, 
extending the live-span of water allocations (beyond a single season) and enabling inter-
seasonal trades. With water unbundling highly advanced and river systems highly 
interconnected (see Figure A.2 for a map of inter-connected trading zones and Table A.1 for 
permissible trades), water is highly fungible, further increasing trade opportunities. Advanced 
water regulation facilitating water trading, the NWI reforms and the Water Act for example, 
and readily available water trading information through water registers, has led to enough 
trust in water entitlements for banks to accept them as collateral for loans, making water 
entitlements an important part of irrigators’ asset bases (Waterfind 2019a). Finally, diverse 
water sources and water users, good pricing data availability and robust water regulation and 
institutions were also necessary for new derivative-type temporary water trading products to 
emerge, further increasing trading possibilities in the sMDB (Grafton et al. 2011; Loch et al. 
2018; Wheeler and Garrick 2020; Wheeler et al. 2017b; Young and McColl 2009). 
These characteristics combined translate into very high levels of water trading activity in the 
sMDB, representing over 80% of total Australian water trades. Based on the average 
transaction per irrigation business from 2008/09 – 2017/18, sMDB irrigators were 4.8 times 
more likely to have conducted an allocation, and 7.9 times more likely to have conducted an 
entitlement trade (Wheeler and Garrick 2020). Figure 3.10 shows sMDB allocation and 
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Figure 3.10 Allocation and entitlement trades in the sMDB 
 
Source: Own Figure, data sourced from BOM (2020g).  
Market participants in MDB water markets have been predominantly irrigators. Since the 
Water Act of 2007, the Commonwealth of Australia has bought significant amounts of water 
entitlements, through water recovery programs under the Basin Plan by the Departments of 
Agriculture and Environment. Recovered water was then transferred to the CEWH for 
management, who has done very little trade, apart from some allocation sales. This leads to 
particular trading patterns, explored later in this chapter (see sections 3.5 and 3.6). 
 
3.4.3 Private transaction costs 
Other important features of a well-functioning water market are low transaction costs and 
timely processing of water trades (Wheeler et al. 2017b). Garrick et al. (2013) describes 
water market transaction costs as having three components: 1) static transaction costs; 2) 
institutional transition costs; and 3) institutional lock-in costs. Static transaction costs 
represent the costs for water users to trade water within an existing institutional setting, 
including the costs of finding a counterparty. Institutional transition costs are costs for policy 
reform implementation, development of tradable water rights and diversion limits. This also 
includes changes to price-discovery mechanisms (such as the introduction of water registers), 
water-user associations and IIOs, water-rights and licencing systems, and trading rules. 
Institutional lock-in costs are the costs to make future changes to current water-use patterns 
or infrastructure, imposed by current institutional choices. The transaction costs most directly 
relevant to stakeholders’ water market participation in the MDB are static transaction costs 
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and transition costs are arguably less impactful for trading decision making as they tend to be 
financed by the government through tax revenue from the general public. This section 
therefore focuses mostly on static transaction costs in the MDB (Garrick et al. 2013). 
With maturing water markets and institutions, static transaction costs should reduce over time 
through ongoing institutional innovations (Carey and Sunding 2001). Garrick et al. (2013) 
argued that periodic pulses of investment in institutional transition costs are needed to 
address unintended consequences of prior reforms, enable gains from trade arising from more 
complex water market trading products (e.g. dry-year options, futures contracts), and carry-
over rules building on market-based allocation reforms. Figure 3.11 shows the stylised 
development of static transaction costs over time. 
Figure 3.11 Average static transaction costs of market-based water allocation 
 
Source: Garrick et al. (2013, p. 201) 
The historic experience of water policy reform in the MDB arguably supports this theory. 
Prior to unbundling water from land ownership in the wake of the COAG reforms in 1994, 
water trading was associated with high static transaction costs. If one wanted to buy water 
entitlements, it was necessary to purchase the associated land title, making it very costly, both 
due to the extra costs attributable to the land, but also the high search costs involved in 
finding a counterparty and the costs involved in transferring a land title (e.g. registration and 
application fees for both water and land). Interstate water trading was largely non-existent, 
with most trades taking place as allocation trades within IIOs via informal markets. This is 
reflected in the low water market trading participation prior to 1994/95 [see Figure 3.2] 
(Grafton et al. 2016; Loch et al. 2018; Wheeler 2014; Wheeler and Garrick 2020). 
Unbundling under the COAG reforms made it significantly less costly to trade water, given 
that it made it possible to trade water alone. Yet, water trading was still slow as states 
struggled to implement the full suite of COAG reforms. The NWI led to an increase in water 
61 
 
trade reform. Specifically, improved water accounting and the establishment of water 
registers made price-discovery significantly less challenging and costly, while also providing 
information about total water availability (Chalmers et al. 2012; Lee and Ancev 2009; Loch 
et al. 2013; Slattery et al. 2012). Another component of high static transaction costs was the 
power and protectionist behaviour of IIOs, and service tariffs set by monopolistic behaviour 
(ACCC 2016). Restrictions in allowing water to be traded out of IIO boundaries and high 
operational costs, termination and administrative fees were factors specifically 
disincentivising water trading. While some of these fees were justified on the basis of cost 
recovery from remaining irrigators (see the “stranded assets” argument in section 2.2.5.1), 
they were protectionist measures and lead to inefficiencies in water trading (Grafton et al. 
2016). The NWI tackled this issue by requiring fees and tariffs to be cost-reflective and on a 
per ML basis, combined with further unbundling of water rights, separating out the water use 
and delivery share components. This represents a significant decrease in transaction costs for 
trading with IIOs, as the entitlement volume, the right to use water, and the right to have it 
delivered became individually tradable, providing extra flexibility for irrigators (Crase et al. 
2014). 
However, interstate and inter-region trading remained difficult, in part due to lack of 
appropriate institutions and support for trading between the states, and because of challenges 
in comparing the hydrological and legal characteristics of different water entitlements. The 
2007 Water Act addressed these issues by tasking states with establishing and harmonizing 
institutions supporting inter-state trading. This was primarily achieved through new water 
trade processing time service standards for all MDB states, established in 2008. Ninety 
percent of interstate trades needed to be processed to completion within 20 days, and 90% of 
intrastate trades within 10 days. In 2009, this was further shortened to 10 and 5 days 
respectively (Loch et al. 2018). Technological advances also contributed to reduce static 
transaction costs: the increased use of computer and digital systems, replacing old paper-
based trade application and processing, significantly reduced processing times (see Figure 
A.3 to Figure A.8 for allocation and entitlement processing times). By 2010/11, all states 
achieved the required processing times (Loch et al. 2018). 
To enable hydrological accounting for cap-compliance and to compare hydrological 
characteristics of different water entitlements, a system of exchange rates was piloted via the 
Interstate Pilot Trade Program in 1998 (Bjornlund et al. 2012), converting nominal volumes 
of one entitlement into nominal volumes of another entitlement from a different catchment 
(MDBA 2010b). As an example, an exchange rate of 1.0 was used on all transfers from NSW 
to Victoria or SA. However, an exchange rate of 0.9 was used for upstream transfers from SA 
into NSW, Victoria to counteract reduced supply security (Loch et al. 2013). This enabled 
stakeholders to take exchange rates as an indicator into consideration for their trading 
decisions. However, high transaction costs associated with exchange rate trade limited its 
expansion beyond the pilot interstate trade program. 
Finally, the Water Act also mandated the Australian Competition & Consumer Commission 
(ACCC) to report and monitor IIO fees and charges, tracking progress towards cost effective 
and non-trade impeding charge structures. Over time, government fees associated with water 
allocation trade decreased, as have fees in most IIOs except the Murray Irrigation district. 
IIOs report average annual transaction cost reductions of between 0.48% and 5.29% between 
2009/10 – 2016/17 for allocation trades (Loch et al. 2018), demonstrating the positive impact 
of NWI and Water Act reforms. In contrast, entitlement transfer transaction costs remained 
largely unaffected. Decreasing transaction costs in one trade product were often offset by a 
fee increase in other products, such as delivery share fees. Overall, transaction costs for 
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allocation trade fell, but increased for water entitlement trades, likely due to the complexity 
and necessary assessment rigour required for such transfers (Loch et al. 2018). 
Under the Basin Plan water trading rules, IIOs are required to transparently communicate 
their fee structure, not impose trading rules which unnecessarily hinder water trade (such as 
the 10% and 4% rule in Victoria, see section 2.2.3.1). Despite considerable progress in fee 
structure reporting, both through IIOs’ websites and the ACCC’s Water Monitoring Report 
series (ACCC 2019b), challenges remain. IIOs’ fee structures can be extremely complicated, 
sometimes including hundreds of different fees (ACCC 2016; Cooper et al. 2014). Delivery 
share products and conditions vary significantly between IIOs and high termination fees, up 
to 10 times the annual fee, remain (Loch et al. 2018). This has the potential to materially 
affect water trading with IIOs. 
Similarly, although water reporting and data accessibility have progressively improved, some 
regions and water registers have yet to fully implement non-paper-based trade application 
processing. This slows trade processing times and routinely causes reporting errors in the 
water register data (MDBA 2019m). Inter-state trading is still marred by differences in 
trading terminology, and overall complexity arising from permissible trades between 
different trading zones (MDBA 2010c). This contributes to irrigators’ spending up to 8 hours 
in searching, negotiating and executing allocation trades, and up to 13 hours for entitlement 
trades, with a substantial amount of time spent on searching for trade partners (Loch et al. 
2018). The complexity of identifying a counter party has given rise to a vibrant industry of 
water market intermediaries, increasing the cost of trade by their charging of service fees, 
usually based on a percentage of trade value (Elders 2019; Waterexchange 2019; Waterfind 
2019b). Additionally, there are concerns about unethical intermediary behaviour in situations 
where water markets are thin or fragmented, intermediaries may (deliberately or otherwise) 
cause price inflation when providing information to potential market participants (ACCC 
2016; Seidl et al. 2020b). 
There is also almost complete absence of information on derivative type products in water 
register data, making price discovery exceedingly challenging. It seems these products are 
implemented using standard allocation or entitlement transfers and have therefore generated 
little or no publicly available data on volumes, number of trades, contractual conditions or 
who is transacting. This could affect the future reliability of water trade data by skewing 
reported prices and volumes (ABARES 2018). 
 
3.4.4 Intervalley trade restrictions and tagged trading 
Historic and on-going water policy efforts, largely successfully, reduced some barriers to 
trade and have facilitated more water trading, but some barriers to trade remain. These 
barriers are often a function of the hydrological necessities and configurations of the MDB, in 
particular “intervalley-trade restrictions” (IVT), the Barmah Choke constraint, and limits 
around the use of “tagged entitlements” and associated trades. 
The most prominent IVTs are the Murrumbidgee IVT, limiting trade between the 
Murrumbidgee and the NSW Murray catchments, the Goulburn-Murray IVT, limiting trade 
between the Goulburn and the VIC Murray catchment, and the Barmah Choke constraint, 
limiting water trade between NSW Murray trade zones 10 and 11, and VIC Murray zones 6 
and 7. Figure 3.12 shows the state of IVTs in the sMDB at 19th January 2019.  
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Figure 3.12 Trade limits and IVTs in the sMDB 
 
Source: MJA (2020, p. 2) 
The Goulburn-Murray IVT was introduced in 2012. It was intended to enable volumes stored 
in dams to supply Victorian Murray water entitlements, and to guarantee that the increasing 
commitments to meet large volumes of trade between Victoria and the Murray did not 
adversely impact on storage levels. The IVT stops any allocation trade from Goulburn, 
Campaspe, Broken and Loddon to the Victorian Murray or to NSW and SA, if a total of 200 
GL is owed to the Murray trade zones downstream. Stakeholders can track the status of the 
trade limit over the inter-valley trade account, with the IVT opening if less than 200GL is 
owed to the Murray (DELWP 2014). 
The Murrumbidgee IVT limits trade between the Murrumbidgee, NSW Murray, NSW Lower 
Darling, Victorian Murray and South Australian Murray, with its inter-valley trade account 
representing the net trade of temporary traded or tagged water out of the Murrumbidgee. 
When water is temporarily traded out of the Murrumbidgee the IVT account balance 
increases, whereas it reduces when water is temporary traded into the Murrumbidgee. In 
contrast to the Goulburn IVT, the Murrumbidgee IVT operates between a lower and an upper 
limit of the inter-valley trade account, closing trade when the account balance moves outside 
these limits. The lower limit is an IVT trade balance of 0GL, closing trade into the 
Murrumbidgee because water cannot flow uphill; whereas the upper limit is a balance of 
100GL, closing trade out of the Murrumbidgee, to minimise third party impacts from large 
volumes of Murray water sitting in Murrumbidgee storages. While counterintuitive at first 
glance, water delivery affects the IVT in the opposite direction from trade, in that water 
delivered to the Murray reduces the IVT, and water delivered from the Murray into the 
Murrumbidgee increases the IVT.19 The operation of the IVT is complicated, as trade does 
not open or close with the lower and upper limit. Instead, trade into the Murrumbidgee opens 
when the account balance has reached 15GL. Whereas trade out of the region opens when the 
IVT account balance falls under 85GL (DPI 2018). 
In contrast to the Goulburn and Murrumbidgee IVTs, the Barmah Choke constraint is due to a 
geological formation limiting the maximum flow through the Murray without flooding the 
surrounding Barmah-Milawa forest. This formation, the Barmah Choke, named after the 
nearby town of Barmah in Victoria, only allows daily flows of 7,000 ML/day between the 
upstream trade zones 6 and 10 to the downstream zones 7 and 11 (MDBA 2019c). 
Consequently, no water can be traded from upstream to downstream if the 7,000ML flow 
threshold has already been reached. The Barmah Choke is significant as it separates 
important irrigation areas in SA, Victoria and NSW from the major upstream storages of 
Dartmouth and Hume dam. Apart from standard allocation trade, the choke also affects the 
                                                 
19 Possible by using Murray Irrigation infrastructure, the Mulwala Canal (GMW 2019). 
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delivery of carry-over from the dams: if the choke is full, carried-over allocations cannot be 
delivered. 
These three IVTs all affect major trading zones (see section 3.4.2) and exert a material 
influence on water market prices. If the IVTs are closed, price differentials form in the 
allocation markets separated by the restriction, continuously diverging while trade is closed. 
Specifically, Murray trade zones 7 and 11 allocation prices increase when the Goulburn IVT 
and the Barmah Choke are closed. The impact of the Murrumbidgee IVT on prices is harder 
to generalise about, because it depends on the balance of in- and out-trade, and also on 
whether the other two IVTs are open. For example, operators in the downstream Murray 
zones may wish to draw on Murrumbidgee water more if they cannot source their demand 
from Goulburn or the upstream Murray. Figure 3.13 shows the allocation price differentials 
between the southern-connected MDB and the Murrumbidgee in 2016/17 due to the closed 
IVT account balance of 100GL. 
Figure 3.13 Allocation prices for sMDB and Murrumbidgee in 2016/17 
 
Source: ABARES (2018, p. 31) 
All allocation transfers are supposedly subject to IVTs under the Water Act (MDBA 2014b). 
However, there is an interesting interaction between IVTs and allocations delivered under a 
tagged water entitlement. Establishing a “tag” on an entitlement enables the owner to extract 
the associated allocation in a different system/catchment than the one in which the 
entitlement is registered. This allocation can only be used, not sold. Tags were introduced to 
enable irrigators to source water from different sources without always having to use the 
market mechanism (incurring trade costs) to have their water delivered (ACCC 2010; 
Frontier Economics 2009). Given the high transaction costs associated with exchange rate 
trade, tagged trade were seen as less complicated and transaction cost intensive solution, as a 
tagged entitlement retains all its characteristics and does not leave its system of origin 
(MDBA 2010d). 
However, allocation deliveries from tagged entitlements are exempt from complying with 
IVTs in two cases: 1) the tag had been established before 22nd October 2010 (MDBA 2014b); 
or 2) they are based in Victoria. Contrary to the intentions of the Water Act, Victoria has 
implemented tagged entitlements as exempt from IVTs, meaning that allocation water from 
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tagged entitlements can be delivered through the closed Goulburn IVT (DELWP 2018). 
Furthermore, the allocation amount deliverable under a tag was not limited to the nominal 
entitlement volume, but, rather, stakeholders were able to purchase large volumes of cheaper 
Goulburn water allocation and deliver them through the closed IVT to the more expensive 
Murray. Although tagged allocation cannot be on-sold, if stakeholders owned Murray water 
as well, they can sell their Murray allocation and use their Goulburn tagged allocation, legally 
arbitraging on the price difference between the two trading zones. This lead to large volumes 
of allocation water being delivered to the Murray through a closed IVT (120 GL in 2018/19), 
and prompted Victoria, from December 2019, to subject all tagged entitlements to IVT rules 
(Neville 2019a). This measure led to considerable uncertainty for Victorian irrigators, many 
of whom were accustomed to and reliant on water supply from their tagged accounts (Hunt 
2019b). At time of writing, the Victorian government is engaged in stakeholder consultation 
regarding proposed changes to the Goulburn-Murray trade rules and tagged accounts 
(DELWP 2020a). The review suggests three options: 1) an annual volumetric limit of water 
tradeable from the Goulburn to the Murray; 2) a dynamic limit, a hybrid between current 
rules and the annual volumetric limit; and 3) a seasonally-based rule consisting of two parts: 
the first part concerns spring, late autumn and winter, when it is ecologically beneficial to 
have high flows and delivery of traded water does not impact the environment. The second 
part implicates summer and early autumn when access is restricted, and operational limits in 
the lower Goulburn River are applied to protect the environment (DELWP 2020a). 
Despite these efforts, tagged entitlements established prior to the 22nd October 2010 remain 
exempt from IVTs. Additionally, price divergence between catchments will continue to 
occur, potentially causing adverse effects for some stakeholders. The terms of reference of 
the current ACCC water market review include assessing the impact of IVTs on trading 
behaviour and prices (ACCC 2019a). 
 
3.5 Water market trading patterns 
Most water market participants are irrigators, using the water market for a variety of reasons. 
This section reviews trading patterns, both for entitlements and allocations, and irrigators’ 
drivers for trading. 
Between 1998/99 – 2010/11 water was largely bought by dairy farmers in Victoria and 
horticultural irrigators in SA; annual croppers in the Murrumbidgee and Lower Darling were 
the main sellers (Wheeler et al. 2014a). From 2007 onwards, significant water volumes were 
traded into SA to maintain supply for high value perennial crops, such as grapes (Wheeler et 
al. 2014a). Figure 3.14 shows the directions and volumes of net water trade between water 
trading zones in the sMDB in 2014/15 and 2015/16.  
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Figure 3.14 Net water trade volumes in the sMDB by catchment in 2014/15 and 2015/16 
 
Source: ABARES (2019b) 
Water trading activity by irrigators is strongly influenced by the type of crop grown, and the 
associated output prices. Generally, perennial horticultural crops have a higher ability to pay 
for water, given their higher output prices. Water trading for perennial producers also 
includes risk and capital maintenance considerations, which are explained later in this chapter 
(see section 3.5.2). Figure 3.15 and Figure 3.16 shows the price movements of important 
crops in the sMDB from 2007/08 to 2016/17. 
Figure 3.15 Selected agricultural commodity price indexes, 2007–08 to 2016–17 
 




Figure 3.16 Almond prices (nominal) from 2008-2016 
 
Source: ABARES (2018, p. 23) 
Given the flexibility of annual crops, such as cotton and rice, to cease production in dry years 
and sell their allocation on the market instead, market prices are somewhat determined by 
their output prices: if the rice price is high, the allocation price needs to be proportionally 
higher to incentivise rice irrigators to stop producing. Douglas et al. (2016) discusses the 
various motivations of irrigators’ planting decisions. 
In recent years, there has been a material increase in almond plantations in the sMDB, driven 
by good almond prices, growing and unmet global demand, stemming from a production 
shortfall in California20 due to drought (Reisman 2019). The area planted for almonds has 
increased more than 12-fold, from 3,546 ha in 2000 to 45,088 ha in 2018. Of these, 53% is 
planted in the Sunraysia district (VIC), followed by 24% in the Riverina (NSW) and 20% in 
SA (ABA 2019). This has translated to substantially increased water use by almond and nut 
farms since 2002/03 in the Lower Murray (see Figure 3.17). 
                                                 
20 California is the world’s most important almond producing region, supplying about 80% of global almond 
demand (Fulton et al. 2019). 
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Figure 3.17 Water used (ML) by farm type in the VIC Murray zone 7 from 2002/03 to 
2015/16 
 
Source: ABARES (2018, p. 24) 
Cotton is the dominant annual crop in the MDB, with larger areas planted in the nMDB, but 
growing area in the sMDB, and almonds and nuts are the dominant perennial crops. 
ABARES modelling shows that irrigated activity in the sMDB has moved from other 
irrigated activities towards these sectors [see Figure 3.18] (ABARES 2018). 
Figure 3.18 Modelled change in sMDB irrigated activity water demand from 2003–2017 
by the ABARES water trade model 
 
Source: ABARES (2018) 
Water trading and prices are not only driven by cropping systems, changes in the agricultural 
industry and commodity prices, but also by physical scarcity, caused by the highly variable 
rainfall in the Basin (see section 2.1.1). While entitlement trading is less impacted by short-
term climatic conditions, allocation prices are driven by rainfall and drought, showing a close 
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inverse relationship with MDB water storage levels [see Figure 3.19] (ABARES 2018; 
Wheeler et al. 2008a; Zuo et al. 2015a; Zuo et al. 2019). 
Figure 3.19 Average monthly nominal sMDB allocation prices and storage volumes 
from 2008/09 to 2016/17 
 
Source: ABARES (2018, p. 29) 
While water availability, output prices and changes in the agricultural industry are important 
influences on irrigators’ trading behaviour and on water market prices, there are also other 
considerations, as highlighted in the following two sections. 
 
3.5.1 Selling permanent water to the government 
Government involvement in form of environmental water recovery through RtB and 
SRWUIP had a marked impact on irrigators’ intentions to trade entitlements (Wheeler et al. 
2012b). While in the direct sense, only buyback is a sale of water entitlement to the 
government, irrigation infrastructure programs also exchange a portion of one’s water 
entitlement (50% of the water savings) for a monetary subsidy. Therefore, this chapter 
regards both modes of environmental water recovery as selling water entitlements to the 
government.  
Irrigators sell water to the government for a variety of reasons. Wheeler and Cheesman 
(2013) surveyed sellers to the RtB and found that 30% of irrigators selling to the RtB did so 
to reduce farm debt and thus improve their financial situation during the Millennium 
Drought. Another 22% participated in order to supplement farm income and make their farm 
more viable, whereas 8% used funds acquired by the sale to make on-farm investments. The 
majority (60%) of irrigators only sold a part of their entitlements. However, 10% sold all of 
their entitlement holdings but continued to farm, demonstrating that entitlement sales to the 
government were part of a strategic decision to adjust farming and production systems. 
Indeed, irrigators nominated the generation of cashflow as the main driver for selling water to 
the government (Wheeler and Cheesman 2013). This is in line with other studies, finding that 
lower farm income and higher debt positively impacted on irrigators’ willingness to sell 
water to the government (Wheeler et al. 2012b). Irrigators with higher security entitlements 
were found to be more willing to sell (Wheeler et al. 2012b), likely related to more revenue 
from higher security entitlement sales, while still retaining enough water supply security due 
to high expected water yield from these entitlement classes. Additionally, larger entitlement 
holdings also increased willingness to sell entitlements, partly due to some irrigators owning 
surplus water or having underutilised water entitlements, which could be sold without 
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impacting farm production (Wheeler and Cheesman 2013; Wheeler et al. 2014c; Wheeler et 
al. 2012b). 
Counter the popular narrative in rural communities and findings by a number of consultancies 
(e.g. (Aither 2016; RMCG 2016)), Zuo et al. (2019) found that government recovery of water 
entitlements did have no statistically significant impact on entitlement prices and trading 
volumes, nor on allocation prices. Rather, the main driver for allocation prices was water 
scarcity, whereas entitlement prices were driven by previous entitlement prices and current 
allocation prices. However, government water recovery had a statistically significant negative 
impact on traded allocation volume (e.g. a 1% increase in water recovery led to a 0.14% 
reduction in allocation volume traded) and increased the volatility of allocation market prices 
and trading volumes. This may be due to different methodologies used: Connor et al. (2014) 
find econometric estimates of marginal revenue changes due to water allocations are lower 
than results from the two mathematical programming (ABARES 2011; Adamson et al. 2011) 
and one Computable General Equilibrium model (Wittwer and Griffith 2011), which 
potentially overestimate the effects of water recovery under the Basin Plan. 
Other research investigating the impacts of selling permanent water on farm finances (both 
current and lagged) have found that there was only very weak evidence that selling water 
entitlements lead to negative consequences for farm income in the longer term (Wheeler et al. 
2014c; Wheeler et al. 2014d). 
Engaging in entitlement sales to the government was also used by some irrigators (30% of 
RtB participants) as a way to exit farming (Wheeler and Cheesman 2013), with the 
willingness to sell all water and exit irrigation increasing at higher AUD$/ML prices for 
entitlements (Zuo et al. 2015b). This may have contributed to the popular perception in 
irrigation communities that selling water to the government is a main driver of farm exit 
(Wittwer 2011). Interestingly, Haensch et al. (2019) found a neighbourhood effect for 
entitlement sales to the government, with an increased probability of entitlement sales if a 
neighbour has sold to the government. This is likely due to decreasing social pressure to 
retain entitlement ownership if other community members have already participated in 
buyback programs. Indeed, Wheeler et al. (2020b) found that the major causes of farm exit in 
the MDB are climatic and socio-economic factors, such as drought and output prices, not 
water trade. 
Irrespective of scientific evidence pointing to its economic inefficiency (Adamson and Loch 
2018; Grafton and Wheeler 2018; Productivity Commission 2010; Wittwer and Dixon 2013; 
Wittwer and Young 2020), the main mechanism for government purchase of water from 
irrigators from 2013 onwards has been through irrigation infrastructure grants (Grafton and 
Wheeler 2018).  
However, recent research has found that irrigators who participated in irrigation infrastructure 
programs are more likely to increase their utilisation of existing water entitlements (including 
groundwater) and buy water allocations and entitlements on the market (Wheeler et al. 
2020a). This creates artificial demand in the water market, potentially leading to increased 
entitlement prices. 
Irrigation infrastructure subsidies incentivise irrigators to increase the utilisation of existing 
water resources and adopt perennial production systems, to maximise the benefit from more 
efficient infrastructure (Adamson and Loch 2014; Loch and Adamson 2015). While 
accelerating change in agricultural systems (e.g. towards almonds) and therefore potentially 
contributing to higher water prices based on crop output prices, it also leads to inflexibility in 
production systems, because perennial producers cannot easily change production systems 
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without loss of capital. This causes a hardening of water demand, given that perennial 
producers tend to be net water buyers in all but the wettest years. Perennial producers are also 
willing to pay very high allocation prices, above the level of generating operational losses 
(short-term choke price), to prevent catastrophic loss of capital in drought or periods of water 
scarcity (Adamson et al. 2017). This may lead to higher allocation prices in periods of water 
scarcity, potentially crowding out lower value perennial industries, particularly under an 
expanding area of perennial production. 
Additionally, being locked into perennial production may increase water entitlement demand 
in general, plus increasing water electricity prices, which is a main form of stress for 
perennial producers (Wheeler et al. 2018). Following Adamson et al. (2017), a risk-averse 
perennial producer aims to secure enough water to maintain plant health even in the driest 
scenarios, requiring significant water entitlement holdings. With MDB perennial producers 
risk averse to downside risk [namely catastrophic capital loss] (Nauges et al. 2016), this 
likely translates to increased demand for high security water entitlements and 
correspondingly high prices. 
Adamson and Loch (2014) find that the largest water savings through infrastructure can be 
achieved by upgrading off-farm supply, rather than on-farm irrigation infrastructure. 
Investment in efficiency thus increases the asset value of IIO systems and associated 
agricultural properties, as public investment in irrigation infrastructure necessarily improves 
its value, resulting in private capital gains for farmers (Loch and Adamson 2015). 
Furthermore, upgrading irrigation infrastructure to pivot and drip systems is often a 
worthwhile investment for irrigators, even without government subsidies; subsidising these 
upgrades can inflate the value of irrigation enterprises (Lee et al. 2012). These gains will then 
be realized by farmers selling their properties, potentially increasing water entitlement prices 
if property value increases are distributed to the land and water component of the farm. This 
is particularly likely in NSW, where water entitlements’ stamp duty exemption status 
incentivises overvaluing of water versus land assets (Revenue NSW, personal 
communication, 11/11/2019). 
In summary, contrary to the claim that buyback has led to higher water entitlement prices, 
due to less water in the consumptive pool, there is the real potential that irrigation 
infrastructure subsidies are having unintended consequences on irrigators’ water trading 
behaviour and contributing to increased water entitlement and allocation prices. 
 
3.5.2 Trading in the private market 
There are also other factors driving irrigators’ water trading behaviour within the private 
market. Irrigators have been using water trading as an important risk management tool for 
years. Allocation trading allows irrigators to manage risk without having to modify their 
entitlement ownership (Bjornlund 2006). Intra- and inter-seasonal trading strategies enable 
irrigators to remain in production in times of water scarcity, generate opportunistic income 
from price fluctuations or to protect asset values (Bjornlund 2002). Allocation demand 
becomes more price elastic in later stages of the season since temperatures generally drop, 
requiring reduced irrigation, and crops are then harvested. However, a considerable amount 
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of end of season trades are undertaken to balance water allocation accounts (Wheeler et al. 
2008b), and to manage carry-over between seasons21 (Brennan 2008; Loch et al. 2012). 
Allocation trading has provided significant drought mitigation benefits: dairy producers were 
able to sell their allocations and buy fodder during the Millennium Drought, generating good 
returns from water sales while also avoiding the need to destock (Kirby et al. 2014a). 
Additionally, allocation trading significantly limits the negative impacts of water scarcity 
through drought and climate change: Kirby et al. (2014a, pp. 157, table 1) found that real 
adjusted gross value of irrigated production in the MDB during the Millennium Drought from 
2000–2001 to 2007–2008 fell by just 10%, despite a 70% decline in irrigated surface-water 
use. Additionally Kirby et al. (2014b) estimated a climate change induced 25% reduction in 
future annual average water availability corresponds to only a 10% contraction of GVIP, as 
water allocations get traded from lower to higher value irrigation activities. 
Loch et al. (2012) found that it was predominantly perennial irrigators who bought allocation 
to keep crops alive in seasons with low water availability and drought, whereas annual 
producers were able to achieve higher incomes from selling allocations to perennial 
producers rather than by growing a crop. Trading allocations early in the season is used as a 
strategy to mitigate the risk of developing water scarcity and higher prices later in the year. 
Allocation trading allows sMDB irrigators to adjust to seasonal fluctuations in commodity 
prices, precipitation, evaporation and water allocation levels, especially during prolonged 
drought, with irrigators experiencing higher variability in profit and increased downside risk, 
purchasing more allocations (Loch et al. 2012; Zuo et al. 2015a). 
Overall, there are five main drivers for water allocation trading identified by the NWC 
(2012): 
• Generation of additional income 
• Minimising input costs 
• Maintaining productive capacity during drought and water scarce periods 
• Improving farm productivity/production 
• Enabling water to be carried over to the next season 
Irrigators’ non-government water entitlement trade motivation is strongly impacted by 
whether an irrigator is an annual or perennial producer. As mentioned earlier, perennial 
producers tend to prefer a larger holding of higher security entitlements to minimise 
downside risk (Adamson et al. 2017; Nauges et al. 2016). Perennial producers have further 
incentive to buy entitlements when prices are low, due to the high marginal profit of one 
extra megalitre of water, estimated at an average of AUD$547 for horticultural and AUD$61 
for broadacre producers (Nauges et al. 2016). However, Zuo et al. (2016) find that 
entitlement price elasticities of supply and demand are inelastic between AUD$1,700 – 
AUD$2,100, with supply more inelastic than demand. This supports findings by Wheeler and 
Cheesman (2013) that it is primarily farmers with higher debt levels and lower incomes who 
opt to sell entitlements, with other irrigators generally preferring to hold on to their 
entitlements. 
However, irrigators also trade entitlements to relocate their production, for example to a 
region experiencing less dryland salinity, or to substitute between surface water and 
                                                 
21 In drier years, extra allocation may be bought to build up carry-over, whereas in wet seasons allocation may 
be sold in order to avoid carry-over spill in the next season. 
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groundwater (Wheeler et al. 2010; Wheeler et al. 2016b), with higher groundwater salinity 
leading to less volume of entitlement sales (Haensch et al. 2016b). 
Irrigators employ diverse water ownership and trading strategies, ranging from owning little 
or no water and relying on water allocation markets to meet annual demand, to holding a 
large proportion, or in excess, of their annual needs in water entitlements, enabling the sale of 
excess (allocation) water. While some irrigators do not engage in water trade, this proportion 
has decreased significantly over time, with almost 80% and more than 40% of irrigators 
having conducted at least one allocation and entitlement trade respectively, in the sMDB 
(Wheeler and Garrick 2020). However, no specific ownership and trading strategy seems 
superior to others. Rather, different strategies are suited to different production systems. 
Wheeler et al. (2014d) found that water received (from allocation to entitlement holdings) 
was a more important influence on farm income for perennial (horticulture) irrigators, than 
for dairy, pasture or annual (broadacre) farmers. Given the seasonal nature of broadacre 
crops, such as cotton and rice, it is the optimal strategy for many broadacre farms to severely 
reduce or stop farm production and to sell water in times of water scarcity and drought. 
 
3.6 Environmental water holders’ market participation 
Since The Living Murray and the Water Act, the environment is now a participant in the 
water market through the establishment of the CEWH and other EWHs, and their growing 
engagement in water markets (Loch et al. 2011). However, the motivations and trading 
patterns of environmental actors are very different to those of irrigators. 
There are two types of environmental water in the MDB: planned and held environmental 
water. The Water Act (Part 1, Section 4; Part 1, Section 6) and Basin Plan (Chapter 10, Part 
3, Division 1, Section 10.09) define them as follows: 
Planned environmental water (also called rules-based water) is prescribed under water 
resource plans, the Basin Plan or state legislation. In unregulated rivers, planned 
environmental water can be achieved through water take restrictions (i.e. no pump embargos) 
to ensure a minimum of environmental flow to specific environmental assets. In regulated 
rivers, water resource plans determine the frequency, volume and timing of water to be 
released for environmental purposes. Planned environmental water cannot be used for any 
purpose except environmental watering and cannot be traded on the market. 
Held environmental water is water attributed to water entitlements, water delivery or 
irrigation rights and is owned (held) by an environmental water holder. This water is 
managed to achieve environmental outcomes. Held environmental water retains the 
characteristics of the underlying water right, and is therefore subject to the same trade 
restrictions, allocation and storage rules. Most of the held environmental water is owned by 
the CEWH and was recovered by the RtB or infrastructure programs (SRWUIP). 
As of 31st December 2019, the Commonwealth owned about 2103.8GL of LTAAY of water 
entitlements, which is about 77% of the original 2750GL water recovery target under the 
Basin Plan (DAWE 2020b). fifty-nine percent22 of this volume has been recovered through 
the RtB program, with the remainder through infrastructure upgrades [see Figure 3.20] 
(Grafton and Wheeler 2018). 
                                                 




Figure 3.20 Commonwealth environmental water recovery entitlement volume as of 
30/09/2017 
 
Source: Grafton and Wheeler (2018, p. 495) 
The main objective of EWHs is to maximise environmental outcomes with the planned and 
held water available to them. Outcomes are defined in ecological terms, such as number of 
bird breeding pairs or the time flood plain areas are inundated, with priority in dry years 
given to environmental assets of great ecological significance, referred to as the “icon sites” 
(MDBA 2014a). 
Under the Water Act, environmental outcomes are to be achieved through adaptive 
management, with the Basin Plan defining and implementing particular practices (Walker 
2019). Indeed, a number of studies have explored the benefits of EWH water market 
participation and trading as a form of adaptive management (Ancev 2015a; Carr et al. 2016; 
Connor et al. 2013; Kirby et al. 2015; Loch et al. 2011; Tisdell 2010; Wheeler et al. 2013a). 
Tisdell (2010) found that allocating tradeable water to an environmental agency maximized 
market efficiency, suggesting that strategies for effectively trading water for environmental 
use may include opportunistic trading in order to be cost effective, potentially through leasing 
water out when not needed, and leasing water in to support environmental flows. Loch et al. 
(2011) suggest that rules-based water rights should be utilised to meet environmental 
instream flow targets, whereas governments should also employ targeted opportunistic 
temporary (allocation) and permanent (entitlement) water market purchases to contribute 
over-bank floods and flushes. 
Ancev (2015a) found that active allocation trading by the CEWH was beneficial for the 
environment and society. This enables to maximise environmental outcomes by purchasing 
extra water allocation at times when they have the largest environmental benefit, e.g. after a 
drought breaking or in wet years to increase over-bank flows and flood plain inundation 
events. However, entering a drought after a multi-year wet period or in dry periods, the 
CEWH can sell water allocation to irrigation, as the environmental benefit of this water is 
comparatively less than the benefit it generates through irrigation. Expanding on the previous 
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study, Ancev (2015b) finds the benefits from an actively trading CEWH extend to climate 
change, with larger benefits manifesting under more severe climate change scenarios. While 
increasing the volume of environmental water available, active trading also provides benefits 
to irrigated production through the trading patterns suggested in Ancev (2015a). Although it 
is a good policy to accumulate environmental water rights, this water should not be barred 
from active water allocation markets, but rather active trading employed to realise the 
significant gains from environmental allocation trade, both for the environment and the 
society at large (Ancev 2015a, 2015b). 
The yield characteristics of irrigation water entitlements (held water) do not necessarily 
match environmental hydrological requirements: while entitlement yield is typically lower 
early in the irrigation season (July-October) and rises over time to its high point towards the 
end of the season (April-June), many MDB ecosystems benefit from floods early and late in 
the season, but receive no material benefit from high water levels in summer (October-
February). Connor et al. (2013) examine whether temporary trading around these temporal 
dimensions can increase environmental outcomes. They find that there is scope for EWHs to 
improve outcomes through temporary trading, particularly in drought and by increasing the 
frequency of moderately large floods. An environmental trading regime of buying water 
when prices are low, and selling when prices are high, seems to have relatively small impacts 
on water market price outcomes due to EWH water trading (Connor et al. 2013). Indeed, the 
strategy of “buying low and selling high” (countercyclical trading) is exactly how the MDB 
Balanced Water Fund achieves the dual targets of improving environmental health and 
generating investor returns (Carr et al. 2016). Water allocation is bought in wet periods to 
expand environmental watering events, and sold to irrigation in dry periods when prices are 
high and environmental assets are adapted to experience drying. 
Given the focus of RtB and infrastructure programs on recovering water entitlements, 
Wheeler et al. (2013a) explored alternative water recovery options, such as allocation trade 
and water leases. The CEWH was found to be able to recover more environmental 
water/deliver more environmental outcomes over the 10-year funding horizon of the RtB by 
employing a mix of entitlement and allocation purchase. This mixed strategy is also 
significantly cheaper, particularly if purchases are made strategically in non-drought periods 
(Wheeler et al. 2013a). 
Kirby et al. (2015) examined a range of different water management and trading strategies for 
irrigators and environmental water holders under potential climate change scenarios, 
including the countercyclical trading described above (Carr et al. 2016; Connor et al. 2013), 
and rebalancing water entitlement holdings by selling in less and buying in more desirable 
catchments. Both rebalancing the portfolio and countercyclical trading result in higher than 
base flows for the projected median climate change scenario, while also increasing flows in 
most months. These increases occur without significant negative impacts for overall irrigation 
gross income. Therefore, greater river flows (and consequently greater environmental 
benefits) can be obtained without much impact on overall gross income of irrigators through 
market acquisition of permanent water entitlements and portfolio rebalancing, or the 
temporary trade of annual allocations (Kirby et al. 2015). 
Evidence suggests that adaptive environmental water management should incorporate active 
trading decisions, in particular (countercyclical) allocation trading, leases, and rebalancing of 
water portfolios. Fortunately, these adaptive management strategies have not been found to 
negatively impact irrigators’ positions in water markets, while also achieving higher 
environmental benefits for less cost, compared to a recovery of environmental water through 
entitlements only. In a sense, EWHs ought to utilise the same diverse set of trading and 
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ownership strategies observed in the irrigation industry. This would both achieve allocative 
efficiency—recovering water for least cost—and environmental water productive 
efficiency—maximising the benefits of environmental watering while keeping managing 
costs low (Horne et al. 2018). 
However, observable (public) EWH trading and ownership strategies do not fully reflect the 
findings and suggestions of the scientific literature. For example, the composition of the 
CEWH water portfolio under the Basin Plan is a function of individual water recovery targets 
in every catchment, rather than targeted entitlement acquisition in certain key areas. 
 
3.6.1 Non-commercial trading: environmental water delivery and transfers 
The majority of public EWH water market participation consists of using carry-over and non-
commercial transfers of water allocation within, or between, environmental organisations. 
Figure 3.21 shows CEWH water transfer and carry-over volumes from 2012/2013 – 2019/20. 
Figure 3.21 Commonwealth environmental water allocation and carry-over 2012/13 to 
2019/20 
 
Source: CEWO (2020a) 
77 
 
Given the structure of water registers, these transfers are listed as AUD$0/ML trades and 
make up a material part of water allocation trades each year (MDBA 2019m). Figure 3.22 
provides an overview of EWH transfer volume across sMDB catchments in 2016/17. 
Figure 3.22 Environmental water holders' net water allocation transfers in the sMDB as 
at 2016/17 
 
Source: ABARES (2018, p. 32) 
This phenomenon is based on a number of factors. For one, the CEWH does not undertake 
environmental watering actions itself, but rather enlists the assistance of partnering 
organisations on the ground, often environmental NGOs or IIOs (CEWO 2019). These 
organisations receive a transfer of environmental water into their allocation bank account 
from one of the CEWH’s allocation bank accounts to then apply water to environmental 
assets. Consequently, every environmental watering action the CEWH participates in has at 
least one associated AUD$0/ML trade. Often multiple EWHs combine their efforts, e.g. to 
create a larger flood to reach onto the floodplain, pooling water resources from: 1) multiple 
sources; or 2) multiple organisations. Many of these will lead to transaction records in the 
water registers. Large EWHs may also wish to move allocations between catchments within 
their organisation; for example to enable releases from upstream storages later in the year. 
These transfers will also appear as AUD$0/ML trades if they take place between different 
allocation bank accounts. 
This can have interesting interactions with IVTs: as environmental water transfers are treated 
like allocation trades, they contribute to the balance of inter-valley trade accounts, potentially 
closing IVTs. Given their large water holdings, both the CEWH and the Victorian 
Environmental Water holder have adapted a so called “good neighbour” policy, giving 
priority to any private/commercial allocation transaction/delivery, if the environmental 
transfer has the potential to negatively affect deliverability of private trades (CEWO 2019). 
This essentially makes held environmental water second-class entitlements, with irrigated and 




3.6.2 Commercial trading: the CEWH water trading framework 
Commercial allocation and entitlement trading by public EWHs is rare and follows strict 
guidelines, mainly based on the CEWH Trading framework (CEWO 2014), defining under 
what conditions environmental water allocation and entitlements can be traded. The 
framework (CEWO 2014, p. 4) states that trade can be used to: 
• Manage inter-spatial variability in water availability and environmental water demand 
across the MDB, for example by selling allocation in one catchment where 
environmental watering needs have largely been met and purchasing in another 
catchment where additional environmental water would be particularly beneficial. 
• Manage inter-temporal variability, for example by selling allocations when 
environmental needs have largely been met and/or market conditions are favourable 
and setting aside the proceeds for a later purchase of allocations that will result in a 
net improvement in environmental outcomes. 
• Re-balance the portfolio of entitlements based on improvements in the knowledge of 
environmental watering requirements. 
• Overcome constraints on the delivery of environmental water, for example by selling 
allocations in one location and using the proceeds to purchase in another location 
should it not be possible to otherwise transfer the allocations between locations. 
• Realise a return on allocations that are not required for environmental watering within 
a given water year and cannot be carried over into the following year. 
At large, public EWHs have generally refrained from actively purchasing allocations to 
deliver environmental outcomes due to concerns over adversely impacting irrigators’ 
allocation trade prices and market access. However, as at March 2020, the CEWH is 
currently considering purchasing water allocations (AUD$2 million worth) in the nMDB 
from Queensland agribusiness Eastern Australia Agriculture (Davies 2020). To the author’s 
knowledge, this is the first time the CEWH buys water allocation. EWHs usually rely on 
water allocations received on their entitlements and their carry-over to undertake 
environmental watering actions. 
By contrast, EWHs have sold allocations to irrigators on the open market (VEWH 2018b). 
While these sales are often justified by claiming the allocation would be lost due to 
insufficient carry-over availability and could not be used for environmental outcomes 
(VEWH 2018c), there are arguably political considerations at play. EWHs do not want to 
increase tensions with irrigators, particularly in drought, and therefore sell allocations to 
signal they are “doing their bit” by ensuring that the environment shares the pain of drought, 
while also supporting struggling farmers. For a visualisation of permissible CEWH water 
allocation sales, see Figure A.9 and Figure A.10. 
With the ban on buybacks in 2015 [see section 2.2.5.2] (Parliament of Australia 2015), 
entitlement buybacks to increase water holdings are impossible, although EWHs may still sell 
and buy entitlements to rebalance their current holdings, as suggested by Kirby et al. (2015) 




Figure 3.23 CEWH entitlement trade under the Water Act 
 
Source: CEWO (2017, p. 22) 
At the time of writing, the CEWH has not traded any entitlements for rebalancing or other 
purposes (CEWO 2020b), other than receiving entitlements recovered by the Department of 
Agriculture.  
In contrast to suggestions within the literature, public EWHs in Australia have in practice 
mostly limited themselves to selling unused allocations, but do not engage in commercial 
entitlement trade and only tentatively start to opportunistically purchase allocation. The focus 
on using ones’ own water, from carry-over or allocations to entitlements, likely constrains the 
potential to achieve environmental outcomes, and is less cost-effective than utilising 
opportunistic, countercyclical trading and rebalancing of water portfolios (Kirby et al. 2015; 
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Wheeler et al. 2013a). This limitation is mainly due to the political considerations of 
potentially adverse impacts for irrigators arising from environmental trading activity. 
However, Wheeler et al. (2013a) and Loch et al. (2014b) have shown that irrigators’ 
willingness to engage in water allocation trade is much higher than water entitlement trade. 
Other research is unable to establish negative impacts from environmental trades on 
irrigators’ gross revenues (Ancev 2015a, 2015b; Tisdell 2010). In summary, limiting EWHs 
to not actively trade may undermine EWHs’ capabilities to manage their held environmental 
water portfolios, with good neighbour policies relegating EWHs to second class water market 
stakeholders in practice. 
 
3.7 The gap: non-landholder investors, derivative-type water products and water as an 
investment asset 
Overall, the review of water market functionality, trading patterns and motivations of 
irrigator and EWH stakeholders has shown they use similar ownership and trading strategies, 
albeit within policy frameworks that constrain the choices of EWHs to a greater extent. 
However, new derivative-type temporary water market products are largely unexplored in the 
MDB literature. 
Bayer and Loch (2017) discuss water forwards in an experimental setting, Brennan (2008) 
discusses the potential of trading carry-over space between irrigators (what are now known as 
water parking products) and Wheeler et al. (2013a) suggest water leases as an alternative way 
to recover water for the environment. Less is known about whether stakeholders will embrace 
these products, apart from research in Loch et al. (2014b) regarding irrigator willingness to 
participate in selling water allocations. The lack of studies can be at least partially attributed 
to the difficulty of assessing data on these products: they are indistinguishable from 
allocation and entitlement transactions in the water registers (ABARES 2018; MDBA 
2019m), making quantitative assessment challenging. However, understanding derivative-
type products and their use is important in answering a number of pressing questions: 
• How do water market participants view derivative type products, in terms of their 
risks and benefits for water management? Do different stakeholder groups have 
different views on these questions? 
• Do derivative-type temporary products accompany or replace existing water 
entitlement portfolio management strategies for irrigators? 
• Do EWHs use derivative-type temporary products more proactively than they use 
allocation and entitlement trading? 
• Are there significant differences in the use of derivative-type temporary products 
between different water market stakeholders? 
• Is water market trading behaviour changing due to these new products? 
Given the maturing of MDB water markets over time, it is likely that derivative-type 
temporary products represent the next step in water market evolution, making timely answers 
to the questions raised above important. 
Successive water policy reforms in the MDB (see section 2.2), and the unbundling of water 
rights in particular, have led to increasing water market liberalisation and trade facilitation, 
up to a point where water entitlements are now a mortgageable asset (Waterfind 2019a). They 
can yield water market returns from trading water allocation and capital gain from the recent 
strong increase in water entitlement prices (Bjornlund and Rossini 2007; Wheeler et al. 
2016a). Prices particularly increased for high security entitlements in important sMDB water 
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trading zones, such as Murrumbidgee, Greater Goulburn, and VIC and NSW Murray below 
the Barmah Choke (see Figure 3.24 regarding the increase in high reliability entitlement 
prices in the Goulburn district). 
 
Figure 3.24 Temporary and permanent annual nominal water prices in the Goulburn 
and sMDB water trade volumes from 1993-94 to 2018-19 
 
Source: Own figure, data sourced from NWC (2011a), BOM (2020g) and DELWP (2019b) 
Indeed, Wheeler et al. (2016a) found that returns from investing water entitlements are 
competitive to returns from investing in the ASX 200 (see Figure 3.25), making water a 
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Figure 3.25 Return from water market investment, compared to the S&P ASX 
accumulation index 
 
Source: Wheeler et al. (2016a, p. 382) 
This raises some important questions regarding water as a financial asset and as collateral: 
• Do MDB stakeholders view water primarily as an investment asset? 
• How does the risk and return from water investment compare to other investment 
assets?  
• How is water valued for financial, investment and mortgage purposes? 
MDB water entitlements have moved into the focus of the financial investment community 
(Roca et al. 2015) and have attracted some investors over the last 10 years. Investment takes 
two general forms: 1) as part of investing in corporate agricultural production, owning land 
and water [often high value horticultural crops like almonds] (ISA 2017); or 2) investing 
directly into water entitlements to generate water market returns, without owning land or 
engaging in agricultural production. For this thesis, we refer to these actors as “agri-
corporates” and “non-landholder23 financial investors”. 
Quantitative information on both agri-corporate and non-landholder financial investor water 
ownership and trading behaviour is extremely limited. There is no publicly available register 
of agri-corporate land and water ownership, apart from what companies publish in their 
annual financial reports. For non-landholders, the closest approximation of water ownership 
is provided by DELWP (2019a) in form of water entitlements owned by the “non-user group” 
[not-tied to land] (see Figure 3.26). 
                                                 




Figure 3.26 Ownership of northern Victorian high-reliability water entitlements by 
stakeholder group 
 
Source: DELWP (2019a, p. 9) 
Non-user ownership of high-reliability water entitlements increased from 5% in 2009 to 12% 
in 2018 (DELWP 2019a). The definition of “non-user” applies to every allocation bank 
account without an irrigation or land-use licence attached to it. It therefore also applies to 
irrigators’ water held in self-managed superannuation accounts, likely making up the majority 
of the non-user group. Therefore, true non-landholder financial investors’ ownership is likely 
still small, but is increasing (DELWP 2019a). There has been a lack of research into why 
financial investors choose to invest in water entitlements and markets. One reason could be 
the attractive returns from water investment (Wheeler et al. 2016a). Another argument is that 
water investment provides diversification benefits (Roca et al. 2015), and is an alternative 
way to invest in agriculture (ISA 2017). Ultimately, which of those arguments is the main 
driver, or if there are others, is currently unknown. Similarly, how non-landholders own and 
trade water, including derivative-type products, is unexplored in the peer reviewed literature, 
albeit there has been some experimental work done (Bayer and Loch 2017). However, there 
is some evidence from newspaper reports that non-landholder investors are significant sellers 
of derivative-type temporary water products (Testa 2019). Given the increasing share of 
ownership by non-landholder financial investors, this gives rise to the following questions: 
• What motivates agri-corporate and non-landholder actors to invest in water? 
• What ownership and temporary trading strategies are employed by agri-corporates 
and non-landholder investors? 
• What is the impact of non-landholder and agri-coporate trading behaviour in the water 
market? 
Combining the three topics of derivative-type temporary water products, water investment 
asset characteristics and emerging non-landholder water market stakeholders may pose 
challenges for current water market capabilities and institutions. Indeed, the way how water 
trading data is currently captured and reported seems unequipped to appropriately reflect 
these new developments. A new round of water policy reform to further facilitate water 
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markets and a reduction in static transaction costs (Garrick et al. 2013) may be necessary to 
tackle the following questions: 
• Are current policy and water market institutions equipped to engage with derivative-
type temporary products and non-landholder water market stakeholders? 
• If necessary, how can water market institutions and water policies be improved to 
keep pace with an evolving water market system? 
The gaps identified in the water market literature are addressed in the following chapters, by 
combining different qualitative and quantitative data sets, containing information on irrigator, 
agri-corporate and non-landholder stakeholders. 
Stemming from irrigators’ discontent during the current drought and their historical 
uneasiness about non-irrigator water ownership (Bjornlund et al. 2011; Sullivan 2019), at the 
time of writing, the ACCC has been tasked with performing a review of current water market 
systems and institutions, paying particular attention to water investor ownership and trading 
behaviour, and to the influence of derivative-type temporary water market products 
(Frydenberg 2019). The reporting period of this inquiry is from the 9th August 2019, with the 
interim report to be published 31st May 2020, and the final report to be handed to the 
Commonwealth by 20th November 2020. The final report is expected to address a number of 
the questions raised in this section. 
 
3.8 Conclusion 
This Chapter has shown the complexity of MDB water markets. It showed that water markets 
in the sMDB are more active than those in the nMDB, for a number of institutional, 
historical, geographical and agricultural reasons. Water market products include permanent 
water entitlements, and temporary allocation trade, with new derivative-type temporary water 
products recently emerging within the market. Although water market participation has 
increased over time, enabled by continuous policy reform and falling static transaction costs, 
barriers to trade remain, mainly in the form of intervalley-trade restrictions. 
The water market in Australia is now used by a multitude of different stakeholder groups, 
including irrigators, environmental water holders and non-landholder financial investors. 
Each stakeholder group has different motivations for trading and owning water, with 
irrigators using the water market mainly to secure production against periods of low water 
availability, and for income from opportunistic water allocation sales. EWHs have the 
potential to employ active and adaptive trading strategies to improve environmental outcomes 
but are historically have only sold water allocations, albeit the CEWH are looking to buy 
water allocations for the first time in 2020. 
What is clear is that non-landholder stakeholders’ ownership and trading strategies, as well as 
the use of derivative-type temporary products by all stakeholders, is currently unexplored. 
Similarly, it is unclear whether current water market instructions and regulations are 
equipped to deal with these new stakeholders and trading products. These gaps in water 
market research are the focus of Chapters six and seven of this thesis. 
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Chapter 4 Methods and data 
The previous chapters of this thesis have reviewed the literature and identified the research 
gaps in irrigators’ water market ownership and trading strategies. While each analytical 
chapter contains a dedicated methods and data section specific to the particular research 
question analysed, there is no justification of why these methods were appropriate for the 
completion of this thesis. This chapter therefore provides a brief overview of the methods and 
data used in this thesis, and how they are the appropriate approach for the overall research 
conducted in this thesis. It is complimentary and therefore only contains information not 
discussed fully in the analytical chapters. The analytical chapters provide a detailed 
description of the data sources and modelling approaches used. 
 
4.1 Mixed method approach for thesis 
As outlined in previous chapters, in relation to the different topics addressed in this thesis, the 
availability of quantitative data varies. First of all, there were high quality quantitative data 
sets of irrigation trade and farm behaviour available, that were appropriate to answer irrigator 
related research questions. In particular, irrigator adaptation behaviour is strongly driven by 
socio-economic factors and irrigator characteristics, justifying the use of quantitative data to 
explore adaptation behaviour. Given that before unbundling irrigators were the primary water 
market stakeholders, their traditional allocation and entitlement trading behaviour is to a large 
extent, well reflected in publicly available water trading data repositories, such as the state 
water registers (although the differences in quality of water registers and level of information 
must be noted (Wheeler and Garrick 2020)). Applying quantitative research seeks to test and 
allow for generalisations about irrigators’ planned adaptation and associated drivers (Hoepfl 
1997). 
In contrast, derivative-type water market products and non-landholder water market 
stakeholders are new and emerging phenomena (Bayer and Loch 2017). As such, trading and 
ownership strategy expectations based on peer-reviewed literature are limited, and trading of 
derivative-type water market products is indistinguishable from allocation and entitlement 
trades in the publicly available water trading data (ABARES 2018; Seidl et al. 2020b). 
Furthermore, publicly available quantitative non-landholder and agri-corporate water 
ownership and trading data are not available or are not collected. Motives for non-landholder 
financial water market investment are largely unexplored, with the exception of Roca et al. 
(2015) and Wheeler et al. (2016a). Exploring these topics requires the extension of theoretical 
understanding or the identification of emerging theory, appropriately applied in a qualitative 
research setting (Bazeley 2013). In this context, it requires specifying non-landholder trading 
and ownership patterns, and their relationship with water investment motives, to provide a 
deeper understanding of these factors and allow for extrapolation to similar situations in the 
field (Hoepfl 1997). 
Both approaches, qualitative and quantitative, have their strengths and weaknesses. This 
thesis uses a combination of both approaches to provide a comprehensive understanding and 
exploration of research topics; a task not possible by only using one approach (Creswell 
2003; Russek and Weinberg 1993). Employing quantitative methods to investigate irrigator 
adaptation and water trading behaviour complements the qualitative analysis of the related 
issue of non-irrigator trading behaviour. Using quantitative water trading and brokerage data 
enables the triangulation and verification of results identified in the qualitative research 
component (Palinkas et al. 2011). In practice, the quantitative data that were available 
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resulted in qualitative and quantitative methods almost exclusively addressing separate, but 
closely related, components of the overall research questions. 
 
4.2 Thesis data sets 
This thesis mainly uses three distinct data sets; two quantitative ones of secondary data and a 
primary qualitative one:  
1. A University of Adelaide quantitative data set of a sMDB irrigator telephone survey, 
conducted in late 2015 and containing the answers of 1000 irrigators across the states 
of NSW, SA and VIC.  
2. A qualitative data set compiled from 64 (albeit 63 were analysed due to one missing 
information) mainly face-to-face interviews with water experts representing agri-
corporates, banks, environmental water holders, financial investors, property 
evaluators and water brokers.  
3. A quantitative unit record data set on water forward and parking trade data from 
2016/17 - 2018/19, provided by the private water trading platform H2Ox. 
 
4.2.1 Irrigator quantitative survey data 
The irrigator survey was conducted in October–November 2015 with 1000 irrigators, not 
dryland farmers, from NSW (n=419), SA (n=209) and Victoria (n=372) in the sMDB. 
Irrigators were randomly sampled from lists of irrigator names (compiled from a variety of 
sources including publicly available information on websites and farm business mailing lists), 
and were surveyed (after receiving ethics approval) using computer assisted telephone 
interviews by a professional survey company (Wheeler et al. 2018). The final response rate 
was 51% (or 73% including irrigators who agreed to be surveyed but were not rung back as 
the target sample size was reached). The survey collected information from 957 (95.7%) 
conventional and 43 (4.3%) certified organic irrigators (Daghagh Yazd et al. 2019). Given the 
actual irrigator population in the sMDB states, their sample sizes resulted in relative standard 
errors (RSE) of 4.7%, 5.1% and 6.6% respectively (e.g. indicating low RSEs), for an 
estimated proportion of 0.5. As an indication, the Australian Bureau of Statistics suggests that 
RSEs>25% are subject to high sampling error and should be used with caution in relation to 
irrigators living in the sMDB (Wheeler et al. 2018). This data set has previously been used by 
Wheeler et al. (2018) and Daghagh Yazd et al. (2019), albeit with different foci and research 
questions. 
 
4.2.2 Semi-structured expert qualitative interview data 
This section provides additional details about the interview sampling and participant selection 
criteria which are not explained in chapters six and seven. To explore the topics of derivative-
type water trading products, financial water investment attitudes and agri-corporate and non-
landholder water ownership and trading strategies, data from a highly knowledgeable, but 
hard to identify, group of stakeholders were needed (Creswell and Plano Clark 2011). 
Members of this group needed to fulfil a number of criteria: 
• Represent an organisation with a “large” water portfolio/trading volume 
• Represent an organisation that is an agri-corporate, a financial water investor or an 
environmental water holder 
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• Have managerial responsibilities over this water portfolio, including strategic 
decision-making capabilities 
• Have an in-depth understanding of MDB water markets 
Or 
• Represent an organisation with a “large” involvement in water mortgaging, or 
financial water valuation 
• Have managerial responsibilities over water lending or water valuation processes 
• Have an in-depth understanding of MDB water markets, and water lending or water 
valuation 
This represents a “Criterion-i” purposeful sampling approach as described by Palinkas et al. 
(2015), in that sampled cases need to meet important criteria which have been predefined. As 
there is no publicly available database containing names of agri-corporates and financial 
investors in the MDB, this group of stakeholders is also hard to identify. However, a 
characteristic of agri-corporates and financial investors in the MDB is that there are few of 
them, and they are highly interconnected. We made use of this characteristic and employed a 
chain-referral sampling approach, also known as “snowball method”, suggested by Biernacki 
and Waldorf (1981) to identify and recruit additional research participants after our initial 
recruitment stage. We therefore combined the “Criterion-i” and snowball sampling methods 
to recruit participants who satisfied our sampling criteria, while making use of their 
professional networks to extend the reach of our research (Palinkas et al. 2015). Following 
Corbin and Strauss (2015), we aimed to interview at least 30 experts to achieve appropriately 
robust results that were relevant to our research aims. 
After gaining ethics approval (approval number H-2017-192), we started initial recruitment 
of interview participants in mid-April 2018, with the last interview conducted in October 
2018. The initial potential participants and organisations were identified from a wide range of 
publicly available sources, including newspaper articles, reports by government departments 
and NGOs, conference attendance, company annual and financial reports, personal and 
professional networks, company websites and web searches. Potential candidates and 
organisations were first approached via email, which included information about the research 
in form of a participant information sheet. The initial contact emails and the participant 
information sheet can be found in Appendices B.1 - B.5. Different email versions were sent, 
depending on whether the recipient was known by name or not, and whether they were based 
in South Australia or in other states. To comply with research ethics, we slightly modified our 
snowball approach in that we requested initial email recipients to forward our recruitment 
email, including participant information sheet, to other eligible stakeholders and subsequently 
have them contact us. This was to make sure no private information was used without prior 
consent: no potential interview participant was approached via contact information not 
publicly available.  
If we did not receive a response to our initial email within 10-15 business days, we sent a 
follow-up email, including an automated read-request via Microsoft Outlook. If there was no 
response for another 10-15 business days, we then called the potential participant to ensure 
the research participation request has been received. If the stakeholder indicated that they did 
not want to be involved in our research they were not contacted again.  
In case of a positive response to our request, we then sent another email to arrange a time and 
date for the interview to take place (see Appendices B.6 and B.7). This email again included 
the request for chain referral and had the participant consent form attached (Appendix B.8). 
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When conducting the interview, we brought spare copies of the consent form and a research 
hand-out with us, which summarised the key points of the research, in case participants 
needed a refresher on the research topic and the questions which would be asked of them. 
This hand-out also collected voluntarily provided information about participants’ experience 
in current and previous professional roles (Appendix B.9). After establishing participants’ 
consent, the interviews were voice-recorded to facilitate transcription. Notes were taken 
during the interview. If interviews needed to be undertaken remotely (over the phone), the 
consent form was read out to participants and their response was voice recorded as proof of 
consent. They were also advised when recording commenced and terminated. Interviews 
were terminated at a participant’s request, or after all interview questions had been answered 
and no new topics were discussed. We used two specific, but closely related, sets of interview 
questions, one for agri-corporates, financial investors and environmental water holders 
(Appendix B.10), and another set for banks, property evaluators and water brokers (Appendix 
B.11). Interview questions and transcripts were provided to participants upon request. 
Overall, 64 of the 83 identified contacts agreed to be interviewed, and semi-structured 
personal interviews were conducted. Although it is strictly not a survey response rate, this 
represents a response rate of 77% (with one of two written responses excluded due to 
incompleteness). We received one eligible written response and conducted 25% of the 
interviews by phone, and discarded one other written response as it was incomplete and did 
not answer all the questions. Of the final 63 interviews used for analysis in this thesis, they 
included 20 agri-corporates and investors, 15 environmental water holders (EWHs) and NGO 
employees, 10 water and property evaluators, 7 financial investors, 6 bankers and 5 water 
brokers (see Table 4.1). Because of the decentralised local organisational structure of some 
environmental water holders, with decisions made at the local level, it was necessary to 
interview a few respondents from the same organisation. Interview transcripts and notes were 
analysed in Nvivo 11 and manually coded according to major themes. 
 
Table 4.1 Interviews and response rates by stakeholder type 
Stakeholder Type Approached Interviewed Response rate in % 
Agri-corporates 32 20 63 
Banks 7 6 86 
EWHs  17 16 (one excluded) 94 
Financial investors 10 7 70 
Property evaluators 12 10 83 
Water Brokers 5 5 100 
Total 83 64 77 
 
4.2.3 Individual water forward and parking trades data set 
Given the difficulties in accessing information on forward and parking data from state 
registers, we requested access to a quantitative private water broker data set of 92 individual 
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forward and parking trades from 2016/17 until 2018/19, provided by H2OX in June 201924. 
This allowed us to triangulate stakeholder interview responses in regard to water forwards 
and parking trading. Note that chapters six and seven do not report the H2OX data summary 
statistics provided in this section. Trading data were anonymised, but contained information 
on stakeholder groups, specifying whether trades were undertaken by financial investors, 
agri-corporates, IIOs, EWHs or private irrigators. The data-set contained traded volumes, 
prices, delivery and contract dates, and source and destination trade zones. Table 4.2 provides 
some summary statistics of forward and parking trade data by year. 
 

















Forward 4 1,100 400 2,500 212 2016/17 
 12 3,517 200 10,000 139 2017/18 
 32 673 200 2,000 227 2018/19 
Parking 0 - - - - 2016/17 
19 646 62 2,000 23 2017/18 
21 736 36 3,800 21 2018/19 
Source: Own figure, data provided by H2OX 
 
4.3 Summary 
This chapter provides the reasons why a mix of quantitative and qualitative data sources for a 
mixed methods approach was used in this thesis. It also provided complementary detail to 
each data source used, with each following analytical chapter giving a more in-depth account 
and discussion of corresponding methodologies and data used. 
 
 
                                                 
24 Of these 92 trades, 88 were for the period of 2016/17-2018/19 and four forwards were for 2019/20. These four 
were excluded because the 2019/20 data are incomplete, given we received the dataset in June 2019. 
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Chapter 5 Accommodating, contractive or expansive: drivers of Murray-
Darling Basin irrigators’ planned adaptation  
 
This chapter presents an unpublished paper manuscript, yet to be submitted to a journal for 
review. It is formatted in submittable manuscript form. There is therefore some repetition 
with other chapters of this thesis, particularly the background sections. 
 
Abstract: 
Irrigators in the Murray-Darling Basin will need to adapt to future uncertainty, because of 
changes in markets, industry structures and climate. Such planned adaptation can be 
classified as expansive, accommodating or contractive strategies. Expansive adaptation 
strategies expand irrigation, accommodating strategies modify existing processes or crops 
without changing the size of the irrigation component of the farm, whereas contractive 
strategies reduce irrigation. Using data from a 2015-16 survey of 1,000 southern Murray-
Darling Basin irrigators, 19 distinct planned adaptation strategies are aggregated into 
expansive, accommodating and contractive adaptation indices to analyse drivers of irrigators’ 
future adaptation. While 90% of all irrigators are planning for at least one form of adaptation, 
there is limited evidence that they prefer expansive adaptation strategies over accommodating 
and contractive adaptation strategies. In particular, succession planning and past adaptation 
experience have a statistically significant positive influence on all planned adaptation indices. 
The influence of financial, human, natural, physical and social capital varies between 
adaptation types, with financial capital variables the strongest statistically significant driver 
for accommodating adaptation. Expansive and contractive adaptation are more strongly 
impacted by human and social capital variables.  
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Climate change, changing economic circumstances and markets are major sources of 
uncertainty for farmers across the globe, requiring continuous adaptation well into the future 
(WEF 2019; Wheeler et al. 2020b). Utilising economies of scale and irrigation technology to 
make farms more productive has traditionally been used by farmers to deal with uncertain 
economic circumstances and a drier climate (de Roest et al. 2018; Turral et al. 2010). 
Although the drive to increase farm productivity through economies of scale likely will need 
to continue to satisfy the increasing demand for food associated with global population 
growth, this process is severely constrained by land degradation and projected pressures on 
water resources stemming from climate change (IPCC 2019). In particular, irrigators’ face 
increased uncertainty compared to dryland farmers (Wheeler et al. 2018). Irrigators’ plans for 
future adaptation can therefore be highly varied. Some will consider strategies that expand 
irrigation in the face of uncertainty, while others will seek to contract the irrigation 
component of the farm, and others will seek to accommodate changes to production and 
irrigation systems without significantly altering the size of irrigated production. 
Understanding what influences irrigators’ adaption plans is important, especially for policy-
makers who design policies to influence both a) farm profitability and b) incentives to exit an 
industry (Zuo et al. 2015b). Although there has been considerable research on general farmer 
adaptation and adoption behaviour (e.g. (Adger et al. 2007; Chavas and Nauges 2020; Feder 
et al. 1985; Llewellyn and Brown 2020; Pannell and Zilberman 2020; Park et al. 2012; 
Prokopy et al. 2008; Zampaligré et al. 2014; Zilberman et al. 2012)), empirical quantitative 
analysis of farmers’ planned adaptation decisions, addressing complex, forward-looking and 
site-specific characteristics of adaptation processes (Below et al. 2012; Wheeler et al. 2013b) 
has been less common. The majority of the literature has also explained past adaptation rather 
than predicting future adaptation/ adoption (Llewellyn and Brown 2020). 
The case study that this paper focussed upon is irrigators in the southern Murray-Darling 
Basin (sMDB) of Australia. Irrigators in this region are at the forefront of experiencing 
changing weather patterns, farm structures, commodity and input prices. Those in NSW are 
currently in the grip of the worst drought in 120 years (BOM 2020c). Indeed, the future 
climate in the sMDB is predicted to be drier, with a higher frequency of extreme events 
(CSIRO 2008, 2012; Timbal et al. 2015). Driven by world demand for high value crops (e.g. 
almonds and cotton), agricultural change in the sMDB is occurring such that horticultural 
demand may exceed water availability in drought years (Loch and Adamson 2015; Loch et al. 
2019). Although sMDB irrigators are historically highly experienced in adapting to changing 
and extreme weather, adapting to changes in both climate and business environments will be 
especially challenging (see sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.3). Given the combination of changing 
climate and the changing structure of agricultural production, the sMDB provides an 
excellent case study to investigate the drivers of planned expansive, accommodating and 
contractive adaptation strategies. 
This study uses a survey of 1,000 sMDB irrigators from 2015-16 to answer the following two 
research questions: 
1) Do sMDB irrigators prefer to rely solely on planned expansive, accommodating or 
contractive adaptation, or a mix of these? 




Insights from this study may be of significant assistance to policy makers in Australia, and 
abroad, when designing policies aimed at increasing irrigators’ planned adaptation behaviour 
in an environment of profound climatic and economic uncertainty. 
 
5.2 Adaptation literature review and background 
Changing climatic and business environments lead to increased uncertainty for irrigators 
arising from imperfect information about future events (Hardaker 2015). Uncertainty relates 
to the nature, the magnitude and the speed of change, both in regard to climate, but also other 
factors, such as commodity prices, interest rates and industry structure. These can be 
independent of, but also indirectly affected by, a changing climate. For example, the price for 
cotton is determined by global demand and supply, with supply potentially impacted by 
changes in climate. As socio-economic factors and available information change over time, 
so does the impact of uncertainty for adaptation decisions (Chavas and Nauges 2020). This 
includes missing information about the impacts of future uncertainty (Hardaker 2015). For 
example, how does an increase of 2°C in mean temperature translate into grape yield per 
hectare? A key distinction between two types of uncertainty is risk and ambiguity (Adamson 
et al. 2009). Risk arises when the probability distribution of a given variable is known, e.g. 
the probability of a 2°C increase in mean temperature by 2030. Ambiguity, also sometimes 
referred to as Knightian uncertainty (Ellsberg 1961; Knight 1933), arises when probabilities 
are unknown, or when it is impossible to describe all possible future outcomes. 
Faced with multiple dimensions of uncertainty about the future, irrigators plan to implement 
measures and actions which they believe will provide net benefits for either one or more 
dimensions (Adger et al. 2007; Chavas and Nauges 2020). These strategies can be seen as 
planned adaptations in response to future uncertainty. 
 
5.2.1 Adaptation strategy types and typologies 
Corresponding to the many dimensions of uncertainty and risk, irrigators have an extensive 
set of adaptation strategies available to them. In this context, we define adaptation as changes 
in public and private decision making and resource allocation in anticipating or responding to 
the prospect or reality of large-scale and long-lasting changes (Zilberman et al. 2012). 
Due to this multi-dimensionality, Smit and Skinner (2002) suggest employing different 
adaptation categorisations to allow for concise analysis of adaptation behaviour. An overview 
of some of the more commonly used adaptation categories and their definitions in Table 5.1. 
For example, irrigators in the MDB use different strategies to adapt to water scarcity or 
drought, which can be categorised as related to information, water trade, land, farm structure, 
agronomy, infrastructure and environment [see Table C.1] (AFI 2019; Wheeler et al. 2014a). 
Utilising available water trade and climatic information enables better predictions around the 
risk of crop failure or enables trading for most financial gain. Employing different water 
market trading products (Seidl et al. 2020b) help to smooth seasonal variability in rainfall and 
farm income, while adjusting land and irrigation area allows for economies of scale and 
flexibility in production systems. Changing farm ownership structures and increasing off-
farm income spreads the risk associated with relying only on farming income and increases 
responsiveness to water scarcity. Changing crop mix, farm management strategies, utilising 
more efficient irrigation infrastructure and environmental friendly practices also has 
adaptation benefits for water scarcity (AFI 2019; Wheeler et al. 2014a). 
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The categorisation suggested by Smit and Skinner (2002) is used to highlight one (or more) 
aspects of adaptation, for example the timing of adaptation in relation to the change event 
(Fankhauser et al. 1999; Zilberman et al. 2012) or the type of adapting actor (Adger et al. 
2005). Considerable work has been done on the adoption of individual, often crop-based, 
adaptation strategies, such as crop diversification or no-till agriculture (Bradshaw et al. 2004; 
D'Emden et al. 2006; de Sousa et al. 2017; Deressa et al. 2009; Moniruzzaman 2015; Pannell 
et al. 2006; Wang et al. 2015b). A smaller, but growing, number of studies explore the 
adaptation of multiple strategies, often in form of different adaptation indices, with index 
components weighted or unweighted (Below et al. 2012; Dinh et al. 2017; Nicholas and 
Durham 2012; Wheeler et al. 2013b).  
This study is interested in how irrigators’ planned adaptation, across a range of potential 
strategies, shapes the structure and size of a farm’s irrigation component. Therefore, planned 
adaptation is analysed in three indices: 1) expansive adaptation that increases or enhances the 
irrigation component of a farm enterprise; 2) accommodating adaptation that changes the 
farm structure without impacting the irrigation component; and 3) contractive adaptation that 
reduces the irrigation component. Wheeler et al. (2013b) found that farmers who believe in 
climate change occurring are more likely to plan accommodating, but not expansive 
strategies. The paper also found an often endogenous relationship between climate change 
belief and planned adaptation strategies, especially pronounced for accommodating 
adaptation. Although a similar approach has been employed by Wheeler et al. (2013b), our 
analysis differs substantially in that we include a much more comprehensive list of 19 
strategies compared to eight strategies in Wheeler et al. (2013b), undertake an improved 
modelling approach by analysing expansive, accommodating and contractive strategy indices 
separately, and employ a more recent data set (2015 vs 2010 data). Wheeler et al. (2013b) 
aggregated expansive, accommodating and contractive adaptation into one overall adaptation 
index, with expansive and accommodating strategies positively contributing, and contractive 





Table 5.1 Overview of common adaptation strategy categories 
Dimension of interest Adaptation category Definition and source Example 
Adapting actor 
Autonomous/unintentional Natural spontaneous adjustment undertaken by independent actors (Adger et al. 2005; 
Smit and Skinner 2002) 
Changed harvesting schedule 
Planned/purposeful Conscious adjustment/intervention requiring coordination with other actors (Adger et 
al. 2005; Smit and Skinner 2002) 
Government Investment in irrigation 
infrastructure 
Adaptation intent 
Facilitating Enhances actors’ ability to adapt (Fuessel and Klein 2006) Research developing drought resistant 
crops 




Micro level Small scale (Zilberman et al. 2012) Irrigation scheduling by individual 
farmer/plot 
Macro level Large scale (Zilberman et al. 2012) No-tillage agriculture across a whole 
region 
Global At global scale (Brooks and Adger 2005) New global production standards 
Local At local scale (Brooks and Adger 2005) Solar-powered farm irrigation system 
Incremental Uses existing technologies and institutional frameworks (Park et al. 2012; Zilberman 
et al. 2012) 
Fodder substitution for irrigating 
pasture 
Transformative Major change in resource allocation across large temporal and spatial scales (Park et 
al. 2012; Zilberman et al. 2012) 
Change from dryland to irrigated 
agriculture 
Adaptation duration 
Short-term/tactical Provides adaptation benefits for a short time period (Smit and Skinner 2002) Fodder substitution for irrigating 
pasture 
Long-term/strategic Provided adaptation benefits for an extended period of future stresses (Smit and 
Skinner 2002) 
Upgrading to drip irrigation 
Adaptation timing 
Reactive The response to the impacts of change/uncertainty after they materialised (Fankhauser 
et al. 1999; Zilberman et al. 2012) 
Relocation after flood/bush fire 
Anticipatory Anticipates future and seeks to address changes before they materialised (Fankhauser 
et al. 1999; Zilberman et al. 2012) 
Farm/crop insurance 
Adaptation technology 
Hard Tangible and mechanised, similar to hard technology (Wheeler et al. 2017c) Farm machinery which causes less 
emissions 
Soft Change of management and skills, often intangible, similar to soft technology 
(Wheeler et al. 2017c) 
Change of planting dates 
Influence on size/structure of adapting 
actor 
Expansive and Accommodating Designed to expands efforts and production, or accommodate change in existing size 
or structure (Wheeler et al. 2013b) 
Increased water ownership, Change in 
soil management practices 
Contractive Designed to reduce effort, resource ownership and size (Wheeler et al. 2013b) Sale of land in change-affected areas 
General 
Technological development Research and development of new technologies or managerial innovations (Smit and 
Skinner 2002) 
Weather and climate information 
systems 
Government programs and insurance Government assistance or incentive programs, insurances against different 
uncertainties (Smit and Skinner 2002) 
Agricultural support programs and 
subsidies, farm/crop insurance 
Farm financial management Including different financial tools and management practices into the farm system 
(Smit and Skinner 2002) 
Crop derivatives (options and futures), 
income diversification 
Farm production practices Changing farm production systems to better cope with uncertainty (Smit and Skinner 
2002) 




5.2.2 A framework and drivers of irrigators’ planned adaptation 
Many adaptation studies analyse the drivers for implemented adaptation behaviour; observing 
what strategies were implemented and why (Abid et al. 2016; Below et al. 2012; Dinh et al. 
2017; Moniruzzaman 2015; Prokopy et al. 2008; Wang et al. 2015a). One particular issue 
with this is controlling for endogeneity between past behaviour using current socio-economic 
characteristics. This study focuses on adaptation behaviour irrigators plan to implement in the 
mid-near future (the next five years in our case). As future implementation cannot be 
observed, we have to rely on irrigators’ self-reported intent to implement adaptation 
strategies. 
However, although intention to implement a behaviour is not the same as enactment, other 
research comparing irrigator stated and actual behaviour suggest high correlation (Wheeler 
and Zuo 2017; Wheeler et al. 2013b). Although Väre et al. (2010) report a large gap between 
planned and actual farm investment, Fielding et al. (2008) found that Australian farmers’ 
planned and actual adoption of sustainable farming is influenced by past behaviour, perceived 
behavioural control, social identity variables, and attitudes. This further supported by 
Wheeler et al. (2013b) who found that Goulburn irrigators intentions for farm management 
and water trading reasonably closely matched their actual behaviour, with intentions slightly 
higher than actual behaviour, and periods of significant drought changing planned behaviour 
considerably. 
To model future adaptation a number of studies (Feola et al. 2015; Li et al. 2017; Wheeler et 
al. 2013b) employ various versions of the Theory of Planned Behaviour (Ajzen 1991) or 
related frameworks, such as the Theory of Reasoned Action (Ajzen 2012). The Theory of 
Planned Behaviour describes how the intention to perform a certain behaviour is formed and 
how it translates into actual enactment, with stronger intention more likely leading to 
enactment. This intention is influenced by three components: attitudes, subjective norms, and 
perceived behavioural control. Attitudes are influenced by beliefs about behaviours, 
subjective norms represent social pressures to perform or not perform certain behaviours, and 
perceived behavioural control represents the (perceived) ease or difficulty of performing a 
behaviour. Conversely, if behaviours are not subject to serious constraints in form of 
perceived behavioural control, intention alone can predict the performance of behaviour 
(Ajzen 1991). 
A critical consideration is how to empirically incorporate difficult to observe or unobservable 
Theory of Planned Behaviour concepts, particularly perceived behavioural control. Limited 
resource access and availability corresponds with low behavioural control (Ajzen 1991). 
Wheeler et al. (2013b) adapted the traditional Theory of Planned Behaviour by expressing 
perceived behavioural control as a function of observable resource access and availability in 
form of financial, human, natural, physical and social capital (based on Ellis (2000)). As we 
analyse 19 planned adaptation strategies, compared to the eight in Wheeler et al. (2013b), we 
have further modified their framework to better distinguish between planned expansive, 
accommodating and contractive adaptation (Figure 5.1). While attitudes may directly 
influence planned adaptation behaviour, e.g. in form of preferences for particular adaptation 
strategies, this chapter also allows irrigators’ world views to impact the influence of 
perceived behavioural control on planned adaptation behaviour, by analysing different 
attitudinal clusters of irrigators. This is signified by the dotted arrow in Figure 5.1.  
97 
 
Figure 5.1 Theory of Irrigators’ Planned Behaviour 
 
Source: Adapted from Wheeler et al. (2013b) 
Table 5.2 provides an overview of key findings in the literature in regard to significant 
drivers of farm adaptation behaviour, from the perspective of the five types of capital. We 
define financial capital as the economic and financial characteristics of an irrigation farm (e.g 
debt, farm income, farmland value, off-farm income), human capital as unique characteristics 
of the irrigator (e.g. education, age, farming experience, health, marital status, household 
size), natural capital as the physical setting of the farm (e.g. temperature, rainfall, 
evaporation, soil quality, region), physical capital as the characteristics and technology of 
irrigated production (e.g. farm size, irrigation technology, farm machinery, number of 
employees, tenure), and social capital as the characteristics of the irrigator’s social unit (e.g. 
membership in social groups, farm extension, succession, government programs and 
subsidies). 
These five types of capital are commonly used in the climate change adaptation (e.g. 
(Harrison et al. 2013; Jäger et al. 2015; Li et al. 2017; Ng’ang’a et al. 2016; Wheeler et al. 
2013b)) and the adoption literature (e.g. (Awotide et al. 2015; García de Jalón et al. 2017; 
Mumuni and Oladele 2016; Siepmann and Nicholas 2018), allowing us to summarise their 
impact on adaptation. Given the vastness of this body of literature, some general trends in 
adoption of new practices can be observed: adoption processes typically begin with a small 
number of farmers (‘innovators’), with the technology adoption then diffusing to other 
farmers as information spreads (Ryan and Gross 1943). This process follows an S-shaped 
curve, with early adoption fairly slow, followed by a rapid increase and finally plateauing off. 
Correspondingly, there are different types of adopters at different stages of adoption: 
innovators, early adopters, early majority adopters, late majority, and laggards (Rogers 2003; 
Ryan and Gross 1943). A large literature subsequently focused on the characteristics of the 
adopting actors (Beal et al. 1957; D'Emden et al. 2006; Feder et al. 1985; Feder and Slade 
1984; Fischer et al. 1996; Fuglie and Kascak 2001; Ghadim and Pannell 1999; Griliches 
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1957; Knudson 1991; Lindner et al. 1982; Morrison 2005; Pannell 1999; Rogers 2003; 
Shampine 1998) finding that innovator farmers (as compared to nonadopters) tended to be 
younger, more educated, more cosmopolitan, have higher incomes, have larger farm 
operations, and be more reliant on primary sources of information (Stephenson 2003). The 
seminal study of the diffusion of hybrid corn by Griliches (1957) linked adoption with 
profitability, rejecting the influence of many sociological variables thought previously 
important. For various types of agricultural innovations, economic and sociological factors 
may be of differing importance. For example, economic factors may play a more important 
role in the adoption of innovations that are easy to implement and provide demonstrable 
benefits [i.e., hybrid corn] (Wheeler et al. 2009). On the other hand, sociological factors may 
play more of a role for adoption of innovations that involve investment in new skills, such as 
sustainable agriculture (Morrison 2005). With study contexts very heterogeneous, a large 
diversity of research questions, different attributes of adapting/adopting actors, and the varied 
technologies explored (Pannell and Zilberman 2020), this leads to a lack of clear convergence 
between various studies of agricultural adoption, with different explanatory variables 




















Access to credit (+) Occasionally (Bryan et al. 2009; Deressa et al. 2009; Touch et al. 2016) 
Debt Unclear Rarely (Wheeler et al. 2013b) 
Income/wealth (+) Often (Below et al. 2012; Deressa et al. 2009; Li et al. 2017) 




Age Usually (-) Occasionally (Pannell et al. 2006; Roco et al. 2014; Wheeler et al. 2013b) 
Climate change belief Usually (+) Rarely (Dang et al. 2014; Deressa et al. 2009; Tambo 2016) 
Climate change risk 
perception 
Usually (+) Rarely (Alam 2015; Arbuckle et al. 2013; Jianjun et al. 2015) 
Education Usually (+) Often (Abid et al. 2016; Alam 2015; Deressa et al. 2009) 
Farm experience Usually (+) Occasionally (Abid et al. 2016; Alam 2015; Bryan et al. 2013) 
Female gender Usually (-) Occasionally (Below et al. 2012; Deressa et al. 2009; Jianjun et al. 2015) 
Health (+) Rarely (Wheeler et al. 2013b) 
Household size Usually (+) Occasionally (Bryan et al. 2009; Bryan et al. 2013; Zampaligré et al. 2014) 
Past experience (+) Rarely 
(Ghadim et al. 2005; Nicholas and Durham 2012; Wheeler et al. 
2013b) 
Risk preference/aversion Unclear Rarely (Ghadim et al. 2005; Tambo 2016; Wheeler et al. 2013b) 




Rainfall Usually (-) Occasionally (Deressa et al. 2009; Gandure et al. 2013; Moniruzzaman 2015) 
Region Unclear Occasionally (Abid et al. 2016; Li et al. 2017; Wheeler et al. 2013b) 
Soil quality Usually (-) Occasionally 
(Azad and Ancev 2020; Gadédjisso-Tossou 2015; Touch et al. 
2016) 






Farm size Usually (+) Often (Bryan et al. 2013; Ghadim et al. 2005; Li et al. 2017) 
Farm 
technology/inventory 
Usually (+) Occasionally (Bryan et al. 2013; Wang et al. 2015b; Zampaligré et al. 2014) 
Tenure Unclear Occasionally (Abid et al. 2016; Alam 2015; Li et al. 2017) 
Social capital 
Characteristics of 
the actor’s social 
unit 
Extension services (+) Occasionally (Below et al. 2012; Bryan et al. 2013; Li et al. 2017) 
Government programs 
and subsidies 
Usually (+) Rarely (Bryan et al. 2013; Gandure et al. 2013; Zampaligré et al. 2014) 
Membership of Social 
networks 
Usually (+) Occasionally (Below et al. 2012; Li et al. 2017; Wheeler et al. 2013b) 
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5.3 Data and Methodology 
This section outlines the study area, the survey data, and the modelling. 
 
5.3.1 Study Area 
The sMDB spans three states New South Wales (NSW), South Australia (SA), Victoria 
(VIC) and the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) in south-eastern Australia (Figure 5.2). 
Figure 5.2 Map of the Murray-Darling Basin  
 
Source: MDBA (2016a) 
The MDB produces food and fibre worth around AU$22 billion annually (MDBA 2019k), is 
home to about 9,200 irrigators (ABS 2016), with the majority stemming from the sMDB’s 
irrigation regions and districts: Sunraysia (VIC and NSW), Riverina (NSW), Goulburn-
Murray Irrigation District (VIC), Murrumbidgee Irrigation district (NSW), Murray Irrigation 
district (NSW), and the Riverland (SA). 
Irrigation in these regions is supported by water entitlements of different security/reliability 
and corresponding water allocations. There are three main securities (high, general and low); 
a water entitlement is the right to extract a share of the available water resource.25 An 
                                                 
25 A high security entitlement yields the full extraction amount in 90-95 out of 100 years (Zuo et al. 2016). 
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allocation is the actual volume of water extracted on an entitlement in a given year. 
Entitlements and allocation can be traded. For further information on water trading and 
ownership strategies, see Seidl et al. (2020b), and Grafton and Wheeler (2018) for water 
trading and water reform history. 
 
5.3.2 Data 
We use data from an irrigator telephone survey, conducted from October-November 2015 in 
the sMDB. The data consists of 1,000 responses (overall response rate 51%)26 by randomly 
sampled irrigators (not dryland farmers) across three states (NSW, Victoria and SA).27 Our 
data include the Sunraysia, NSW Murray and Murrumbidgee irrigation districts (mostly 
annual cotton and rice), the VIC Goulburn-Murray Irrigation District (mostly dairy and 
livestock), and the SA Riverland (mostly perennial citrus, grapes, fruits and nuts). With the 
high response rate, the large sample size and irrigator demographics which are very similar to 
other commonly used data sources (Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian Bureau of 
Agricultural and Resource Economics and Science), our survey is strongly representative of 
the general irrigator population. The survey collected information on farmers’ attitudes, 
socio-economic and farm characteristics, past farm management and adaptation strategies and 
future/planned management and adaptation strategies in the next 5 years. For more discussion 
on the survey data collection see Daghagh Yazd et al. (2019) and Wheeler et al. (2018). 
Gridded historic temperature, rainfall and evaporation data from the Bureau of Meteorology 
was geo-matched to the post-codes of each survey respondent and incorporated into the 
survey data set. This allows us to also examine the impact of climatic influences on planned 
adaptation. 
 
5.3.3 Dependent variable 
This section illustrates dependent variable construction for the different modelling 
approaches. Table 5.3 to Table 5.5 provide an overview of dependent variables and summary 
statistics for the individual planned adaptations and the planned adaptation indices models. 
  
                                                 
26 Or a response rate of 73% if irrigators who agreed to be surveyed but were not rung back as the target sample 
size was reached were included. 
27 Given irrigator populations in the three states, the final sample sizes of NSW (419), VIC (372) and SA (209) 
will result in relative standard errors (RSE) of 4.7%, 5.1% and 6.6% respectively (e.g. indicating low RSEs), for 
an estimated proportion of 0.5. As an indication, ABS suggests that RSEs>25% are subject to high sampling 
error and should be used with caution. 
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Table 5.3 Irrigators' planned individual adaptation strategies and response percentages 
(n=1,000) 
Planned adaptation strategies (1= yes, 0= otherwise) % of ‘yes’ 
responses In the next 5 years, are you planning to: 
Expansive strategies  
purchase water allocations  56 
purchase water entitlements 30 
purchase any farmland near your current properties 29 
purchase any farmland in different zones/regions for risk purposes 11 
improve the efficiency of your irrigation infrastructure 67 
increase your irrigated area 29 
Accommodating strategies  
change ownership structures 29 
changed your irrigated production 48 
diversify your production 40 
increase farm insurance 39 
decrease your area of dryland production 9 
increase any collective bargaining or collaboration with other farmers 22 
increase your area of dryland production 20 
utilise solar-power energy and battery system for your irrigation pumping 31 
Contractive strategies  
think about selling the whole farm 53 
decrease your irrigated area 15 
sell water allocations 38 
sell water entitlements 15 



















Planned adaptation strategies; yes=1, 
0=otherwise) 




6.5(3.2) 0 16 
Planned expansive 
adaptation index 
2.2(1.7) 0 6 
purchase water allocations  
purchase water entitlements 
purchase any farmland near your current 
properties 
purchase any farmland in different 
zones/regions for risk purposes 
improve the efficiency of your irrigation 
infrastructure 




2.3(1.8) 0 7 
change ownership structures 
changed your irrigated production 
diversify your production 
increase farm insurance 
decrease your area of dryland production 
increase any collective bargaining or 
collaboration with other farmers 
increase your area of dryland production 
utilise solar-power energy and battery system 
for your irrigation pumping 
Planned contractive 
adaptation index 
1.3(1.4) 0 5 
think about selling the whole farm 
decrease your irrigated area 
sell water allocations 
sell water entitlements 





Table 5.5 Frequency of expansive, accommodating and contractive planned adaptation 
indices (n=1,000) 
 Expansive index Accommodating index Contractive index 
Index 
count 
observations % observations % observation % 
0 182 18.2 170 17.0 261 26.1 
1 196 19.6 220 22.0 331 33.1 
2 216 21.6 190 19.0 217 21.7 
3 166 16.6 166 16.6 109 10.9 
4 123 12.3 117 11.7 58 5.8 
5 80 8.0 80 8.0 20 2.0 
6 33 3.3 40 4.0   
7   13 1.3   
Missing 4 0.4 4 0.4 4 0.4 
Total 1000 100 1000 100 1000 100 
 
5.3.3.1 Individual and compound planned adaptation 
Each of the 19 individual planned adaptation strategy questions (see Table 5.4) serve as the 
dependent variable for one biprobit model (see section 5.3.5.1). See Table C.2 for correlation 
analysis of the individual strategies. 
To test for planned compound adaptation, a number of combinations of the aforementioned 
individual strategies was considered, serving as the dependent variables for the multivariate 
probit models described in section 5.3.5.2. These combinations were designed with particular 
themes in mind, based on the literature and experience of irrigator behaviour in the MDB. 
Broad themes concerned water trading, change in irrigated area, the influence of 






Table 5.6 Potential planned compound adaptation and components 
Combination Planned adaptation 1 Planned adaptation 2 Planned adaptation 3 
Water trading 1 purchase water 
entitlements 
sell water allocations purchase water 
allocations 
Water trading 2 sell water entitlements sell water allocations purchase water 
allocations 








increase irrigated area 
More irrigation 
2 
utilise solar-power Improve irrigation 
efficiency 
increase irrigated area 
More irrigation 
3 
sell water entitlements Improve irrigation 
efficiency 
increase irrigated area 
More irrigation 
4 


















increase irrigated area 
Land ownership 
1 





sell any farmland 
Land ownership 
2 
decrease irrigated area sell water entitlements sell any farmland 



















increase irrigated area 
* Receiving an irrigation infrastructure grant since 2010 was modelled as a function of the independent 
variables. While not a planned adaptation strategy, we wanted to understand whether planned adaptation is 
dependent upon receiving a grant, based on irrigators’ socio-economic characteristics. 
 
5.3.3.2 Indices 
The planned total, expansive, accommodating and contractive adaptation indices are 
constructed by summing up irrigators’ positive responses to 19 questions about planned 
implementation of expansive, accommodating and contractive adaptation strategies (see 
Table 5.4). 
Since we make no assumptions about the relative importance of different strategies, and since 
our data contain no information about the degree of implementation of these planned 
strategies, the indices’ components are unweighted, following the approach in Wheeler et al. 
(2013b). The implicit assumption is choosing more strategies (a higher index count) 
represents a higher degree of adaptation. However, given the data limitations we see this 
methodological choice as appropriate.  
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Index construction also assumes that planned adaptation strategies are chosen independently. 
However, we find a correlation coefficient of 0.53 between the planned expansive and 
planned accommodating, and -0.28 between the planned expansive and planned contractive 
adaptation indices (see Table C.3). While well below the value of 0.7, considered as 
problematic correlation, we used a SUR model (see 5.3.5.3) to minimise any potential bias in 
our estimations. These correlations may stem from the existence of compound adaptation 
strategies (e.g. sell dryland to increase irrigated area), making the choice of planned 
adaptation strategy not independent. We tested for this by modelling potential compound 
strategies using multivariate probit models, and examined the statistical dependence of the 
planned adaptation strategies involved. We found some limited evidence of compound 
strategies existing (i.e. strategies not being statistically independent [see Table C.17-Table 
C.31]), for example selling entitlement and more dryland or less irrigated area and more 
dryland, possibly causing the moderate and weak correlation of the dependent variables. 
 
5.3.4 Independent variables 
The literature (see Table 5.2) was used to identify the total amount of explanatory variables. 
To limit the large number, of variables available for analysis from the survey, we used 
correlation analysis to identify and exclude any collinear variables (at a correlation 
coefficient of 0.7 and above (see Table C.4 for independent variable correlation matrix). 
After removing variables with a variance inflation factor above 10 (see Table C.5 to Table 
C.10), step-wise elimination of insignificant variables was undertaken, provided this 
improved model fit (decreasing Akaike's and Schwarz's Bayesian information criteria), 
leading to the set of variables used in the final model (Table 5.7). The same approach was 




Table 5.7 Independent variable definitions and summary statistics by capital types 
Capital Variable definition Mean (std. dev.) Min Max 
Financial 
capital 
Farm debt ($m)28 0.4(0.5) 0 1.25 
Farmland value ($m) 1.4(1.0) 0.125 3 
Net farm income ($m) 0.1(0.1) 0 0.25 
Number of insurance contracts29 4.6(1.4) 0 7 
Off-farm income (%) 24.8(31.1) 0 100 
Productivity change 
(last 5 years: 1 = strongly decreasing; 5 = strongly increasing) 
3.2(1.2) 1 5 
Received irrigation infrastructure grant since 2010 
(1=yes, 0=otherwise) 
0.2(0.4) 0 1 
Human 
capital 
Believes climate change is a risk for their region 
(1= yes, 0 = otherwise) 
0.4(0.5) 0 1 
Irrigator’s age (years) 58.7(11.4) 24 90 
Low education 
(1 = highest education level is year 10 or below, 0 = otherwise) 
0.2(0.4) 0 1 
Male (1= male, 0= otherwise) 0.9(0.3) 0 1 
Marital status (1=married/partnered; 0=otherwise) 0.9(0.3) 0 1 
Number of Children 2.8(1.4) 0 10 
Plans for climate change on their farm (1= yes, 0= otherwise) 0.5(0.5) 0 1 
Succession (1 = succession plan in place, 0= otherwise) 0.4(0.5) 0 1 
Risk taker (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree) 3.1(1.3) 1 5 
Whole farm plan (1= has a farm plan, 0 = otherwise) 0.7(0.4) 0 1 
Natural 
capital 
Average annual pan evaporation over the last 10 years (mm) 1712.1(225.3) 1115.1 2232.7 
Average annual rainfall over the last 10 years (mm) 378.4(82.6) 265.3 925.3 
Average annual temperature over the last 30 years (°C) 23.3(0.9) 20.1 25.2 
Average final water allocation over the last 10 years (%)30 0.58(0.26) 0 0.96 
Millennium Drought dummy 
(1 = experienced drought; 0 = otherwise) 31 
0.9(0.2) 0 1 
Net rainfall over last 10 years 
(average of annual rainfall minus evaporation, mm)32 
-1333.7(282.6) -1943.1 -207.3 
State dummy NSW (1 = yes; 0 = otherwise) 1.8(0.8) 1 3 
State dummy VIC (1 = yes; 0 = otherwise)    
State dummy SA (1 = yes; 0 = otherwise)    
Temperature volatility over last 30 years 
(std. dev. of temperature) 
0.75(0.07) 0.53 0.83 
Physical 
capital 
Water application rate (ML/irrigated ha) 11.3(179.0) 0 5634 
Broadacre (1= main income from broadacre, 0= otherwise)33 0.3(0.4) 0 1 
Carry-over use between 2014-2016 
(1= used carry-over, 0= otherwise) 
0.6(0.5) 0 1 
Dairy (1= main income from dairy, 0= otherwise) 0.2(0.4) 0 1 
Farm size (irrigated plus dryland; 100ha) 9.0(27.3) 0 368 
Livestock (1= main income from livestock, 0 = otherwise) 0.2(0.4) 0 1 
Majority of farm area under drainage 
(1= drainage on more than 50%, 0= otherwise) 
0.6(0.5) 0 1 
Majority of farm area under drip irrigation 
(1= drip irrigation on more than 50%, 0= otherwise) 
0.2(0.4) 0 1 
Number of employees 2.6(3.4) 1 60 
Owns excess water entitlements 
(1= owns more water then needed, 0= otherwise) 
0.2(0.4) 0 1 
Water ownership size 
(Ln of long-term annual average yield of water entitlements)34 
5.3(1.8) 0 10.3 
Social capital Social group membership (1= member in any group; 0=otherwise) 0.6(0.5) 0 1 
Past 
experiences 
Expansive adaptation strategies used in last 5 years 2.1(1.5) 0 6 
Accommodating adaptation strategies used in last 5 years 2.0(1.5) 0 7 
Contractive adaptation strategies used in last 5 years 1.1(1.0) 0 4 
                                                 
28 Net farm income, debt and farmland value figures were semi-continuous variables converted from the middle point range value. 
Specifically, net farm income values were: 0, 25k, 62.5k, 87.5k, 112.5k, 137.5k, 200k and 250k; debt values were: 0, 25k, 75k, 125k, 200k, 
375k, 625k, 875k, 1125k and 1250k; and farmland values were: 125k, 375k, 625k, 875k, 1125k, 1375k, 1750k, 2500k and 3000k 
29 include crop insurance, private health cover, home and content insurance, live insurance, car insurance, work cover and income protection 
30 Allocation factor is the seasonal amount of water received as a percentage of nominal water entitlements based on security and location 
31 Irrigators were seen as having experienced the Millennium Drought if they started farming in 2008 or earlier. 
32 Rainfall, evaporation, and temperature data over 30-year period (1986–2015). No significant difference between 10- and 30-year net 
rainfall, temperature volatility over 30 years provides better model fit. 
33 Horticulture acted as the base case 
34 LTAAY is the long-term annual average volume of water permitted to be taken for consumptive use under a water access entitlement. 
Currently all LTAAY figures are calculated using the long-term diversion limit equivalent factors, with these factors to be accredited in 
finalised state water resource plans (Cheesman and Wheeler 2012). We used irrigators’ postcode to attribute LTAAY figures to water 
ownership across different products. For NSW irrigators living between the Murrumbidgee and the Murray, and VIC irrigators between the 
Goulburn and the Murray, we attributed 50% of their holdings to each entitlement class respectively. 
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Attention has to be given to the influence of climate change believe on adaptation decisions. 
While irrigators likely adapt more if they believe in being at risk from climate change, 
irrigators conversely may believe more strongly in being at risk from climate change because 
they plan to adapt for it. Some adaptation studies (e.g. (Hogan et al. 2011; Park et al. 2012)) 
argue that the causal relationship runs from climate change belief to adaptation, and TPB 
theory dictates that attitudes should influence behaviour (e.g. (Ajzen 1991)), but the true 
relationship might be endogenous, with each influencing the other. Leviston and Walker 
(2011) recognised the causal influence of the Australian public’s climate change attitude and 
their behavioural and Wheeler et al. (2013b) tests and controls for an endogenous relationship 
between belief and adaptation. We address this potential endogeneity between irrigators’ 
climate change risk perception and their planned expansive, accommodating and contractive 
adaptation by using irrigators’ climate change planning on farm as the instrument for the 
instrument variable approaches (see sections 5.3.5.1 and 5.3.5.2) and the control function 
approaches (see 5.3.5.3), following Nauges and Wheeler (2017) and Wheeler et al. (2013b). 
 
5.3.5 Model 
This section introduces the different modelling approaches undertaken in this chapter, namely 
the modelling of planned adaptation strategies in a number of forms (individual, compound, 
and indices), and clustering the data around different irrigator attitudinal groups. All 
modelling was done in Stata 16. To arrive at the final models, different statistical tests were 
used. 1) correlation analysis to eliminate correlated independent variables (see Table C.4); 2) 
collinearity diagnostics using variance inflation factors; 3) step-wise elimination of 
insignificant variables; 4) determining model robustness by lowest Akaike's and Schwarz's 
Bayesian information criteria values, 5) tests for goodness-of-fit and overdispersion; and 6) 
the stability of independent variable significance and direction across the different model 
iterations. 
 
5.3.5.1 Individual planned adaptation strategies – dependent variables 
We modelled 19 individual planned adaptation strategy questions using probit models. The 
correlation matrix for the 19 planned adaptation strategies can be found in Table C.2. There 
may be endogeneity between the individual planned adaptation strategy as the dependent 
variable and irrigators’ climate change risk perceptions (see 5.3.4 for more detail). We use a 
recursive bivariate probit model with robust standard errors, as suggested in Greene (2008), 
simultaneously estimating an irrigator’s individual planned adaptation strategy, and the 
instrument variable approach to deal with endogeneity, with the irrigator’s climate change 
planning on farm (𝐶𝐶_𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑗) as the instrument variable (biprobit, vce(robust) in Stata 16). 
For each individual adaptation strategy, the reduced form equation is: 
 
(1)    𝑌∗ =  𝑋′𝛽𝑌 + 𝐷𝛼 +  1, 𝑌 = 𝕀(𝑌
∗ > 0) 
  𝐷∗ =  𝑋′𝛽𝐷 + 𝑍′𝛾 +  2, 𝐷 = 𝕀(𝐷
∗ > 0) 
Where 𝕀 (∙ ) denotes the indicator function. X contains the common independent variables 
and Z is our instrument (climate change planning on farm (CC_plan)). The latent variables 𝑌∗ 
and 𝐷∗ are mapped into the observed outcome Y (strategy adoption) and the observed 
(potentially endogenous) regressor D (climate change risk perception (CC_risk)), using 
109 
 
threshold crossing conditions, and the joint distribution of Y and D conditional on X and Z, 
giving the probability of adoption as (Li et al. 2019): 
(2)    𝑃(𝑌 = 𝑦, 𝐷 = 𝑑|𝑋 = 𝑥, 𝑍 = 𝑧) 
A good instrument needs to be correlated with climate change risk perceptions, but 
uncorrelated with the error term in our main equation 1. As our data set is similar, we 
followed Wheeler et al. (2013b), who used climate change planning on farm as an appropriate 
instrument for climate change risk perception. Following Greene (2008), the Wald statistic 
given by the Stata command enables to test for endogeneity, with a rejection of H0 translating 
into the presence of endogeneity between the dependent variable and irrigator’s climate 
change risk perception. We also tested addressing endogeneity with a control function 
approach suggested by Wooldridge (2010, 2015), but the instrument variable approach 
provided more robust results, based on lower Akaike's and Schwarz's Bayesian information 
criteria (AIC and BIC) values. 
 
5.3.5.2 Compound adaptation strategies 
There is the possibility that irrigators do not plan individual adaptation strategies 
independently, but rather that several individual planned adaptations together comprising one 
strategy set (Kassie et al. 2015; Manda et al. 2016; Vigani and Kathage 2019; Wainaina et al. 
2016). We call them compound strategies. If the error terms of individual planned adaptation 
strategies are inter-dependent, it is more efficient to model them simultaneously. An example 
of a compound strategy may be irrigators planning to buy more farmland, more water 
entitlements and planning to expand irrigation. We considered a range of individual planned 
adaptation combinations to make up compound strategies (see Table 5.6). Following Greene 
(2008), we model combinations (15 compound strategies) of three individual planned 
adaptation strategies, as a recursive multivariate probit model with robust standard errors, and 
the instrument variable approach as the 4th equation (mvprobit, robust in Stata). For one set of 
compound strategies, the equation is: 
(3)    𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏[𝑌𝑠 = 1, 𝑌𝑟 = 1, 𝑌𝑡 = 1, 𝐶𝐶_𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 = 1 |𝑿𝒔, 𝑿𝒓, 𝑿𝒕, 𝑿𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒌] =  𝜙4(𝑿𝒔
′ 𝜷𝒔  +
 𝛾 𝐶𝐶_𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘, 𝑿𝒓
′ 𝜷𝒓  +  𝛿 𝐶𝐶_𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘, 𝑿𝒕
′ 𝜷𝒕  +
 𝜂 𝐶𝐶_𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘, 𝑿𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒌
′ 𝜷𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒌, 𝜌𝑠𝑟 , 𝜌𝑠𝑡, 𝜌𝑠𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 , 𝜌𝑟𝑡, 𝜌𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 , 𝜌𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘) 
Where 𝜙4 (∙,∙; 𝜌𝑠𝑟 , … , 𝜌𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘) denotes the cumulative distribution function of the multivariate 
standard normal distribution with coefficients of correlation (𝜌𝑠𝑟 , … , 𝜌𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘). The dependent 
variables of the model are: 
𝑌𝑠 = 1 if plans to implement adaptation strategy s; 0 otherwise 
𝑌𝑟 = 1 if plans to implement adaptation strategy r; 0 otherwise 
𝑌𝑡 = 1 if plans to implement adaptation strategy t; 0 otherwise 
CC_risk = 1 if sees climate change as a risk for their region; 0 otherwise 
with s ≠ r ≠ t. The independent variables of the model are: 
𝑋𝑠 = 𝑋𝑟 = 𝑋𝑡 = vector of independent variables (see section 5.3.4) 
CC_plan = climate change planning on farm (the instrument variable) 
The regressor vectors are: 
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𝑿𝒔= 𝑋𝑠,    𝑿𝒓= 𝑋𝑟,     𝑿𝒕= 𝑋𝑡,    𝑿𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒌= 𝑋𝑠, CC_plan 
In contrast to the individual strategy models, the Wald statistics have a different 
interpretation: if 𝜌𝑠𝑟 = 0 or 𝜌𝑠𝑟 = 0 or 𝜌𝑠𝑡 = 0 or 𝜌𝑟𝑡 = 0 can be rejected, it means that the 
error term of respective planned adaptation strategies are not independent, and may have 
common unobservable correlation left in the error terms, making it more efficient to be 
estimated simultaneously. If 𝜌𝑠𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 = 0 or 𝜌𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 = 0 or 𝜌𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 = 0 cannot be rejected, 
endogeneity may exist between the corresponding dependent variable and irrigator’s climate 
change risk perception. This is repeated for all 15 compound strategies.  
 
5.3.5.3 Indices 
Finally, we also aggregated the 19 binary irrigators’ planned adaptation questions into four 
indices: the planned total, expansive, accommodating and contractive adaptation indices, 
serving as the dependent variables for the model. A variety of different models were tested, 
including negative binomial, Poisson and multivariate linear regression, but Seemingly 
Unrelated Regressions [SUR] (Zellner 1962, 1963) ultimately provided the most robust 
results35 for expansive, accommodating and contractive indices. The planned total adaptation 
index was modelled using a standard linear regression approach. Pairwise Pearson correlation 
analysis revealed a low and medium correlation between planned expansive, accommodating 
and contractive indices (see section 5.3.3.2 and Table C.3 for more detail). To address this, 
we followed Oliveira and Teixeira-Pinto (2015) and compared standard errors of the 
individual multivariate linear regressions and SUR. SUR model results were more robust, 
displaying higher R2 values and lower root mean squared errors. The SUR method applies 
generalised ordinary least-squares (OLS) simultaneously to a system of equations; coefficient 
estimators so obtained are asymptotically more efficient than those obtained by an equation-
by-equation approach. For simplicity of notation, we discuss the modelling equations by 
using only one index as an example.  
In our case, the equation for one index is as follows: 
(5)     𝑦 =  𝑋𝛽 +  𝑢 
The dependent variable 𝑦 is the value for the planned adaptation index value. 𝑋 is the matrix 
of all independent variables (note every index uses the same set of independent variables). 𝛽 
is the vector of regression coefficients and 𝑢 the vector of random error terms. 
There may be endogeneity between the independent variable climate change risk perception 
(CC_risk) and the dependent variables (see 5.3.4 for more detail). We use a control function 
approach, suggested in Nauges and Wheeler (2017) and detailed in Wooldridge (2010, 2015), 
to address the issue of endogeneity and to receive consistent and asymptotically normal 
estimates: 
(6)     𝐶𝐶_𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 =  𝑉𝜃 +  𝜅𝐶𝐶_𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛 +  𝐸_𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟 
An irrigator’s climate change risk perception (CC_risk) is the dependent variable regressed 
on the vector of independent variables (V)36 and irrigators’ climate change planning on farm 
(CC_plan), our instrument variable. A good instrument needs to be correlated with climate 
change risk perceptions, but uncorrelated with the error term in our main equation 𝑢. As our 
                                                 
35 Model robustness was determined on lowest Akaike's and Schwarz's Bayesian information criteria values, 
tests for goodness-of-fit and overdispersion, and stability of independent variable significance. 
36 Note that V contains the same variables as X, but without CC_risk: (X = V + CC_risk). 
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data set is similar, we followed Wheeler et al. (2013b) who used climate change planning on 
farm as an appropriate instrument for climate change risk perception. 
We first estimate (6) using OLS and obtain the estimated residuals 𝐸_𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟̂ . We then estimate 
(7) using SUR, an augmented version of (5) which includes the estimated residuals as an 
additional independent variable: 
(7)     𝑦 =  𝑋𝛽 +  𝜆𝐸_𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟̂ +  𝜔 
Note that the SUR model estimates equation (3) for every index simultaneously. Assuming 
climate change planning on farm is a valid instrument, the SUR estimation provides unbiased 
estimates of 𝛽 and 𝜆. The term 𝜆𝐸_𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟̂  is the “control function” used to test for 
endogeneity. A rejection of the null assumption that 𝜆 = 0 would be evidence for 
endogeneity of the climate change risk perception variable, and a positive (negative) 𝜆 
coefficient would indicate that the impact of irrigators’ climate risk perception on the planned 




The data were clustered using a range of attitudinal clustering variables and a variety of 
clustering approaches. We constructed clusters based on four to six different attitude 
statements about water trading, motivations for farming, environmental considerations, and 
flexibility about changing residence and profession, in various combinations, representing 
traditional, environmentally friendly and business mindsets. Cluster appropriateness was 
decided based on a minimum cluster size of 150 observations37, interpretable and meaningful 
attitudinal differences between the clusters, and statistical criteria, such as stopping rules and 
unique cluster membership of observations. We also employed a Pearson correlation matrix 
for all the attitude statements, because severe multicollinearity can jeopardize the outcomes 
of cluster analysis (Aldenderfer and Blashfield 1984). No severe multicollinearity was 
revealed. The most robust clusters emerged from using a partitioning clustering method, 
determining cluster membership based on the Euclidian distance as the dissimilarity measure 
(“cluster kmeans” in Stata 16). We then utilised the Caliński–Harabasz pseudo-F stopping 
rule to determine the optimal number of clusters as indicated by a larger F-value (Caliński 
and Harabasz 1974), leading to three optimal attitudinal clusters (see Table 5.8, and Table 
C.11 for numeric results).  
We labelled irrigators belonging to the clusters as traditional, corporate-minded or 
environmentally friendly, based on their agreement/disagreement with the statements used to 
construct the clusters. These clusters were used in all planned adaptation models (individual, 
compound, and indices) to encapsulate potential differences in planned adaptation 
preferences and the drivers between different types of irrigators. 
Other clustering methods and distance measures were also tested but did not lead to satisfying 
results. Following the approach employed by Kuehne et al. (2008), we created clusters based 
on hierarchical clustering with seven different dissimilarity measures (Single link, average 
link, complete link, weighted average link, median link, centroid link, Ward’s link) and both 
the Caliński–Harabasz pseudo-F and the Duda pseudo T-squared stopping rule (Duda et al. 
2012). Resulting clusters often contained less than 150 observations, displayed little 
                                                 
37 A minimum of 150 observations in each cluster was necessary to allow for model convergence for planned 
individual and planned compound adaptation strategy modelling. 
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differences in attitudes, and cluster membership was not unique, indicated by frequent 
dendrogram reversals (Rencher and Christensen 2012). Attempting to generate clusters via 
latent class analysis as shown in Morey et al. (2006) was equally unsuccessful: when latent 
class models rarely converged towards results, the statistically optimal clusters were too 
small and displayed no meaningful attitudinal differences. 
Table 5.8 Optimal irrigator clusters and corresponding attitudes 








Observations 401 283 316 
I could never imagine living anywhere other 
than this area* 
Agree Disagree Agree 
Farming is the only occupation I can imagine 
doing* 
Agree Disagree Agree 
We would be willing to have our seasonal 
allocations reduced to ensure sufficient water 




It is essential to make allocations to the 
environment otherwise irrigation will not be 
long-term sustainable* 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
I believe water trading has been a good thing 
for farming* 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
* Attitudes were measured on a Likert scale with 1 = strongly disagree; 5= strongly agree 
 
5.4 Results and discussion 
This chapter focuses on the planned expansive, accommodating, and contractive adaptation 
indices results; results for individual and compound strategies, and the total planned 
adaptation index, are not discussed (but regression tables for the full models can be found in 
Table C.12, Table C.13, and Table C.17 to Table C.31). Similarly, the impact of our three 
clusters for total, expansive, accommodating and contractive planned adaptation indices is 
also not reported here in order to simplify results, but can be found in Table C.14 to Table 
C.16. The results and discussion are structured in three parts. We first analyse whether 
irrigators prefer one type of adaptation strategies (one index) over others. The second part 
reports on significant drivers of planned expansive, accommodating and contractive 
adaptation, comparing them with total planned adaptation. The last section summarises the 
results across different indices, discusses limitations and draws attention to overarching 
themes. Results from individual and compound models, as well as clustered indices results, 
can be found in the Appendices. 
 
5.4.1 Descriptive statistics of expansive, accommodating and contractive indices 
Ninety percent (90%) of irrigators plan to employ more than one type of index strategy 
(Table 5.9). Comparing the proportion of individual adaptation strategies chosen per index,38 
                                                 
38 Since the indices do not comprise the same number of questions, we compared 
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑛 (𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡)
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑒𝑠 (𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡)
. Unpaired t-tests revealed that the mean 
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irrigators seem to choose on average a higher proportion of available expansive adaptation 
strategies (37%), as compared to accommodating (29%) and contractive adaptation (29%) 
strategies. There is no statistically significant difference between the proportion of 
accommodating and contractive adaptation strategies chosen. This reflects findings in 
Wheeler et al. (2013b), where the majority of irrigators preferred expansive and 
accommodating adaptation strategies. 
 







more than one 
individual 
adaptation 
strategy (out of 
19 adaptations)  
Irrigators using 
only one type of 
index strategy 





Expansive index 37%*** 81% 3% 
Improve irrigation 
infrastructure efficiency 
Accommodating index 29% 83% 1% 
Change irrigated 
production 
Contractive index 29% 74% 7% Selling the whole farm 
All strategies 31% 98% 10% 
Improve irrigation 
infrastructure efficiency 
*** Using unpaired t-tests show irrigators choose a higher proportion of planned expansive adaptation strategies 
than planned accommodating and contractive strategies (p<0.01) 
 
While in line with conventional wisdom, irrigators prefer growing rather than shrinking the 
farm, the strength of this result should not be overestimated due to the construction of the 
planned expansive adaptation index. A high incidence of planned water allocation purchase 
(56% of irrigators, see Table 5.3) is not surprising, given that water allocation trading is 
common place for sMDB irrigators (Seidl et al. 2020b). 
Many irrigators would like to purchase extra water entitlements, to increase water supply 
security to deal with increasing water scarcity, to expand operations, or as an investment 
(Haensch et al. 2019), provided they can afford it given increasing water entitlement prices. 
Our data do not allow controlling for these factors, in particular for the effect of increasing 
entitlement prices on irrigators’ willingness and affordability to buy water entitlements. 
However, Zuo et al. (2016) find that demand for high security water entitlements is inelastic 
in the range of AUD$1,700-2,100/ML, with price elasticity for general security in an almost 
identical range, and low security entitlements extremely inelastic. Therefore, planning to buy 
entitlements within this price range seems to be a fairly fixed decision by irrigators, 
experiencing little impact from rising entitlement prices. This may change if entitlement 
prices are higher than AUD$2,100/ML: the plan  to buy entitlements may then potentially be 
more optimism than a fixed decision. 
At time of data collection, the Commonwealth has been, and has continued, to heavily 
subsidise irrigation efficiency upgrades under various water recovery programs (Grafton and 
Wheeler 2018). We cannot know whether irrigators’ plans to improve irrigation efficiency 
                                                 
percentage of chosen planned accommodating and contractive strategies are not significantly different, but the 




are contingent upon securing government subsidies, making this planned strategy choice 
somewhat relative, however, given that it is known that subsidies probably will be available 
given the remainder of water recovery as at 2015, it is highly likely they expected some sort 
of subsidy.39 
Three of six planned expansive strategies may represent ‘business as usual’ water trading 
behaviour or optimism. Therefore, a large part of irrigators’ preference for planned expansive 
over accommodating and contractive adaptation strategies may be based on cheap talk and 
ideal conditions. This result should therefore be interpreted cautiously.  
 
5.4.2 SUR Results 
The SUR analysis shows different capital drivers have varying influence on irrigators’ 
planned expansive, accommodating and contractive adaptation (Table 5.10). Due to a number 
of missing observations in some variables (e.g. farm debt, farm income and land value), the 
final SUR model uses 903 of the 1,000 surey observations. 
Comparing Table 5.2 and Table 5.10 reveals a number of factors broadly follow the 
directions predicted by the literature. Farm debt (access to credit) is a significant positive 
driver (p<0.01) for the expansive and accommodating index, farm income is statistically 
significant positive (p<0.1) for the accommodating adaptation index, climate change risk 
perception is statistically significant positive (p <0.01) for the expansive and accommodating 
index, male gender is statistically significant positive (p<0.01) for the expansive index, 
succession planning is statistically significant positive (p<0.01) for expansive and 
accommodating indices and statistically significant negative (p<0.01) for the contractive 
index, while past adaptation experience is statistically significant positive (p<0.01) for all 
indices. In the following, we discuss statistically significant drivers by the various capitals. 
 
  
                                                 
39 We controlled for irrigators receiving an irrigation upgrade grant since 2007 and since 2013 onwards in our 
modelling. These were insignificant. 
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Table 5.10 SUR regression of planned expansive, accommodating and contractive 
adaptation 
 
Planned adaptation indices  
Expansive Accommodating Contractive 
VARIABLES coefficient (standard error) 
Financial capital 
   
Farm debt 1.271***(0.374) 1.092***(0.415) -0.198(0.365) 
Farm debt squared -0.827***(0.293) -0.743**(0.326) 0.383(0.287) 
Farmland value -0.231(0.210) -0.808***(0.233) -0.024(0.205) 
Farmland value squared 0.071(0.061) 0.221***(0.067) 0.005(0.059) 
Net farm income 2.100(1.995) 3.967*(2.218) 2.452(1.949) 
Net farm income squared -6.637(7.496) -16.666**(8.329) -12.452*(7.320) 
Number of insurances 0.076**(0.031) 0.091***(0.035) -0.034(0.031) 
Off-farm income -0.004**(0.001) -0.002(0.002) 0.000(0.001) 
Productivity change 0.087**(0.034) -0.005(0.038) -0.138***(0.033) 
Human capital    
Age -0.011(0.026) 0.006(0.029) 0.013(0.025) 
Climate change risk perception 0.543***(0.155) 0.679***(0.174) 0.091(0.151) 
Low education 0.032(0.111) 0.092(0.124) 0.248**(0.109) 
Male gender 0.398***(0.118) 0.174(0.131) 0.006(0.116) 
Succession 0.537***(0.086) 0.464***(0.096) -0.629***(0.084) 
Whole of farm plan 0.120(0.097) 0.303***(0.107) -0.008(0.094) 
Natural capital    
Average historic water allocation -0.001(0.178) -0.003(0.198) -0.161(0.174) 
Historic net rainfall -0.000*(0.000) -0.000(0.000) -0.000(0.000) 
Historic temperature volatility -0.748(0.744) 0.060(0.823) 1.779**(0.724) 
Physical capital    
Broadacre 0.166(0.161) -0.241(0.179) -0.268*(0.157) 
Carry-over use between 2014-2016 0.112(0.100) 0.145(0.110) -0.098(0.097) 
Dairy 0.031(0.174) -0.258(0.193) -0.298*(0.171) 
Excess water -0.228**(0.104) -0.060(0.114) 0.618***(0.100) 
Farm Size -0.000(0.002) 0.001(0.002) 0.000(0.002) 
Livestock 0.098(0.166) -0.339*(0.185) 0.445***(0.162) 
Majority of farm area under 
drainage 
-0.002(0.096) -0.015(0.106) 0.044(0.093) 
Majority of farm area under drip 
irrigation 
-0.296**(0.142) -0.339**(0.159) -0.136(0.139) 
Number of employees 0.014(0.013) 0.011(0.015) -0.019(0.013) 
Water application rate -0.001(0.009) -0.015(0.010) 0.001(0.009) 
Water ownership -0.054*(0.028) 0.000(0.031) 0.037(0.027) 
Past experiences    
Past index 0.495***(0.031) 0.611***(0.030) 0.225***(0.037) 
Control function residual -0.564***(0.180) -0.639***(0.201) -0.070(0.175) 
Constant 0.864(0.964) 0.294(1.067) -0.124(0.944) 
AIC 8562.493 8562.493 8562.493 
BIC 9052.676 9052.676 9052.676 
Observations 903 903 903 
R-squared 0.541 0.493 0.239 





5.4.3 Financial capital 
Financial capital variables have a pronounced influence on planned expansive and 
accommodating adaptation. As expected, farm debt levels are highly statistically significant 
(p,0.01) and positive drivers for planned expansive and contractive adaptation, albeit at a 
decreasing rate signified by the statistically significant negative (p<0.05 and p<0.01) 
influence of farm debt squared. In contrast to other studies, which often treat access to credit 
as a qualitative/binary variable (Bryan et al. 2009; Bryan et al. 2013; Deressa et al. 2009; 
Touch et al. 2016), our results allow us to quantify the benefits of credit access versus the 
hampering effect of large farm debt. At a threshold level of around AUD$765,000 for 
expansive and AUD$736,000 for accommodating adaptation, the negative influence of very 
large farm debt squared outweighs the positive influence of farm debt.. 
The statistically significant positive influence (p<0.1) of farm income on planned 
accommodating adaptation, as well as the statistically significant positive (negative) 
influence (p<0.05 and p<0.01) of increased farm productivity on planned expansive 
(contractive) adaptation is in line with expectations: higher income increases adaptation 
affordability, while irrigators which have been improving productivity over the last five years 
would be less likely to plan to employ contractive measures, such as far exit or decreased 
irrigation area. 
The strong statistically significant negative impact (p<0.01) of farmland value on planned 
accommodating adaptation is surprising: contributing to irrigators’ wealth, one would expect 
a positive relationship mirroring the findings of studies examining farmer wealth (Harvey et 
al. 2014; Li et al. 2017; Roco et al. 2014). Upon reviewing the index component models (see 
Table C.12), the result is driven by a statistically significant negative impact of farmland 
value on planned insurance uptake. One possible explanation is that wealthier irrigators, 
expressed by higher farmland values, may prefer to self-insure rather than take out insurance. 
This is in line with Nauges et al. (2016) who find that Australian farmers are encouraged 
through drought policy to self-insure as there is an absence of yield insurance available (Hatt 
et al. 2012). The relationship between farmland values and insurance uptake has also been 
found in other studies (Mishra and Goodwin 2006; Shaik et al. 2008; Sherrick et al. 2004). 
The current level of insurance, expressed by the number of different insurance contracts, is a 
statistically significant positive impact (p<0.05 and p<0.01 level) on planned expansive and 
accommodating adaptation. We interpret current insurance level as a proxy for irrigators’ risk 
aversion, with more insurance corresponding to higher risk aversion.40 Thus, our results 
support findings in other studies that increasing risk aversion increases adaptation (Tambo 
2016; Wheeler et al. 2013b). 
 
5.4.4 Human and social capital 
Human and social capital factors play an important role in planned adaptation. Past 
adaptation experience, expressed by the past adaptation index value, and succession planning 
are highly significant drivers. Past experience is a uniformly statistically significant positive 
driver (p<0.01) for all three planned adaptation indices, as it shows familiarity with, and 
learning about, the technologies/strategies involved (Chavas and Nauges 2020), while 
succession planning is statistically significant negative (p<0.01) for planned contractive 
                                                 
40 Using self-reported risk aversion (see Table 5.7) instead of current level of insurance was not significant and 
did not improve model quality. 
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adaptation, and statistically significant positive (p<0.01) for planned expansive and 
accommodating adaptation indices. This intuitively obvious, as irrigators would prefer to 
hand over a larger and or improved, rather than a smaller, farm, whereas with farm exit, there 
would be no succession. Our results are in line with results from other studies (Ghadim et al. 
2005; Nicholas and Durham 2012; Wang et al. 2015b; Wheeler et al. 2012a; Wheeler et al. 
2013b). 
Irrigators’ climate change risk perceptions are statistically significant positive drivers 
(p<0.01) for planned expansive and accommodating adaptation, confirming growing 
evidence in the literature (Alam 2015; Jianjun et al. 2015; Wheeler et al. 2013b). Note that in 
contrast to earlier studies, which focus on farmers’ belief in climate change (e.g. see 
(Arbuckle et al. 2013; Dang et al. 2014; Deressa et al. 2009; Tambo 2016)), we use the 
concept of perceived affectedness by climate change as a factor driving planned adaptation 
behaviour (Leiserowitz 2005; van der Linden 2017). 
We find only limited statistically significant influence for gender and education: male gender 
and low education are statistically significant positively (p<0.01 and p<0.05) for planned 
expansive and contractive adaptation respectively. Together with age not statistically 
significant influencing any type of planned adaptation, this is somewhat surprising given the 
strong influence of gender, higher education, and age in countless adaptation studies (Abid et 
al. 2016; Alam 2015; Below et al. 2012; Deressa et al. 2009; Huffman 2020; Jianjun et al. 
2015; Roco et al. 2014). With age fairly homogeneous and with little variation, it is not an 
important factor in our data. The small number of female respondents in our sample (12%) 
may not provide enough variation to lead to a significant gender impact.  
The impacts of social group membership overall, as well as the how many social groups an 
irrigator is a member of was statistically insignificant in our data and subsequently removed 
from analysis. This is in contrast to Wheeler et al. (2013b) who find membership in an 
environmental group is a statistically significant positive influence on the future purchase of 
farmland. 
 
5.4.5 Natural capital 
Natural capital variables, such as geography, location and climate are common drivers for 
adaptation behaviour in many studies. In our case, rainfall-evaporation balance over the last 
10 years (signifying dryness/drought) is a statistically significant negative (p<0.1) influence 
on the expansive adaptation index. Mean annual temperature variability over the last 30 years 
(signifying changes in extreme events) has a statistically significant positive influence 
(p<0.05) on the planned contractive adaptation index. This supports recent findings by 
Wheeler et al. (2020b) that farm exit (and or shrinking of irrigation in our case) in the sMDB 
is strongly driven by climatic factors. Going beyond the common approach to focus on 
nominal temperature or rainfall values (Deressa et al. 2009; Gandure et al. 2013; 
Moniruzzaman 2015; Wheeler et al. 2013b), our results expand the literature addressing 
changing volatility of climatic patterns as a main influence on adaptation. 
As quantitative climate and geographic data is often challenging to collect or source, 
particularly in developing countries, many studies opt to use regional dummies to encapsulate 
this information (Abid et al. 2016; Bryan et al. 2013; Roco et al. 2014). Some use region or 
state dummies together with observable climate and geographic data (Deressa et al. 2009; 
Wheeler et al. 2013b). This was unsuccessful in our study as state dummies (NSW, SA, VIC) 




5.4.6 Physical capital 
Finally, physical capital variables also influence planned expansive, accommodating and 
contractive adaptation. Excess water holding has a statistically significant positive influence 
(p<0.01) on planned contractive adaptation and all but one index components (see Table 
C.12). This finding is in line with results by Wheeler and Cheesman (2013), showing 
irrigators sell excess water entitlements for environmental water recovery but keep irrigating. 
That irrigators sell more water allocations if they own excess water makes intuitive sense and 
is well documented (Loch et al. 2012). 
The statistically significant negative influence (p<0.05) of excess water holding on planned 
expansive adaptation is interesting. One might expect that irrigators plan to increase their 
irrigated production or buy extra land to make use of the available water (Adamson and Loch 
2014; Loch and Adamson 2015; Wheeler et al. 2020a). The models for the planned expansive 
adaptation index components (see Table C.12) reveal no statistically significant impact on 
planned land purchase or plans to increase irrigated area. Rather, owning excess water results 
in irrigators’ planning to buy less allocations and entitlements, leading to an ultimately a 
statistically negative influence for the overall index. 
We find a statistically significant negative impact (p<0.05) on planned expansive and 
accommodating adaptation if the majority of farm area (more than 50%) is under drip 
irrigation. This may be due to a few factors: drip irrigation leads to a significant technological 
lock-in, constraining the flexibility to modify the planted area and crop types (i.e. only high 
value and water intensive crops make drip irrigation worthwhile) (Adamson and Loch 2018; 
Adamson et al. 2017). There also may be less incentive to further increase irrigation 
efficiency if the majority of the farm is already under drip irrigation (Adamson and Loch 
2018; Loch et al. 2014b). Finally, higher plant water use efficiency through drip irrigation 
can limit the amount of water (allocations and entitlements) irrigators plan to buy.41 
Industry (broadacre, dairy and livestock)42 has a (weak) statistically significant negative 
influence (p<0.1, p<0.1 and p<0.01) on planned contractive behaviour, but it is statistically 
insignificant for planned expansive and accommodating adaptation. Examining planned 
contractive adaptation index components (see Table C.12) reveals that livestock irrigators in 




Faced with multiple dimensions of future uncertainty and risk, sMDB irrigators plan to use a 
mix of expansive, accommodating and contractive adaptation. Although there is some 
evidence that planned expansive adaptation is preferred, this might be an artefact of index 
construction, ‘business as usual’ in water allocation trading, and optimism in regard to 
entitlement purchases. 
Financial, human, natural, physical and social capital influence planned adaptation, but their 
influence can vary between planned expansive, accommodating and contractive adaptation. 
                                                 
41 Note that drip irrigation only “saves” water on-farm, given that irrigated area does not increase. On a 
catchment scale, it can increase overall water extraction by the associated reduction of return flows (Grafton et 
al. 2018; Williams and Grafton 2019). 
42 The base category for industry is horticulture. 
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Human and social capital play an important role: past adaptation experience and succession 
planning are highly significant factors for all three planned adaptation types. Climate change 
risk perception is a significant positive driver for planned expansive and accommodating 
adaptation, illustrating the importance of climate change affectedness, rather than mere belief 
in climate change (van der Linden 2017). The human and social capital factors of past 
experience, succession planning and climate change risk perception, are the most important 
drivers for planned expansive and contractive adaptations. 
In contrast, financial capital variables are the most important driver for planned 
accommodating adaptation, but also play an important role for planned expansive adaptation. 
Farm debt, risk aversion (expressed by number of insurances), and productivity change are 
the most influential financial capital variables, confirming the results of other studies (Li et 
al. 2017; Tambo 2016; Touch et al. 2016; Wheeler et al. 2013b). 
Surprisingly, planned contractive adaptation is largely unaffected by financial capital, despite 
the expected link between poor farm financials (high debt, low income) and land sale, water 
entitlement sale, and farm exit. Instead, industry dummies and historic temperature variability 
have a more pronounced impact, showing the importance of climate and industry 
characteristics. This supports Wheeler et al. (2020b) who find farm exit in the sMDB is 
mainly driven by climatic factors and producer prices. 
The influence of industry characteristics notwithstanding, we find physical capital is not a 
major driver for planned adaptation. For planned expansive and accommodating adaptation, 
the lock-in effect of drip irrigation limiting flexibility to change farm area, structure and 
crops, is the only material physical capital influence. Owning excess water entitlements does 
not influence the planned expansion or contraction of irrigation, but rather the water trading 
side of an irrigation farm: less allocations and entitlements need to be bought, while also 
enabling the sale of allocations and entitlements for extra income. This manifests as a 
negative (positive) impact of excess entitlement holding on planned expansive (contractive) 
adaptation. This is in line with findings of Wheeler and Cheesman (2013), that irrigators tend 
to sell excess water entitlements but continue production. 
Although the data used in this study is rich and of high quality, data limitations exist about 
the quality of adaptation strategies, impacting the design of our dependent variables. We 
acknowledge modelling planned adaptation as unweighted count indices is a fairly coarse, but 
necessary approach, given the binary planned adaptation strategy data, which does not 
capture the degree of planned adaptation. 
Future research should aim to include the intensity of planned adaptation into the analysis to 
provide a more nuanced picture of drivers for adaptation, and to allow for a 
ranking/weighting of different (and compound) planned adaptation strategies. Our study 
provides valuable insights for irrigators’ planned adaptation behaviour. Although some 
variables, such as past adaptation experiences and succession planning, influence planned 
expansive, accommodating and contractive adaptation simultaneously, the majority of drivers 
vary between different adaptation types. Financial capital variables (farm debt, farmland 
value, income, and number of insurances) are the major driver for planned accommodating 
adaptation, whereas human and social capital (climate change risk perception, succession and 
past experiences) are more important for planned expansive and contractive adaptation.  
Nauges et al. (2016) find that MDB irrigators may be willing to pay for insurance products 
protecting them against the risk of yield or revenue losses. Through subsequent drought 
policies (e.g. the National Drought policy, the Farm Household Support Scheme, and the 
Farm Household Allowance), the Australian government have always encouraged farmers to 
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be self-reliant and develop their own risk management strategies (Alston and Kent 2004; 
Botterill 2003, 2005). These policies relied on financial incentives, such as, the Income 
Equalisation Deposits scheme, the Farm Management Bond and the EC Interest Rate Subsidy 
(Botterill 2003, 2005, 2010; Peterson 2016). However, although refraining from subsidising 
insurance premiums, the government has traditionally provided drought assistance for 
‘exceptional’ droughts through the aforementioned programs, hence indirectly compromising 
the establishment of a competitive insurance pooling farmers’ risks, and thus contributed to 
the failed introduction of yield insurance products (Hatt et al. 2012). For example in the 
Millennium drought, 23% of Australian farms received some drought financial support 
(Productivity Commission 2009). 
As another drought response policy, the Commonwealth implemented the Water for Fodder 
program in 2019/2020: an agreement to use the Adelaide desalination plant to produce an 
extra 100GL of water for SA water consumption in exchange for Commonwealth funds 
(DAWE 2020a). In turn, 100GL of Murray water (40GL in 2019/20 and 60GL in 2020/21) 
from the SA state entitlement will be made available to irrigators, in blocks of 50ML for 
$5,000 per water allocation account, to produce fodder at a discounted price of 
AUD$100/ML (DAWE 2019d). At the time of writing, of the 40,000 ML available in round 
1, 14,250 ML were delivered to irrigators in NSW, 25,100 ML to irrigators in VIC, and 650 
ML to irrigators in SA (DAWE 2020c). Drought assistance for ‘exceptional droughts’ and the 
Water for Fodder program are examples of how Australian Drought policy is indirectly 
compromising irrigators’ risk management efforts (Nauges et al. 2016). Irrigators with 
appropriate risk management practices would not have to rely on ad hoc government support 
or subsidised cheap water allocations for their livelihoods. In essence, this rewards poor 
individual risk management and incentivises irrigators’ reliance on the government as the 
insurer of last resort (Watson 2019) 
Given the findings of this chapter, an over-reliance on ad hoc financial support may do little 
for or even disincentivise planned adaptation to drought and climate change. Stronger 
emphasis should be given to support irrigators’ risk management efforts, by financial 
incentives on those which support irrigators’ risk management, such as Revenue Contingency 
Loans or the Farm Management Deposit Scheme (Botterill 2010; Botterill et al. 2017). 
Providing non-monetary incentives and better support for irrigators’ private risk management 
efforts, potentially through improved climate change forecasting, also translating into 
tangible risk implications, could increase planned adaptation and potentially foster the 
emergence of commercial insurance products. Policy makers aiming to incentivise planned 
adaptation should clearly identify which type of adaptation they are targeting and which 
capital factors have the strongest corresponding influence. This allows for more targeted and 
potentially cheaper incentive policies, particularly because the inclusion of human and social 
capital factors can have large benefits, while likely being less resource intensive than 
financial capital stimuli. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
With increasing pressures from climate change, agricultural industry restructuring and 
globalisation, Irrigators will continuously need to adapt to an uncertain and risky future. 
While sMDB irrigators have historically proven flexible and adaptive, these attributes are 
ever more important going forward. Having access to a large variety of adaptation strategies, 
irrigators may prefer some adaptation types over others, and/or their adaptation decision may 
be influenced by different drivers. This study explores sMDB irrigators’ preferences and 
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drivers for different planned adaptation types, using three indices: 1) planned expansive 
adaptation that aims to increase irrigation of a farm; 2) planned accommodating adaptation 
that alters farm structure and production practices while leaving the irrigation component 
unchanged; and 3) planned contractive adaptation that aims to decrease irrigation. 
The majority of irrigators plan adaptation from more than one type, with limited evidence 
that planned expansive adaptation is preferred over accommodating and contractive 
adaptation. While financial, human, natural, physical and social capital variables all influence 
planned adaptation, their role varies between planned expansive, accommodating and 
contractive adaptation strategies. 
Financial capital drivers are the most influential for planned accommodating adaptation, in 
particular farm debt, farmland value and farm income. There is less influence of financial 
capital for other planned adaptation types. Farm debt, off-farm income and productivity 
change influence planned expansive adaptation, whereas planned contractive adaptation is 
only influenced by productivity change. Natural and physical capital factors play an 
important role for planned contractive adaptation, with historic temperature volatility and 
industry specificity as major factors. This supports recent research showing that sMDB farm 
exit is driven mostly by climate factors and low production prices in certain industries. 
Human and social capital are common drivers across all types of planned adaptation. Farm 
succession planning and past adaptation experiences strongly impact planned expansive, 
accommodating and contractive adaptation. Furthermore, climate change risk perception has 
a significant positive influence on both planned expansive and accommodating adaptation, 
supporting results from other studies showing that not the belief in climate change happening, 
but personal affectedness is driving climate change adaptation. 
Our study illustrates the importance of incentivising irrigators’ private risk management 
efforts and of non-financial factors for irrigators’ planned adaptation, particularly of 
succession planning and adaptation experience. Knowing what drives planned expansive, 
accommodating and contractive adaptation allows policy-makers to design targeted and 
effective policies to incentivise increased adaptation of a particular type. Aiding irrigators’ 
risk management efforts by employing forward-looking financial support rather than ad hoc 
relief measures such as the Farm Management Deposit Scheme, and improving climate 
change forecasting or succession planning support, reforming drought policy such that it also 
draws on non-monetary incentives, and policies targeting different types of adaptation 
directly could increase future adaptation to climate change and water scarcity. This has the 
potential to achieve better policy outcomes and avoid costly one-size-fits-all approaches, 
which may have an overly strong focus on ad hoc financial relief that only has a small impact 
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Abstract 
Water markets are well known in improving the efficient use and reallocation of water, and 
the southern-connected Murray-Darling Basin water market is recognised as the most 
advanced water market globally. In recent years, the market has matured considerably with 
new water ownership and trading strategies emerging, along with increased participation 
from non-landholders (i.e. environmental water holders and financial investors, such as pure 
traders and superannuation companies). This study draws on a quantitative survey of 1,000 
southern Basin irrigators plus qualitative interviews with 63 water experts from banks, 
environmental water holders, investors/agri-corporates, financial investors, property 
evaluators and water brokers to illustrate the different water ownership and trading strategies 
employed. Findings suggest that many stakeholders, including non-landholders, prefer to own 
most of their water needs in higher security water entitlements and use temporary trade to 
mitigate water supply shortfalls. However, some own no water entitlements (or land) at all, 
while financial investors and large agri-corporates are more likely to use/supply highly 
sophisticated temporary trading products, such as water forwards and parking contracts. In 
addition to the need to reinforce the fundamentals of water institutions in the Murray-Darling 
Basin (i.e. robust accounting of water extraction and use, and continual monitoring, 
compliance and enforcement of water extraction/trades), we suggest three major reform 
areas: 1) data reform: improving the quality and availability of trade and water data plus 
standardised water market and water forwards terminology; 2) rules and regulation reform: 
increased transparency of trade and allocation/carry-over restrictions plus increased water 
market regulation and enforcement; and 3) new water market institutional development: a 
central exchange and clearing house. 
Keywords: water investment; water markets; permanent trade; market maturity; temporary 
trade; non-landholders. 
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Water scarcity and climate change are two of the biggest global strategic risks faced by 
humanity. Many countries will have to deal with both a drier and more volatile climate in the 
future, requiring substantial adaptation in agricultural systems and production (IPCC 2019). 
Continued increase in water extraction and decline in quality and quantity of water resources 
requires the production of more crops with less water (Perry et al. 2017) without 
compromising ecosystems. Increasingly, water markets are seen as a key demand 
management strategy to address water scarcity (Rey et al. 2019), and Australia plays a 
leading role in this space given it has the most advanced water market system in the world in 
the Murray-Darling Basin (MDB) (Grafton et al. 2011). 
Since their inception a number of decades ago, MDB water markets have been continuously 
evolving and maturing, and in recent years new water market products such as forwards and 
parking have emerged (ABARES 2018; Bayer and Loch 2017). The separation of land from 
water ─ known as unbundling ─ has allowed for new market participants, such as 
Environmental Water Holders (EWHs) and non-landholder financial investors (such as 
superannuation companies and trade speculators) to own and trade water. The reason 
financial investors have increasingly invested in water is because of the long-term increase in 
water asset values – to diversify their investment portfolios with water assets which share 
little correlation with other asset classes (Roca et al. 2015; Wheeler et al. 2016a), and the fact 
that variability in water market prices presents significant opportunities for investment trade 
returns. In other words, there has been a significant increase in various stakeholders treating 
the water market like a stock market over the past five to ten years. Although investment in 
water entitlements by corporate non-landowners is still relatively small, it is increasing – 
estimated at around 12% in some areas in 201843 (DELWP 2019a). Additionally, 9% of MDB 
water entitlements are held by companies with some level44 of foreign ownership (ATO 
2019). The Commonwealth of Australia is the largest EWH water owner in Australia, 
currently owning over 2,000GL (gigalitres) of long-term average annual yield (LTAAY – see 
Appendix A for a glossary of terms) in water entitlements, which it has been recovering from 
consumptive use since 2007-08 (Zuo et al. 2019). 
With large parts of south-eastern Australia currently experiencing the most severe drought in 
120 years (Doyle 2019), and high water allocation and entitlement prices, increasingly 
questions have been raised regarding water market functionality and equity issues. In 
particular, questions surround the role that non-landholders and EWHs play in influencing 
water market prices, along with their water ownership and trading behaviour (Miller 2019). 
Public concerns culminated in the Australian Government commissioning a current review of 
MDB water markets. Although recent academic evidence (Zuo et al. 2019) shows water 
market prices are driven primarily by water scarcity rather than government water recovery, 
                                                 
43The Commonwealth minister for water resources stated in an interview on 09/09/2019 that 14% of all southern 
MDB entitlements are owned by entities “that don’t have land attached to it”. This figure is based on 2018 
internal Department of Agriculture and Water Resources (DAWR) estimates of non-landholder ownership of 7-
14%. DAWR advised that this estimation is no longer used due to physical variations and changes in water 
investment strategies in 2019 (DAWR, personal communication, 2019). 
44The ATO (2019) defines companies with a level of foreign ownership as: 1) owned by an individual not 
ordinarily an Australian resident; 2) owned by a foreign government or government investor; 3) a company or 
trust where an individual not ordinarily resident in Australia, a foreign corporation or government holds a 
substantial interest of at least 20%; or 4) a company or trust where two or more foreign persons hold an 




there are still considerable knowledge gaps around water corporate and non-landholder 
(namely EWH and financial traders/investors) water market strategies. 
This study seeks to understand the water ownership and trading strategies used by MDB 
stakeholders, both landholders and non-landholders. We draw upon 1,000 telephone 
interviews with irrigators in the sMDB and 63 in-depth interviews with water experts in 
banks, large agri-corporates, environmental water groups (generally non-landholding), 
financial investors (non-landholding), property evaluators and brokers. In particular, our 
study sought to answer three research questions in regards to water ownership, trade and 
water market improvements: 
1) What motivates land-holders and non-landholders to own water entitlements in the 
MDB and what ownership strategies are employed? 
2) What are the water market trading strategies employed by various stakeholders in the 
MDB and is there a difference in trading strategies between land-holders and non-
landholders? 
3) What do various stakeholders think are the key lessons for water market 
improvement? 
We conclude with our recommendations for MDB water market design reform and a number 
of key insights for the development of water markets in other countries. 
 
6.2 Background of MDB Water Trading  
The benefits from introducing water ownership rights (otherwise known as entitlements and 
licences) and water trading markets have been well established, both in theory and in practise 
(Bjornlund 2006; Grafton et al. 2016; Pujol et al. 2006). Water markets have been adopted in 
a number of countries, such as Spain, Mexico, Chile and the United States, however the most 
advanced water market operates in Australia’s MDB – routinely serving as the exemplar of 
best-practice (Grafton et al. 2011; Leonard et al. 2019; Rey et al. 2019). 
Informal water markets have been operating in the MDB since the 1960s, with water 
swapping even known during the World War II drought, but were more formally established 
from the 1990s onwards, and driven by the cap of water diversions implemented in 1995, 
with the annual permitted extraction from watercourses and regulated rivers set at 1993–94 
levels of development (although Queensland was set at 1999-2000 levels (AAS 2019) and 
South Australia where the Cap was set at an average use of 90% of entitlements which was 
considerably above its 1993-94 levels of use). The 2000s saw the separation of land and 
water ownership (e.g. Victoria unbundled water from land in 2007), which allowed non-
landowners to own water for the first time. Water markets developed from the late 1980s and 
early 1990s onwards. Trade generally occurs through two main products: 1) water 
entitlements (permanent water – a right to extract water from a watercourse/body); and 2) 
water allocations (temporary water – the seasonal allocation received by a given water 
entitlement) (Wheeler et al. 2014a). Water entitlements come in three main forms within the 
southern system: high, general and low security (reliability in Victoria), reflecting the 
probability of receiving a full water allocation. For example, a high security entitlement is 
meant to yield, on average, a full allocation in 90-95 out of 100 years (Zuo et al. 2016). Other 




irrigation network (Crase et al. 2015)), parking (right to use carry-over45 space owned by a 
different entitlement holder), water leases, water forwards and water options.46 For a 
Glossary of important water market products and expressions, see Table D.1. 
Over 150 different types of water entitlements currently exist in different parts of the Basin 
(MDBA 2019l). Table 6.1 illustrates the main types of water products traded, along with 
some price examples of what each product traded for in recent water seasons. 
                                                 
45Carry-over allows water owners to store allocation in dams for future use, minus 5% loss for storage 
evaporation losses. 
46To date only “call options” were traded, giving the contract buyer the option, but not the obligation, to buy an 
agreed volume of water for an agreed price and timeline. It seems “put options”, giving the contract buyer the 





Table 6.1 Overview of the main MDB water market products 












Entitlements (regulated and 
unregulated) 
• High security (HS) 
• General security 
(GS) 
 































37 (seller pays) 
Allocation 
• Surface water 
• Groundwater 
Water lease 
• 1 year 
 
• Multi-year (mostly up to 5 years) 
 
Carry-over space (parking) 
Water forwards 
• 1 year 








GS: 80+ (p.a.) 











HS: 250-350 (p.a.) 
LS: 25-35 (p.a.) 






Notes: *Water allocation and entitlement prices are based on monthly median prices, excluding prices of AUD$0/ML, and are sourced from BOM (2019c) for Murrumbidgee 
and DELWP (2019b) for 2018-19 Goulburn water season. H20X water trading platform data provided values for groundwater, delivery shares, leases, parking and forwards. 
**One delivery share in the Murrumbidgee allows the delivery of 1.2 ML and can be traded annually (MI 2015). One delivery share in the Goulburn delivers 270 ML (1ML 
per day per irrigation season (270 days)) and are valid indefinitely. Licencing fees amount to $2,925–5,333 per year per share, with a termination fee of $29,250–53,333 





Figure 6.1 illustrates the development of water allocation and entitlement volume traded from 
the early 1990s in the sMDB, and also displays nominal annual water allocation and high 
security (HS) entitlement prices for the Goulburn system of Victoria, one of the most active 
and mature trading regions. 
Figure 6.1 Temporary and permanent water prices in the Goulburn and sMDB water 
trade volumes from 1993-94 to 2018-19 
 
Source: Adapted from Seidl et al. (2020a). 
 
Under an entitlement lease, the buyer gains the right to extract water allocated to the seller’s 
entitlement for a given time-period. Water forward/options contracts deliver a predetermined 
volume of allocation at a set date and price to the buyer. Forward delivery is mandatory, 
whereas under option contracts the buyer can choose not to acquire the water. In contrast to 
forwards and options, where the seller bears (part of the) supply risk and guarantees physical 
delivery, these risks are borne by water lease buyers. 
From 2007 onwards, an organisation can buy water entitlements on the market irrespective of 
land-ownership, and achieve a return by selling temporary water through the market to 
agriculturalists (Wheeler et al. 2016a). As a result, non-landholder ownership (i.e. 
superannuation companies, trade speculators and arbitrageurs, NGOs, EWHs) of water 
entitlements in the MDB has been growing (DELWP 2019a).  
Market participation by irrigators in general has also grown over time with 52% and 78% of 
irrigators in 2015-16 having conducted at least one entitlement or allocation trade 
respectively (Grafton and Wheeler 2018). Corresponding to the increase in market use, water 
market transaction costs and trade barriers have reduced over time (Loch et al. 2018), 
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glossary in Table D.1), and physical barriers (e.g. the 7,000 megalitres per day (ML/day) 
Barmah-Choke flow constraint47 (MDBA 2019c)) remain. There is also evidence that 
regulations are improving market conditions. For example, there is some quantitative 
evidence that insider trading potentially declined after the introduction of relevant legislation 
in 2014 (de Bonviller et al. 2019). At the same time, market participants have become more 
sophisticated and willing to speculate in the past decade, which can have both benefits and 
costs for various stakeholders in the market. 
Although reasons for water market participation vary markedly between stakeholders, they 
can be associated with two broad themes: 1) water trading and ownership to mitigate shortage 
and secure water supply; and 2) water trading and ownership for direct financial gain (from 
water use). 
A dominant strategy for many irrigators (both past and present) is to own more water than 
needed in order to achieve a buffer. Trading surplus water can be dependent upon prices 
and/or output prices (Wheeler and Cheesman 2013). Another recent strategy is to diversify 
water ownership, e.g. owning entitlements across different securities and regions (Leroux and 
Martin 2016). Carry-over has also allowed stakeholders to mitigate future scarcity. Water 
scarcity is often mitigated using temporary water trading (although irrigators also employ 
many other farm strategies (Gaydon et al. 2012; Kirby et al. 2014a)). The simplest approach 
is to buy water allocations to supplement water supply during times of scarcity (Loch et al. 
2012). Generally, at higher water allocation prices, dairy irrigators are usually the first to 
switch from buying to selling allocations, followed by broadacre irrigators; whereas perennial 
horticulturalists continue to purchase allocations even at higher prices to avoid capital loss 
(Adamson et al. 2017; Wheeler et al. 2014d; Zuo et al. 2015a). In the last few years, 
derivative-type temporary water trading products such as water forwards, options, and 
parking have emerged (Bayer and Loch 2017). 
Water entitlement trading is often used by irrigators to restructure existing water portfolios, 
increase supply security and relocate farm enterprises (Haensch et al. 2016b). Water 
entitlements are also sold when an irrigator wishes to exit farming, restructure farm finances 
or retire farm debt (Wheeler and Zuo 2017; Zuo et al. 2015b). For some, having 
buffer/surplus water enables irrigators to sell unused entitlements to the government and 
therefore maintain farm production (Wheeler et al. 2014c; Wheeler et al. 2014d). 
However, stakeholder trading strategies can vary significantly. For example, the 
Commonwealth Environmental Water Holder (CEWH) owns a large and diverse portfolio of 
water entitlements, but only rarely trades this water (CEWO 2019). Also, some irrigators and 
financial investors treat water trading similar to trading on stock markets. Trading returns 
from temporary trade can result from the change in price when selling one’s own allocation, 
but also from the price difference between seasons or catchments when the allocation was 
purchased – by selling in a different catchment or water year (Loch et al. 2012). Financial 
gain from selling parking or lease contracts can be seen as a service fee for using the seller’s 
water entitlement/carry-over space and usually takes the form of a nominal price per 
megalitre. The water forward price includes a risk premium (above the allocation price when 
entering the contract) as the seller bears the risk for the buyer. The risk premium for options 
is higher than that for forwards, as the seller bears the additional risk if the buyer chooses not 
to exercise the contract at the due date. 
                                                 
47Note that the official maximum flow per day capacity figure can be 7,000 ML/day or 9,500–10,600 ML/day, 




Revenue from water ownership is derived from temporary trading and capital appreciation, 
for example, Zuo et al. (2019) highlight that water entitlements are driven by temporary 
prices and hysteresis – plus it has been shown that MDB water ownership has often had 
higher internal rates of returns than stock markets (Wheeler et al. 2016a). Furthermore, some 
investors choose water entitlements as another avenue to invest in agriculture, with the 
advantage of non-depreciation (ISA 2017). This increasing investment, especially by non-
landholders, has raised issues of undue influence in water markets. 
One issue in seeking to investigate this question of non-stakeholder trading strategies is that 
there is a lack of publicly available water market/ownership data across all stakeholders. 
Water register transaction data only encompasses entitlement and allocation trades, and 
provides no information on other products such as leases or forwards (MDBA 2019m) or who 
conducts such trades. Hence this is one reason why, to date, there has been little research on 
agri-corporates or non-landholder water market trading strategies. This study seeks to extend 
the literature through a mix of qualitative and quantitative research, to provide a detailed 
analysis of non-landholder and landholder water ownership and trading strategies, as well as 
identifying areas for water market reform. 
 
6.3 Material and methods 
We employed a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods to explore the questions 
surrounding water trade and water ownership in the MDB by type of stakeholder (landholder 
versus non-landholder). For an overview of data sources used and corresponding analysis, see 
Table D.2. 
 
6.3.1 Qualitative information 
A total 64 semi-structured interviews were conducted with key stakeholders across the MDB. 
As water register data on agri-corporate and non-landholder investor ownership is not 
publicly available, we chose the method of targeted qualitative expert interviews to 
understand these stakeholders’ trading strategies. To specifically target prominent agri-
corporate and non-landholder organisations with a “large” holding of sMDB water 
entitlements, we used publicly available information48 to first identify relevant organisations 
(and individuals within), and employed a chain referral approach to recruit additional 
interview participants (Biernacki and Waldorf 1981). We also approached large organisations 
with expert knowledge in water entitlement valuation, water trading and agri-business 
lending in the sMDB, such as banks, evaluators and water brokers. Consequently, the 
qualitative interviews focus on the views and behaviours of large and corporatised 
organisations, rather than the typical irrigator. Overall, we approached 83 eligible individuals 
or organisations for interview and hence obtained a response rate of 77%. The stakeholders 
interviewed included: 20 investors and agri-corporates (very large landholders owning and/or 
trading water but generate their main income from farming); 15 EWH and NGO employees49 
(public or private entities, owning or delivering water entitlements or allocations for 
                                                 
48This included reviewing stakeholders’ annual and financial reports before interviews. 
49Note we interviewed a few respondents who worked for the same organisation. This was because some EWHs 
operate across multiple states with water management decisions made at the local level, making it necessary to 
interview a variety of local representatives. While some EWHs own land, their primary function is water 
management so they are classified as non-landholders. Three respondents from environmental NGO 




environmental purposes); 10 water evaluators (consultants etc. specialised in water 
valuation); 7 financial investors (non-landholders trading water for financial gain50); 6 
bankers (employees from financial institutions who were the key individuals responsible for 
significant lending portfolios in water entitlements); and 5 water brokers (who earn 
commission-based revenue from water market transactions). 
The interviews were mostly conducted face-to face during 2018-19, at times and locations 
convenient for respondents across the MDB. A quarter of interviews were undertaken by 
phone and two provided written submissions. The incompleteness of one written submission 
meant it was excluded, hence only 63 responses are included here. The interviews had a 
median length of 60 minutes, with interview recordings and transcripts compiled into 
Nvivo11 and coded into major themes. A range of open-ended questions were asked on 
topics of water ownership, trading, water accounting, water markets and valuation. 84% of 
our respondents were male, while 70% of our female respondents worked for EWHs. This 
gender balance is (unfortunately) reflective of the industry in general. 
This study focuses mainly on understanding water ownership and market strategies by land-
holders versus non-landholders, hence, it uses information from a range of quantitative 
sources plus our interviews with 1) investors and agri-corporates; and 2) EWHs and financial 
investors. Hence, most of the analysis is focussed on 38 of our interviews51, however we also 
use responses from the full set of 63 interviews in the final section to explore suggestions for 
water market design improvements. 
 
6.3.2 Quantitative data 
This study also used quantitative data to illustrate stakeholder water entitlement ownership, 
along with allocation, entitlement, carry-over and forward trading behaviour. We utilised data 
from a representative telephone survey of 1,000 sMDB irrigators52 undertaken in 2015-16 
(see Wheeler et al. (2018) for further detail) to supplement the personal interview information 
and establish general MDB water ownership and trading behaviour. We also analysed 
transaction data made available by one of the MDB’s leading water trading platforms53 to 
illustrate the extent of water forward and parking trading. 
 
6.4 Results 
The results are presented in three sections: 1) an overview of water market participation using 
the survey of 1,000 irrigators and interviews with 38 landholder/non-landholder investors and 
EWHs; 2) qualitative data on 38 water investors’ and EWHs’ trade strategies and 
motivations; and 3) qualitative data on all 63 interview expert participants’ beliefs about 
water market improvements. 
                                                 
50Investment and ownership structures of financial investors are complex. Some own agricultural land in other 
investment funds. Generally financial investor respondents manage an exclusive water asset portfolio, therefore 
are classified as non-landholders. 
5112 EWHs, 19 investors/agri-corporates and 7 financial investors. One investor interviewed was not included in 
our data analysis as they owned no water in the Basin, but were interviewed originally as they were considering 
it. 
52Includes 419 NSW, 209 SA and 372 VIC irrigators. 





6.4.1 Water market participation and strategies – quantitative data 
About 65% of Victorian (VIC) irrigators own a diverse water portfolio of at least two types of 
entitlements, with diverse ownership less common in New South Wales (NSW) (28%) and 
South Australia (SA) (7%) – where ownership is mostly concentrated in general and high 
security surface-water entitlements respectively (Table 6.2).54 These ownership patterns are 
mainly because of historical factors of water ownership by states. 
 
Table 6.2 Surface-water entitlement ownership and carry-over for MDB irrigators and 
landholder/non-landholder interview participants 
Method State/ 
stakeholder  





















NSW (n=419) 37% 65% 12% 4% 28% 67% 
VIC (n=372) 94% 3% 62% 2% 67% 84% 
SA (n=209) 














95% 26% 37% 0% 58% 39% 
Notes: *More than one type of water entitlement can be owned. 
**Does not include delivery share ownership  
***Question asked for the 2014-15 water season in telephone survey. Carry-over was not available on SA 
entitlements in 2014-15, but some South Australians own water elsewhere with carry-over availability. 
****Investors/agri-corporates own land, EWHs and financial investors generally do not. 
 
Synthesised and created from both our qualitative and quantitative data, Figure 6.2 illustrates 
the overall different water ownership and trading strategies employed by sMDB stakeholders. 
The majority of sMDB stakeholders have established water trading and ownership strategies 
to secure water for production, such as using their own carry-over and trading allocation. 
Entitlement trade was less common. Table 6.2 and Figure 6.2 both illustrate that standard 
irrigators own less diverse surface-water portfolios than larger agri-corporates, with non-
landholders’ surface-water ownership the most diverse. Between 58% and 86% of our 
interviewed respondents had a diverse water entitlement portfolio across stakeholder groups. 
                                                 
54While all SA water entitlements are high security, stakeholders could decide to own different security 




Figure 6.2 An overview of sMDB water ownership and trading strategies 
 
Notes: Diagram is not drawn to scale, and classifications of irrigators into groups (e.g. standard irrigators, standard agri-corporates etc are approximate only).  
*Based on trade results for 1,000 irrigators in the sMDB in water season 2014-15: irrigators conducted no water trades=38%; traded only allocations=51%; traded only 
entitlements=4%; traded allocations and entitlements=7%. 
**Based on 38 landholder and non-landholder interviews: 55% trade carry-over and/or allocations/leases; 29% trade forwards, multi-year leases and carry-over; and 3% own 
no entitlements but trade carry-over, multi-year leases, multi-year forwards, and options. 




Various stakeholders undertake differing levels of sophisticated trading strategies. A 
“standard/traditional” irrigator, EWHs, and “traditional” agri-corporate (which represent the 
majority of MDB irrigators at the base of Figure 6.2) use their own carry-over, and trade 
allocation to either supplement water supply or to earn income from surplus water. Note this 
typology relates to water trading and ownership strategy sophistication, is indicative and not 
to scale. A significant number own all or an excess of their water needs under one type of 
regional entitlement. More “savvy” irrigators, EWHs, and “standard” agri-corporates (a 
smaller proportion of irrigators in the MDB) own diverse portfolios of entitlements, 
occasionally trade entitlements, and make regular use of their own carry-over, allocation and 
lease trading for farming. “Savvy” agri-corporates and financial investors (which note 
represent a very small proportion of MDB stakeholders), own diverse entitlement holdings, 
and frequently trade sophisticated temporary products such as water forwards and parking, 
not just for water supply but also for price arbitrage differences. 
Finally, there is an even smaller number of highly “sophisticated” market entrepreneurs and 
speculators who, while not owning water, trade and arbitrage daily across the whole diverse 
range of temporary products, often developing and trading new temporary derivative-type 
water products. 
 
6.4.2 Water Ownership rationale and strategies – participant qualitative data 
The qualitative data provided rich information on participants’ views of water assets and their 
surface-water ownership strategies. Table 6.3 classified rationales for water ownership into 
eight broad reasons: historic; supply security; asset investment; diversification; proximity to 
(agricultural) operations; price; deliverability; and liquidity. Rationale for water ownership 





Table 6.3 Water asset characteristics and rationales for surface-water ownership 
strategies 









Do you view water entitlements 
primarily as a 
financial/investment asset? (% of 
yes responses) 
79% 75% 100% 74% 
How do water entitlements 
compare to other 
financial/investment assets? (% of 
respondents believing 
entitlements represented an 
unique asset) 
50% 33% 57% 58% 
Answers to the open-ended question: “Reasons why you own the water portfolio that you do?”** 
Historic (e.g. water bundled with 
land) 
21% 21% 4% 32% 
Supply security (e.g. high 
security) 
17% 21% 13% 18% 
Strong investment (e.g. expected 
value appreciation) 
16% 13% 25% 12% 
Diversification (e.g. different 
entitlements across regions) 
13% 13% 17% 12% 
Proximity to operations (e.g. 
entitlements in the farm region) 
12% 13% 8% 15% 
Price (e.g. “cheap” purchase price 
opportunity) 
11% 8% 13% 12% 
Deliverability (e.g. can trade 
allocation to most other MDB 
catchments) 
9% 13% 17% 0% 
Liquidity (e.g. entitlements in 
active trading zones) 
1% 0% 4% 0% 
Notes: *Investors/agri-corporates own land, EWHs and financial investors generally do not. 
**Multiple answers were allowed.  
 
Around four-fifths of investor/agri-corporate, EWH and financial investor respondents (79%) 
saw water entitlements as an (investment) asset, with half perceiving water entitlements to be 
an extremely attractive, but unique asset class. 
“There is no depreciation, there's no goodwill, there is no maintenance and repairs. 
There is really very few costs in the ownership of it. There are not many asset classes 
that are that good.” (Investor/Agri-corporate) 
Although 75% of EWH respondents regard water entitlements as an investment asset, they 
found it challenging to compare water to other assets. Since EWHs typically do not own 
water entitlements for financial gain, entitlement risk and return characteristics are of little 
relevance: 
“It is completely different because we are putting water out there for environmental 
purposes, so it depends on how you end up valuing the environmental benefit which is 




Unsurprisingly, all financial investor respondents saw water entitlements as an investment 
asset, particularly pointing to their unique risk profile, good returns, non-depreciation and 
non-correlation to other assets: 
“That is the attraction, it does not trade in the same pattern as real estate or 
infrastructure assets, it has different drivers of return. Probably 10% return per 
annum: we derive that from 4-6% income yield and 4% capital appreciation over the 
longer term. Your yield can be pretty volatile, which would demand a higher return 
and we do get that. Often real estate has some material financial leverage, whereas 
we are acquiring water at 100% equity basis, which de-risks it again.” (Financial 
Investor) 
However, some respondents highlighted that water entitlements are a statutory asset, subject 
to regulatory changes55 and are therefore legally very different from property and 
consequently has less protection: 
“[legal] Accuracy around the entitlements comes from the bipartisan nature of water 
policy. Commonwealth and states, through agreement and through practice over the 
last 25 years, really reduced the sovereign risk in the water market to an extent where 
people are prepared to invest in it. As if it were a solid property right, what it is not.” 
(EWH)  
Despite the legal status of entitlements as non-property as determined by the high court 
(Fisher 2010), our findings suggest that most market participants treat water entitlements as 
property. 
The most frequently cited motivation for water ownership strategies was historic reasons, as 
water entitlements were acquired with agricultural land prior to unbundling and had not been 
traded since. Many EWHs had their water portfolio legislated into existence. Water supply 
security was identified as the second-highest motivation. This related both to the strategy of 
owning excess/buffer water and the preference for more secure entitlement classes or large 
carry-over capacity. Other important factors highlighted in Table 3 include the need for 
proximity of water entitlement holdings to the relevant farm/environmental asset; the ability 
of a particular entitlement class to trade allocation into different catchments (deliverability); 
diversification of water holdings across regions and entitlement classes; and entitlement 
price. 
When considering the motivations of non-landholder stakeholder groups: historic reasons and 
supply security were the most important factors for EWHs, whereas financial investors 
ranked strong investment, diversification and deliverability the highest. Similar to EWHs, 
landholders’ ownership strategies were largely influenced by historic reasons, supply security 
and agricultural proximity. Financial investors saw water entitlements as a growth asset due 
to increasing high-value horticultural production and climate change:  
“We often see dramatic changes in the commodity mix that is being produced 
throughout the Basin, to much more horticulture and higher value crops. We think 
that over time, not only do those crops need more water, but they become more 
inelastic to pricing. They will have to water their permanent crops and they have 
                                                 
55States can change the security of an entitlement, rules regarding use and access to allocation, or the overall 
allocation volume to a catchment based on sustainable diversion limit considerations (Water Act 2007 (Cwlth), 
pt2 d4 sdA s77). For example, a change in the Barwon-Darling water sharing plan allowed entitlement holders 
to extract water at lower river levels, with increased extraction (and drought) substantially contributing to a mass 




higher margins so they can support higher prices.” (Financial Investor) 
Overall, there appeared to be three major themes influencing the ownership of water 
entitlements: 1) supply and operational factors; 2) water trading and delivery; and 3) financial 
factors. 
Owning water close to operations is seen as a strategy that reduces the need for water trading, 
exposure to trade restrictions and transaction costs.56 On the other hand, concentrating 
entitlements in one region increases exposure to localised climate uncertainty. 
Another strategy as already highlighted is diversification: owning a variety of highly tradable 
water entitlements (e.g. see MDBA (2010c)) across different regions. For example: 
“The portfolio was very focused on the southern MDB, we want the interconnectivity, 
that is what attracted us to start there. The portfolio focused on the tradability of 
water and the movability of water around [trading] zones, the maturity of the market, 
and the liquidity it provides. In terms of the portfolio construction, we want a mix of 
high security, general and low.” (Financial Investor) 
This strategy maximises water trading and reduces the impact of localised climate, at the cost 
of more exposure to trade restrictions and transaction costs. 
Some respondents discussed the impact of IVTs on ownership and water markets, particularly 
the Barmah-Choke trade restriction. As water portfolio structure was influenced by historic 
factors, so is landholders’ exposure to IVTs. Interestingly, only a few respondents, mainly 
non-landholder financial investors, stated that they diversified their entitlement portfolio 
around minimising the impacts of IVTs. An exception is the Barmah-Choke constraint, with 
most respondents preferring entitlement ownership below the choke: 
“Five years ago, we would have bought NSW Murrumbidgee. Now with the difficulty 
of getting out of the ‘Bidgee, first to the Murray, and then from the Murray, down to 
here. That is our strategy, to now only look at Victoria below the Choke.” 
(Investor/Agri-corporate) 
Water entitlements below the choke (i.e. unaffected by constraints), such as Victorian Murray 
trade Zone 7, are seen as more desirable. While respondents identified the Goulburn system 
and the Mulwala canal (10,000 ML/day capacity (GMW 2019)), which is part of the Murray 
Irrigation area, as important to mitigate the choke constraint, they acknowledged the limits of 
these mitigations due to the Goulburn-Murray IVT and the higher cost of delivering water 
through Murray Irrigation infrastructure. IVTs and in particular the Barmah-Choke trade 
restriction disproportionately affect EWHs, as one EWH stakeholder explained: 
“So whenever we do an inter-valley transfer, we have got a watering action that we 
are doing, and we have moved some water from below the choke to above the choke. 
Our water is included as water going through the choke and it opens up the choke for 
water going the other way, when in fact we have moved the water up there so that we 
can bring it back to fill the choke up. IVTs are something we have to keep a very close 
eye on. If you could move 1GL of water between valleys A and B, we have probably 
got that gigalitre of water. We choose not to do it because it would choke the industry 
out and good neighbour policy means that you do not do that.” (EWH) 
                                                 
56While subject to negotiation, it is convention that the allocation buyer shoulders transfer and register fees 




Larger and more sophisticated agri-corporates often mix strategies of concentration and 
diversification: they own a diversified portfolio of water entitlements but use them to run 
operations in the corresponding catchments. This approach would reduce the exposure to 
IVTs. Financial investors’ lack of land ownership means their main strategy is to sell 
temporary water to producers, requiring a highly deliverable, diversified water portfolio 
capable of mitigating the effects of IVTs. 
The majority of EWH, financial investor and investor respondents generally own their 
complete water needs (for a typical year) in entitlements. A fifth of our investor participants 
chose not to own their entire water needs in entitlements for capital reasons, supplementing 
their entitlement ownership with temporary trading, while other investors own only a small 
fraction of water in entitlements and trade frequently, be it for farming purposes or for 
making money from delivering forwards and options. 
“Our standing position is generally not to own water. That is about capital sheet 
efficiency, and not tying up a lot of capital.” (Investor/Agri-corporate) 
A few respondents commented on owning water delivery shares, and utilised a strategy of 
owning more delivery shares than water entitlements – or even owning most of the delivery 
shares within an irrigation system, in order to guarantee priority of water delivery. 
 
6.4.3 Temporary trading strategies: carry-over, parking, forwards – Qualitative data 
Figure 2 illustrated that the majority of MDB stakeholders have used allocation and carry-
over. We found that our interviewees with more diverse water portfolios employed more 
sophisticated trading strategies (Table 6.4). Table 6.4 illustrates that many employ lease and 
forward contracts, and use carry-over opportunistically (e.g. parking trade, carry-over 

























Do not use 19% 50% 0% 42% 37% 
Farming/environmental 
use 
41% 42% 0% 37% 
32% 
Parking trade 37% 8% 100% 16% 29% 
Leases 
Do not use 56% 100% 0% 42% 53% 
One year 0% 0% 0% 11% 5% 
Multi-year 41% 0% 100% 37% 37% 
Forwards 
Do not use 41% 83% 0% 53% 53% 
One year 41% 17% 57% 26% 29% 
Multi-year 15% 0% 43% 11% 13% 
Notes: * Investors/agri-corporates own land, EWHs and financial investors generally do not. 
**A few stakeholders did not answer these questions; hence not all totals add up to 100%. 
 
Land-owning stakeholders (investors/agri-corporates) use temporary products such as leases, 
forwards and carry-over primarily as tools to manage water supply risk. Water lease contracts 
seem to be a standard tool and are well established; whereas only more sophisticated agri-
corporates employ a mix of parking, forwards and lease contracts. This approach aims to 
minimise the capital cost of water ownership, while maintaining supply security. 
“We take a portfolio approach, we own some, we lease some, we have got forward 
positions, we use carry-over, and we use the spot market. We have got half of the 
water needs covered with forward positions, 10% with leasing and 30% is in the spot 
market. Moving forward, we see ourselves building more exposure with leases and 
forwards.” (Investor/Agri-corporate) 
Carry-over was the most employed strategy by stakeholders. EWHs and investors/agri-
corporates use carry-over mainly for their own surplus water, however at least one EWH sells 
parking contracts to generate extra revenue: 
“We also use carry-over as a market-based mechanism, essentially carrying over 
dollars but in water, but also as a product we can offer to sell. We use the carry-over 
capacity on our licences to offer space to irrigators.” (EWH) 
All financial investors use carry-over opportunistically; employing parking for extra 
allocation to supply forward arrangements, or to speculate on temporary prices. In addition, 
more sophisticated investors/agri-corporates employ parking contracts to expand their carry-
over capacity, or use carry-over to substitute between different water sources: 
“We might have carry-over capacity on our accounts and [when] the price in the 
temporary market is acceptable, we buy-in to carry-over. Or we have got a mix of 
water types…where we might turn off the bores, buy temporary river water for 
production and carry-over allocation volume on the bore water account” 
(Investor/Agri-corporate) 
Financial investors and investors/agri-corporates use and sell multi-year leases. Financial 




(up to five years) as this provides stable income with less risk, whereas investors/agri-
corporates often employ leases to avoid water entitlement ownership: 
“We have the long-term view that we lock at least 70-80% of the portfolio into leases 
which gives us a nice steady, climatic risk free, return.” (Financial Investor) 
“Water is so expensive to buy…so it is a lot of capital you need to put up-front when 
you are doing a development. We have had a strategy of putting in place some long-
term leases, at least five years, and as we start producing almonds and generate some 
cash flow, then we will buy entitlements.” (Investor/Agri-corporate) 
Financial investors and investors (along with one EWH) are also regularly using forwards – 
namely one-year contracts. Analysis of private water trading platform data shows that 92% of 
forwards traded since 2016 have been one-year contracts. Given that water forwards have 
only been commercially available since 2014, and participants are still learning about the 
product, multi-year forward supply is limited by the small number of vendors willing to bear 
the extra risk. Although financial non-landholding investors only own around 10% of MDB 
water entitlements (DELWP 2019a), they trade a significant proportion of forwards (37% of 
forwards sold since 2016 based on our analysis of private water trading platform data). Many 
of the interviewees see forwards as a valuable risk management tool, but also cited a number 
of dangers in relation to reputation, counterparty and market immaturity. For example, EWHs 
currently do not trade forwards due to reputational and political risk issues: 
“EWHs use [forward trading] very cautiously because there is just as much risk 
around their social licence to operate as there is around portfolio management…And 
it is a huge political risk. They [public EWHs] are at the whims of the government 
and need to be seen as not skewing the market, so they have got to be above board 
like you would not believe.” (EWH) 
Counterparty risk occurs where the forward seller has incentive to default during times of 
high temporary prices, whereas the buyer has incentive to default at low prices. Another 
aspect of counterparty risk is non-delivery: 
“Parties that only own about 100-200ML write a 400ML forward, hoping they can 
buy the allocation on the market and deliver against it on a multi-year basis. If we get 
a really dry year they are not going to deliver.” (Financial Investor) 
Due to the fact that respondents are cautious who they trade with and that often 20% of 
contract value is required as a down payment, counterparty default was described as rare. 
However, greater water market institutional reform was called for, such as standardised 
forward contracts, a regulatory body, and a central exchange and clearing house:57 
“The issue with forwards in the water markets is, it is a semi-sophisticated product in 
a very unsophisticated market…. We are trying to move into these more sophisticated 
products but we have not got the underlying infrastructure in the market to do that, a 
central exchange and clearing house for example.” (Water Broker) 
Forwards are seen as more expensive than using temporary allocation plus carry-over fees (or 
parking), and less secure due to counterparty risk. Carry-over and forwards have different 
cash-flow implications for the buyer: the full costs of temporary trade combined with parking 
need to be paid immediately, whereas forwards only require an initial deposit, with the 
                                                 
57In financial markets, the clearing house is the counterparty for all trades, guaranteeing delivery in case of 




remaining costs paid at delivery. Some respondents argued that carry-over and forwards are 
essentially identical – to guarantee delivery, the forward seller has to store the contracted 
temporary volume in carry-over (adjusted for spill risk and evaporation). A few financial 
investors underwrote forwards with other temporary products, abstracting forward delivery 
from entitlement holdings and carry-over. 
 
6.4.4 Water market design improvements – Qualitative data 
Finally, respondents were asked an open-ended question to nominate and comment on any 
aspects they would like changed or improved in relation to the MDB. 59% of the total 63 
surveyed participants responded to this question with comments relating to water market 




Table 6.5 Stakeholder views on improvements to MDB water markets and ownership 





















Water trading and storage data and standardisation 
(e.g. more complete and transparent water register 
data) 25% 40% 62% 0% 44% 11% 14% 
Relaxed catchment trade restrictions (e.g. IVTs) 13% 0% 0% 33% 14% 22% 0% 
Greater transparency in allocation and inter-valley 
trade restriction announcements (e.g. better explain 
reasons behind decisions) 12% 0% 0% 0% 0% 16% 44% 
Change legal status of water (e.g. reverse unbundling; 
make water property) 12% 20% 0% 50% 0% 11% 0% 
Introduce regulation and accreditation for 
intermediaries (e.g. water broker licence) 10% 20% 0% 17% 14% 6% 14% 
Simplify carry-over arrangements (e.g. SA carry-over 
access) 8% 0% 25% 0% 0% 6% 14% 
More public EWH trading capabilities (e.g. sell 
environmental allocation) 8% 0% 0% 0% 14% 16% 0% 
Better understanding and regulation of agricultural 
development (e.g. limit on permanent planting area) 4% 0% 13% 0% 0% 6% 0% 
Decrease water trade transaction costs (e.g. faster 
processing) 4% 0% 0% 0% 14% 0% 14% 
Environment to contribute to water delivery costs 
(e.g. delivery fees for environmental transfers) 4% 20% 0% 0% 0% 6% 0% 
Notes: *Some respondents addressed multiple topics in one interview. 
**Responses based on those 37 respondents in the total 63 interviews that named water market/ownership reform issues. 




The primary issue identified by all stakeholders concerned the quality of dam storage and 
water trade data. Consistent with the findings of Grafton and Wheeler (2018) about lack of 
consistency in MDB water data, many participants argued that MDB storage volumes differ 
depending on the data source, and that water market data via registers was outdated and of 
poor quality.  
“Accessing current information is very challenging. All that information exists but the 
quality of it is very poor. For example, if you want to know how much water is in Lake 
Hume at any one time, I can go to GMW, I can go to NSW water and I can go to the 
MDBA, and I will get three different figures, which is absurd. Likewise, if I want to 
know the states’ share of water in the Murray system storages, the MDBA releases 
that information once a month, two weeks after the end of the month, at best.” (Water 
Broker) 
Additionally, standardised water market terminology and a central water register containing 
all trading information was seen as needed, with others suggesting a central water exchange 
and clearing house, similar to the ASX. This reflects findings from other studies, suggesting 
insufficient water trade and ownership data quality and access. Current data capturing 
processes are ill-equipped to support emerging temporary products such as parking, forwards 
and options. 
Another important issue raised was the transparency of trade restrictions and allocation 
announcements. Respondents advocated both for more transparency in announcing 
allocations and IVTs, a particular issue in the Murrumbidgee, and for relaxing restrictions in 
general. For example: 
“Farmers have zero idea of what the allocation is going to be, particularly in NSW. 
And it seems that that information is almost made up. It is often nonsensical, it often 
has errors in it and people are trying to make investment decisions, not only around 
trading water but also around growing crops.” (Water Broker) 
“[The Goulburn IVT] limits that region to become just a regionalized trading region 
rather than sit across the whole southern connected MDB. NSW does the same in the 
Murrumbidgee. Effectively, they stop water being traded across the basin and make 
life difficult.” (Financial Investor) 
There is no clear pattern of landholders or non-landholders advocating for relaxing trading 
restrictions and IVTs. Rather, respondents owning diverse water portfolios and personally 
affected by IVTs suggested this improvement.  
A significant number of bank, EWH and investor/agri-corporate respondents desired the 
reversal of unbundling, or alternatively restricting non-irrigator ownership of entitlements, 
believing it would decrease speculation and lower water market prices. This view was not 
shared by financial investors and water brokers. EWH respondents argued that unbundling 
has put a price on biodiversity via the cost of allocations needed to achieve environmental 
outcomes and led to calls for EWHs to pay water licencing and delivery fees. The lack of 
market intermediary regulation and its implications for misconduct was also raised. For 
example: 
“You need some rules around the way brokers operate. I know brokers who have 
interest-bearing accounts and they keep the interest from customers’ acquired funds 
that sit there. In theory you should have an allocation trust account which holds water 




gets traded by the brokers for their own profit. I also know brokers that are the 
counterparty to their client, they are not intermediary, they are actually the principal. 
They see a really good deal and instead of passing that on to a seller, they sell it 
themselves.” (Financial Investor) 
While the Australian Water Broker Association provides a voluntary code of conduct for its 
members (AWBA 2019b), an industry-wide legally binding code of conduct does not exist, 
leading to some industry calls for more regulation (Waterfind 2019a). Claims of intermediary 
misconduct are contested (Miller 2019), but difficult to show quantitative evidence for 
without corresponding reporting and regulatory requirements. 
Other less common responses included issues surrounding more accessible, greater and 
standardised carry-over. Some respondents advocated for a more proactive role of public 
EWHs in water trading, especially during drought. The least discussed topics included faster 
and more efficient water trade processing; the size and impacts of MDB permanent plantings; 
and the financial contribution of EWHs to water delivery and storage operations. EWH 
respondents rejected making monetary contributions to the delivery of environmental water 
based on their limited ability to raise funds: 
“The environment cannot make a return in order to pay those fees. So where does this 
return come from? It can only come from the taxpayer.” (EWH) 
In regards to the issues concerning increases of MDB permanent plantings, a few respondents 
worried whether there was enough water to satisfy the existing and future needs of plantings, 
and the ability to physically deliver the water to these areas: 
“There will be a risk of delivery failure. They cannot get water to certain parts of the 
system. They have all the trees being planted downstream in the Basin and there is a 
lot of trade restrictions. Do they expect to get water from all of the tributaries 
upstream?” (Financial Investor) 
Some respondents called for a restriction on permanent planting area until the impacts have 
been fully assessed. Indeed, the Victorian government recently stopped processing 




While MDB irrigators have become more sophisticated in their water ownership and trading 
strategies, the majority still own all or most their water needs under one type of entitlement 
(in one region) and use the temporary market to supplement supply. While a typical irrigator 
in the sMDB owns mainly high or general surface-water security entitlements and use this as 
their main water source (Wheeler and Garrick 2020), non-landholders and investors/agri-
corporates tend to own a variety of entitlements across different regions. Hence, there appears 
to be two broad philosophies underpinning water entitlement ownership strategies: 1) 
concentrate ownership in one catchment; and 2) diversify water ownership across multiple 
entitlements and catchments. Groundwater entitlements are also playing a role in this 
diversification by many agri-corporates (Davies and Burns 2019). Interestingly, most 
landholder respondents diversify around water entitlement security and carry-over capacity - 
with the exposure to trade restrictions, apart from the Barmah-Choke constraint - rarely stated 
as a driver for diversification. The two strategies are not mutually exclusive: some 




potentially to limit the exposure or impact of trade restrictions. Financial investors prefer the 
second of these strategies, owning large and diverse water portfolios with significant 
proportions of high and low security entitlements and the capability to mitigate trade 
restrictions. As the larger part of their portfolio is leased out on a long-term basis, having a 
diverse portfolio of attractive high security entitlements is paramount, while low security 
entitlements provide the carry-over capabilities to supply forwards or sell parking. In 
contrast, some stakeholders, particularly agri-corporates, own little to no water entitlements, 
relying on temporary trading. Although this strategy can have capital outlay benefits, 
particularly for industries pairing high upfront capital requirements with delayed revenue, it 
is susceptible to high temporary water prices. 
Most respondents see water entitlements as an investment asset, with some pointing to the 
unique characteristics of the asset class. The vast majority of respondents ignore the legal 
status of water entitlements as a statutory asset (Fisher 2010), potentially leading to an 
illusion about the legal security and protection of water assets in practice. 
Forwards, leases and parking are only used by small number of MDB stakeholders, with 
parking mostly used by financial investors and some investors/agri-corporates. This reflects 
some landholder respondent comments that they prefer plant-based management strategies 
(e.g. mulching, improved irrigation scheduling – see Wheeler and Marning (2019) for more 
detail) over managing their water portfolio to address water shortage. Forwards are 
recognised as an important risk management tool, but questions remain around counterparty, 
reputational risk, and market maturity. Although trade to date has been limited, the forward 
and options market is likely to grow given its capability to reduce supply risk and guarantee 
physical delivery. 
Respondents identified a need to improve water data quality and accessibility, which has been 
well documented previously (de Bonviller et al. 2019; Grafton and Wheeler 2018; Seidl et al. 
2020a). However, standardised water product contracts, intermediary regulation, market 
integrity rules and a water market central exchange and clearing house have yet to receive 
much attention (although Leonard et al. (2019) discusses advantages of a central exchange 
and clearing house for western US water markets). Currently, publicly available water market 
data is unable to identify and support transparent reporting of parking, water forwards and 
options trading – which will require increased attention in a maturing water market. Indeed, 
the call for more transparent data is now also backed by the water broker peak industry body 
(AWBA 2019a) and the Australian Competition & Consumer Commission (ACCC 2019a), 
while the Commonwealth Government recently invested over AUD$1 million to develop the 
Waterflow app to improve water storage and trade information (Business.gov.au 2019). 
Respondents saw a need for intermediary regulation to provide minimum quality standards 
and address conflicts of interest (such as intermediaries owning and principally trading water, 
and unethical handling of customer accounts). While the intermediary industry seems to 
regard self-regulation, rather than standardised and enforceable rules for code of conduct, as 
sufficient (AWBA 2019a), the recent findings of the Royal Commission into Misconduct in 
the Banking, Superannuation and Financial Services Industry cast doubts on the effectiveness 
of such approaches (Hayne 2019). Indeed, with the water market increasingly behaving like a 
financial derivatives market, regulation may be especially relevant in the MDB. Particularly 
with regards to conflict of interest and insider trading, the Australian Securities & Investment 
Commission (ASIC) market integrity rules could provide guidance (ASIC 2018). 
Issues also surround different terminology and allocation, IVTs, and carry-over 
announcements. Increased transparency in allocation, carry-over and IVT rules may address 




institutions (Wheeler et al. 2017a; Wheeler et al. 2017b). Arguably, addressing water 
accounting issues, particularly around water use versus water extraction and consumption 
accounting (Young 2014); water valuation and methodology issues (Seidl et al. 2020a) and 
addressing issues in current water resource plans (Productivity Commission 2018), could 
contribute to improved decision-making. Given the prevailing criticism of hydrological water 
accounting in the MDB (Walker 2019; Wheeler and Garrick 2020; Williams and Grafton 
2019), it seems unlikely that rule transparency can be forgone due to improved accounting. 
Further, we share the view that an examination of the appropriateness of IVTs and trade 
restrictions would be beneficial (ACCC 2019a). While a necessity of the hydrological 
realities of operating in the MDB, some IVTs arguably tend to isolate particular catchments 
(and industries) from the water market system, keeping water prices low and preventing the 
politically undesirable exodus of water licences and industry from catchments. In particular, 
respondents often claimed the Goulburn-Murray IVT is a protectionist measure for the 
Goulburn dairy industry, albeit that potentially increased flow levels in the Goulburn river 
associated with the removal of the IVT could lead to increased river bank erosion. Generally, 
it is possible that trade restrictions and IVTs can lead to price distortions in the rest of the 
inter-connected water markets and to distorted trade patterns as stakeholders scramble to 
trade water out of/into a catchment while the IVT is open. In particular, investors/agri-
corporates and financial investors, often with the help of water brokers, seem to have a 
comparative advantage (as compared to smaller operators) to act upon an IVT opening, 
pushing large volumes across catchments and subsequently closing the IVT often in a matter 
of hours. 
Despite the fact that many irrigators call for water to be linked again to land-ownership, 
driven by the perceptions about the negative impacts of non-landholder entitlement 
ownership (Hunt 2019a), and the view that increased demand by non-stakeholders has led to 
higher water entitlement prices58 and gauging behaviour by some operators, it is also true that 
unbundling has brought material benefits for irrigators. It enabled drought adaptation through 
water trading (Kirby et al. 2014a), allowed irrigators to reduce debt by selling water to the 
government (Wheeler et al. 2014c), and saw water entitlement values increase significantly 
(Seidl et al. 2020a). Our results also indicated that non-landholders can be beneficial for the 
water market: new water market products are often developed/called for and first used by 
non-landholders, and financial investors and EWHs are major sellers of forward and parking 
contracts. This view is shared by the Australian Water Brokers Association, pointing out that 
restricting non-landholders in owning and trading water could have detrimental consequences 
for the water market (Testa 2019). While water market speculators exist – generating revenue 
from temporary price differences without owning entitlements – their current small numbers 
suggest limited market impact, however this impact is dependent upon: a) the liquidity of the 
local water market they operate within; and b) the volume of their trade or any insider 
information knowledge. Although non-landholder entitlement ownership and speculative 
trading in general is rising, and there are calls for increased regulation of this type of investor 
in the market, we suggest that growth is likely limited by the required financial investment 
and derivative trading skills, and consequently the opportunity cost of trader involvement 
given the lower annual turn-over of water markets as compared to financial derivative 
markets. However, monopolistic concentration of entitlement ownership and market power 
can lead to price gauging by landholder and non-landholder actors alike, particularly in 
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illiquid markets or when combined with insider information (de Bonviller et al. 2019). As a 
clear example of this, some respondents claimed that information available in regards to 
regulatory and water delivery consultation (e.g. such as being part of a relevant water steering 
committee) enables a range of insider trading to take advantage of changed rules. Therefore, 
and given the material data challenges for quantifying their water ownership and trading, 
non-landholder regulation should be delayed until more quantitative evidence (such as 
linking both ownership and trading register data) has been collected and analysed. 
Although some respondents expressed the desire for EWHs to sell their allocation in drought 
to support irrigation, there is evidence that EWHs are disadvantaged during drought59 
(Pittock 2013), and current water holdings are insufficient to deliver ecological targets 
(Walker 2019). However, proactive temporary trading for environmental purposes may be 
beneficial for more EWHs to adopt, by extending flood events (Connor et al. 2013) or by 
sourcing water cheaper (and more socially acceptable by irrigators) than buying more 
entitlements (Wheeler et al. 2013a). Indeed, EWHs seem to be more disadvantaged compared 
to irrigators in regards to transmission losses associated with delivering water. For example, 
EWHs have transmission losses associated with environmental watering activities attributed 
to their water account (MDBA 2019h), albeit associated return flows are credited (which one 
may view as surprising given the incomplete crediting of return flows by the Commonwealth 
government in recovering water through irrigation infrastructure (Williams and Grafton 
2019)). On the other hand, while transmission losses from supplemented water transactions 
are attributed towards irrigator accounts in the nMDB, there is no such adjustment in the 
sMDB; transmission losses are attributed to conveyance water60 and socialised. While 
acknowledging that socialising may not be appropriate, the ACCC (2010) argues that 
transmission losses in the sMDB are negligible and difficult to attribute to individual users 
due to the large number of storages. This topic has since received further attention: the 
MDBA (2019h) states that while water extractions between regions is shifting, the 
corresponding impact on transmission losses is too difficult to quantify. However, the 
unequal treatment of market participants and EWHs and the subsequent impact on water 
markets deserves further investigation. 
Another topic that has received limited attention includes tagged trading61 (DELWP 2018). 
While the contingencies of tagged trading (low irrigator uptake, perceived delivery guarantee 
and high administrative burden) were initially discussed by the ACCC (2010), subsequent 
discussions highlight a continuing low uptake of tagging and the potential violation of IVTs 
(Productivity Commission 2018). Current practice in Victoria allows owners of tagged 
accounts and entitlements to deliver unlimited allocation volume across the Goulburn Murray 
IVT, legally arbitraging on price differentials between the zones (use cheap and sell 
expensive water) (DELWP 2018), and circumventing the intentions of the Water Act 2007. 
This is also the case across the sMDB for tags established before 22nd October 2010, which 
are exempt from IVTs (MDBA 2014b). There are claims that some operators use this to 
illegally sell water allocations across IVTs (Hunt 2017). As the magnitude of tagged trading 
                                                 
59A substantial part of water for the environment is “rules-based” water: the difference between the total water 
available and the water allocated for consumption (including conveyance water). In drought, this rules-based 
water contracts disproportionally more than the consumptive pool (CSIRO 2008). 
60Conveyance water is set aside by states to ensure the river system connectivity. Conveyance loss can be 
around 12,000GL in one year, depending on hydrological and climatic factors (MDBA 2019h). 
61Establishing an entitlement tag allows extraction and use of temporary water in a different region than the 




is hard to quantify,62 further analysis of this issue may be advisable. As also identified by 
some EWH respondents, high water levels in the Goulburn river, stemming from high water 
delivery, caused environmental river bank damage,63 prompting Victoria to subject all tagged 
trading to IVT rules, which will begin in December 2019 (Neville 2019a). At the time of 
writing, this announcement was said to lead to temporary price increases in the affected 
trading zones (Hunt 2019b). 
These findings provide insights into needed water market design reform. It is important to 
first remember that water markets only exist within institutions and hydrological and 
scientific knowledge (Wheeler et al. 2017b). There is a continuing fundamental need in the 
MDB for robust accounting of water extraction and use (at both a catchment and basin scale); 
continual monitoring; compliance and enforcement of water use; and water market 
institutional conditions – in order to ensure transparency and confidence in the market – as 
well as continual adaptation over time (e.g. (Grafton and Wheeler 2018; Wheeler et al. 
2017b). Many commentators (e.g. Productivity Commission (2018); Walker (2019); AAS 
(2019)) have also made a large number of recommendations on the need for changes in water 
policy, with some of these relevant for water markets in general. This also includes the need 
to review river water operations – as changes in where water is being used are having a 
potentially negative environmental impact. We suggest that there is a great need for further 
water design reform, using new insights from the economics market design literature (e.g. 
Bichler et al. (2019)). In particular, our above discussion suggests the need for three key 
water market design changes: 1) data reform; 2) rules and regulation reform; and 3) new 
institutional development.  
Firstly, water register data reform includes the need within registers to identify water 
forward, lease, option, and parking transactions – including counterparty type – in order to 
support emerging water market products. Entitlement transactions in conjunction with land 
must be identified, along with mandatory price reporting and rigorous quality controls of 
different water register data enforced (MDBA 2019m). Entitlement ownership by stakeholder 
type data should be analysed at a catchment level to identify and address concerns of market 
power and monopolistic behaviour. These issues have also been identified as critical by the 
ACCC and the Victorian government (ACCC 2019a; DELWP 2019c). 
Second, improving and making transparent rules and standards for water forwards and 
options, carry-over access, allocation and IVT determinations would contribute to better 
decision-making of MDB stakeholders. In absence of clear standards for water forwards and 
options, product comparability is problematic. Counterparty risk for forwards is significant. 
Water futures would offer similar risk management benefits for lower risk, as they are 
standardised and exchange traded, where a central clearing house mitigates counterparty risk 
through daily cash settlement of profits and losses. However, water futures would require a 
water market central exchange and clearing house (see glossary in Table D.1). With the 
increasing use of derivative type products and increasing incentives for counterparty default 
in times of water scarcity, particularly in drought, the topic of standardisation and 
counterparty risk requires urgent attention. Unified water market terminology for comparable 
water products, such as water entitlements or allocations could improve interstate trading by 
                                                 
62Tagged entitlement data is fragmented and reported differently between water registers. For example, 
Victorian data suggests that allocation delivered under a tag in the Goulburn increased to 120GL in 2017/18 
(Neville 2019a). 
63Respondents explained that environmental watering in spring may lead to recruitment of native river red gums, 
while high river levels from delivery of irrigation water in summer through tagged trades regularly drowns 




removing confusion and ambiguity; whereas a review of tagging and transmission losses 
through trading should identify and quantify corresponding third party impacts. Conversely, 
very careful assessment needs to be given to any change in unregulated entitlements to allow 
trading, such as allowing trading in floodplain water harvesting rights. Legal loopholes 
enabling stakeholders to bypass trade restrictions and extraction embargoes need to be closed. 
Administrative arrangements and structures minimising insider trading and rent-seeking are 
key for robust water sharing systems (Young 2019). Therefore, membership of consultation 
bodies, such as water steering committees, and standards for water brokers needs to be fully 
transparent and publicly declared to avoid rent seeking by vested interests. 
Finally, the more that stakeholders treat water markets like stock markets, then the more that 
water markets will require sophisticated institutional development to avoid negative 
consequences/externalities. ASIC market integrity rules could provide guidance for water 
market changes. Institutional development is particularly important for derivative type 
temporary products, where consideration should be given to additional water market 
infrastructure, such as a central exchange and clearing house, along with a well-resourced 
market regulatory agency with competency in derivative products that monitor and enforce 
compliance. While a central exchange and clearing house provides benefits in regards to 
counterparty risk and transparency of trades (Duffie and Zhu 2011; Pirrong 2011), it likely 
will increase the transaction costs of trade initially, both monetary and temporal, and require 
substantial regulatory reform. Sophisticated derivative type products require comprehensive 
spot price data, in this case allocation and entitlement data. This data is challenging to 
provide in a timely manner without a central exchange trading allocation and entitlements. 
However, this does not necessitate one central exchange for all products; a number of central 
exchanges, e.g. one for allocation and entitlements and another for derivative products may 
also be appropriate. In addition, greater water market intermediary regulation is needed, 
particularly in defining, policing and sanctioning conflict of interests, along with establishing 
minimal brokerage requirements. Potential regulation is also needed to stop water market 
intermediaries from commercial water entitlement ownership and principal trading, to avoid 
conflict of interest. Water market institutions and regulation need to enforce product 
standards and code of conduct, and limit rent-seeking from privileged information, as well as 
having prosecution powers to effectively limit counterparty risk in derivative type products 
and unlawful intermediary behaviour. As the water market continues to evolve, institutions 
and regulation need to keep pace in order to support an effective and fair market for all 
stakeholders. 
Although we suggest that non-landholder and corporate trading behaviour can be beneficial 
for the water markets, large knowledge gaps remain. In particular the water ownership, 
trading patterns and potential concentration of market power are difficult to quantify due to 
lack of publicly available water trade and ownership data. Further research should aim to 
quantify how much water is held and traded by investors/agri-corporates and non-
landholders, and assess whether this has quantifiable impacts for the water market to 
influence its long-term dynamics (e.g. see Zuo et al. (2019)), including a consideration of 
concentration of market power, price gouging or unequal access to carry-over and inter-
valley transfers. 
While the importance of water accounting and data quality for water markets is 
internationally well-understood, the Australian case draws attention to the importance of 
water ownership and the use of different trading products by non-landholder stakeholders. 
Additionally, it exemplifies the need for adaptable institutions capable of designing and 




innovation within markets. Finally, the Australian case emphasises the ongoing need for 
assessment and research of any negative externalities created from unintended behaviour in 
water markets, to enable institutional change as a response. 
 
6.6 Conclusion 
This study draws upon key insights provided by 63 qualitative interviews with key water 
experts and landholder (investors and agri-corporates) and non-landholder (EWHs and 
financial investors) MDB stakeholders. Combined with market intermediary and large-scale 
representative irrigator survey data, it highlights issues around major themes of water 
entitlement ownership, water trading strategies, and water market reform. 
We found that MDB water markets have evolved and matured considerably: market 
participation has increased, and new trading products, ownership and trading strategies have 
developed with non-landholders actively trading water and fulfilling important market 
functions. The majority of stakeholders own most or all of their water needs under 
high/general reliability water entitlements in their region and trade water allocations 
occasionally to supplement their water supply, although some investors/agri-corporates own 
little to no entitlements for capital reasons. Diverse water entitlement portfolios are more 
prevalent for non-landholder EWHs and financial investors. More sophisticated 
investors/agri-corporates and financial investors use parking contracts, multi-year water 
leases, and water forwards. However, the market for parking and multi-year forwards is still 
under-developed. Results suggest non-landholders act as major sellers of leases, forwards and 
parking to irrigators, potentially having positive market impacts. While current public debate 
in Australia revolves around the perceived negative impacts non-landholders may be having 
in the water market (i.e. increased water demand leading to higher prices or market power), 
without further quantitative research it is unclear if, or to what extent, negative impacts exist 
and how much these are offset by the benefits from increased diversity of water market 
products.  
Water markets are an important tool to drive efficiency and provide risk-management 
benefits to irrigators. As Wheeler and Garrick (2020) conclude, water market participation is 
driven fundamentally by robust government regulation and institutional rules; low transaction 
costs; and homogeneous marketable products (and heterogeneous market users). There is a 
continuing fundamental need in the MDB for robust accounting of water extraction and use at 
both a catchment and basin scale, continual monitoring, compliance and enforcement of 
water extractions. The MDB experience of market maturity has led to evolving market 
challenges, and provides important lessons for other countries. Three associated water market 
reform policy recommendations were made, namely the need for more transparent and 
cohesive: 1) water market data and terminology; 2) rules and regulation reform; and 3) water 
market infrastructure and intermediary regulation and standards (such as ASIC market 
integrity rules, a central exchange and clearing house and a regulatory and policing 
organisation). It is important that maturing MDB water markets draw on best practice 
guidelines and structures from financial markets wherever possible, and continue to adapt 
their institutions and rules as needs arise. Hopefully such reform will address negative 
externalities, prevent conflicts of interest and unethical behaviour from market 
intermediaries, as well as supporting and fostering the development of new derivative type 
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This chapter presents a paper published in Agricultural Water Management (2020). The 
paper is included in its published form, with only minor changes to formatting to bring it in 
line with the overall thesis. There is therefore some repetition with other chapters of this 
thesis, particularly the background sections. 
 
Abstract 
Australia’s sophisticated and advanced water market legislation has allowed direct 
investment by non-landholder stakeholders in water ownership, which over time has 
increased the volume of water entitlements owned by government, non-governmental 
organisations and non-landholder investors (e.g. superannuation companies, trade 
speculators). The growing market value of Australian water rights, driven by increased water 
scarcity and international commodity prices, has meant that water is now one of the most 
valuable assets owned by many irrigators. However, to date, there is no standard practise of 
financial water valuation and accounting, nor is there an understanding of the most common 
methods used by various stakeholders. We report information from 63 in-depth expert 
interviews with bankers, environmental water holders, investors, property evaluators and 
water brokers in the Murray-Darling Basin to establish the current practices employed. The 
most common valuation methods used current market prices based on water register and 
water broker data. Water entitlements were valued with historical cost or fair value water 
accounting, depending on the stakeholder. However, given the lack of standardised 
methodology, evaluator discretion and fast moving (or thin) markets can lead to considerable 
divergence in water valuation values. Recommendations are made for the need for greater 
transparency and standardised water valuation methods. 
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Much of the world’s agricultural systems and regions face a drier future with increased 
frequency of extreme events, such as droughts (IPCC 2019). This is especially true for 
Australia’s Murray-Darling Basin (MDB), a region already experiencing a highly variable 
climate. Much of south-eastern Australia has been experiencing drought from 2017 onwards, 
leading to a rapid increase in permanent and temporary water prices (albeit temporary prices 
have still not reached the heights of the Millennium drought time-period from 2001-02 to 
2009-10) (DELWP 2019a). The rapid rise of water prices means that sometimes water is one 
of the most valuable commodities owned by an irrigation farmer.  
In the MDB, water ownership has been separated from land, allowing non-landholders like 
financial investors and environmental water holders (EWHs) direct ownership of water rights 
via water markets (Grafton and Horne 2014a). With MDB water markets routinely 
recognized as the most advanced water markets globally (Grafton et al. 2011), their 
challenges and best practice solutions are highly relevant for other water market systems 
world-wide. Water markets have existed formally in the MDB since the 1980s but developed 
more rapidly since water entitlement ownership was separated from land from 2004 onwards 
(COAG 2004a), the further unbundling of water rights in use and delivery rights (NWC 
2011b), and the stepwise reduction in trade limits and barriers across the MDB (ACCC 
2010). Although there now is a large variety of tradable water rights (e.g. more than 150 
different tradeable entitlements (MDBA 2019l)), trade concentrates in two main products: 1) 
water entitlements (permanent water – a right to extract water from a watercourse/body); and 
2) water allocations (temporary water – the seasonal allocation received by a given water 
entitlement from a watercourse/body) (Wheeler et al. 2014a). Water entitlements come in 
three main forms: high, general and low security, reflecting the probability of receiving a full 
water allocation. For example, a high security entitlement is meant to yield, on average, a full 
allocation in 90-95 out of 100 years (Zuo et al. 2016). MDB water markets seek to allocate 
water to its highest and best use, and have historically provided significant economic and 
drought adaptation benefits (Grafton and Horne 2014b; Kirby et al. 2015). Yet a number of 
rights, such as water use licences, are still tied to land-ownership and not fully unbundled. 
Similarly, trading rural water for urban use is restricted, although with some exceptions, such 
as irrigation infrastructure organisations and water utilities purchasing water entitlements to 
support country towns’ or Adelaide’s water supply, during the Millennium Drought (NWC 
2012). From 2007 onwards, an organisation can buy water rights in the sMDB64 on the 
market place without owning any land, and achieve a return by selling water through the 
market to end-users like irrigators (NWC 2011b; Seidl et al. 2020b; Wheeler et al. 2016a). 
Water market development in the MDB is now very advanced. Figure 7.1 illustrates water 
entitlement and allocation trade over time in the sMDB, and high reliability entitlement and 
allocation prices in Victoria’s 1A Goulburn, one of the most active trading regions in the 
sMDB. 
Combined with the removal of barriers to ownership (e.g. 10% limit on entitlement 
ownership not tied to land in Victoria (ACCC 2010)), non-landholder ownership (e.g. 
superannuation companies, trade speculators and arbitragers, NGOs) of water entitlements in 
the MDB has been growing. This has been shown by DELWP (2019a) as increasing 
ownership of entitlements held by the ‘non-user’ group – estimated at around 12% in 
Northern Victoria. Water also attracts international investment, with 9.4% of MDB water 
                                                 
64Unbundling has been slower in the nMDB, with some systems/entitlements still linked to land. However, 
greater institutional and regulatory reform is required before increased trade can occur without causing 




entitlements held by companies with a level65 of foreign ownership (ATO 2019). However, 
without publicly available non-landholder ownership data (Seidl et al. 2020b), and with a 
significant proportion of entitlements in the ‘non-user’ group held by irrigators (i.e. in self-
managed superannuation accounts), discerning the volume of entitlements owned by non-
landholders is challenging.  
Figure 7.1 Temporary and permanent water prices in the Goulburn and sMDB water 
trade volumes from 1993-94 to 2018-19 
 
Sources: Historical water prices (based upon nominal average annual prices for Goulburn 1A Zone allocation 
and high security entitlement trade) datasets held by GFAR, and Victorian water state registry (DELWP 2019b). 
sMDB trade volumes were sourced from NWC (2011a) and BOM water market dashboard (BOM 2019d). 
The importance of the value of water entitlements to irrigators can be illustrated with an 
example. An average sized Victorian irrigation farm with average water entitlement 
ownership in 2015-16 held land and water assets worth about AUD$2,285,000 - with water 
entitlements representing around 41% of the combined land and water value.66 The same 
water portfolio would be worth AUD$1,315,000 under 2018/19 prices, almost the same as 
their land value. The importance of water and its financial value, combined with the 
emergence of non-landholder water entitlement owners, such as financial investors or EWHs, 
has led to the following issues: i) how irrigators can borrow against their water entitlements 
                                                 
65The ATO (2019) defines companies with a level of foreign ownership as: 1) owned by an individual not 
ordinarily a resident of Australia; 2) owned by a foreign government or government investor; 3) a company or 
trust where an individual not ordinarily resident in Australia, a foreign corporation or government holds a 
substantial interest of at least 20%; or 4) a company or trust where two or more foreign persons hold an 
aggregate substantial interest of at least 40%. 
66Average farmland value (AUD$1,360,000) and average water holding (370 ML of high security and 160 ML 
of low security) was based on Centre for Global Food and Resources 2015-16 survey data for a Victorian farm 
(see Wheeler et al. (2018) for detail on survey). Water value (AUD$925,000) was based on revenue of selling 





and the credit for corporates versus family farms67; (Australian Property Institute 2016); ii) 
how there is different access to information for various irrigators68; and iii) how water assets 
are valued by different stakeholders. The lack of standard practice and consistency in valuing 
water can have many financial and political ramifications. 
In conjunction with this reform in water property rights, there has been a large-scale effort to 
achieve environmental sustainability in the Basin to deal with issues such as water scarcity 
(drought), water over-allocation and severe environmental degradation. The Water Act 2007 
(Cwlth) and the MDB Plan 2012 (Basin Plan) aimed to return 2,750GL of water from 
consumptive to environmental use by mid-2019. The existence of water markets and the 
unbundling of water from land allowed the Australian Federal Government (Commonwealth) 
to purchase water entitlements from willing sellers. As a result, the Commonwealth now 
owns a large amount of environmental water entitlements (Grafton and Wheeler 2018), 
estimated at around 20% at mid-2019. There are three main ways the Commonwealth has 
acquired water entitlements for the environment under the Basin Plan: 1) through open 
reverse-auction tenders buying water entitlements directly off willing sellers in various 
regions (from 2007-08 to 2012-13); 2) through subsidising upgrades of irrigation and supply 
infrastructure, both on and off-farm (from 2008 onwards); and 3) through closed tenders 
(strategic purchases) buying water entitlements (and occasionally land) from large sellers 
(mainly from 2013-14 onwards) (Grafton and Wheeler 2018). The Commonwealth states that 
strategic purchases target water entitlements with substantial ecological or hydrological 
importance for the MDB that are difficult to acquire with buybacks or infrastructure upgrades 
(DAWR 2018). However, many strategic purchases have been heavily criticised for being 
inefficient and costly, with little environmental water received for the dollars spent 
(Productivity Commission 2018; Slattery and Campbell 2019; The Senate 2018). For 
example, water recovered through one such strategic purchase from a Queensland property in 
2017, Kia Ora, has come under public scrutiny, receiving significant media attention 
regarding the fair value of the recovered entitlements (e.g.Davies (2019b)). As non-
landholder water investment is increasing and with strong public interest in Commonwealth 
water investment activities, the methods used to assess and report water value are therefore 
highly relevant. While improvements in physical water accounting was a key requirement 
under the National Water Initiative (NWI) (COAG 2004a), there has been very little work 
done to date on ensuring consistency in how different stakeholders assess and account for 
financial water value in practice (Tingey-Holyoak 2019). Indeed, there is a lack of 
understanding about what water market valuation practices are actually used by organisations 
such as banks, brokers, governments, non-governmental organisations, superannuation 
companies and large corporates. 
Water accounting and valuation is especially relevant as governments around the globe spend 
considerable resources to improve irrigation efficiency with the aim of reducing water 
consumption, with the need to demonstrate value for money on the expenditure. However, 
without comprehensive physical water accounting, increased irrigation efficiency can actually 
lead to more water consumption (Grafton et al. 2018), whereas flawed financial water 
accounting can lead to overpayments for water licences and budget blowouts. With Australia 
at the forefront of both water commodification through water markets, and extensive 
resources spent on water recovery through irrigation infrastructure efficiencies (Grafton and 
                                                 
67Family farms are said to be disadvantaged in comparison to corporate actors when borrowing against their 
water entitlements (Waterfind 2019a). 
68Loch et al. (2018) found irrigators on average spent 5.2 hours per transaction searching for trade opportunities. 




Wheeler 2018), learnings from Australian water accounting and valuation practices have 
valuable insights for the approaches in other countries. 
This study identifies the valuation methods and accounting practices used for MDB water 
entitlements, drawing on 63 in-depth interviews with bankers, environmental water holders, 
investors, property evaluators and water brokers. In particular, it seeks to address the 
following research questions: 1) what accounting practices and valuation methods are used by 
different MDB stakeholders; and 2) how does the employment of various valuation methods 
significantly impact water entitlement actual values? 
We provide lessons for water accounting and water entitlement valuation in the MDB. The 
lessons learned from the MDB can provide key insights for water accounting and water 
valuation other countries.  
 
7.2 Water accounting and valuation principles literature 
This background literature section is structured in three parts: 1) a review of international 
water accounting systems and frameworks; 2) a discussion of water financial valuation 
methods; and 3) an overview of the current practice of water valuation and accounting in 
Australia. 
 
7.2.1 International water accounting systems 
Water accounting systems or frameworks report water-related data for a number of different 
purposes and areas. There are a variety of water accounting frameworks used globally, all 
differing in purpose and scope (Godfrey and Chalmers 2012). The majority focus on physical 
water accounting, the reporting of volumes and quality of water, on different scales. Each 
framework has a particular purpose, for example: the System of Environmental-Economic 
Accounting for Water and the International Water Management Institute Water Accounting 
Framework report on water flows, water stocks, water use and consumption, and water 
quality on the basin scale (Karimi et al. 2012; Vardon et al. 2012). On the company or 
product level, water footprint accounting shows the water volume necessary to manufacture a 
unit of product and water management accounting aims to increase businesses’ water 
management by illustrating water use and associated costs in production and supply chains 
(Christ and Burritt 2017a; Hoekstra 2012). 
A common trait of water accounting frameworks is their limited capacity to incorporate 
financial/monetary water data. The System of Environmental Economic Accounting for Water 
attempts to include monetary flows that correspond to water flows by linking into a country’s 
system of national accounts, mainly for delivery and treatment cost, and by having dedicated 
water valuation accounts. However, due to data limitations, water valuation accounts remain 
experimental and unimplemented (Vardon et al. 2012). The International Water Management 
Institute Water Accounting Framework attempts to capture water value by relating water use 
to agricultural output, yet this is of minor consideration in the framework and seldom 
implemented (Godfrey and Chalmers 2012). Additionally, in this framework, water is only 
valuable as a function of agriculture, ignoring the potential value to non-agricultural water 
users (Karimi et al. 2012). Water value in water management accounting is highly dependent 
on the costs of water supply and wastewater treatment. These are determined by water 
utilities’ tariffs, often set low for political reasons in many countries (Mungatana and Hassan 




Water accounting frameworks describe what data ought to be reported, but rarely provide 
guidance on how this data should be measured and compiled. This is particularly true for data 
concerning monetary/financial valuation of water assets. 
 
7.2.2 Financial valuation for water assets 
In the absence of international agreement on how to value water resources, the System of 
Environmental Economic Accounting for Water suggests water valuation methods commonly 
applied in economics (e.g. residual methods, revealed and stated preferences, production 
functions) should act as the default approach. Alternatively, asset valuation methods from 
finance and accounting could also be used. Economic tools based on the concept of total 
economic value can be applied to the valuation of water resources based on their direct, 
indirect and non-use value (United Nations 2012). 
As the aforementioned water accounting frameworks focus mostly on direct water use, water 
as an investment asset receives no mention and therefore no corresponding water valuation 
technique is discussed. However, a mainstay of finance and accounting is the valuation and 
reporting of asset value, therefore financial asset valuation techniques could be applied for 
water rights. Financial asset valuation follows three approaches: 1) discounted cash-flows 
(e.g. ascertains value based on an asset’s fundamentals such as associated cash-flows; 
expected growth of the asset; associated risk to cash-flows; and the asset’s terminal value); 2) 
value of comparable assets (relative valuation - price of comparable assets in the market 
place, adjusting for difference in asset characteristics, or cost of replacing the asset); and 3) 
option pricing models (contingent claim valuation - dependent upon the occurrence of a 
particular event) (Damodaran 2012b, 2012c). 
In contrast to financial valuation, accounting determines the value of an asset as the historical 
cost of the asset less its accumulated depreciation, or fair value. If historical cost accounting 
is used, this can result in significantly different book and market values for an asset, 
especially for assets such as water which can move in value very quickly (Damodaran 
2012a). If fair value is used, water market prices need to be readily available. Hence, 
although possible, financial water valuation and financial water accounting in the absence of 
water market prices is difficult. 
 
7.2.3 Water accounting and valuation in Australia 
Although Australia has employed continuous water accounting since 1983 (Connell 2007), 
water accounts were primarily used for internal agency management purposes. From 2004, 
the National Water Initiative (COAG 2004a) required a water accounting framework to be 
developed, which provides information for internal and external stakeholders to facilitate 
planning, monitoring, trading, and environmental and farm management. This led to the 
Australian Water Accounting Standards for “General Purpose Water Accounting” (GPWA) 
currently used at the basin scale around Australia, including in the MDB (Water Accounting 
Standards Board 2012a). GPWA employs water accounts to report physical levels of water 
assets, water liabilities, net water assets, changes in water assets, and changes in water 
liabilities, with application mainly on the catchment/basin/country scale, although the 
framework was intended to be used also by companies/businesses (Water Accounting 
Standards Board 2012b). On the basin/catchment scale, these water accounts underpin water 




how much water is managed, how much is extracted, and how much is traded (Chalmers et 
al. 2012). The implementation of GPWA remains challenging; the definition of relevant 
water assets is not standardised and often left to practitioners, leading to inconsistencies 
between regions. Another significant methodological challenge is poor quality and lack of 
hydrological data (Tello and Hazelton 2018). Due to this lack of data, GPWA assumes water 
extraction equals consumption. This approach ignores return flows back to the river, and 
hence has the potential to overestimate consumption and underestimate negative externalities, 
which has been widely canvassed in the international literature (Grafton et al. 2018; Perry et 
al. 2017). Reflecting global practice, GPWA also focuses on physical water accounting and 
does not incorporate economic/financial data69 (Godfrey and Chalmers 2012). 
While basin-level physical water accounting has dramatically improved with GPWA, 
monetary water accounting is still underdeveloped. The only monetary data readily available 
is water market data, either an abridged version of the trade in state water registers and the 
Bureau of Meteorology water dashboard or analysed in report form (ABARES 2018). 
However, reviews have highlighted a number of issues with water register data (Deloitte 
2019; MDBA 2019m). First, there is no mandatory price reporting, leading to a large number 
of trades without price, or with a price of zero. Second, entitlement transactions as a part of a 
land transaction are not always identified, potentially skewing reported prices, and this is a 
particular problem in the Queensland water register. Third, even if reporting errors have been 
identified, they are either not corrected, or a correct transaction gets inserted into the data, 
without removing the erroneous transaction record (MDBA 2019m). Additionally, and in 
contrast to land registers, water ownership registers are not accessible publicly. Individual 
water licence information is often behind a pay-per-record paywall, making it difficult to 
discern the size and value of various water holdings. This is complicated by the fact that 
authorities often require stakeholders’ permission to share water licence information, even in 
case of paid requests. 
At the individual business level, water accounting is voluntary and not standardised (Christ 
2014; Tingey-Holyoak 2019). For financial reporting, the Australian Accounting Standards 
Board (AASB) recommends treating (unbundled) water rights as intangible assets with an 
indefinite lifespan. Water rights get valued at initial cost, or purchase price, less impairment. 
Contingent upon an active market, a fair value assessment is undertaken at revaluation 
(AASB 1995, 2019b, 2019c). The AASB (2019a) recommends three techniques for fair 
valuation: 1) market (namely relative valuation); 2) replacement cost (amount required to 
replace the asset); and 3) income (discounted cash-flow). However, it does not provide a 
detailed valuation method for water entitlements, nor does it recommend any of the fair 
valuation techniques. 
There is also no industry-recommended water valuation method. Although the Australian 
Property Institute (2017) touches on water valuation in its guidelines for rural and 
agribusiness property valuation, and runs water evaluator courses, it only advises evaluators 
to understand water trade and budget issues. Similarly, how to value water entitlements is 
only sparsely addressed in legislation, if at all. The Water Act 2007 (Cth) mentions the 
“market value” of entitlements and that methods to establish this value are subject to 
“regulations”. These regulations seem not to exist on the Commonwealth level. On the state 
level, there is a similar but nuanced picture. Prior to unbundling, water entitlements were 
valued as part of the land and governed by the relevant acts in every basin state and the 
Australian Capital Territory (ACT) ((Rates Act 2004 (ACT); Valuation of Land Act 1916 
                                                 
69The framework theoretically allows for monetary values to be used if appropriate for users’ information needs. 




(NSW); Land Valuation Bill 2010 (QLD); Valuation of Land Act 1971 (SA); Valuation of 
Land Act 1960 (VIC)). Since unbundling, no state in the MDB has passed a legislative 
instrument dedicated to financial water valuation. While some states refer to land valuation in 
their water legislation, others make no mention of the issue. NSW excludes water 
entitlements as part of land valuation but prescribes no methods for valuation in the Water 
Management Act 2000 (NSW). The Queensland Water Act 2000 (QLD) mentions the market 
value of entitlements for compensation purposes, but does not identify a corresponding 
valuation method. It seems that the Victorian Water Act 1989 (VIC) addressed financial water 
valuation the most comprehensively, requiring water entitlements to be valued by a certified 
valuer, and exit fees in irrigation districts should represent the present value of all future fees 
payable. But, while the Act prescribes discounted cash flow valuation for exit fees, it 
provides no guidance on water entitlement valuation. In contrast, the ACT and SA have no 
provisions for water valuation in their legislation (Water Resources Act 2007 (ACT); Natural 
Resources Management Act 2004 (SA)). For an overview of relevant water valuation 
legislation see Table E.2. 
Hence, in the absence of dedicated guidelines in the MDB, the choice of water valuation and 
financial water accounting practice lies with the evaluator, and raises the research question of 
what methods are stakeholders applying, and what are the potential consequences that arise 




7.3.1 Data collection and analysis 
A mix of qualitative and quantitative methods were employed to explore a variety of water 
trade, water ownership, strategic risk management, water valuation and accounting methods 
issues in the MDB.  
This paper reports the findings from 64 semi-structured interviews conducted with bankers, 
evaluators, EWHs, investors and water brokers across the MDB. Given the fact that there are 
1) no standard industry and legislative valuation methods; 2) no publicly available register of 
water entitlement valuations; and 3) the commercial in-confidence practise of valuations, we 
chose a qualitative method of data collection to understand these stakeholders’ water 
valuation strategies. To specifically target large and prominent organisations with expert 
knowledge in water entitlement valuation, water trading and agri-business lending in the 
sMDB, such as banks, evaluators and water brokers, we used publicly available information 
to first identify relevant organisations (and individuals within), and as a second step, a chain 
referral approach to recruit additional interview participants (Biernacki and Waldorf 1981). 
Consequently, the qualitative interviews focussed on the views and valuation approaches of 
large and corporatised organisations. Given that the common approach to valuation employed 
both by government and industry, is to contract large evaluation firms to undertake water 
entitlement valuations, then our method of recruitment was aimed at understanding the 
methods by these firms. The interviews were conducted mostly face-to face in mid to late 
2018 at times and locations convenient for respondents (with 25% of interviews undertaken 
by phone and two respondents provided written submissions). Overall, we approached 83 




Recruitment continued until saturation was reached, namely when no new information and 
themes were identified. The incompleteness of one written submission meant it was excluded, 
hence only 63 responses are included here. Interview recordings and transcripts were 
compiled into Nvivo11 (a qualitative data analysis software package) and manually coded 
into major themes; the interviews had a median length of 60 minutes and comprised three 
main stakeholder groups, namely: 1) 15 EWH employees; 2) 27 water market investors; and 
3) 21 bankers (6), water brokers (6) and water evaluators (10)70. EWHs are public or private 
entities, owning or delivering water entitlements or allocations for environmental purposes. 
Investors own and or trade water to generate non-commission income from water trading or 
revenues from growing crops. The majority (e.g. 20) of these were investors and agri-
corporates (very large landholders owning and/or trading water but generated their main 
income from farming), while 7 were financial investors (non-landholders trading water for 
financial gain). Bankers represent financial institutions with significant portfolios in 
agribusiness (and water entitlement) lending. Water brokers generate commission-based 
revenue from water market transactions. Evaluators are specialised in rural, agribusiness and 
water valuations. The socio-economics were that 84% of our respondents were male, with 
70% of the female respondents working for EWHs, and 75% of respondents have had 
experience in their current or a similar previous role for more than 10 years. However, our 
analysis suggested responses were mainly driven by the stakeholder group rather than by job 
experience or gender. 
In addition, this study applied a quantitative case study methodology to illustrate the 
monetary impact of using different water valuation methods. The case study is the strategic 
water purchase by the Commonwealth from Kia Ora, a Queensland property owned by 
Eastern Australian Agriculture, for the purpose of returning water from consumptive to 
environmental use. We collected relevant water register data and various water valuation 
methods to illustrate the differences in water values from different techniques applied. 
 
7.4 Results and discussion 
The results are broken down into two main themes: water valuation methods and water 
accounting methods. Over two thirds (68%) of all participants discussed water valuation and 
water accounting in detail during the interviews, with most comment respectively provided 
by bankers, evaluators and water brokers, investors and then EWHs. 
 
7.4.1 Water valuation methods 
Table 7.1 summarises the valuation methods and data sources considered by respondents (43 
respondents commented on water valuation methods). Relative valuation methods based on 
current water market entitlement prices and transaction data were most commonly used. 
Other methods included adopting the broker price/purchase price or using volume weighted 
average prices based on different lengths of data (6-18 months). Respondents explained that 
                                                 
70Note we interviewed a few respondents who worked for the same organisation. This was because some EWHs 
and evaluators operate across multiple states with water management or valuation decisions made at the local 
level, making it necessary to interview a variety of local representatives. We grouped bankers, water brokers and 
water evaluators together in the analysis as they do not own water and base their income on water-related 




only transaction data between non-distressed, at arms’ length counterparties71 is considered, 
excluding transactions resulting from liquidation or bankruptcy72, and 19% of respondents 
mentioned other valuation methods. These alternative methods included: 1) valuation based 
on historic and future allocation volume; 2) associated production; 3) long-term average 
annual yield (LTAAY) (e.g. see Cheesman and Wheeler (2012, p. 68)); 4) statistical and 
time-series analysis; and 5) capital asset pricing type valuation models.  
In the stakeholder interviews, respondents discussed in-depth some water valuation 
challenges. In particular, comments were made in regards to thin water markets ─ also called 
illiquid markets ─ which refers to areas of trade with only a small number of market 
participants or very few trade transactions over multiple years (Tisdell 2011). The biggest 
challenge with thin markets was the absence of high quality data. Stakeholders addressed this 
gap by using water trade data from comparable water products in other regions (based on 
reliability) or property sales data. For example, evaluators consulted stock and station agents 
for the water value proportion of a property transaction: 
“We take out the value of the land, structures, apportion value to all those things and 
then work back to what an in-situ value of water might be. But it can be very difficult 
in those instances and people can have a wide variety of opinions as to what they 
think it might be worth” (Evaluator) 
 
Table 7.1 Water valuation method and data sources mentioned by respondents who 
discussed water valuation and accounting (n=43) 
 Answers to: 1) What 
method do you use to 
value water entitlements? 
and 2) What data sources 












Current market price 50 53 16 67 
Volume weighted average 33 27 0 33 
Original purchase price 17 0 0 0 
Other 17 13 32 0 
Data 
sources* 
Water registers 67 73 16 67 
Water brokers 67 80 11 33 
Own data 67 20 0 0 
Property sales 0 27 0 0 
Other evaluators 17 7 0 0 
Test listing** 0 7 0 0 
Note: *Multiple mentions of methods and data sources per interview possible. 
**Where a water broker offers an entitlement for sale to collect bidding data, but then does not go through with 
the sale. 
 
                                                 
71There is no standard legal definition of non-distressed counterparties. Rather, evaluators apply an economic 
definition, similar to the definition in Land Valuation Bill 2010 (QLD), meaning a transaction under reasonable 
terms without time pressure. This is a core principle of commercial valuation. 
72This stems from land valuation practices, where transactions from liquidation are significantly discounted. The 
NSW water register tracks water trades as a result of liquidation as ‘71X’ trades, but they are unidentified in 




Only very rarely is a competing valuation undertaken by a different company to negotiate a 
valuation outcome, or an entitlement valued at a discount to the market in an attempt to adjust 
for scarce or biased data. There is a fair amount of discretionary space to choose data sources 
and methods for valuation, but strong personal contacts in the real estate sector and to other 
evaluators are considered paramount to improve data availability. 
On the other hand, in a highly liquid water market, respondents rate data quality and 
availability less of a concern for water valuation: 
“There are components of the water market that are still immature, but largely across 
the southern connected system, I think it's a very dynamic, very well informed 
market.” (Evaluator) 
However, Table 7.1 highlights there is still an element of discretion even for liquid markets, 
particularly around data cleaning and data sources used. Another area of discretion is the 
time-period. All participants used entitlement trade data from the relevant state water 
registers, but problems with data reported meant the need to clean data-sets. For example, 
there are a large number of zero-priced transactions (representing either trades without a valid 
contract (e.g. EWH trade or transfer) or price not reported), low and high outlier prices, and 
data reporting lags of up to a few months (de Bonviller et al. 2019; MDBA 2019m). It is 
common practice to exclude zero price trades from valuation, or use median prices, but 
adjustment for outlier values is less straight forward, especially in less liquid markets. 
Abnormally high prices for water entitlements can appear for a number of reasons. In NSW 
for example, there is incentive to over-value the water component of a bigger land transaction 
in order to minimise stamp duty fees given water’s exempt status (Revenue NSW, personal 
communication, 11/11/2019). The ACT, NSW, Queensland and SA water registers currently 
do not contain information on combined land-water transactions, allowing inflated water 
prices to enter unrecognised (MDBA 2019m). Water registers also do not contain information 
on whether an entitlement transaction included allocation or carry-over volume (Deloitte 
2019). These are called ‘dry’ and ‘wet’ water sales, with ‘wet’ sales containing allocation or 
carry-over volume. Prices of wet entitlement sales are higher as a portion of the value is in 
the form of water allocations. Some respondents adjust their valuation by referring back to a 
dry entitlement price, others implicitly assume that entitlements are wet/dry at certain times 
of the year and this reflects in market prices: 
“I try and go back to a dry value if I can, but obviously our evaluations are at a 
certain period of time, we're taking it as at that date and if you're selling water that's 
got a bit of temporary water included then you're going to get a little bit of a 
premium.” (Evaluator) 
The scale of a particular water entitlement transaction can also lead to outlier prices, referred 
to as “scalability” by respondents. The issue arises from water entitlements trading at a 
premium (or discount) corresponding to its transaction size. Some respondents’ argued that 
larger parcels of water trade for a premium, with the buyer paying for the convenience and 
lower transaction costs of not having to aggregate the volume from smaller parcels.73 A 
single large transaction can also incur a premium due to perceived less reputational risk and 
backlash in rural communities compared to many small transactions: 
                                                 
73Entitlement transactions require on average 13.2 hours per trade to finalize, can include trading fees of on 
average AUD$24-1064/transfer when crossing Irrigation Infrastructure Operator boundaries, and water broker 




“I think a continuing trend that's witnessed is that we typically see a premium of some 
sort for a larger parcel when compared to a smaller parcel.” (Evaluator) 
On the other hand, some respondents noted that smaller parcels of water trade at a premium, 
because they are more affordable and attract a bigger pool of buyers: 
“Smaller parcels have the higher premium. Someone has got 100ML and they buy this 
10ML parcel for $4,100/ML, all they've done is made the average cost of their water 
go from $2200/ML to $2300/ML and the addition of throwing in 10ML. And they 
slowly accumulate on the basis of being able to afford it.” (Investor) 
Bankers, evaluators and water brokers pointed to water broker data as an important source of 
information to mitigate shortcomings in the water registers, particularly to address time lags. 
While some respondents rely on a single broker, many consult a number of water broker 
platforms in order to get a comprehensive market picture. Evaluators use property sales data, 
sourced from real estate agents or the parties involved, to identify the value apportioned to 
water in land-water transactions. Some organisations also maintain internal databases on 
transactions or valuations undertaken: 
“Our best evidence is what our clients are actually selling and buying…I see every 
formal valuation that's done so we have a big database of what other valuers are 
putting on water.” (Banker) 
Respondents also discussed the time-period used to value water entitlements. While some 
include data from the last month only, others consider up to the previous 18 months of data. 
Investors seem to prefer more recent data, whereas bankers and EWHs use longer periods: 
“We tend to have a rolling benchmark, so that looks back 18 months, what the price has been 
doing…Another way in which we look at it, we look at the last six to twelve months.” 
(Banker) 
While most MDB water valuations use relative valuation methods in liquid markets, discretion is 
exercised around what periods of data and what data sources to draw upon, and around water value 
assumptions. This often makes it difficult to compare different valuations, as assumptions and 
methodology are often scarcely documented or commercial-in-confidence. Although some valuations 
contain explanatory footnotes, these likely do not attract much attention as managers fixate on the 
valuation number as the main source of information (Briers et al. 1997). 
While variations in valuations based on different approaches might be minor in liquid 
markets and where water values are not rapidly increasing, it can have a substantial impact 
for thin markets as demonstrated in the following case study. 
 
7.4.1.1 Case study: strategic purchase of water from Eastern Australian Agriculture 
The strategic purchase of water from Eastern Australian Agriculture by the Commonwealth 
Department of Agriculture and Water Resources (DAWR and now titled the Department of 
Agriculture), as part of the Basin Plan to return water from consumptive to environmental 
use, illustrates the impact of different valuation methods, assumptions and evaluators’ 
discretion. The DAWR acquired 28,740ML of overland flow water entitlements in the 
Condamine-Balonne region from Eastern Australian Agriculture’s properties Kia Ora and 
Clyde via a strategic purchase in August 2017 (DAWR 2018). For a definition of overland 
flow licences and their difference to unbundled water entitlements, see the glossary in Table 




decommission levee banks and structures which allowed it to harvest the overland flows for 
the licences in question. The publicly available documents state that this removal is done by 
the company “at no cost” (The Senate 2018, p. 412). Of the purchase value of AUD$78.9 
million, AUD$38.95 million was apportioned to 14,190ML of unsupplemented Condamine-
Balonne water entitlements - overland flow licences - from Kia Ora. While the purchase 
received initial attention in the Senate in 2018 (Slattery and Campbell 2018b; The Senate 
2018), it attracted major public interest in the 2019 Federal election campaign (West 2019; 
Wroe 2019). 
One key issue was whether the price paid by strategic purchase (namely in negotiation with 
the company, not on the open market) was value for money for the type of water entitlements 
acquired (Davies 2019b), given the relevant water valuation documentation was not publicly 
available (DAWR 2019; The Senate 2018). Grafton and Williams (2019) have argued that the 
Kia Ora purchase in particular was an example of rent-seeking behaviour by vested irrigation 
and corporate agriculture interests, seeking to benefit from unduly high water entitlement 
valuations. 
Although government policy regarding strategic purchases is meant to give regard to socio-
economic impacts74 (DAWR 2018), a government commissioned assessment by 
NCEconomics deemed the Kia Ora water purchase to have negligible socio-economic 
impacts for the region75 (The Senate 2018). In 2017, an evaluator estimated a value for Kia 
Ora water entitlements based on: 1) historic sales evidence; 2) an estimation of the LTAAY 
based on 1922-1995 data; and 3) the difference in property value with and without water, 
leading to a negotiated price of AUD$2,745/ML. The government’s competing valuation by 
NCEconomics reduced the estimated LTAAY of Kia Ora water from 14,190ML to 
12,983ML, based on 1985-2009 data, leading to a 9% difference in purchase cost (The Senate 
2018). To illustrate the impact of an evaluator’s discretion and the implications for water 
prices, we undertook a relative valuation of comparable water products, such as unregulated 
water licences in the Gwydir, the Barwon-Darling and the NSW intersecting streams, and the 
more reliable76 water entitlement of regulated high security (HS Reg) 1A Goulburn in 
Victoria for the given time-period (Figure 7.1). 
  
                                                 
74The government has stated it prefers strategic water purchases over voluntary water buybacks, as they are 
believed to have less socio-economic consequences (DAWR 2018). Part of a strategic purchase application is to 
demonstrate that the purchase has no or negligible socio-economic impacts (The Senate 2018, pp. 369-371). 
However, socio-economic impacts (on a farm level) are then used to justify a particular water price by 
evaluators, based on the in-production value of water and its impact on farm viability (if the farm is less viable, 
a higher price is seen as justified) (The Senate 2018, p. 389). 
75The NCEconomics assessment established that the strategic purchase: 1) has a negligible impact on regional 
production and employment; 2) would reduce Eastern Australian Agriculture’s land under irrigation by only 9% 
in higher-flow years and less in normal years, without adverse impacts on farm viability; and 3) would constrain 
regional peak production (higher-flow years) by 2-3%, or 14,900 – 19,100 bales of cotton, and 8-10 seasonal 
labour positions, offset by alternative dryland cropping (The Senate 2018). 
76Goulburn high security water yields a full allocation 95 years out of 100, with this allocation supported by 
storage infrastructure. It also provides access to carry-over. A Gwydir general security entitlement yields a full 
allocation 36 years out of 100, a Kia Ora unregulated overland flow licence 12 years out of 100, and are not 
supported by storage infrastructure. This makes Goulburn HS Reg a more valuable entitlement (Cheesman and 




Figure 7.2 Median price and purchase price for unregulated Kia Ora, Condamine-
Balonne, NSW intersecting streams, Gwydir and Barwon-Darling, and Goulburn HS 
Reg licences as at 12/05/2017 
 
Notes: *Median based on previous 12 months, prices based on BOM (2019a) and The Senate (2018). 
**Median price of 1A Goulburn HS Reg is stable for last 12, 6, and 3 months. 
 
Table 7.2 Comparing Kia Ora water purchase price and transaction value for 







compared to Kia Ora 
Price Paid 
Purchase price Kia Ora  
(in Condamine-Balonne) 
2,745 38.95 n.a. 
Condamine-Balonne 
unregulated 
1,600 22.70 -42% 
NSW Intersecting Streams 
unregulated 
95 1.34 -97% 
Gwydir unregulated 750  10.64 -73% 
Barwon-Darling 
unregulated 
1,337 18.98 -51% 
1A Goulburn HS Reg 
Victoria 
2,600 36.89 -5% 
 
It would have been within the evaluator’s discretion to value the water at the median of 
Condamine-Balonne or comparable overland flow licences, as it was also in their discretion 
























Given the lack of transparency and information regarding the purchase price of Kia Ora, it is 
not possible to state why the value seemed higher than what could be expected. However, 
what can be verified is that if the Commonwealth paid the median market price, the purchase 
cost would have been around 42-97% less, depending on the unregulated reference licence 
(see Table 7.2). While Kia Ora water could have traded at a premium due to its size 
(14,190ML – given government does prefer larger parcels to decrease its transaction costs per 
water transfer), other aspects of its unregulated nature arguably do not warrant a price 
premium, to the extent of making the water more expensive than the more reliable 
entitlement of Goulburn high security. 
 
7.4.1.2 Water Valuation summary 
This study is limited by its focus on primarily qualitative data, which hinder attempts at 
quantifying the impacts of different valuation methods. Future studies should analyse a 
dataset of real water valuations (which was not available for this study77) to quantify the 
monetary impacts of different assumptions and methods, data cleaning and evaluators’ 
discretion on water entitlement valuations. 
Nevertheless, our results provide a useful illustration of water valuation practices and their 
challenges. While water valuation follows similar processes to the valuation of agricultural 
land (i.e. market value of the asset at valuation date), which may be due to continuation of the 
practice of irrigated land valuation prior to unbundling, the assets are arguably very different. 
Water entitlements are more volatile than land, and in many cases extremely liquid, traded 
routinely in large volumes on active markets. Despite these differences, a dedicated water 
valuation methodology has yet to emerge: the current legislative and valuation industry’s 
guidelines are fairly inconclusive on the treatment of water assets, leaving large areas to 
evaluators’ discretion. There is a lack of clearly defined methodologies and guidelines in the 
current practice of water valuation and accounting in the MDB, confirming the findings of 
other studies (Christ and Burritt 2017b; Tingey-Holyoak 2019). Insights from the case study 
and respondents’ water valuation comments highlight how the valuation process can be 
sensitive to bias, as it relies heavily on secondary data that is not always reported correctly, 
nor transparent. This is particularly pronounced in thin markets, where data scarcity and 
quality arguably require the use of longer time-periods and multiple data sources.  
In addition, commercial valuation relies on the notion of non-distressed counterparties. An 
interesting application of this involves government water recovery. With environmental water 
recovery targets for each catchment and the corresponding deadline, in form of the Basin 
Plan, public knowledge, this condition is arguably violated: the government could be seen as 
a distressed buyer. Under a strategic purchase regime, particularly in thin markets with a high 
concentration of water entitlement ownership/market power and a significant portion of the 
environmental water recovery still to recover, various interests may be able to extract unduly 
high water entitlement prices due to the ‘government distress’. Similarly, evaluators’ method 
choices and assumptions could drive valuation outcomes, and hence provides opportunities 
for rent-seeking. 
                                                 
77Water entitlement valuations are often commercially in-confidence and not publicly available. If available, 
valuation methodology and assumptions sections are usually redacted. There is no register containing water 
valuations. While a public central register for land and property valuations exists in some states, it contains only 
the final value but not the actual valuation report. However, having access to the valuation report, in particularly 





7.4.2 Water accounting systems 
The other major theme identified by our respondents was how water value was reported in 
accounting systems, with distinct practices identified for banks, EWHs and investors. 
 
7.4.2.1 Accounting by banks: water as collateral/security 
Bankers explained a MDB water entitlement can be accepted as a security for a loan or 
mortgage. The value of this security is a function of the entitlements’ market value, 
established by water valuation, and a risk adjustment78 (otherwise known as an “internal 
lending margin” or “extension rate”). Some banks undertake water valuation in-house, others 
contract external valuation services due to conflict of interest. Larger or more complex 
valuations tend to be done externally, whereas simpler valuation tasks stay in-house. Most 
banker respondents conceded that experience with water as a security is limited, and banks 
therefore employ a more conservative extension rate for water than for land. In addition, 
some banks reduce the valuation amount by 10% before applying the extension rate. Most 
also prefer to mortgage against a mix of water and land assets, leading to a higher extension 
rate for water as part of an asset mix, and to not lend against water entitlements alone.  
It is known that water entitlements are less protected than land in legal terms. First, water 
entitlements are a statutory property right, making them less protected from regulatory 
change than a land title (Fisher 2010). Second, banks can directly access the money from a 
land sale to satisfy their mortgage, whereas such a provision does not exist in every state for 
water entitlement sales as the money can go straight to the seller.79 There are cases where the 
water owner took the money, defaulted on the mortgage and disappeared, leaving it to the 
bank to chase the money through litigation. Although one-third of the bankers interviewed 
accepted water entitlements as security by themselves, they are subject to lower extension 
rates, ranging between 50-70%, representing a 10-20% discount as compared to agricultural 
land extension rates. Note that banks still negotiate the terms of the mortgage, and extension 
rates only determine securities’ value: 
“If it's part of a wider transaction that involves farming land, so dirt and water, and 
water being used on the land, then we'll lend up to 70% of the water value. If it's a 
transaction where it's not being used specifically by the owner or a related party of 
the owner for farming purposes, so it's more of a speculative investment type 
purchase, then we reduce that to 50%.” (Banker) 
Once a mortgage has been negotiated, banks do not adjust the value of the water asset until 
revaluation. Again, revaluation periods depend on the bank: they may, for example, be 
yearly, every three years, or only for intended re-mortgage. 
                                                 
78Banks adjust for: the risk of the mortgagor defaulting; the liquidity; and collateral ‘security’. Bankers 
explained that standard lending risk metrics such as debt-equity ratio, historic income and cash-flow are 
considered, as well as the agribusiness banker’s expertise and judgement about the farm enterprise. 
79NSW, QLD and VIC legislation rule that caveats can be placed on water entitlements, entitlements can only be 
transferred if agreed by the mortgagee, and in the case of default - proceeds of water sales need to satisfy 
mortgages first (Water Act 1989 (VIC); Water Act 2000 (QLD); Water Management Act 2000 (NSW)). In 
contrast, SA legislation allows for caveats to be placed on water entitlements, but does not provide mortgagees 
with veto powers, nor does it dictate the use of proceeds from water sales in case of default (Natural Resources 





7.4.2.2 Accounting by EWH: Water as environmental asset 
EWH respondents account for the value of their water assets at historic cost less impairment 
(AASB 2019b). The relevant cost is heavily influenced by the way water was initially 
acquired: purchase price if the water was bought on the market; or the value apportioned to 
water recovered as part of a strategic purchase or infrastructure upgrade (DAWR 2018). For 
strategic purchases, the water value relies heavily on external valuation. For water 
entitlements acquired through infrastructure upgrades, they can cost a premium of up to 7.1 
times the market price once transaction program costs are taken into account (Productivity 
Commission 2018). Finally, for water entitlements transferred from another entity for free 
(e.g. gift of environmental water entitlements by the Victorian Government to the Victorian 
Environmental Water Holder (VEWH 2018a)), the cost is AUD$0/ML.80 
These costs remain unadjusted in EWH accounts, save annual impairment testing, until 
revaluation (which only occurs in active markets). However, EWH respondents often argue 
that there is no active market for environmental water since it is never to be sold. In practice, 
this leads to environmental water assets being massively undervalued: most water 
entitlements have appreciated considerably from the time the majority of EWHs acquired 
their portfolios, and impairment adjustment cannot exceed the initial cost. 
The practice of claiming no active market to avoid revaluation has likely evolved within 
public EWHs with the aim to avoid Treasury calls for revenue from water assets. Although 
most public EWHs are not required to recover costs or create revenue, but rather manage 
their water for environmental benefit (O'Donnell 2013, 2018), this is not the case for all, and 
subject to regulatory change. One respondent explained that as water entitlements are listed 
on a state’s asset register, they reported that the Treasury argues that water assets are 
contributing to a state’s bottom line and need to be valued at market value. There is then 
perhaps an argument that they should therefore recover the associated costs of holding and 
using the asset (licencing and trading fees), requiring EWHs to create a monetary return 
through allocation sales. However, EWHs prefer to manage water for environmental benefits, 
not cost recovery: 
“The model where government absorbs the costs in some other mechanism and the 
EWH just has to go about their business as managing the water is the preferred 
model.” (EWH) 
There are some EWHs that employ a market valuation approach for entitlements acquired 
through direct purchase, although water recovered through infrastructure upgrades remains at 
cost. This approach allows EWHs to represent water ownership value closer to the current 
market, better informing water portfolio rebalancing decisions. 
 
7.4.2.3 Accounting by Investors 
All businesses list their water portfolio value in their balance sheets but the accounting 
framework differs for entitlements held for production or as part of an investment asset 
portfolio. When water entitlements govern water held for production, water entitlements are 
treated as intangible assets with an indefinite life-span, accounted for at historic cost less 
                                                 
80This is generally the case for EWHs when no cost (purchase price or cost of infrastructure efficiency program) 




impairment, with the purchase price as the historic cost (AASB 2019b). In contrast to EWHs, 
investors revalue their entitlements at fair market value. However, this often occurs 
infrequently. For example, family farms tend to account for entitlements at cost for multiple 
years without revaluing, and only revalue if required by their bank. While some investors 
revalue their water assets annually, this was not standard process amongst our respondents. 
Non-landholder financial investors hold water entitlements as part of a real asset investment 
portfolio. They value water entitlements at current market prices and revalue at a high 
frequency, sometimes every month, making sure the market asset value is represented at all 
times. This provides transparency and enables shareholders to make swift decisions about 
portfolio restructure: 
“We are an investment fund, we have to hold water at its fair market value based on 
AASB13 (Fair Value Measurement) in our books, rather than historic cost. That's 
important for us because our members can trade in and out of our product daily. We 
need to have an up-to-date market valuation so that we can ensure they're trading in 
and out at fair market value.” (Financial Investor) 
Historical cost accounting has implications for investors: having a significant part of their 
asset value not reflected in financial statements can make communication with shareholders 
difficult, as well as not reflecting the true value of the company: 
“My previous employer had water that was at about a tenth of its value on the books. 
That just suggests that the accounting standards are back to front.” (Investor) 
By accounting for water at fair value (AASB 2019a), financial investors have stronger 
balance sheets, which is advantageous when trying to attract investor interest and credit 
opportunities. However, one banker respondent claimed that the balance sheet value of water 
has no bearing on credit decisions: 
“Financial institutions take no notice of the value in the balance sheet when it comes 
to property, and that's why they do valuations on water. And at the end of the day, the 
bank manager and the customer know the true value of the asset.” (Banker) 
One potential reason for this may be the difference between the market value of water as 
represented by comparative valuations versus the value of the water used by the business. All 
businesses will have differing marginal values of water (e.g. see Wheeler et al. (2014d) 
estimates for differing buy and sell water trade values for various irrigation industries). The 
“true value” the respondent refers to is likely the marginal value of water for a particular 
business, which can be different to the book value81 and different to the current market value.  
 
7.4.3 Accounting Framework Summary 
Financial water accounting practice in Australia broadly follows historical cost or fair value 
accounting practices set out by the AASB (AASB 2019a, 2019b). However, as AASB 
standards only have to be used by ‘reporting entities’, such as ASX200 listed or companies 
with significant external stakeholders, water accounting by smaller businesses is not 
impacted. This leads to a wide variety of water values being reported, without much 
transparency about assumptions or the accounting framework used. This is exasperated by the 
                                                 
81However, due to accounting treatment under AASB138 (Intangible Assets) (AASB 2019b), book value is 
impaired when water prices fall below the initial purchase price. Therefore, the current market value can only 




sometimes poor quality of water entitlement ownership data, misreporting the location and 
security of stakeholders’ water entitlement ownership. Consequently, comparing different 
water asset portfolios is challenging at best. Historical cost accounting particularly has been 
criticised as obscuring real performance, providing largely irrelevant information, and leading 
to poorer business decision-making (Argilés Bosch et al. 2012; Barlev and Haddad 2003). 
This resonates with the concern that smaller businesses are disadvantaged in accessing capital 
since an important part of their asset base, namely water entitlements, are often undervalued 
due to historical cost accounting and infrequent re-evaluation. Given the maturity of sMDB 
water markets, fair value accounting for water assets is possibly more transparent, more 
reflective of economic realities, and arguably easier than historical cost accounting. More 
transparent water accounting frameworks, reflecting the current value of water, provide 
important information for stakeholders and may enable better water management. 
Transparency in accounting can also build trust in the water market system (Wheeler et al. 
2017b). 
The MDB case points to important aspects for water valuation and accounting globally. 
Current water accounting initiatives on the business scale are not standardized, they focus 
mainly on physical water information and water use, but do not pay attention to water asset 
values (Burritt and Christ 2017; Tingey-Holyoak 2019). Future studies should pay more 
attention to financial water values and attempt to incorporate these values better into existing 
accounting frameworks. With water increasingly becoming a sought-after investment asset, 
an important part of irrigators’ assets, and with non-landholder ownership increasing, water 
accounting needs to adequately reflect the fair value of the asset, rather than its historic cost, 
or just the cost of provision and physical volumes. While some basin-scale water accounting 
frameworks envision financial water accounting conceptually, they provide little instruction 
on best practice water valuation methods. Clear standards and methodologies for both 
accounting and valuation are necessary to enable transparent and comparable assessment of 
financial water asset value for diverse stakeholders. To underpin the hydrological integrity 
and financial water asset values, physical accounting considering net water consumption on a 
basin-scale (Grafton et al. 2018), and financial fair value accounting of water rights, 
reflecting current market values, are paramount. Transparent valuation of water resources 
should follow a standardised approach in regards to data cleaning, data sources considered 
and valuation methods employed. In addition, governance, regulation and corruption have 
been identified as important issues for water markets globally (O'Donnell and Garrick 2019). 
Therefore, when water valuations concern government expenditure, we suggest that methods, 
data and assumptions used should be publicly available, rather than commercial in-
confidence, to: 1) increase accountability; 2) demonstrate “value for money”; 3) discourage 
rent-seeking by vested interests; and iv) engender trust in government processes (Grafton and 
Williams 2019; Wheeler et al. 2017b). Furthermore, in situations where the government is 
perhaps classified as a “distressed buyer” to recover water, standard commercial valuation 
methodology might not be appropriate to discern the value of water rights. 
 
7.5 Conclusion 
This study used qualitative information from 63 interviews with water experts (banks, 
evaluators, EWHs, investors and water brokers) and case study quantitative information to 





The majority of respondents used relative valuation (namely current market value) to value 
water entitlements, as well as other methods such as purchase price and volume weighted 
average price. Bankers value water on a longer period of water market data (6-18 months), 
whereas evaluators largely rely on information within the last six months. Water register and 
water broker data were the most commonly used data sources. Issues associated with 
valuation include transparency and accuracy of water market data, larger versus smaller water 
parcels, transaction costs and fees, and ‘wet’ versus ‘dry’ trades. These are particularly 
impactful in thin water markets where data availability and quality are poor. We show that 
the use of different data and methods can have a meaningful impact on valuation values, as 
demonstrated in the Kia Ora Commonwealth’s strategic purchase case study where the same 
water entitlement could have been valued anywhere between AUD$95-2,745 per ML, and it 
is highly likely that the Commonwealth paid considerably more than they should have due to 
evaluator discretion. 
In the MDB, physical water accounting is limited by its focus on gross-extraction, rather than 
net consumption of water. Financial water accounting frameworks value water at historical 
cost (less impairment) or fair value. Bankers stated they applied extension rates between 50-
60% to water valuations, whereas rates between 60-70% apply to agricultural land, for 
mortgage and security purposes. On the other hand, financial investors, owning water as part 
of a real asset investment portfolio, revalue assets monthly at current market prices. EWHs 
undertake yearly impairment testing, but do not revalue their portfolio, as they claim there is 
no active market for environmental water. The difference in accounting can lead to a material 
divergence in reported water portfolio values between stakeholders - making comparisons 
challenging. The predominant use of historical cost accounting by small businesses could 
disadvantage them in regards to access to capital. 
These findings highlight that there are no clear standards for water valuation and financial 
water accounting and we illustrated this impact on water asset values. Physical water 
accounting does not report real availability of water resources as it is based on an assessment 
of gross-extractions. There is a need for proper water accounting across the whole Basin, 
accounting for return flows and all water use. The processes of financial water valuation and 
accounting are confusing and potentially obfuscating, enabling rent-seeking by various 
interests. As illustrated by a series of inquiries, a MDB Royal Commission, and considerable 
public interest in government water valuation of strategic environmental water purchases, 
there is a compelling need for transparent and open water management, valuation and 
financial water accounting. Greater transparency and a standardised water valuation method, 
clearly identifying assumptions made, would reinforce the development of water markets, 
both in the MDB and worldwide. Proper accounting practice is important to discharge 
organisations’ responsibilities for water management and purchase against its stakeholders, 
contributing to greater trust in institutions and governance, which is a vital issue for all water 
market systems.  
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Chapter 8 Conclusions and Policy Implications 
This thesis has undertaken a multi-method exploration of the drivers of irrigators’ planned 
adaptation behaviour, focussing particularly on water ownership and trading issues. This 
chapter provides a summary, presents key findings, and makes a series of policy 
recommendations. Finally, comments about the limitations of this study and future research 
directions are also made. 
  
8.1 Summary of the thesis and key findings 
Table 8.1 summarises the key thesis findings, with the related implications for policy 
development discussed in the following section. 
Following the introduction in Chapter 1, Chapters 2 and 3 provided a detailed description of 
the MDB, its history of water policy reform and water market systems. Given the already 
highly variable climate in the MDB, and climate change projections predicting a drier and 
more volatile future climate, MDB irrigators will be subject to increased future uncertainty 
and likely worsening water scarcity (CSIRO 2008, 2012; Timbal et al. 2015). This creates the 
need for continuous adaptation to changing circumstances. Historically, MDB water policy 
reform has aimed to address water scarcity and volatility, initially by constructing major 
infrastructure, such as dams, to smooth seasonal rainfall variability (Connell 2007; Guest 
2016). From 1994 onwards, water policy focused on enabling flexible demand side responses 
to water scarcity via water markets and subsequent market liberalisation and unbundling, 
while also attempting to address over-allocation of water resources and strike a new balance 
between consumption and the environment (Connell 2007; Crase et al. 2014; Guest 2016; Lee 
and Ancev 2009). Water markets are now very advanced, with allocations and entitlements 
routinely traded in large volumes by diverse market participants (Grafton et al. 2016), albeit 
with the nMDB water market far less developed than the sMDB water market (Wheeler and 
Garrick 2020). New derivative-type temporary water market products and non-landholder 
water market stakeholders have recently emerged in the past few years (ABARES 2018; 
Bayer and Loch 2017; Brennan 2008; Wheeler et al. 2013a). Trading motivations and 
behaviours are well-understood for irrigators (Haensch et al. 2016a, 2019; Loch et al. 2012; 
Nauges et al. 2016; Wheeler and Cheesman 2013; Zuo et al. 2015a; Zuo et al. 2015b), and to 
a lesser extent for EWHs (Ancev 2015a; Connor et al. 2013; Lee et al. 2012; Wheeler et al. 
2013a). However, there is a clear gap in the literature regarding water ownership and the 
trading behaviour of non-landholders and the use of derivative-type temporary water market 





Table 8.1 Summary of Key Thesis Findings 






There are 100 years of successive MDB water policy 
reform that has attempted to address over-allocation of 
water resources. Major reforms include implementing 
water markets and driving market liberalisation. 
Contention remains around the appropriate split between 
water for consumption and the environment, which is all 
the more urgent given that the MDB’s highly variable 
climate is predicted to become drier and more volatile 







Derivative-type temporary water market products and 
non-landholder stakeholders have recently emerged. 
While trading in entitlements and allocations by 
irrigators and environmental water market participants is 
well understood, very little is known about these new 








Given data availability and the research questions, a 
mixed methods approach was chosen as the most 







Irrigators’ planned adaptation behaviour was modelled 
using a survey of 1,000 sMDB irrigators in 2015-16. It 
was found behaviour was strongly influenced by 
irrigators’ financial, human and social capital, but their 














In-depth interviews with 63 stakeholders (banks, agri-
corporates, water traders, EWHs, financial investors) 
were conducted in 2018-19. Many stakeholders, 
including non-landholders, prefer to own most of their 
water needs in higher security water entitlements and 
use temporary trade to mitigate water supply shortfalls. 
Financial investors and large agri-corporates are more 
likely to use and/or supply derivative-type temporary 
trading products. Most stakeholders view water 
entitlements as financial assets. 
Thematic qualitative 
interview analysis 
There are three key water market reform areas: 1) data 









Insights from the in-depth interviews were used to find 
that most MDB water entitlement valuations are 
comparative valuations, using different data and data 
cleaning procedures. Irrigators and EWHs use historical 
cost accounting, financial investors use fair value 
accounting. Banks extend water entitlements for 50-60% 
of their valuation value. 
Thematic qualitative 
interview analysis 
Applying different water entitlement valuation and data 
cleaning protocols can lead to a difference in entitlement 





Chapter 4 justifies the use of a mixed methods research approach in this thesis and provides 
extra detail on data sets and data collection protocols, complementing the analytical Chapters 
5-7. Due to the recent introduction of derivative-type temporary water market products and 
non-landholder stakeholders and the water registers not adequately reporting different types 
of market trades, public quantitative data is not available. It was therefore appropriate to 
employ qualitative techniques such as expert stakeholder interviews to gather information on 
these topics. 
Chapter 5 investigated MDB irrigators’ planned expansive, accommodating and contractive 
adaptation strategy choices and their related drivers, including the impacts of human and 
social capital, and attitudinal factors. Planned adaptation is analysed in three indices:1) 
expansive adaptation that increases or enhances the irrigation component of a farm enterprise; 
2) accommodating adaptation that changes the farm structure without impacting the irrigation 
component; and 3) contractive adaptation that reduces the irrigation component. Expansive 
adaptation strategies include buying water allocation and/or entitlements, buying more 
farmland (in the same or a different region), increasing irrigated area and improving irrigation 
efficiency. Accommodating adaptation strategies include changing farm ownership 
structures, change irrigated production (e.g. crop mix), diversify production, increase farm 
insurance, increase dryland area, increase collaboration and collective bargaining, decrease 
dryland area, and utilising solar for irrigation infrastructure. Contractive adaptation strategies 
include selling the farm, decreasing irrigated area, selling water allocations and/or 
entitlements, and sell any farmland. This chapter used a survey of 1,000 sMDB irrigators, 
conducted in October - November 2015, with 419 responses from NSW, 209 from SA and 
372 from VIC. The survey had a final response rate of 51% and contained information on 
irrigators’ socio-economic characteristics, world views, past and planned future adaptation 
behaviour.  
Key results from this chapter included: 1) most irrigators plan to use to use all adaptation 
types, but have a slight preference for expansive over accommodating and contractive 
planned adaptation; 2) succession planning and past adaptation experience have a statistically 
significant positive influence for all planned adaptation; 3) the influence of financial, human, 
natural, physical and social capital variables varies between adaptation types. Financial 
capital variables (e.g. farm debt or farm income) were the strongest statistically significant 
driver for planned accommodating adaptation, whereas planned expansive and contractive 
adaptations are more strongly statistically significantly impacted by human and social capital 
variables. These results confirm findings from ex-post adaptation studies, suggesting that 
farm succession, and experience with, or the ability to trial strategies, are important factors 
determining farmers’ adaptation (Ghadim et al. 2005; Li et al. 2017; Nicholas and Durham 
2012; Wang et al. 2015b). The variation in the importance of specific drivers across different 
adaptation strategies has also been suggested in other studies (Gadédjisso-Tossou 2015; 
Moniruzzaman 2015; Prokopy et al. 2008). In contrast to many other adaptation studies (e.g. 
(Abid et al. 2016; Below et al. 2012; Dinh et al. 2017; Moniruzzaman 2015; Prokopy et al. 
2008; Wang et al. 2015a)), this study quantitatively explores drivers for planned, and 
therefore future adaptation, rather than adaptation implemented in the past (Llewellyn and 
Brown 2020), making prediction possible. This is important to better understand irrigators’ 
future risk management behaviour, enabling the development of more efficient and targeted 
drought and climate change adaptation policies (Chavas and Nauges 2020; Nauges et al. 
2016). To our knowledge, only Wheeler et al. (2013b) has examined MDB irrigators’ planned 
adaptation across a range of adaptation types, albeit using a simpler modelling approach for a 




Given water trading is an important risk management tool and adaptation strategy for 
irrigators, Chapter 6 explored MDB water ownership and trading strategies and their role for 
different stakeholders, including agri-corporates, environmental water holders, and non-
landholder financial investors. This chapter utilised the irrigator survey, quantitative water 
forward and parking trading data from 2016/17-2018/19, and 63 qualitative expert interviews 
with 20 agri-corporates, 6 banks, 15 EWHs, 7 non-landholder investors, 10 property and 
water evaluators and 5 water brokers, conducted from April - October 2018. This chapter also 
addressed the use of emerging derivative-type temporary water market products, and 
stakeholders’ perceptions on water asset characteristics from a financial perspective. Finally, 
current water market and policy issues identified by different stakeholders were illustrated 
and improvements suggested. Results show that most stakeholders (79%) see water 
entitlements as a financial investment asset, with some pointing to its unique characteristics. 
A majority also own most or all of their annual average water needs under high/general 
reliability water entitlements in their region/trading zone and trade water allocations 
occasionally to supplement their water supply, although some agri-corporates (20% of all 
agri-corporates) own little or no entitlements, preferring to invest capital elsewhere. Diverse 
water portfolios, made up of entitlements of different securities and in different regions, 
including groundwater entitlements, are more prevalent among non-landholder EWHs (83% 
of EWHs) and financial investors (86% of financial investors). Although a few irrigators use 
some derivative-type temporary water market products, it is mainly the sophisticated agri-
corporates and financial investors that use parking contracts, multi-year water leases, and 
water forwards regularly.  
Consequently, the market for parking and multi-year forwards is still underdeveloped, with 
leases overall the most common derivative-type temporary product, followed by parking 
(42% of respondents use leases, 29% use parking, and 13% use multi-year forwards). We 
also found that non-landholders acted as major sellers of derivative-type temporary products 
to agri-corporates and irrigators (37% of forwards in the available data were sold by non-
landholder investors), providing market liquidity. This is in line with Brennan (2008) and 
Bayer and Loch (2017), who find that forward and parking contracts lead to more efficient 
water market outcomes. As Wheeler and Garrick (2020) conclude, water market participation 
is driven by robust government regulation and institutional rules, low transaction costs, and 
homogeneous marketable products (and heterogeneous market users). These criteria are 
arguably not completely fulfilled for derivative-type temporary products because transaction 
costs (due to counter party risk) are high, and in the absence of standardisation, products are 
not homogeneous. Similarly, robust regulation and institutional rules for non-landholder and 
agri-corporate market participation do not exist. This chapter therefore suggests three major 
water market and policy reform areas to tackle these issues: 1) data reform; 2) rules and 
regulation reform; and 3) new water market institutional development.  
The final chapter (Chapter 7) also used the stakeholder qualitative interview data to further 
investigate water entitlements as a financial asset, specifically how they are valued for 
investment and mortgaging purposes, and how they are accounted for in an organisation’s 
financial reports. It also investigated whether employing different valuation and accounting 
methodologies may have an impact on reported entitlement values. While a literature review 
identified potentially applicable valuation and accounting frameworks, and the Australian 
rules and legislation in regard to water entitlement valuation and accounting, stakeholder 
interviews explored the methods and data used in practice. This chapter found that due to an 
absence of standardised rules, valuation is routinely contracted to large corporatised property 
evaluators, who predominantly use comparative valuation methods, albeit with different data 




The case study of the strategic purchase of Kia Ora overland flow licences in the Queensland 
Condamine-Balonne region by the Federal Government as a part of the water recovery 
program in 2017 demonstrated that the choice of data sources and valuation methods can 
have significant impacts on water entitlement values in the range of 5 - 97% of final value. 
This issue of valuation is particularly pronounced in thin water markets where data are 
scarce. Stakeholders account differently for water entitlements: EWHs, private irrigators and 
agri-corporates use historical cost accounting, which only adjusts to present entitlement 
market values in the event of revaluation, which in practice is undertaken infrequently. 
EWHs do not revalue their water portfolios, arguing that environmental water is not to be 
sold and therefore needs not to be revalued. Non-landholder financial investors account for 
entitlements at fair market value, often revaluing very frequently, sometimes monthly. Given 
the recent rise in water entitlement prices, historical cost accounting undervalues water 
entitlements. With the majority of EWHs’ entitlement holdings acquired prior to 2015, EWH 
entitlement portfolios are substantially undervalued. Banks use 50-60% of the water 
entitlement book value for mortgage and collateral purposes. Given the unequal accounting 
treatment, this may disadvantage irrigators, especially smaller irrigators, in accessing credit.  
 
8.2 Policy recommendations 
Based on the results discussed, three broad topic policy recommendations are presented: 1) 
drought and water scarcity adaptation policy; 2) water market policy and regulation; and 3) 
financial water valuation and accounting policy. 
  
8.2.1 Climate change and drought adaptation policy 
Given climatic variability in the MDB and the likely future impacts of climate change, 
irrigators will continue to experience water scarcity and drought, likely to persist at current, 
or increased, levels (CSIRO 2008, 2012; Timbal et al. 2015). Future drought and climate 
change policy therefore needs strong incentives to foster continuous adaptation to changing 
circumstances. The following elaborates further on drought policy in Australia. 
Drought policy 
Drought policy has a long history in Australia (Aslin and Russell 2008), with drought treated 
as a natural disaster until 1989, giving farmers access to associated welfare support payments 
(Botterill and Chapman 2002), such as the Natural Disaster Relief Arrangements (NDRA). 
Following a review in 1989, drought was excluded from the NDRA and a National Drought 
Policy (NDP), based on principles of self-reliance and risk management, was introduced in 
1992 (Alston and Kent 2004; Botterill 2003). Drought was thereafter treated as a business 
risk for farmers. In the same year, the income smoothing schemes of the Income Equalisation 
Deposits (IED) scheme and the Farm Management Bond (FMB) scheme were introduced, 
and farmers were encouraged to make use of these to manage drought risk (Botterill 2003). 
These schemes allowed farmers to deposit pre-tax income for use in later years and 
encouraged farmers to increase their self-reliance through improved risk management 
(Botterill 2005). However, the NDP also recognised that there are severe events not 
manageable for many farmers, enabling the affected areas to be declared as experiencing 
Exceptional Circumstances [EC] (White and Karssies 1999). To be classified as an EC event, 
which is not limited to drought but includes any type of event outside the capacity of good 




average, every 20 to 25 years) and cover events outside the range of “normal” ones (Aslin 
and Russell 2008). 
The Farm Household Support Scheme links the established drought relief payments with the 
‘EC Exit Package’ (Botterill 2005) and is meant to encourage those farmers without a long-
term sustainable future in farming to leave the industry (Botterill 2003). Farmers can receive 
some financial compensation for selling their farms and support in adapting to a new business 
or different employment (Stehlik 2009). This includes an Exit Grant, offering a taxable 
payment, an Advice and Retraining Grant, and a Relocation Grant (DAFF 2014). An earlier 
version of the Exit Package was the MDB Small Block Irrigators Exit Grant Package, 
implemented in the Millennium Drought to aid the RtB efforts until early 2010 (Zuo et al. 
2015b). 
In 2011, after the Millennium Drought, a new framework to support farmers without the need 
for EC declarations was agreed, removing the national EC Interest Rate Subsidy because it 
was determined to neither help farmers to prepare for drought, nor improve risk management 
(DA 2019). When drought returned to eastern Australia in 2013, there were again calls for 
financial support for farmers, including interest rate subsidies. Thus, in February 2014, a new 
drought assistance package, which included subsidising loans, was announced (Peterson 
2016). The most recent drought policy package in 2019 includes an additional Farm 
Household Allowance, which is available for farmers in two instalments. To make it easier 
for farmers to succeed, it includes a simplified support process and an increased net asset 
threshold cap of AUD$5.5 million (Lawrence et al. 2019).  
Botterill et al. (2017) argue that current attitudes to drought assistance are not reasonable and 
do not adequately protect farmers from insolvency risks. In particular, taxpayer subsidies can 
be minimised by delivering default insurance for farmers; the so-called Revenue Contingent 
Loans. Given that the attitudes of individual farmers to risk have not changed, and that no 
single drought strategy addresses the needs of all agricultural sectors, farmers decide on their 
own drought strategies, according to their expectations and financial position (Watson 2019). 
Moreover, there are some arguments that current drought policy settings are expensive, with 
spending on the 2001-03 drought amounting to more than AUD$1 billion (Botterill 2005). 
Botterill (2010) identified that encouraging farmers to build financial reserves, by providing a 
tax-related savings mechanism in form of the Farm Management Deposit scheme, is an 
effective risk management approach to drought. 
Nauges et al. (2016) suggest that MDB irrigators may be willing to pay for insurance 
products which protect against the risk of yield or revenue losses. As shown above, 
Australian drought policy to a large extent encourages farmers to develop their own risk 
management practices. This is especially relevant because attempts to introduce yield 
insurance products have failed (Hatt et al. 2012). Despite encouraging farmers’ self-reliance 
and being unwilling to intervene on the insurance market by subsidising premiums, 
Australian governments have traditionally provided drought assistance for ‘exceptional’ 
droughts through the aforementioned income support, interest rate subsidies and exit 
packages. This may indirectly compromise the establishment of a competitive insurance 
market, which can pool farmers’ risks through various products. For example, in the 
Millennium drought of the 2000s, 23% of Australian farms received some drought financial 
support (Productivity Commission 2009). 
Drought and water policy 
As another drought and water response policy, the Commonwealth implemented the Water 




produce an extra 100 GL of water for SA water consumption in exchange for Commonwealth 
funds (DAWE 2020a). In turn, 100GL of Murray water (40GL in 2019/20 and 60GL in 
2020/21) from the SA state entitlement will be made available to irrigators, in blocks of 
50ML for $5,000 per water allocation account, to produce fodder at a discounted price of 
AUD$100/ML (DAWE 2019d). At the time of writing, of the 40,000 ML available in round 
one, 14,250 ML were delivered to irrigators in NSW, 25,100 ML to irrigators in VIC, and 
650 ML to irrigators in SA (DAWE 2020c). Nauges et al. (2016) criticised Australian 
drought policy for indirectly compromising irrigators’ risk management efforts by providing 
assistance in exceptional droughts (see later in this section). Crase (2019) criticises the Water 
for Fodder program for its high cost, for not taking the diversity of MDB farmers into 
account, for a lack of safeguards against arbitraging by buying cheap water from the program 
and selling one’s own allocation for a higher price at the market, and for the difficulties 
associated with monitoring the program and enforcing compliance with program rules. 
Arguably, irrigators with appropriate risk management practices would not have to rely on 
subsidised cheap water allocations for their livelihoods. In essence, the Water for Fodder 
program is a very expensive and blunt instrument (Crase 2019), rewards poor individual risk 
management and incentivises irrigators’ reliance on the government as the insurer of last 
resort (Watson 2019). The introduction of carryover allowed on this program (Miller 2020), 
signals the uselessness of this policy and most likely its demise. 
Irrigation infrastructure policy 
Another aspect is the governments’ focus on subsidising irrigation infrastructure efficiencies 
(and the supply projects) for environmental water recovery, given that there are large 
questions surrounding the sustainability and effectiveness of the irrigation infrastructure 
program This focus on recovering water through infrastructure upgrades, needs to be 
reconsidered as such infrastructure investment policies are found to be not cost effective (e.g. 
(Grafton 2010; Lee and Ancev 2009; Wittwer and Dixon 2013)) and reduce irrigators’ 
flexibility and adaptive capacity for future droughts (Adamson and Loch 2018; Adamson et 
al. 2017; Wheeler et al. 2020a). See Wheeler et al. (2020a) for a summary of the criticisms of 
irrigation infrastructure upgrades. This reconsideration would allow some of the public 
spending on infrastructure upgrades to be allocated towards restructuring the water buyback 
scheme and providing farm adjustment programs, in order to achieve better overall 
environmental and socio-economic outcomes (Wheeler et al. 2013a; Wittwer and Young 
2020). Recovering water for the environment can be more appropriately achieved through an 
optimal mix of flexible water recovery options, including water trading and physical 
caps/quotas or water pricing increases (Ancev 2015a; Connor et al. 2013; Crase et al. 2015; 
Loch et al. 2011; Loch et al. 2014b; Wheeler et al. 2013a). MDB policy makers should 
ultimately concentrate on “what is sustainable and what is not and how to best balance and 
optimise the water needs of the environment, agriculture, other non-agricultural industry, 
and human settlements” (Kiem 2013, p. 1624). 
 
Summary 
This review shows Australian drought and drought adaptation initiatives have strongly 
focussed on financial capital drivers, such as access to credit and farm income or wealth. The 
results of this thesis show that although financial capital is an important driver of planned 
adaptation, financial capital incentives do not work equally well across the full gamut of 
potential adaptation strategies, and particularly if they are ad hoc responses to crises (Watson 




(Nauges et al. 2016). More emphasis should be given to empower and support irrigators to 
develop better and more robust risk management strategies. Continuing to restrict the focus to 
financial incentives that compromise risk management, such as the Water for Fodder, or 
income support measures may lead to expensive policies, failing to incentivise planned 
adaptation to future drought and climate change. Future policies could also harness the power 
of non-monetary incentives, such as succession planning and farmer experience with 
adaptation strategies. Supporting improved succession planning and experience with a range 
of adaptation strategies, through trials or education, potentially has large positive impacts on 
future adaptations across all adaptation strategy types, while also encouraging irrigators to 
manage their own risk. This may also be more effective than focusing on monetary incentives 
only. To avoid costly, one-size-fits-all and ad hoc approaches, improved adaptation and 
drought policies need to consider the differences between specific adaptation strategies and 
the way they are influenced by particular drivers. 
 
8.2.2 MDB water market benefits and market failure 
MDB water markets have evolved considerably in the last few years, with both irrigators’ 
entitlement and allocation cumulative trading participation ever increasing (Wheeler and 
Garrick 2020). Water markets have been shown to provide 1) allocative efficiency; 2) 
dynamic efficiency; and 3) productive efficiency (Grafton et al. 2016). 
Water market efficiency benefits 
An extensive literature has shown that short-term adaptation, namely allocative efficiency, to 
seasonal conditions (e.g. weather, cropping choices) is most often achieved through water 
allocation trade. Water allocation trading is an important risk management strategy for many 
irrigators (e.g. (Loch et al. 2012; Nauges et al. 2016; Zuo et al. 2015a)), allowing income 
creation for annual croppers through selling water allocations to permanent growers to keep 
their crops alive during droughts (Adamson et al. 2017; Kirby et al. 2014a; Wheeler 2014). 
Water scarcity plays a major role in water allocation prices and volumes traded on the market 
(Loch et al. 2012; Wheeler et al. 2008b; Zuo et al. 2015a; Zuo et al. 2016), demonstrating 
MDB water markets’ allocative efficiency. 
Voluntary trading of water entitlements allows for new investment opportunities and 
increased dynamic efficiency, through regulatory shifts in access arrangements (e.g. 
extraction limits or embargos) or personal strategic choices (e.g. retirement) based on 
structural or long-term decision making. The two most important motivations for water sales 
were a) retiring debt and b) generating cash to support farm income and re-investment in the 
farm (Wheeler and Cheesman 2013). Wheeler and Cheesman (2013) also found that thirty 
percent of farmers who sold all their entitlement retired, with a number of farmers selling 
water as part of succession plans. There are two influences from selling water entitlements: a 
positive (reduction in debt, farm restructure and reinvestment to make it more productive or 
efficient) and a negative (less water for production and/or higher costs in buying water 
allocations or bought feed) impact. Wheeler et al. (2014c) found no statistically significant 
impact on irrigation farms’ current financial year from selling water entitlements (but found a 
negative impact on current year rate of return from buying water entitlements).  
Changing water prices (both allocation and entitlement) offer productive efficiency incentives 
for efficient water resource use, either as an investment or input for productive outcomes 
(Loch et al. 2013), allowing water to be traded to its highest value use (Grafton and Wheeler 




type temporary trading products, which aid risk management (Seidl et al. 2020b) and provide 
greater allocative efficiency. The growing value of water entitlements over time provides a 
benefit for existing farmers in terms of superannuation, as an investment or as mortgage 
property (Seidl et al. 2020a; Wheeler et al. 2016a). These factors contribute to MDB water 
markets’ productive efficiency. 
Water market failure 
As highlighted by Wheeler et al. (2017b) and Wheeler and Garrick (2020), water markets 
only exist within institutions and structures which allow and govern the transfer of water. If 
these institutions and structures are corrupted or are missing, then this can result in negative 
impacts for society and market failure. Despite its evolution and maturity, market failure in 
MDB water markets exists in three areas: 1) imperfect competition; 2) externalities; and 3) 
information asymmetry. 
Imperfect competition occurs when markets are characterised by monopoly, oligopoly, 
bilateral monopoly or some other market imperfection, potentially leading to an imperfect 
allocation of resources. In the MDB, there is more evidence of imperfect competition in the 
nMDB than the sMDB, due to both endowment of resources and unregulated property rights 
(Wheeler and Garrick 2020). Evidence from the operation of some IVTs is that they do exert 
material influence on water market prices, and that some brokers have a technical ability and 
automatically monopolise trade through the choke (Hunt 2020). 
Externalities occur when property rights are not clearly defined, and costs and/or benefits can 
therefore spillovers to others. When discrepancies between private and social benefits and 
costs occur, then the resource allocation generated by markets will not be efficient because 
market prices do not reflect the ‘full’ or social costs involved. In the MDB, there are issues 
associated with tagging and transmission losses through trading which have potential third 
party impacts, and impacts of water markets on the environment. However, there is evidence 
that these environmental impacts are both positive and a negative. For example, positive 
impacts include allowing the environment to acquire equal water rights (Grafton and Wheeler 
2018), decreasing salinity (Lee et al. 2012), and allowing greater movement of water 
downstream, leading to ecological benefits (NWC 2012). Negative impacts identified are 
increased salinity in areas where water is traded from (Bjornlund 1999; Khan et al. 2009), 
increased groundwater substitution and salinity issues (Haensch et al. 2016b; Wheeler et al. 
2020a; Wheeler and Cheesman 2013), and activating sleeper and dozer licences (NWC 
2012). In order to transfer environmental water between regions, EWHs are required to 
formally trade water allocations, subject to market trading rules. This has the potential to 
trigger volumetric trade restrictions, such as IVTs. 
Information asymmetry occurs where one party has better information than the other. The 
information-rich agent can then increase their own benefits at the cost of the information-
poor. There are a number of information asymmetries in MDB water markets, hampering 
decision-making for both irrigators and policy makers. There are ongoing issues with price 
disclosure in registers, consistency of data information (and timeliness); accuracy of 
information in registers (especially across states). Water availability and trade data can be 
fragmented, incomplete or erroneous and weeks out of date (MDBA 2019m; Seidl et al. 
2020b). Water valuation and accounting practices are exasperated by poor quality water 
entitlement ownership data, which sometimes misreports the location and security of 
stakeholders' water entitlement ownership. There is also information asymmetry through 
membership of consultation bodies, such as water steering committees, and specific 




evidence that insider trading may have been present in MDB water markets, especially prior 
to rules being enforced in 2014 (de Bonviller et al. 2019). 
In sum, there is evidence of market failure in MDB water markets. Imperfect competition 
does seem to exist in some forms, especially in regards to the nMDB, IVT issues and 
unregulated water broker behaviour. Negative externalities are clearly present, mainly 
because of the lack of clear property rights and institutional rules. Information asymmetry 
also clearly exists, again in relation to IVT issues, data and information on prices, water 
registers and weather, insider trading issues of working groups and water brokers. 
To address these issues, this thesis recommends reform in two main areas: 1) water market 
regulation and policy; and 2) financial water valuation and accounting regulation and policy. 
 
8.2.2.1 Water markets regulation and policy 
As highlighted in the previous section, barriers to trade, market failure and the need for 
further water market regulation and policy reform remain. There is a fundamental need in the 
MDB for: continued robust accounting of water extraction and use (at both catchment and 
basin scale); continual monitoring; compliance and enforcement of water use; and water 
market institutional conditions – in order to ensure transparency and confidence in the market 
– as well as continual adaptation over time (e.g. (Grafton and Wheeler 2018; Wheeler et al. 
2017b)). Additionally, this thesis identifies three areas of further reform: 1) data reform; 2) 
rules and regulation reform; and 3) new institutional development. 
Data Reform 
Existing data water registry rules need to be strengthened and better implemented, such as 
mandatory price reporting for all water trades (MDBA 2019m). In particular, entitlement 
transactions in conjunction with land must be identified, especially in thin markets and where 
tax incentives lead to an overreporting of the water entitlement value (i.e. NSW and QLD). 
There is a pressing need to identify water forward, lease, option, and parking transactions, 
including counterparty type, within registers in order to support emerging derivative-type 
water market products. Under current conditions, price discovery is very challenging for 
these products, likely limiting stakeholders’ appetite to utilise them. The spectre of water 
barons and price gouging by non-landholder investors is front of mind for many irrigators and 
rural communities. Without reliable water ownership data across all stakeholder types, it is 
impossible to ascertain whether there may be non-landholder related water market issues. 
This thesis demonstrates that price-gouging and monopolistic behaviour has little to do with 
stakeholder type, but rather is based on the concentration of market power within or across 
particular catchments. Data on entitlement ownership by stakeholder type needs to be 
transparent and analysed at a catchment level to identify and address concerns about market 
power and monopolistic behaviour. These issues have also been identified as critical by the 
ACCC and the Victorian government (ACCC 2019a; DELWP 2019c). 
Rules and regulation reform 
As argued by Wheeler et al. (2017b), key criteria for robust water markets are strong and 
transparent institutions and a clear understanding of water rights and trading products, which 
in turn drive market participation (Wheeler and Garrick 2020). Clear standards and regulation 
are currently lacking in some areas. Derivative type temporary products are not standardized 
and are unregulated. Carry-over access and rules are unequal between the states, i.e. SA’s 




operate their carry-over portion in Dartmouth and Hume differently. As shown in Chapter 3, 
water market terminology across states is described as confusing to many, IVT rules and 
announcements lack transparency and are viewed as highly complicated. Improved and more 
transparent rules and standards for water forwards and options, carry-over access, allocation 
and IVT determinations would contribute to better decision-making by MDB stakeholders. In 
the absence of clear standards for water forwards and options, product comparability is 
problematic, and counterparty risk for forwards is significant. An arguably superior product 
to forwards is futures, routinely used for many agricultural commodities, such as cotton or 
corn. Water futures would offer similar risk management benefits for lower counterparty risk, 
as they are standardised and exchange traded, with a central clearing house that mitigates 
counterparty risk through daily cash settlement of profits and losses (Pirrong 2011). 
However, water futures would require a water market central exchange and clearing house, 
like that of the ASX. With the increasing use of derivative type products and increasing 
incentives for counterparty default in times of water scarcity and drought, the topic of 
standardisation and counterparty risk requires urgent attention. Unified water market 
terminology for comparable water products, such as water entitlements or allocations could 
improve interstate trading by removing confusion and ambiguity. A review of tagging and 
transmission losses through trading should identify and quantify corresponding third-party 
impacts. Conversely, very careful assessment needs to be given to any change in unregulated 
entitlements to allow trading, such as allowing trading in floodplain water harvesting rights. 
Legal loopholes enabling stakeholders to bypass trade restrictions and extraction embargoes, 
for example, as is the case for entitlements tagged prior to 22nd October 2010, need to be 
closed. Administrative arrangements and structures minimising insider trading and rent-
seeking are key to robust water sharing systems (Young 2019). Therefore, membership of 
consultation bodies which might provide access to sensitive information, such as water 
steering committees, and standards for water brokers needs to be fully transparent and 
publicly declared to avoid rent seeking by vested interests. 
New institutional development 
Finally, the more that stakeholders treat water markets like stock markets, managing water 
entitlements as financial assets, as opposed to production inputs, and use derivative-type 
temporary products, the more water markets will require sophisticated institutional 
development to avoid negative consequences/externalities. A special focus should target 
codes of conduct and conflict of interest rules for market participants and intermediaries. 
Australian Securities and Investment Commission market integrity rules (ASIC 2018) could 
provide guidance for this. Water market institutional development is particularly important 
for derivative-type temporary products, consideration should therefore be given to additional 
water market infrastructure, such as creating a central exchange and clearing house. This 
should be complemented by a well-resourced market regulatory agency with competency in 
monitoring and enforcing compliance in relation to derivative products. While a central 
exchange and clearing house provides benefits in regards to counterparty risk and 
transparency of trades (Duffie and Zhu 2011; Pirrong 2011), it likely will increase the static 
transaction costs of trade and will require substantial regulatory reform. Arguably, market 
efficiency gains through derivative products (Bayer and Loch 2017) will make this initial 
institutional investment worthwhile in the longer term. Sophisticated derivative type products 
require comprehensive allocation and entitlement data.  Providing these data in a timely 
manner is challenging without a central exchange trading allocation and entitlements. 
However, this does not necessitate one central exchange for all products; a number of central 
exchanges, e.g. one for allocation and entitlements and another for derivative products may 




policing and sanctioning conflicts of interests, along with establishing minimal brokerage 
requirements. Commercial water entitlement ownership by water market intermediaries and 
principal trading is a point of contention for many water market stakeholders. Regulation may 
be needed to stop this and thereby avoid conflicts of interest. Strong water market institutions 
and regulation needs to enforce product standards and codes of conduct, limit rent-seeking 
based on privileged information, and have appropriate prosecution powers to effectively limit 
counterparty risk in derivative-type products and unlawful intermediary behaviour. As the 
water market continues to evolve, institutions and regulation need to keep pace in order to 
support an effective and fair market for all stakeholders, drawing on best practice from 
financial and derivative markets. 
 
8.2.2.2 Financial water valuation and accounting policy 
With water entitlements widely used as collateral for farm credit and mortgages, appropriate 
valuation of water assets and their financial accounting is increasingly important. 
Water valuation follows similar methods to the valuation of agricultural land (i.e. market 
value of the asset at valuation date), yet the assets are very different. For one thing, water 
entitlements are less legally protected than land titles (Fisher 2010); albeit governments and 
most water market stakeholders ignore this and treat entitlements as a quasi-property right in 
practice. Water entitlements are also more volatile than land, in many cases extremely liquid, 
and traded routinely in large volumes in active markets. This arguably makes water a more 
attractive investment asset than land, given investing and divesting is reasonably quick and 
uncomplicated. However, a dedicated water valuation methodology has not yet emerged: the 
current legislative and valuation industry’s guidelines are unclear about the treatment of 
water assets. This leaves much to evaluators’ discretion: for example, what period to collect 
data from, which sources to use, how to clean data, and the general assumptions for valuation 
calculations. There are a lack of clearly defined methodologies and guidelines in the current 
practice of water valuation and accounting in the MDB, confirming the findings of other 
studies (Christ and Burritt 2017b; Tingey-Holyoak 2019). This thesis highlights how the 
valuation process can be sensitive to bias, because it relies heavily on secondary data that is 
neither always reported correctly, nor always transparent. This is particularly pronounced in 
thin markets, where data are scarce and of sometimes dubious quality, which arguably 
requires the use of longer time-periods and multiple data sources. The use of different data 
and methods can have a meaningful impact on entitlement values: in the Kia Ora 
Commonwealth’s strategic purchase case study, the same water entitlement could have been 
valued anywhere between AUD$95-$2,745 per ML. In thin markets and where market 
concentration and market power are present, various interests may be able to extract unduly 
high water entitlement prices, particularly where large portions of the Basin Plan water 
recovery targets have yet to be met, such as in northern NSW and southern Queensland. It is 
standard practice that the seller or mortgagor contracts the services of professional valuation 
companies and shoulders the cost. As evaluators’ method choices and assumptions could 
drive valuation outcomes, this provides opportunities for deliberate misevaluation, collusion 
and rent-seeking. Water entitlement valuations are commercial in-confidence, making 
methodological choices non-transparent and valuations hard to compare. Arguably, valuation 
methodologies, assumptions, data sources and cleaning methods should be publicly available 
in order to allow for the reproduction of valuation results, particularly in cases where large 
public funds are involved, such as strategic purchases. A publicly available database of water 




Financial water accounting in practice follows fair value (AASB 2019a) or historical cost 
accounting (AASB 2019b) set out by the Australian Accounting Standards Board. With these 
standards only adhered to by “reporting entities”, such as ASX200 listed companies or those 
with significant external stakeholders, water accounting by smaller businesses is not 
included. This leads to a wide variety of financial water values being reported, without much 
transparency about assumptions or the accounting framework used. This is exasperated by the 
sometimes poor quality of water entitlement ownership data, misreporting the location and 
the security of stakeholders’ water entitlement ownership. This makes comparing different 
water asset portfolios challenging, at best. Historical cost accounting has been criticised as 
obscuring real company and farm performance, providing largely irrelevant information, and 
leading to poorer business decision-making (Argilés Bosch et al. 2012; Barlev and Haddad 
2003). As most MDB irrigators use historical cost accounting for water entitlements and 
revalue infrequently, if they undertake financial accounting at all, there is concern that 
smaller businesses are disadvantaged in accessing capital since an important part of their 
asset base, namely water entitlements, are undervalued. EWHs also use historical cost 
accounting; they undertake yearly impairment testing but generally do not revaluate. While 
this seems to be a practice stemming from inter-departmental and political reasons, it likely 
leads to extremely undervalued water portfolios, given that most water entitlement recovery 
took place at times with lower water entitlement prices. It is therefore extremely challenging 
to ascertain whether water recovery has provided value for money for the tax-payer. Given 
the maturity of sMDB water markets, fair value accounting for water assets is possibly more 
transparent, more reflective of economic realities, and likely simpler than historical cost 
accounting, particularly with highly probable future improvements in water market data 
quality from implementing current reviews’ recommendations (ACCC 2019a; MDBA 
2019m). There is arguably scope for a dedicated financial valuation and accounting 
framework for water entitlements which reflects the current value of water, because 
transparent water accounting frameworks provide important information for stakeholders and 
enable better water management (Chalmers et al. 2012), and they also build trust in the water 
market system (Wheeler et al. 2017b). 
 
8.3 Limitations and Future research 
 
8.3.1 Limitations 
As described within this thesis, the methodologies employed have some weaknesses or 
limitations. This section briefly summarises the limitations that were encountered, how they 
were dealt with and their potential effect on the findings. 
 
8.3.1.1 Quantitative irrigators’ planned adaptation modelling 
Although the irrigator survey data set used for Chapter 5 was rich and comprehensive, a few 
limitations exist, particularly in relation to different planned adaptation strategies: 
- Irrigators were not asked why they plan to adopt a certain strategy. Therefore, the 
planned adoption of a given strategy cannot be definitively attributed to reasons such 
as climate change or profit maximisation. Given that irrigators will adopt strategies if 
they perceive a benefit from them (Chavas and Nauges 2020), and perceived benefits 




Skinner 2002), this thesis argues that modelling planned adaptation at least partially 
reflects climate change adaptation. It also addresses this limitation by consciously 
defining planned adaptation strategies as a response to any type of future uncertainty, 
not just that induced by climate change. 
- Irrigators did not provide information on the magnitude of planned adaptation, e.g. 
increasing the irrigated area by only a small fraction or changing all of a farm area to 
irrigation, nor whether they intend to undertake certain strategies as one bundle, e.g. 
increasing the area irrigated and putting the same area under more efficient irrigation 
infrastructure. As Chapter 5 outlined in more detail, potential dependence of planned 
adaptation strategies was addressed by utilising seemingly unrelated regression and 
multivariate probit modelling approaches, as well as using unweighted adaptation 
indices to reflect the unknown magnitude of adaptations. Sensitivity analysis revealed 
no material impacts on dependent and independent variable magnitude, direction and 
significance levels, between models which addressed and ignored potential 
interdependencies. 
 
8.3.1.2 Qualitative expert interview analysis 
There are also some limitations with the expert interviews used in Chapters 6 and 7. Ideally, 
to analyse all land and non-land stakeholders’ water ownership and trading strategies, data 
would have been available via water registers as either a) a census; or b) representative 
dataset. As highlighted in Chapter 3, these data are not publicly available for derivative-type 
temporary water products and ownership/trade information. Interview data represents 
therefore a second-best solution, but it provided a way to also obtain rich qualitative 
information on motivations in addition. 
- Given the small sample size of 64 total interviews, it cannot be assumed that 
interview data is statistically representative across all stakeholder types and states, 
especially as it was first targeted at larger and more sophisticated market participants 
to supplement the already existing dataset of irrigator trade behaviour.  
- It is possible that interview participants may have deliberately misled or engaged in 
“cheap talk” in due to ulterior motives, such as reviewer bias. Since interviews were 
anonymised, unincentivised (i.e. unpaid – albeit a Haigh’s chocolate frog or chocolate 
Murray Cod was provided as a thankyou!), and participants did not directly gain from 
research outcomes, the likelihood of interviewees being deliberately misleading is 
small. Nevertheless, information volunteered in interviews was fact-checked as much 
as possible, for example by triangulating stated water portfolio size and entitlement 
ownership with annual financial reports.  
- Initial interview recruitment may have missed key stakeholders. As our target 
respondent group is highly inter-connected, both professionally and at a personal 
level, the chain-referral approach employed in this thesis was considered highly 
appropriate for recruiting important participants. Given recruitment efforts were only 
terminated if: 1) a relevant person agreed to the interview; 2) directly refused to 
participate; or 3) no new information was added from more interviews and more data 
collection subsequently unnecessary, this limitation has no likely material impact on 
the results. 
In addition, data and claims made in the expert interviews were triangulated with other data 




approach ensured maximum caution and research rigour were employed in order to not bias 
results and derive wrong conclusions.  
 
8.3.2 Future research and Conclusion 
Several recommendations for future research can be drawn from this thesis: 
Future research 
Future research can expand on modelling irrigators’ planned behaviour by using data 
encompassing information on adaptation motivation and magnitude. This analysis requires 
that future surveys collect in-depth, detailed information on why irrigators plan to employ 
certain adaptation strategies in the future and how much they intend to do. Given the 
importance of water ownership and trading strategies, future quantitative data collection 
should also explore irrigators’ derivative-type, temporary trading behaviour, and ask them to 
consider and nominate different, alternative ownership philosophies. For example, “I own all 
my water needs and do not use leases, forward and futures”, or “I own less than 50% of my 
water needs in entitlements and source the rest from the allocation market or through leases, 
forwards and futures”. Panel data time-series analysis was not possible in this thesis: 
although a 2010/11 round of the irrigator farm survey was available, it contained a different 
set of questions, in particular in regards to adaptation strategies and only 338 irrigators 
participated in both surveys, which is not enough observations for the modelling approaches 
used in this thesis. Future surveys should be conducted with the aim of establishing a large 
panel of irrigators, spanning multiple years, in order to analyse how behaviour changed over 
time. Following Chavas and Nauges (2020), this thesis can be expanded by better 
incorporating the impacts of planned adaptation on risk and uncertainty. One conceivable 
way of doing this is grouping planned adaptation strategies around whether they increase, 
decrease or transform future risk or uncertainty. However, given the inherent complication of 
assessing multi-dimensional concepts of risk and uncertainty, careful thought needs to be 
given to how to define the risk-increasing and risk-reducing attributes of planned adaptation 
strategies. 
This thesis found that there are different rules, formal and informal, for EWHs and irrigators 
when trading on the water market. For one, the good neighbour policy of EWHs may 
materially impact their ability to deliver environmental outcomes or manage inter-seasonal 
risk via carry-over. Another aspect is the different treatment of evaporation and delivery 
losses associated with water trading. EWHs have these attributed to their allocation bank 
account and irrigators do not. This unequal treatment and the subsequent impact on water 
markets deserves further investigation, ideally through quantitative data analysis. 
The impact of exceptions to water trading rules and restrictions, such as IVTs, through tagged 
entitlements has also been identified. Given the trend of increasing perennial plantings 
downstream of the Barmah Choke (Doolan et al. 2019), and a related likely increase in IVT 
closures, this needs urgent attention. Analysis should quantify how much water bypasses 
trade restrictions, how this impacts water availability and water prices in different zones and 
whether this causes environmental damage to the river and its ecosystems. This requires 
multi-disciplinary research between economists, hydrologists and ecologists. 
A quantitative analysis of representative lease, forward and parking data, including a review 
of water ownership concentration and trading behaviour by different stakeholder types, is of 




traded by investors/agri-corporates and non-landholders, and assess whether this has 
quantifiable impacts for the water market or influences its long-term dynamics (e.g. see (Zuo 
et al. 2019)). This should include a consideration of concentration of market power, price 
gouging, or unequal access to carryover and inter-valley transfers. Currently, this analysis is 
impossible as unit-record water ownership data are not publicly available and derivative-type 
temporary trading data are not collected. However, given recent debate and the ACCC review 
currently taking place (ACCC 2019a), the situation may change in the near future, making 
this type of analysis feasible. 
This thesis used a case study to demonstrate potential impacts of valuers’ discretion for water 
entitlement values under Commonwealth strategic purchases. Subject to data availability, a 
systematic audit of financial water valuations and methodologies used should be undertaken. 
Valuers’ methodological choices could be contrasted to alternative data cleaning and 
valuation methods, establishing the monetary impact of method choice across different 
valuations. These differences could then be analysed to quantify whether discretion has a 
material financial impact in many cases, and the potential for existing patterns to aid 
deliberate misevaluation for rent-seeking purposes. 
Finally, some data collected for this thesis has not yet been analysed. Expert interviews also 
discussed stakeholders’ climate change plans, perceptions, adaptation strategies and future 
portfolio aspirations. This information will enable an exploration of how non-landholder 
stakeholders and agri-corporates plan for climate change, and what their likely trading and 
ownership behaviour may be in the future. Similarly, the data also contain rich information 
on environmental water management practices and challenges experienced by EWHs. 
Combined with environmental site case study data, future analysis may yield important 
insights for environmental watering in practice and identify beneficial rules and policy 
changes or adjustment. Participants also provided rich data, via comments about non-water-
market-related MDB policy improvements and their views and concerns related to 
compliance issues identified by Four Corners (Four Corners 2017). Triangulating this with 
quantitative water compliance data and their development over time may enable an analysis 
of compliance attitudes and perceptions versus the state of compliance in the MDB. This may 
lead to important insights regarding water market confidence and compliance regulatory 
adequacy. 
Overall, there is a clear need for future studies in water trading and ownership behaviour, 
quantifying the impact of different rules for consumptive and environmental water users. 
Special focus needs to be given to derivative-type temporary products trading and non-
landholder stakeholders water market activity, quantifying related impacts for third parties, 
identifying potential market failure, rent-seeking, market power, or monopolistic behaviour. 
Conclusion 
This thesis is one of the first studies to explore financial valuation and accounting of water 
entitlements in-depth, and one of only a very few studies analysing derivative-type water 
market products and non-landholder water market stakeholder behaviour. Further research is 
warranted to better understand the nature of water entitlements as financial assets, as well as 
water market evolution towards derivative-type water products and different types of 
stakeholders. It has also significantly increased our understanding of the drivers of irrigator 
planned adaptation behaviour. 
MDB irrigators will have to adapt to a likely drier and more volatile future, drawing on a 
range of adaptation strategies, including expansive, accommodating and contractive ones. 




management by employing all possible drivers for future adaptation, instead of distributing 
ad hoc financial support and relying on policies which disincentivise private risk 
management. Water markets have a large role to play: with increasing diversity of water 
market stakeholders and tradeable products, including derivative type temporary products, 
risk management through water trading becomes increasingly powerful and effective. This 
thesis showed that utilising water entitlement ownership strategies and drawing on the full 
gamut of new water trading products is currently largely limited to a few agri-corporates and 
non-landholder financial investors. Water market reform and policy needs to enable and 
support all water market participants to benefit from these improved risk management 
options, while also safeguarding against market failure, adverse third-party impacts, conflict 
of interest, and unethical behaviour. With water entitlements increasingly becoming a 
valuable financial asset, water accounting and valuation practices need to be transparent and 
reflect the real value of water, in order to enable equal access to credit and mortgaging for all 
water holders. 
By considering these topics, related policy programmes and future water market trading rules 
and regulations can achieve more equitable outcomes and contribute to a fair and efficient 






Appendix A Supplementary material for Chapter 3 
Table A.1 Allowable direction of water trades in the southern-connected Murray–
Darling Basin 
MDB Valley  Water Trading Zones  Transfers may be 
made to these trading 
zones…  
Transfers may be 
made from these 
trading zones…  
Goulburn  Trading Zone 1  
Greater Goulburn (includes Lake 
Eildon to Goulburn Weir;  
Goulburn irrigation areas; and  
Loddon weir pool)  
3, 6, 6B, 7, 10, 11, 12 
back trade only: 4A, 
4C, 5A, 13, 14*  
4A, 4C, 5A  
back trade only: 3, 6**,  
6B, 7, 10**, 11, 12, 13,  
14*  
Goulburn  Trading Zone 3  
Lower Goulburn (includes  
Goulburn River below Goulburn 
Weir)  
6, 7, 10, 11, 12  
back trade only: 1, 4A, 
4C, 5A, 6B, 13, 14*  
1, 4A, 4C, 5A  
back trade only: 6**, 
6B, 7, 10**, 11, 12, 13, 
14*  
Campaspe  Trading Zone 4A  
Campaspe (includes Lake  
Eppalock to Waranga Western 
Channel; and Campaspe District)  
1, 3, 4C, 6, 6B, 7, 10, 
11,  
12  




back trade only: 1, 3, 
5A,  
6**, 6B, 7, 10**, 11, 
12,  
13, 14*  
Campaspe  Trading Zone 4C  
Lower Campaspe (includes lower 
Campaspe River from  
Waranga Western Channel to  
Murray River)  
1, 3, 4A, 6, 6B, 7, 10, 
11,  
12  
back trade only: 5A, 
13,  
14*  
1, 4A, 5A  
back trade only: 3, 6**,  
6B, 7, 10**, 11, 12, 13,  
14*  
Loddon  Trading Zone 5A  
Part Loddon (includes Loddon  
River and Tullaroop Creek; from 
Cairn Curran and Tullaroop reservoirs 
to Loddon Weir; and Serpentine Creek 
system above Bears Lagoon)  
(conditional) 1, 3, 6, 
6B, 7, 10, 11, 12  
back trade only: 13, 
14*  
back trade only: 1, 3, 
6**, 6B, 7, 10**, 11, 
12, 13, 14*  
Vic Murray  Trading Zone 6  
Vic Murray above Barmah Choke** 
(includes River Murray from Lake 
Hume to Barmah Choke; Mitta Mitta 
River below Lake Dartmouth; and 
Murray Valley area)  
10 back trade only**: 
1, 3, 4A, 4C, 5A, 6B, 7, 
11, 12, 13, 14*  
1, 3, 4A, 4C, 5A, 6B, 7, 
10, 11, 12, 13  
Vic Murray  Trading Zone 6B  
Lower Broken Creek (includes  
Broken Creek downstream of  
Katamatite)  
6, 7, 10, 11, 12  
back trade only: 1, 3, 
4A,  
4C, 5A, 13, 14*  
1, 4A, 4C, 5A  
back trade only: 3, 6**, 
7, 10**, 11, 12, 13, 14*  
Vic Murray  Trading Zone 7  
Vic Murray from Barmah Choke to 
SA Border (includes  
Torrumbarry area, Tresco, Nyah, 
Robinvale, Red Cliffs, Merbein and 
FMIT irrigation districts)  
6, 10, 11, 12  
back trade only: 1, 3, 
4A,  
4C, 5A, 6B, 13, 14*  
1, 3, 4A, 4C, 5A, 6B, 
11, 12, 13  
back trade only**: 6, 
10  
NSW Murray  Trading Zone 10  
NSW Murray above Barmah Choke 
(includes River Murray from Lake 
Hume to Barmah Choke; and Murray 
Irrigation Ltd areas, including Wakool  
Irrigation District)  
6  
back trade only**: 1, 3,  
4A, 4C, 5A, 6B, 7, 11, 
12, 13, 14*  
1, 3, 4A, 4C, 5A, 6, 6B, 




MDB Valley  Water Trading Zones  Transfers may be 
made to these trading 
zones…  
Transfers may be 
made from these 
trading zones…  
NSW Murray  Trading Zone 11  
NSW Murray below Barmah Choke 
(includes River Murray from Barmah 
Choke to SA border (including the 
Edwards / Wakool system and the 
Western Murray Irrigation District))  
6, 7, 10, 12  
back trade only: 1, 3, 
4A,  
4C, 5A, 6B, 13, 14*  
1, 3, 4A, 4C, 5A, 6B, 7, 
12, 13  
back trade only**: 6, 
10  
SA Murray  Trading Zone 12  
South Australian Murray***  
(includes River Murray in SA and 
Trust districts)  
6, 7, 10, 11  
back trade only: 1, 3, 
4A,  
4C, 5A, 6B, 13, 14*  
1, 3, 4A, 4C, 5A, 6B, 7, 
11, 13  
back trade only**: 6, 
10  
Murrumbidgee  Trading Zone 13  
Murrumbidgee (including  
Murrumbidgee Irrigation and  
Colleambally Irrigation areas; 
Murrumbidgee and Tumut below 
Burrinjuck and Blowering reservoirs 
(including Yanko, Colombo and 
Billabong Creek  
systems))  
6, 7, 10, 11, 12  
back trade only: 1, 3, 
4A,  
4C, 5A, 6B, 14*  
back trade only: 1, 3, 
4A,  
4C, 5A, 6**, 6B, 7, 
10**,  
11, 12, 14*  
Lower Darling  Trading Zone 14  
Lower Darling* (includes  
Menindee Lakes and the Darling River 
downstream of the Menindee Lakes)  
back trade only: 1, 3, 
4A,  
4C, 5A, 6B, 13, 4A, 
4C, 5A, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12  
back trade only: 1, 3, 
4A,  
4C, 5A, 6**, 6B, 7, 
10**,  
11, 12, 13  
Note* Trade to and from the Lower Darling is subject to section 11 (of the Permissible Transfer between Trading Zones protocol  
Note** Trade through the Barmah Choke is subject to sections 7 to 10 (of the Permissible Transfer between Trading Zones protocol  
Note*** South Australia is divided into four ‘cap valleys.’ The three cap valleys from and to which water entitlements and water allocations 
may be transferred are: 
(a) SA Country Towns 
(b) SA Reclaimed Swamps 
(c) SA All Other Purposes. 
Interstate trade also occurs in the northern Basin between the New South Wales and Queensland Border Rivers. Please click here for more 
information on trade in this region. 
Backtrade:  
Section 5 (Definitions) of the Permissible Transfer between Trading Zones Protocol define backtrade as: 
‘A transfer from one trading zone to another trading zone, being a transfer that is no greater in volume than the net volume of preceding 
transfers between the same trading in the opposite direction and the volume available in the relevant valley account.’ 
Section 6 (2) (Restrictions on Transfers) of the Permissible Transfer between Trading Zones Protocol specify that if: 
(a) a trading zone specified in column 2 of an item in the table is identified as ‘back trade only’ then a person may transfer an 
entitlement (by exchange rate but not by tag trade) or allocation, into the trading zone only from the trading zone described in 
column 1 of the item by back trade 
(b) a trading zone specified in column 3 of an item in the table is identified as ‘back trade only’ then a person may transfer an 
entitlement (by exchange rate but not by tag trade) or allocation, only from the trading zone into the trading zone described in 
column 1 of the item by back trade. 





Figure A.1 Interstate trading zones in the northern MDB 
 





Figure A.2 Interstate trading zones in the southern-connected MDB 
 




Figure A.3 Processing time for water allocation trades in VIC 
 





Figure A.5 Processing time for water allocation trades in SA 
 





Figure A.6 Processing time for water entitlement trades in NSW 
 





Figure A.8 Processing time for water entitlement trades in SA 
 




Figure A.9 CEWH unused water allocation trade under the Water Act 
 





Figure A.10 CEWH water allocation trade to fund environmental activities under the 
Water Act 
 













B.1 Initial recruitment email to known SA participant 
 
Dear Mr/Ms …….., 
My name is Constantin Seidl and I am a PhD student with the Centre for Global Food and 
Resources at the University of Adelaide. As part of my research, I am looking for a wide 
range of stakeholders willing to be interviewed about their engagement and experiences with 
ownership of water entitlements in the Murray-Darling Basin. 
This research will explore stakeholders’ perceptions and practices around the topics of water 
risk, water value and water management. It will investigate the motives of Environmental 
Water Holders and Investors to own and trade water, and their water managing practices. I 
am also interested in the finance industry’s and property valuers’ practices around valuing 
water entitlements. For more detailed information about the research project, please refer to 
the participant information sheet. 
You have been invited to be interviewed based on your position, knowledge and experience 
in the water sector. 
If you are willing to be interviewed, please reply to this email. Interviews will take place at 
your work at a convenient time and date to yourself within the next few weeks, and take 
about 30-40 minutes. Further information about the research is attached. If this research is not 
directly relevant to your current field of work, I would be grateful if you could kindly 
forward this email to others in your organisation who have relevant expertise and might be 
interested in participating. 
If you have any questions, you are very welcome to contact me or my PhD supervisors Prof 
Sarah Wheeler (sarah.wheeler@adelaide.edu.au), Dr Adam Loch 
(adam.loch@adelaide.edu.au) and Dr Alec Zuo (alec.zuo@adelaide.edu.au). 







B.2 Initial recruitment email to unknown SA participant 
 
To whom it may concern, 
My name is Constantin Seidl and I am a PhD student with the Centre for Global Food and 
Resources at the University of Adelaide. As part of my research, I am looking for a wide 
range of stakeholders willing to be interviewed about their engagement and experiences with 
ownership of water entitlements in the Murray-Darling Basin. 
This research will explore stakeholders’ perceptions and practices around the topics of water 
risk, water value and water management. It will investigate the motives of Environmental 
Water Holders and Investors to own and trade water, and their water managing practices. I 
am also interested in the finance industry’s and property valuers’ practices around valuing 
water entitlements. For more detailed information about the research project, please refer to 
the participant information sheet. 
This email is addressed to the person(s) in your organisation directly involved and most 
familiar with the water sector. 
If you would describe yourself with these attributes and are willing to be interviewed, please 
reply to this email. Interviews will take place at your work at a convenient time and date to 
yourself within the next few weeks, and take about 30-40 minutes. Further information about 
the research is attached. If this research is not directly relevant to your current field of work, I 
would be grateful if you could kindly forward this email to others in your organisation who 
have relevant expertise and might be interested in participating. 
If you have any questions, you are very welcome to contact me or my PhD supervisors Prof 
Sarah Wheeler (sarah.wheeler@adelaide.edu.au), Dr Adam Loch 
(adam.loch@adelaide.edu.au) and Dr Alec Zuo (alec.zuo@adelaide.edu.au). 







B.3 Initial recruitment email to known non-SA participant 
 
Dear Mr/Ms …….., 
My name is Constantin Seidl and I am a PhD student with the Centre for Global Food and 
Resources at the University of Adelaide. As part of my research, I am looking for a wide 
range of stakeholders willing to be interviewed about their engagement and experiences with 
ownership of water entitlements in the Murray-Darling Basin. 
This research will explore stakeholders’ perceptions and practices around the topics of water 
risk, water value and water management. It will investigate the motives of Environmental 
Water Holders, large-scale Irrigators and Investors to own and trade water, and their water 
managing practices. I am also interested in the finance industry’s and property valuers’ 
practices around valuing water entitlements. For more detailed information about the research 
project, please refer to the participant information sheet. 
You have been invited to be interviewed based on your position, knowledge and experience 
in the water sector. 
If you are willing to be interviewed, please reply to this email. Interviews will take place at 
your work or via telephone at a convenient time and date to yourself from the 28/05/2018 
onwards, and take about 30-40 minutes. Further information about the research is are 
attached. If this research is not directly relevant to your current field of work, I would be 
grateful if you could kindly forward this email to others in your organisation who have 
relevant expertise and might be interested in participating. 
If you have any questions, you are very welcome to contact me or my PhD supervisors Prof 
Sarah Wheeler (sarah.wheeler@adelaide.edu.au), Dr Adam Loch 
(adam.loch@adelaide.edu.au) and Dr Alec Zuo (alec.zuo@adelaide.edu.au). 







B.4 Initial recruitment email to unknown non-SA participant 
 
To whom it may concern, 
My name is Constantin Seidl and I am a PhD student with the Centre for Global Food and 
Resources at the University of Adelaide. As part of my research, I am looking for a wide 
range of stakeholders willing to be interviewed about their engagement and experiences with 
ownership of water entitlements in the Murray-Darling Basin. 
This research will explore stakeholders’ perceptions and practices around the topics of water 
risk, water value and water management. It will investigate the motives of Environmental 
Water Holders and Investors to own and trade water, and their water managing practices. I 
am also interested in the finance industry’s and property valuers’ practices around valuing 
water entitlements. For more detailed information about the research project, please refer to 
the participant information sheet. 
This email is addressed to the person(s) in your organisation directly involved and most 
familiar with the water sector. 
If you would describe yourself with these attributes and are willing to be interviewed, please 
reply to this email. Interviews will take place at your work or via telephone at a convenient 
time and date to yourself within the next few weeks, and take about 30-40 minutes. Further 
information about the research is attached. If this research is not directly relevant to your 
current field of work, I would be grateful if you could kindly forward this email to others in 
your organisation who have relevant expertise and might be interested in participating. 
If you have any questions, you are very welcome to contact me or my PhD supervisors Prof 
Sarah Wheeler (sarah.wheeler@adelaide.edu.au), Dr Adam Loch 
(adam.loch@adelaide.edu.au) and Dr Alec Zuo (alec.zuo@adelaide.edu.au). 







B.5 Participant information sheet 
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
PROJECT TITLE: 
Investigating different water risk management perspectives in the Murray-
Darling Basin: Irrigators, Environmental Water Holders and Investors  
HUMAN RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE APPROVAL NUMBER: 
H-2017-192 
PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR: Prof. Sarah Ann Wheeler  
STUDENT RESEARCHER: Constantin Seidl 
STUDENT’S DEGREE: PhD 
Dear Participant, 
You are invited to participate in the research project described below. 
What is the project about? 
The research will explore Environmental Water Holders’ (EWH) and (financial/corporate) investors’ 
water holdings in the southern Murray-Darling Basin (sMDB) under the premise of different water 
value and water risk perceptions. It will investigate the motives of EWHs and Investors to own water, 
their water holding management strategies and their water trading goals. It will also explore potential 
barriers and difficulties faces by EWHs and Investors in managing and using their water holdings. 
Additionally, this research will investigate different water valuation practices employed by a range of 
entities, such as banks, and property and land valuers. This study will contribute to a better 
understanding of water market functionality and could lead to policy recommendations for water market 
reform to better incorporate non-irrigator stakeholders. 
Who is undertaking the project? 
This research is part of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy for Constantin Seidl, under the 
supervision of Prof. Sarah Ann Wheeler, Dr. Adam Loch and Dr. Alec Zuo in the Centre for 
Global Food and Resources, the University of Adelaide. The PhD research is made possible 
under the University of Adelaide Wildcard Scholarship, granted by the University of 
Adelaide. 
Why am I being invited to participate? 
We are conducting research on non-irrigator water holdings in the sMDB to understand how 
EWHs and Investors manage their water, the associated risks and contingencies. 
Additionally, we are investigating the processes and practices commonly used to value water 
in a financial/accounting context. You have been selected for interview based on your 
capacity to provide us with better information on strategic goals for water investment, water 
portfolio management issues, water valuation, and water value and water risk perceptions of 
non-irrigator stakeholders. 
What will I be asked to do? 
You are invited to participate in an interview. You will be asked questions about your 
organisation’s water holdings and related (strategic) goals and barriers, your view on risk and 
value of water as an asset, and rationales for water trading and water investment. This activity 




during interview. Your identity will be kept confidential. Any statement you made will not be 
attributed to you. The interview will be transcribed and sent to you, should you request to see 
your transcript  
How much time will the project take? 
Interviews will be about 30-40 minutes. If you want to devote more time, interviews can be extended 
beyond the 40 minute mark. 
 
Are there any risks associated with participating in this project? 
All the information will be kept confidential. The small number of potential respondents 
means that it may be possible that you could be identified from your answers to our 
questions. However, we will take all possible care to ensure your confidentiality. The only 
cost to you will be the time it takes to complete the interview you were asked to participate. 
What are the benefits of the research project? 
The research might assist MDB policy makers to better understand and subsequently change/reduce 
water market barriers specific to EWHs and Investors. It could also potentially reduce distrust of other 
market participants towards EWHs and Investors and therefore lead to a more favourable starting point 
for potential future interactions with these participants. 
Can I withdraw from the project? 
Participation in this project is completely voluntary. If you agree to participate, you can 
withdraw from the interview at any time. You will not be penalised in any way, nor will the 
choice to withdraw be used against you in any way. 
What will happen to my information? 
Only the project supervisors and research student associated with this research project will 
have access to participant data during the collection, recruitment phase and data analysis 
phase. Only statistics and analytical results will be released publicly. Interview data will be 
anonymised and only excerpts directly quoted, for illustrative purposes, to provide the highest 
level of anonymity for participants.  
 
The project outcomes will be made publicly accessible through a PhD thesis and journal 
articles. All records and materials will be held by principal supervisor (Prof. Sarah Ann 
Wheeler) at Centre for Global Food and Resources, Faculty of Profession, the University of 
Adelaide in a password protected computer for at least 5 years, consistent with the Australian 
code for Responsible Conduct of Research. 
Who do I contact if I have questions about the project? 
1. Prof. Sarah Ann Wheeler, Centre for Global Food and Resources, the University of 
Adelaide. 
Phone: +61 8 8313 9130 
e-Mail: sarah.wheeler@adelaide.edu.au 
2. Dr. Adam Loch, Centre for Global Food and Resources, the University of Adelaide. 
Phone: +61 8 8313 9131 
e-Mail: adam.loch@adelaide.edu.au 
3. Dr. Alec Zuo, Centre for global Food and Resources, The University of Adelaide. 





4. Constantin Seidl, Centre for Global Food and Resources, The University of Adelaide. 
Phone: +61 8 8313 0490 
e-Mail: constantin.seidl@adelaide.edu.au 
 
What if I have a complaint or any concerns? 
The study has been approved by the Human Research Ethics Committee at the University of 
Adelaide (approval number H-2017-192). If you have questions or problems associated with 
the practical aspects of your participation in the project, or wish to raise a concern or 
complaint about the project, then you should consult the Principal Investigator. If you wish to 
speak with an independent person regarding a concern or complaint, the University’s policy 
on research involving human participants, or your rights as a participant, please contact the 
Human Research Ethics Committee’s Secretariat on:  
Phone:  +61 8 8313 6028  
Email: hrec@adelaide.edu.au  
Post: Level 4, Rundle Mall Plaza, 50 Rundle Mall, ADELAIDE SA 5000  
Any complaint or concern will be treated in confidence and fully investigated. You will be informed of 
the outcome. 
If I want to participate, what do I do? 
Please read the participant information sheet and consent form carefully. If you accept the 
condition defined in these forms, please sign and return the consent form to the student 
researcher or interviewer, then the research activity will commence. If you participate by 
phone, the consent form will be read out to you before the interview. You can then verbally 
give your consent (voice-recorded) to participate. Finally, if you respond to questions asked 
via email, you give consent to be involved in this research. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
Prof. Sarah Ann Wheeler 
Dr. Adam Loch 






B.6 Follow-up and scheduling email for SA participant 
 
Dear …….., 
Thank you so much for generously volunteering your time to be interviewed.  
I would suggest these times in the week starting …………….. for conducting the interview, 
but I am also flexible if a different arrangement is more suitable.  
Could you please mark in the table which slot works the best for you: 
 Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday 
9.00 -10.00      
11.00 – 12.00      
14.00-15.00      
16.00-17.00      
 
 
Could you also kindly fill out the consent form (attached) and have it with you for the 
interview? 
I would be grateful if you could kindly forward the information about this research to 
members of your professional network in other organisations who have relevant expertise and 
might be interested in participating. 







B.7 Follow-up and scheduling email for non-SA participant 
 
Dear …….., 
Thank you so much for generously volunteering your time to be interviewed.  
I would suggest these times in the week starting …………….. for conducting the interview, 
but I am also flexible if a different arrangement is more suitable.  
Could you please mark in the table which slot works the best for you: 
 Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday 
9.00 -10.00      
11.30 – 12.30      
15.00-16.00      
 
 
Could you also kindly fill out the consent form (attached) and have it with you for the 
interview? 
I would be grateful if you could kindly forward the information about this research to 
members of your professional network in other organisations who have relevant expertise and 
might be interested in participating. 







B.8 Interview participant consent form 
 
Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) 
CONSENT FORM 
1. I have read the attached Information Sheet and agree to take part in the following research 
project: 
Title: Investigating different water risk management perspectives in the Murray-Darling 




2. I have had the project, so far as it affects me, fully explained to my satisfaction by the research 
worker. My consent is given freely. 
3. Although I understand the purpose of the research project it has also been explained that 
involvement may not be of any benefit to me. 
4. I have been informed that, while information gained during the study may be published, I will not 
be identified and my personal results will not be divulged. 
5. I understand that I am free to withdraw from the project at any time. 
6. I agree to the interview being audio recorded.  Yes  No  
7. I am aware that I should keep a copy of this Consent Form, when completed, and the attached 
Information Sheet. 
Participant to complete: 
Name:  _____________________ Signature: _______________________  Date: __________  
Researcher/Witness to complete: 
I have described the nature of the research to _______________________________________  
  (print name of participant) 
and in my opinion she/he understood the explanation. 








This research will explore stakeholders’ perceptions, views and practices around the topics of water 
risk, water value and water management. It will investigate the motives of EWHs and Investors to 
own and trade water, and their water managing practices. We are also interested in the finance 
industry’s and property valuers’ stance and practices around attaching financial value to water 
entitlements. 
This interview will contain questions around the value of water. In this instance, water value means, 
but is not limited to mean, financial monetary value. Other questions will explore water valuation 
practices and methods. These target the processes employed by stakeholders to attribute a financial 
monetary value to a water entitlement.  
This study will contribute to a better understanding of water market functionality and water value 
for a range of stakeholders. It could lead to policy recommendations for water market reform to 
better incorporate non-irrigator stakeholders reflecting their particular take on water value. 
 




Could you please answer the questions below? This is completely voluntary. 
 
How long have you been working in your current position for your current organisation?  
__________________________years 
 
Have you previously been working in a similar position for a different organisation? 
☐ Yes                                                                                                                   ☐No 









1. Do you own any Murray-Darling Basin water entitlements?  
a. Do you own water entitlements outside of the Murray-Darling Basin? 
2. When and why did you first obtain a water entitlement? 
a. Do you own water entitlements with different security in different regions? 
b. What are the reasons for owning this mix of water entitlements? 
3. In a normal year, how do you use the seasonal allocations associated with your water 
entitlements? 
4. What is the legal structure of the entity that holds your water entitlements? 
5. How do you value a specific water entitlement? 
6. Do you use carry-over? 
7. In your view, what risks are associated with water entitlements? 
a. What benefits are associated with water entitlements? 
8. Do you view water entitlements primarily as an asset? 
a. How do water entitlements compare to other assets? 
9. Are there barriers/difficulties you face in trading, using or managing your water? 
10. What are the strengths of the water market for you? 
a. What are the weaknesses of the water market for you? 
11. Do you plan to hold more or less water entitlements, or water entitlements with 
different reliability (ML) in 5 years and why? 
12. How do you expect climate change to impact your entitlement portfolio? 
13. Are you aware of the FOUR CORNERS report from July 2017, alleging water theft 
and Basin plan non-compliance? 
a. Did these events influence the way you think about the security of your 
water/water portfolio? 
14. If you could change one administrative arrangement or piece of legislation regarding 
water issues, what would it be?  




B.11 Interview questions for banks, property evaluators and water brokers 
Interview response sheet (Valuers) 
 
1. What method do you use to value water entitlements? 
a. Do you value water differently depending on the type and security of the 
water entitlement (surface, ground, regulated, unregulated, etc.)? Does 
the method change? 
b. Have you ever changed the method you use to value water? When and 
why? 
2. Do you know any fees associated with water entitlements and their allocations? 
Which? 
a.  Do you use any of these fees in your assessment of water entitlement values? 
How? 
3. How do allocations influence your valuation of a water entitlement?  
4. Does carry-over capacity policy factor in your estimation of water entitlement values? 
5.  In your view, what risks are associated with water entitlements? 
a. What are benefits associated with water entitlements? 
6. Do you view water entitlements primarily as an asset? 
a. How do water entitlements compare to other assets? 
7. Did the separation of water from land affected water and farmland value? How? 
8. Are there barriers/difficulties you face in trying to value a water entitlement? 
9. Does the risk of climate change affect your valuations of water entitlements? 
a. Has climate change changed the way you value water? 
10. Do you expect the practices of valuing water to change in the near to medium future 
(5-10 years)? Why/how? 
11. Are you aware of the FOUR CORNERS report from July 2017, alleging water 
theft and Basin plan non-compliance?  
a. Did these events effect the value of water entitlements?  
b. Has it changed your approach to valuing water? 
12. If you could change one administrative arrangement or piece of legislation 
regarding water issues, what would it be?  





Appendix C Supplementary material for Chapter 5 
Table C.1 Irrigation adaptation measures in the MDB 
Type Strategy Specifics 
Information 
• Utilise a variety of information to 
predict risk of water scarcity for the 
season, through a) utilising historic 
records of inflows and allocations, 
and b) utilising Southern Oscillation 
Index data and a range of climate 
projections for rainfall and 
evaporation predictions 
• Utilise water trade information to 
understand intra-seasonal trade prices 
& demand 
• Provides better predictions about risk of crop failure, whether to 
plant or trade water for the season 




• Can sell/buy water allocations/entitlement at the point in the intra-
season where private gains are maximised 
Trade • Utilise alternative water market 
products such as options, entitlement 
leasing 
• Buy (or sell) more water allocations 
and/or entitlements 
• Carry-over 
• Helps to even out price hikes, provides more certainty about prices 
and returns over the medium term  
• Swap lower security entitlements for higher security entitlements. 
Make greater use of resources not yet fully allocated or subject to 
restrictions (such as groundwater) 
• Adopt carry-over techniques (where available) and buy water 
allocations when cheaper to carry-over 




• Increase (or decrease) irrigated areas 
(e.g. irrigate a larger section and 
improve input efficiency or only 
irrigate part of an area) 
 
• Dry-land practices 
• Larger enterprises provide a number of benefits in terms of 
business scale – can build greater flexibility & capacity to respond 
more quickly to changed conditions or volatility. Shift growing 
areas to southern locations (e.g. viticulture to Tasmania) 
• If production is limited by available water supply, irrigators may 
need to abandon the idea that production can be maximised on 
individual paddocks. It is likely that optimal farm performance in 
irrigated settings will be arrived at by sub-optimal paddock 
performance & spreading the water where land is abundant 
• Learn & implement dry-land practices (such as stubble retention 
and/or supplementary feed for livestock) because future farming 
with less water is less likely to focus on purely irrigated practices 
Farm 
structure 
• Increase off-farm work 
• Portfolio management 
 
 
• Develop ownership structures to 
better manage risk  
• Reduce risk associated with one source of income 
• Optimise responsiveness to water availability, such as growing a 
mix of permanent and annual plantings. Put mechanisms in place to 
share or transfer risk to others. 
• Includes further consolidation, possibly at an accelerating rate, to 
larger, better capitalized family enterprises or corporate structure 
agricultural enterprises. Establish succession early on for the farm.  
• Longer-term supply contracts with key purchasers 
Agronomy • Change basic agronomy and 
management farm practices 
• Different crop mixes; precision agriculture; short rotation and 
pasture-spelling regimes; row configuration; diversify production; 
varieties, planting dates/times, irrigation, fertilizer regimes; soil 
management practices, substitute pasture for bought feed; fallow 
production area; shift timing of livestock reproduction; focus on 
more water flexible & annual/semi-annual crops; minimum/no-
tillage; crop cover; and use deficit irrigation when needed 
Infrastructure • Adopt more efficient irrigation water 
infrastructure 
 
• Improve irrigation management 
•  Install automatic bay gates, drip irrigation, laser grade paddocks, 
update reuse system, recycling system, solar energy use, on-farm 
water storage 
• Improve irrigation scheduling, soil moisture monitoring, decrease 
furrow lengths; crop protection treatments (greenhouse, polytunnel, 
solar radiation shading and evaporative cooling) 
Environment • Employ sustainable practices  • Plant trees, crop cover, improve soil management, adopt 
conservation tillage, grade banks; improve sediment runoff via 
grassed waterways and erosion control structures; wetland creation; 
reduce carrying capacity  





Table C.2 Tetrachoric correlations between individual planned adaptation strategies 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 95) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) 
(1) purchase water allocations 1.00                   
(2) purchase water entitlements 0.67 1.00                  
(3) purchase any farmland near current properties 0.46 0.52 1.00                 
(4) purchase any farmland in different regions 0.39 0.43 0.65 1.00                
(5) improve the efficiency of irrigation infrastructure 0.47 0.42 0.50 0.25 1.00               
(6) increase irrigated area 0.40 0.49 0.51 0.22 0.58 1.00              
(7) change ownership structures 0.11 0.16 0.25 0.22 0.12 0.15 1.00             
(8) changed irrigated production 0.39 0.33 0.36 0.33 0.53 0.47 0.20 1.00            
(9) diversify production 0.27 0.29 0.34 0.41 0.45 0.34 0.24 0.65 1.00           
(10) increase farm insurance 0.31 0.29 0.38 0.27 0.38 0.33 0.18 0.32 0.33 1.00          




0.05 0.11 0.32 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.16 1.00         
(12) increase any collective bargaining with other farmers 0.34 0.34 0.27 0.43 0.26 0.31 0.10 0.38 0.30 0.30 0.17 1.00        
(13) increase area of dryland production 0.26 0.14 0.44 0.53 0.30 0.20 0.17 0.39 0.37 0.30 0.01 0.28 1.00       
(14) utilise solar-power for irrigation 0.28 0.31 0.31 0.22 0.36 0.29 0.08 0.26 0.32 0.22 0.10 0.29 0.10 1.00      






















0.04 1.00     


















0.16 0.33 1.00    


















0.06 0.10 0.17 1.00   




















0.11 0.36 0.37 0.40 1.00  



























Table C.3 Planned adaptation indices correlations 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
(1) Planned expansive adaptation index 1.00 
(2) Planned accommodating adaptation index 0.53 1.00 




Table C.4 Pairwise correlation of full model independent variables 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
(1) Farm debt 1.00           
(2) Farm debt squared 0.97 1.00          
(3) Farmland value 0.61 0.61 1.00         
(4) Farmland value squared 0.60 0.61 0.98 1.00        
(5) Net farm income 0.35 0.36 0.53 0.52 1.00       
(6) Net farm income squared 0.37 0.38 0.51 0.52 0.97 1.00      
(7) Number of insurances 0.32 0.30 0.39 0.38 0.29 0.27 1.00     
(8) Off farm income -0.25 -0.22 -0.28 -0.23 -0.22 -0.17 -0.11 1.00    
(9) Productivity change 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.12 0.18 0.16 0.11 -0.12 1.00   
(10) Received irrigation grant 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.11 0.11 0.10 -0.10 0.17 1.00  
(11) Climate change risk perception 0.08 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.14 0.13 0.02 -0.01 0.05 0.08 1.00 
(12) Age -0.30 -0.26 -0.17 -0.16 -0.15 -0.15 -0.23 0.08 -0.09 -0.11 -0.12 
(13) Age squared -0.30 -0.26 -0.17 -0.15 -0.15 -0.15 -0.24 0.08 -0.09 -0.10 -0.12 
(14) Low education -0.07 -0.05 -0.07 -0.05 -0.07 -0.06 -0.12 0.04 -0.12 -0.07 -0.15 
(15) Male gender -0.02 -0.02 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 
(16) Marital status 0.11 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.09 0.08 0.17 0.04 0.07 0.02 -0.04 
(17) Number of Children 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.06 -0.05 0.05 0.05 -0.04 
(18) Succession 0.23 0.21 0.32 0.31 0.22 0.19 0.15 -0.18 0.13 0.09 -0.08 
(19) Risk Taker 0.18 0.18 0.14 0.14 0.10 0.10 0.09 -0.09 0.10 0.05 -0.10 
(20) Whole of farm plan 0.20 0.18 0.16 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.19 -0.17 0.11 0.11 0.04 
(21) Plans for climate change on farm 0.18 0.16 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.12 -0.09 0.13 0.08 0.50 
(22) Average historic pan evaporation -0.10 -0.10 -0.20 -0.16 -0.11 -0.09 -0.02 0.06 -0.03 -0.04 0.02 
(23) Average historic rainfall 0.11 0.10 0.27 0.23 0.13 0.11 0.10 -0.05 0.01 -0.06 0.02 
(24) Average historic temperature -0.07 -0.07 -0.19 -0.14 -0.08 -0.06 0.02 0.05 -0.01 0.03 -0.02 
(25) Average historic water allocation 
factor 
-0.16 -0.16 -0.22 -0.21 -0.15 -0.13 -0.11 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.02 
(26) Millennium Drought dummy -0.07 -0.06 -0.09 -0.09 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 0.02 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 
(27) Historic net rainfall 0.11 0.11 0.24 0.20 0.12 0.10 0.04 -0.06 0.02 0.01 -0.01 
(28) State -0.17 -0.16 -0.24 -0.22 -0.15 -0.13 -0.23 0.13 0.09 0.11 0.01 
(29) Historic temperature volatility 0.13 0.13 0.19 0.15 0.12 0.09 0.16 -0.12 -0.09 -0.07 -0.01 
(30) Application rate -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.06 -0.03 -0.05 -0.01 0.04 
(31) Broadacre 0.16 0.15 0.23 0.22 0.19 0.16 0.22 -0.06 -0.04 0.08 0.00 
(32) Carry-over use between 2014-2016 0.12 0.13 0.20 0.17 0.19 0.17 0.14 -0.09 0.00 0.03 0.04 
(33) Dairy 0.23 0.21 0.14 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.01 -0.19 0.07 0.02 0.00 
(34) Farm Size 0.19 0.20 0.37 0.39 0.29 0.29 0.23 -0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(35) Livestock -0.20 -0.18 0.00 0.00 -0.09 -0.08 -0.08 0.11 -0.13 -0.13 -0.08 
(36) Majority of farm area under drainage 0.22 0.23 0.18 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.10 -0.11 -0.01 0.11 0.02 
(37) Majority of farm area under drip 
irrigation 
-0.06 -0.07 -0.17 -0.15 -0.10 -0.08 -0.04 0.05 0.11 0.07 0.06 
(38) Number of employees 0.33 0.34 0.37 0.37 0.29 0.30 0.18 -0.12 0.17 0.13 0.03 
(39) Excess water -0.10 -0.10 -0.08 -0.07 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 0.09 0.03 -0.04 0.04 
(40) Water ownership 0.28 0.28 0.36 0.32 0.32 0.29 0.23 -0.24 0.02 0.15 0.04 




Variables (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) 
(1) Farm debt            
(2) Farm debt squared            
(3) Farmland value            
(4) Farmland value squared            
(5) Net farm income            
(6) Net farm income squared            
(7) Number of insurances            
(8) Off farm income            
(9) Productivity change            
(10) Received irrigation grant            
(11) Climate change risk perception            
(12) Age 1.00           
(13) Age squared 0.99 1.00          
(14) Low education 0.29 0.29 1.00         
(15) Male gender 0.05 0.06 0.08 1.00        
(16) Marital status -0.05 -0.07 0.01 0.06 1.00       
(17) Number of Children 0.20 0.19 0.06 -0.04 0.24 1.00      
(18) Succession 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.00 0.06 0.21 1.00     
(19) Risk Taker 0.06 0.08 0.12 0.06 0.04 0.09 0.13 1.00    
(20) Whole of farm plan -0.07 -0.08 -0.05 -0.01 0.07 0.07 0.12 0.13 1.00   
(21) Plans for climate change on farm -0.12 -0.13 -0.12 -0.09 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.03 0.13 1.00  
(22) Average historic pan evaporation -0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 -0.06 0.00 -0.17 0.00 1.00 
(23) Average historic rainfall -0.02 -0.03 -0.05 -0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.15 0.02 -0.60 
(24) Average historic temperature -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.05 -0.18 -0.02 0.71 
(25) Average historic water allocation factor 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.10 0.03 -0.04 -0.10 -0.08 -0.04 -0.04 0.14 
(26) Millennium Drought dummy 0.32 0.27 0.06 0.01 0.08 0.10 0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.01 
(27) Historic net rainfall 0.00 0.00 -0.05 -0.01 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.18 0.01 -0.97 
(28) State 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.03 -0.05 -0.09 -0.06 -0.16 0.01 -0.05 
(29) Historic temperature volatility 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.21 0.01 -0.21 
(30) Application rate 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.01 0.02 -0.06 -0.03 0.05 -0.05 0.03 0.04 
(31) Broadacre -0.05 -0.05 -0.03 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.17 0.06 0.12 -0.01 -0.04 
(32) Carry-over use between 2014-2016 0.02 0.02 -0.06 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.14 0.05 -0.28 
(33) Dairy -0.11 -0.11 -0.04 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.00 0.20 0.06 -0.38 
(34) Farm Size -0.02 -0.02 -0.06 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.16 0.08 -0.01 0.03 0.01 
(35) Livestock 0.19 0.20 0.09 -0.10 -0.11 -0.04 -0.06 -0.02 -0.08 -0.06 -0.19 
(36) Majority of farm area under drainage -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 0.07 0.02 0.06 0.09 0.02 0.27 0.04 -0.31 
(37) Majority of farm area under drip 
irrigation 
-0.04 -0.04 -0.03 0.02 0.08 -0.07 -0.09 -0.02 -0.13 0.07 0.46 
(38) Number of employees -0.13 -0.12 -0.06 -0.01 0.05 0.00 0.14 0.10 0.06 0.03 -0.03 
(39) Excess water 0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.06 0.05 -0.09 -0.11 -0.06 -0.02 -0.01 0.11 
(40) Water ownership -0.07 -0.07 -0.05 0.11 0.02 0.03 0.18 0.05 0.18 0.03 -0.11 




Variables (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) 
(1) Farm debt            
(2) Farm debt squared            
(3) Farmland value            
(4) Farmland value squared            
(5) Net farm income            
(6) Net farm income squared            
(7) Number of insurances            
(8) Off farm income            
(9) Productivity change            
(10) Received irrigation grant            
(11) Climate change risk perception            
(12) Age            
(13) Age squared            
(14) Low education            
(15) Male gender            
(16) Marital status            
(17) Number of Children            
(18) Succession            
(19) Risk Taker            
(20) Whole of farm plan            
(21) Plans for climate change on farm            
(22) Average historic pan evaporation            
(23) Average historic rainfall 1.00           
(24) Average historic temperature -0.72 1.00          
(25) Average historic water allocation factor -0.22 0.12 1.00         
(26) Millennium Drought dummy -0.02 0.01 0.01 1.00        
(27) Historic net rainfall 0.77 -0.78 -0.18 -0.02 1.00       
(28) State -0.29 -0.04 0.18 0.04 -0.04 1.00      
(29) Historic temperature volatility 0.41 -0.25 -0.12 -0.05 0.29 -0.78 1.00     
(30) Application rate -0.04 0.05 -0.02 0.01 -0.05 0.05 -0.05 1.00    
(31) Broadacre 0.13 0.00 -0.23 -0.03 0.07 -0.36 0.27 -0.02 1.00   
(32) Carry-over use between 2014-2016 0.29 -0.31 -0.17 -0.03 0.31 -0.37 0.52 -0.04 0.21 1.00  
(33) Dairy 0.26 -0.44 0.00 -0.03 0.38 0.07 0.18 -0.02 -0.29 0.20 1.00 
(34) Farm Size 0.04 0.10 -0.12 0.00 0.00 -0.22 0.09 -0.01 0.14 0.10 -0.09 
(35) Livestock 0.22 -0.18 -0.14 0.03 0.22 -0.17 0.19 -0.02 -0.33 0.13 -0.26 
(36) Majority of farm area under drainage 0.23 -0.29 -0.15 0.01 0.32 -0.27 0.44 -0.04 0.24 0.36 0.29 
(37) Majority of farm area under drip irrigation -0.45 0.41 0.22 0.01 -0.50 0.41 -0.47 -0.01 -0.27 -0.42 -0.22 
(38) Number of employees 0.05 0.03 -0.02 -0.07 0.04 -0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.03 0.05 
(39) Excess water -0.10 0.12 0.16 0.05 -0.12 0.09 -0.14 -0.02 -0.12 -0.14 -0.15 
(40) Water ownership 0.06 -0.02 0.20 -0.04 0.10 -0.28 0.30 0.07 0.22 0.27 0.13 




Variables (34) (35) (36) (37) (38) (39) (40) (41) 
(1) Farm debt         
(2) Farm debt squared         
(3) Farmland value         
(4) Farmland value squared         
(5) Net farm income         
(6) Net farm income squared         
(7) Number of insurances         
(8) Off farm income         
(9) Productivity change         
(10) Received irrigation grant         
(11) Climate change risk perception         
(12) Age         
(13) Age squared         
(14) Low education         
(15) Male gender         
(16) Marital status         
(17) Number of Children         
(18) Succession         
(19) Risk Taker         
(20) Whole of farm plan         
(21) Plans for climate change on farm         
(22) Average historic pan evaporation         
(23) Average historic rainfall         
(24) Average historic temperature         
(25) Average historic water allocation factor         
(26) Millennium Drought dummy         
(27) Historic net rainfall         
(28) State         
(29) Historic temperature volatility         
(30) Application rate         
(31) Broadacre         
(32) Carry-over use between 2014-2016         
(33) Dairy         
(34) Farm Size 1.00        
(35) Livestock 0.15 1.00       
(36) Majority of farm area under drainage 0.07 0.00 1.00      
(37) Majority of farm area under drip irrigation -0.14 -0.24 -0.36 1.00     
(38) Number of employees 0.18 -0.10 0.03 0.04 1.00    
(39) Excess water -0.03 -0.02 -0.16 0.20 -0.01 1.00   
(40) Water ownership 0.21 -0.10 0.29 -0.15 0.20 -0.01 1.00  




Table C.5 Collinearity diagnostics for the full planned total adaptation index model, 
clustered and unclustered 
 













Age squared 60.77 66.64 65.77 68.19 
Age 60.05 66.32 64.22 67.71 
Farmland value 31.84 32.39 38.67 33.45 
Farmland value squared 29.82 30.5 36.1 30.89 
Farm debt 23.04 22.95 27.64 25.77 
Farm debt squared 22.06 21.52 25.81 24.89 
Net farm income 20.03 19.79 23.62 21.85 
Net farm income squared 18.99 18.67 22.17 21.13 
Climate change risk perception 4.27 4.23 4.7 4.62 
Control function 3.91 3.92 4.27 4.35 
Broadacre 3.69 5.43 3.52 3.13 
Livestock 3.39 4.62 3.62 3.01 
Dairy 3.36 4.7 3.1 2.82 
Majority of farm area under drip irrigation 2.08 1.76 2.06 2.51 
Historic temperature volatility 1.91 1.8 2.24 2.45 
Historic net rainfall 1.92 1.91 2.23 2.18 
Water ownership 1.73 1.59 2.02 2.05 
Carry-over use between 2014-2016 1.58 1.35 1.94 1.96 
Majority of farm area under drainage 1.59 1.5 1.59 1.77 
Number of insurances 1.35 1.36 1.49 1.63 
Number of employees 1.32 1.59 1.33 1.59 
Past index 1.44 1.49 1.68 1.5 
Farm Size 1.37 1.45 1.41 1.46 
Succession 1.27 1.29 1.3 1.43 
Whole of farm plan 1.25 1.28 1.41 1.42 
Off farm income 1.26 1.21 1.59 1.4 
Average historic water allocation factor 1.44 1.49 1.78 1.39 
Low education 1.2 1.3 1.24 1.28 
Application rate 1.19 1.25 1.31 1.27 
Productivity change 1.18 1.23 1.34 1.25 
Excess water 1.13 1.11 1.29 1.24 
Irrigation grant 1.19 1.23 1.36 1.24 
Male gender 1.07 1.12 1.18 1.22 
Mean VIF 9.5 10 10.76 10.43 
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Buy land in 
same 
region 

















Age squared 60.72 60.7 60.68 60.86 60.71 60.78 61.56 60.68 60.72 60.68 
Age 59.86 59.81 59.78 60.02 59.78 59.99 60.8 59.77 59.85 59.77 
Farmland 
value 
31.65 31.65 31.65 31.67 31.66 31.7 31.78 31.64 32 31.83 
Farmland 
value squared 
29.7 29.69 29.78 29.7 29.71 29.76 29.73 29.7 29.99 29.78 
Farm debt 23.13 22.93 23.05 22.88 22.9 22.97 22.88 22.96 22.87 22.88 
Farm debt 
squared 
22.1 22.08 22.04 22.03 21.99 22.01 21.98 22.02 21.98 21.98 
Net farm 
income 




18.87 18.83 18.84 18.83 18.85 18.83 18.86 18.82 18.85 18.82 
Broadacre 3.65 3.65 3.65 3.65 3.67 3.65 3.65 3.65 3.65 3.65 
Livestock 3.38 3.37 3.36 3.36 3.38 3.37 3.36 3.36 3.36 3.36 





2.08 2.07 2.07 2.07 2.07 2.08 2.07 2.08 2.09 2.07 
Historic net 
rainfall 




1.9 1.91 1.9 1.91 1.91 1.9 1.9 1.91 1.9 1.9 
Water 
ownership 














1.44 1.44 1.44 1.45 1.44 1.44 1.44 1.44 1.44 1.44 
Past strategy 1.39 1.23 1.34 1.18 1.27 1.27 1.14 1.19 1.16 1.16 
Farm Size 1.37 1.37 1.37 1.41 1.37 1.37 1.37 1.37 1.37 1.37 
Number of 
insurances 
1.34 1.34 1.33 1.34 1.35 1.33 1.33 1.34 1.34 1.36 
Number of 
employees 
1.31 1.32 1.31 1.31 1.3 1.32 1.31 1.31 1.31 1.3 
Off farm 
income 
1.26 1.27 1.26 1.26 1.26 1.26 1.26 1.27 1.26 1.26 
Succession 1.24 1.24 1.25 1.24 1.24 1.24 1.24 1.24 1.24 1.24 
Whole of 
farm plan 
1.21 1.22 1.21 1.21 1.22 1.22 1.21 1.23 1.22 1.21 
Application 
rate 
1.19 1.19 1.2 1.2 1.19 1.19 1.19 1.19 1.2 1.19 
Productivity 
change 
1.18 1.19 1.19 1.18 1.19 1.22 1.18 1.19 1.19 1.19 
Excess water 1.18 1.13 1.13 1.13 1.14 1.13 1.13 1.13 1.13 1.13 
Low 
education 
1.15 1.15 1.15 1.15 1.15 1.15 1.15 1.15 1.15 1.15 
Irrigation 
grant 




1.09 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.09 
Male gender 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.07 




Table C.7 Collinearity diagnostics for planned individual adaptation strategies index full models, 
table continued 
 
















60.7 60.76 60.68 60.82 60.91 60.8 60.72 60.78 60.88 
Age 
59.78 59.81 59.77 59.92 59.95 59.89 59.81 59.91 59.99 
Farmland 
value 
31.64 31.72 31.7 31.67 31.66 31.67 31.64 31.66 32.3 
Farmland 
value squared 
29.69 29.75 29.79 29.71 29.71 29.72 29.7 29.71 30.08 
Farm debt 
22.95 22.9 23.31 22.87 22.96 22.88 22.89 22.87 22.95 
Farm debt 
squared 
22.05 22.02 22.35 21.98 22.02 21.98 21.99 21.98 22.06 
Net farm 
income 




18.82 18.81 18.82 18.84 18.83 18.83 18.82 18.95 18.82 
Broadacre 
3.66 3.65 3.69 3.66 3.65 3.65 3.65 3.67 3.65 
Livestock 
3.37 3.36 3.4 3.37 3.36 3.36 3.4 3.36 3.36 
Dairy 





2.07 2.07 2.07 2.07 2.07 2.09 2.07 2.08 2.07 
Historic net 
rainfall 




1.9 1.9 1.91 1.91 1.9 1.9 1.91 1.9 1.9 
Water 
ownership 














1.44 1.44 1.44 1.45 1.44 1.45 1.44 1.44 1.44 
Past strategy 
1.05 1.05 1.21 1.06 1.15 1.12 1.19 1.16 1.1 
Farm Size 
1.37 1.37 1.37 1.37 1.37 1.37 1.37 1.37 1.37 
Number of 
insurances 
1.34 1.34 1.34 1.34 1.34 1.33 1.34 1.34 1.34 
Number of 
employees 
1.31 1.3 1.31 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.31 1.3 1.3 
Off farm 
income 
1.26 1.26 1.26 1.26 1.26 1.26 1.26 1.26 1.26 
Succession 
1.24 1.24 1.24 1.24 1.29 1.24 1.24 1.24 1.25 
Whole of 
farm plan 
1.21 1.22 1.21 1.21 1.21 1.21 1.21 1.21 1.21 
Application 
rate 
1.19 1.19 1.19 1.19 1.19 1.2 1.2 1.19 1.19 
Productivity 
change 
1.18 1.18 1.19 1.18 1.21 1.25 1.18 1.18 1.2 
Excess water 
1.13 1.13 1.13 1.13 1.13 1.13 1.14 1.13 1.13 
Low 
education 
1.15 1.15 1.15 1.15 1.16 1.15 1.15 1.15 1.16 
Irrigation 
grant 




1.09 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.1 1.1 1.09 1.09 
Male gender 
1.07 1.07 1.07 1.08 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.07 
Mean VIF 




Table C.8 Collinearity diagnostics for planned expansive adaptation strategies index full 
models, clustered and unclustered 













Age squared 60.77 66.93 65.31 68.03 
Age 60.04 66.9 63.62 67.49 
Farmland value 31.67 32.24 38.22 33.66 
Farmland value squared 29.74 30.41 35.61 31.19 
Farm debt 23.06 23.13 27.64 25.53 
Farm debt squared 22.01 21.53 25.74 24.64 
Net farm income 20.02 19.4 23.65 21.83 
Net farm income squared 18.97 18.44 22 21.14 
Climate change risk perception 4.18 4.13 4.48 4.6 
Control function 3.86 3.88 4.13 4.34 
Broadacre 3.69 5.43 3.52 3.12 
Livestock 3.39 4.62 3.62 3.02 
Dairy 3.37 4.71 3.13 2.83 
Majority of farm area under drip 
irrigation 2.07 1.76 2.06 2.51 
Historic temperature volatility 1.91 1.82 2.27 2.45 
Historic net rainfall 1.91 1.9 2.23 2.17 
Past index 1.78 1.94 1.89 1.91 
Water ownership 1.73 1.59 2.04 2.05 
Carry-over use between 2014-2016 1.6 1.37 1.97 1.96 
Majority of farm area under drainage 1.58 1.5 1.56 1.78 
Average historic water allocation 
factor 1.44 1.53 1.77 1.38 
Farm Size 1.37 1.44 1.41 1.46 
Number of insurances 1.35 1.35 1.5 1.64 
Number of employees 1.33 1.61 1.35 1.6 
Succession 1.27 1.31 1.29 1.4 
Off farm income 1.26 1.21 1.59 1.41 
Whole of farm plan 1.24 1.33 1.33 1.41 
Productivity change 1.2 1.26 1.36 1.27 
Application rate 1.19 1.25 1.31 1.27 
Low education 1.19 1.3 1.23 1.28 
Irrigation grant 1.18 1.23 1.29 1.23 
Excess water 1.16 1.09 1.35 1.25 
Male gender 1.07 1.12 1.19 1.22 




Table C.9 Collinearity diagnostics for planned accommodating adaptation strategies 
index full models, clustered and unclustered 














Age squared 60.79 66.65 65.71 68.15 
Age 60.02 66.29 64.11 67.59 
Farmland value 31.89 32.37 38.36 33.49 
Farmland value squared 29.84 30.49 35.79 30.88 
Farm debt 22.99 22.9 27.71 26.42 
Farm debt squared 22.08 21.52 25.84 25.45 
Net farm income 20.06 19.67 23.68 21.91 
Net farm income squared 19 18.6 22.18 21.18 
Climate change risk perception 4.29 4.29 4.72 4.6 
Control function 3.93 4.02 4.27 4.33 
Broadacre 3.7 5.42 3.51 3.12 
Livestock 3.4 4.62 3.63 3.03 
Dairy 3.36 4.71 3.1 2.81 
Majority of farm area under drip irrigation 2.1 1.76 2.1 2.53 
Historic net rainfall 1.91 1.91 2.22 2.17 
Historic temperature volatility 1.91 1.79 2.24 2.45 
Water ownership 1.73 1.59 2.02 2.07 
Majority of farm area under drainage 1.58 1.51 1.57 1.77 
Carry-over use between 2014-2016 1.58 1.35 1.94 1.97 
Average historic water allocation factor 1.44 1.5 1.77 1.39 
Past index 1.38 1.38 1.61 1.57 
Farm Size 1.37 1.45 1.44 1.45 
Number of insurances 1.37 1.39 1.51 1.64 
Number of employees 1.31 1.58 1.32 1.59 
Succession 1.27 1.32 1.3 1.4 
Off farm income 1.26 1.21 1.61 1.4 
Whole of farm plan 1.23 1.26 1.4 1.39 
Productivity change 1.19 1.24 1.35 1.27 
Application rate 1.19 1.25 1.31 1.27 
Low education 1.19 1.3 1.23 1.28 
Irrigation grant 1.15 1.21 1.29 1.22 
Excess water 1.13 1.1 1.29 1.23 
Male gender 1.07 1.12 1.18 1.22 




Table C.10 Collinearity diagnostics for planned contractive adaptation strategies index 
full models, clustered and unclustered 













Age squared 61 66.69 65.34 68.51 
Age 60.18 66.32 63.68 67.95 
Farmland value 31.74 32.24 38.09 33.68 
Farmland value squared 29.79 30.41 35.69 31.03 
Farm debt 22.95 23.01 27.63 25.17 
Farm debt squared 22.02 21.59 25.76 24.53 
Net farm income 20.06 19.61 23.74 21.83 
Net farm income squared 18.99 18.53 22.11 21.11 
Climate change risk perception 4.19 4.11 4.48 4.6 
Control function 3.84 3.87 4.1 4.32 
Broadacre 3.7 5.39 3.55 3.13 
Dairy 3.41 4.73 3.18 2.84 
Livestock 3.39 4.62 3.63 3.01 
Majority of farm area under drip irrigation 2.07 1.76 2.06 2.51 
Historic temperature volatility 1.91 1.79 2.23 2.45 
Historic net rainfall 1.89 1.9 2.2 2.15 
Water ownership 1.73 1.59 2.02 2.06 
Carry-over use between 2014-2016 1.58 1.36 1.94 1.96 
Majority of farm area under drainage 1.57 1.49 1.55 1.77 
Average historic water allocation factor 1.44 1.5 1.76 1.38 
Farm Size 1.37 1.45 1.4 1.46 
Number of insurances 1.34 1.35 1.5 1.63 
Number of employees 1.31 1.59 1.32 1.57 
Succession 1.27 1.29 1.29 1.43 
Off farm income 1.26 1.22 1.59 1.4 
Whole of farm plan 1.21 1.25 1.32 1.39 
Productivity change 1.21 1.28 1.33 1.31 
Application rate 1.19 1.25 1.31 1.27 
Low education 1.19 1.3 1.23 1.28 
Irrigation grant 1.17 1.22 1.33 1.23 
Past index 1.16 1.29 1.25 1.17 
Excess water 1.13 1.09 1.3 1.23 
Male gender 1.07 1.13 1.17 1.22 




Table C.11 Irrigator attitudinal clusters and numeric attitude values 








Observations 401 283 316 
    
I could never imagine living anywhere other than this area 
(1 = strongly disagree; 5= strongly agree) 
3.8 2.1 3.9 
Farming is the only occupation I can imagine doing 
(1 = strongly disagree; 5= strongly agree) 
4.4 2.1 4.3 
We would be willing to have our seasonal allocations reduced to ensure sufficient water 
for the environment 
(1 = strongly disagree; 5= strongly agree) 
1.2 1.6 2.0 
It is essential to make allocations to the environment otherwise irrigation will not be 
long-term sustainable 
(1 = strongly disagree; 5= strongly agree) 
1.8 2.6 3.6 
I believe water trading has been a good thing for farming 
(1 = strongly disagree; 5= strongly agree) 





Table C.12 Individual planned adaptation full model regression results 
 Planned expansive adaptation index components 
VARIABLES Buy allocation Buy entitlement 
Buy land in same 
region 
Buy land in 
different region More efficiency More irrigation 
Farm debt -0.027(0.551) 1.294***(0.467) 1.012**(0.472) 1.254**(0.623) 0.635(0.496) 1.003**(0.466) 
Farm debt squared 0.044(0.444) -0.850**(0.365) -0.595(0.362) -0.765(0.466) -0.233(0.396) -0.707**(0.360) 
Farmland value 0.107(0.297) 0.175(0.275) -0.601**(0.279) -0.200(0.390) -0.083(0.274) -0.261(0.271) 
Farmland value 
squared -0.029(0.086) -0.020(0.078) 0.175**(0.078) 0.088(0.107) 0.007(0.081) 0.082(0.077) 
Net farm income 1.327(3.063) 3.537(2.518) 2.848(2.529) -0.929(3.343) 0.825(2.692) 0.048(2.543) 
Net farm income 
squared -4.019(11.433) -8.483(9.324) -9.276(9.370) 3.071(12.492) -3.499(10.310) -2.294(9.481) 
Number of insurances 0.012(0.045) 0.116***(0.040) 0.027(0.039) -0.001(0.050) 0.098**(0.040) 0.061(0.040) 
Off farm income -0.002(0.002) -0.003(0.002) -0.003(0.002) -0.004(0.003) -0.002(0.002) -0.002(0.002) 
Productivity change 0.004(0.049) 0.051(0.045) 0.185***(0.046) -0.026(0.057) 0.109**(0.046) 0.125***(0.045) 
Irrigation grant 0.153(0.156) 0.077(0.121) -0.170(0.123) 0.267*(0.147) -0.466***(0.128) -0.209*(0.122) 
Climate change risk 
perception 0.124(0.199) 0.203(0.191) 0.679***(0.176) 0.414(0.283) 0.610***(0.183) 0.259(0.205) 
Age 0.074*(0.045) 0.006(0.032) -0.024(0.034) -0.001(0.042) 0.029(0.037) -0.032(0.032) 
Age squared -0.001**(0.000) -0.000(0.000) -0.000(0.000) -0.000(0.000) -0.000(0.000) 0.000(0.000) 
Low education 0.092(0.167) 0.093(0.154) -0.044(0.156) 0.253(0.189) -0.057(0.144) -0.031(0.153) 
Male gender 0.164(0.175) 0.343**(0.155) 0.800***(0.173) 0.153(0.191) 0.047(0.155) 0.207(0.150) 
Number of employees 0.016(0.018) 0.038*(0.020) -0.006(0.015) 0.005(0.017) 0.030(0.023) 0.016(0.014) 
Whole of farm plan 0.261*(0.140) 0.134(0.122) -0.111(0.130) -0.003(0.165) 0.194(0.121) 0.321**(0.127) 
Historic net rainfall -0.000(0.000) -0.001**(0.000) -0.000(0.000) -0.001**(0.000) -0.000(0.000) -0.000(0.000) 
Average historic water 
allocation factor -0.469*(0.255) 0.447**(0.226) -0.089(0.250) -0.140(0.281) 0.038(0.221) -0.035(0.223) 
Historic temperature 
volatility -0.274(1.148) -1.115(0.939) -0.798(1.056) -1.107(1.510) -1.007(0.951) -0.311(0.893) 
Application rate -0.003(0.016) -0.004(0.013) 0.010(0.011) -0.053**(0.022) -0.012(0.012) 0.011(0.010) 
Broadacre -0.171(0.249) -0.263(0.216) 0.394*(0.232) 0.737***(0.273) 0.174(0.220) -0.065(0.202) 
Carry-over use 
between 2014-2016 0.268*(0.148) 0.140(0.128) 0.059(0.140) 0.162(0.169) 0.296**(0.124) -0.096(0.127) 
Dairy 0.175(0.265) -0.443*(0.235) 0.038(0.248) 0.579*(0.318) -0.000(0.242) -0.046(0.218) 
Farm Size 0.001(0.002) -0.001(0.002) 0.002(0.002) 0.003(0.002) -0.004**(0.002) -0.003(0.002) 
Livestock -0.551**(0.253) -0.133(0.224) 0.280(0.245) 0.501*(0.293) 0.160(0.220) -0.034(0.212) 
Majority of farm area 
under drainage 0.391***(0.134) 0.227*(0.128) -0.161(0.123) 0.002(0.160) 0.003(0.128) -0.149(0.123) 
Majority of farm area 
under drip irrigation 0.142(0.219) -0.215(0.186) -0.231(0.200) 0.140(0.296) -0.478***(0.185) -0.110(0.175) 
Excess water -0.362**(0.158) -0.341**(0.146) 0.047(0.138) -0.165(0.192) -0.184(0.135) -0.006(0.130) 
Water ownership -0.031(0.042) -0.116***(0.037) 0.023(0.040) -0.037(0.043) 0.062*(0.036) -0.070*(0.036) 
Succession 0.449***(0.138) 0.263**(0.111) 0.612***(0.107) 0.134(0.139) 0.414***(0.116) 0.483***(0.109) 
Past index 1.966***(0.121) 1.084***(0.130) 0.613***(0.122) 1.379***(0.212) 1.191***(0.124) 0.898***(0.113) 
Constant -2.769*(1.584) -1.989(1.238) -0.847(1.276) -1.620(1.688) -2.204*(1.337) -0.077(1.173) 
        
athrho -0.036(0.129) -0.238*(0.134) -0.395***(0.137) -0.150(0.202) -0.305**(0.135) -0.263*(0.150) 
AIC 1643.118 1877.386 1841.471 1512.785 1841.846 1916.178 
BIC 1965.176 2199.444 2163.529 1834.843 2163.904 2238.236 
Observations 904 904 904 904 904 904 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 




Individual planned adaptation full model regression results, continued 1 










insurance Less dryland 
More 
collaboration More dryland Utilise solar 
Farm debt 0.292(0.443) 1.019**(0.480) 0.969**(0.471) 0.002(0.492) 0.112(0.681) 0.323(0.532) 0.541(0.542) 0.963**(0.439) 
Farm debt 
squared -0.009(0.345) -0.755**(0.374) -0.697*(0.370) -0.151(0.390) 0.186(0.543) -0.149(0.417) -0.554(0.417) -0.689**(0.343) 
Farmland value -0.164(0.256) -0.397(0.259) -0.319(0.281) -0.531*(0.291) -0.512(0.369) -0.797**(0.314) -0.406(0.317) -0.216(0.258) 
Farmland value 
squared 0.057(0.074) 0.091(0.075) 0.114(0.081) 0.143*(0.082) 0.105(0.109) 0.215**(0.090) 0.127(0.090) 0.071(0.074) 
Net farm 
income 2.712(2.443) 1.720(2.532) 2.238(2.548) -1.821(2.639) -0.051(3.518) 2.748(2.937) -1.284(2.879) 4.061*(2.432) 
Net farm 
income squared -12.926(9.078) -6.492(9.432) -9.543(9.601) 8.083(9.798) 2.551(13.139) -11.213(10.855) 2.531(10.889) -20.023**(9.203) 
Number of 
insurances 0.044(0.039) 0.069*(0.040) 0.034(0.039) 0.103**(0.043) 0.056(0.058) 0.081*(0.047) 0.005(0.049) 0.077**(0.039) 
Off farm 
income 0.001(0.002) -0.002(0.002) 0.000(0.002) 0.001(0.002) -0.002(0.002) -0.003*(0.002) -0.002(0.002) -0.001(0.002) 
Productivity 
change 0.043(0.040) -0.071(0.045) -0.027(0.044) 0.056(0.046) 
-
0.182***(0.060) 0.062(0.048) 0.008(0.051) 0.051(0.042) 
Irrigation grant -0.143(0.115) -0.023(0.125) -0.056(0.130) -0.069(0.123) 0.225(0.155) 0.047(0.129) 0.016(0.135) 0.121(0.115) 
Climate change 
risk perception 0.358**(0.180) 0.373**(0.172) 0.524***(0.178) 0.209(0.197) -0.156(0.284) 0.465**(0.208) 0.541**(0.222) 0.679***(0.175) 
Age -0.052(0.033) 0.026(0.036) -0.003(0.037) 0.006(0.032) -0.039(0.047) 0.001(0.034) 0.013(0.035) 0.030(0.032) 
Age squared 0.001**(0.000) -0.000(0.000) -0.000(0.000) -0.000(0.000) 0.000(0.000) -0.000(0.000) -0.000(0.000) -0.000(0.000) 
Low education 0.148(0.129) 0.013(0.144) -0.124(0.146) 0.023(0.155) 0.357**(0.179) -0.081(0.160) 0.025(0.173) 0.092(0.140) 
Male gender 0.182(0.150) 0.224*(0.132) 0.037(0.156) 0.204(0.158) 0.334(0.288) 0.085(0.167) 0.151(0.165) -0.188(0.138) 
Number of 
employees -0.003(0.014) 0.034*(0.020) 0.004(0.021) -0.000(0.016) -0.024(0.033) -0.013(0.017) 0.036**(0.016) 0.026*(0.014) 
Whole of farm 
plan 0.133(0.120) 0.197(0.123) 0.255*(0.135) 0.053(0.137) 0.137(0.198) 0.397***(0.152) -0.006(0.159) 0.248**(0.119) 
Historic net 
rainfall 0.000(0.000) -0.000(0.000) -0.000(0.000) -0.000(0.000) 0.000(0.000) 0.000(0.000) -0.000(0.000) -0.000(0.000) 
Historic 
allocation 
factor -0.104(0.222) -0.211(0.220) 0.065(0.221) 0.068(0.258) -0.087(0.302) -0.287(0.227) -0.161(0.278) 0.233(0.217) 
Historic 
temperature 
volatility -0.393(0.922) -0.425(0.941) -0.001(0.968) 1.096(1.004) 1.266(1.272) -0.320(1.036) -0.184(1.102) 0.218(0.917) 
Application 
rate -0.002(0.012) -0.001(0.012) -0.008(0.014) -0.016(0.014) -0.018(0.020) -0.010(0.014) -0.032*(0.019) -0.005(0.013) 
Broadacre 
-0.100(0.194) 0.092(0.217) 0.018(0.212) 
-
0.620***(0.210) 0.037(0.306) -0.385*(0.226) 0.740**(0.287) -0.307(0.203) 
Carry-over use 
between 2014-
2016 0.087(0.123) -0.069(0.122) -0.064(0.128) 0.240*(0.134) 0.216(0.180) 0.239*(0.139) 0.221(0.142) -0.092(0.122) 
Dairy -0.017(0.209) -0.097(0.230) -0.299(0.236) -0.445**(0.222) 0.164(0.340) -0.220(0.237) 0.828***(0.308) -0.266(0.208) 
Farm Size 0.000(0.002) -0.001(0.002) -0.001(0.002) 0.002(0.002) -0.001(0.003) 0.003(0.002) 0.001(0.002) 0.001(0.002) 
Livestock 
-0.210(0.205) 0.124(0.218) -0.322(0.224) 
-
0.596***(0.221) -0.035(0.313) -0.263(0.229) 0.792***(0.286) -0.309(0.209) 
Majority of 
farm under 
drainage -0.221*(0.117) 0.060(0.121) 0.151(0.126) 0.215*(0.127) -0.181(0.179) -0.039(0.136) 0.108(0.140) 0.076(0.121) 
Majority of 
farm under drip 
irrigation -0.342*(0.176) -0.331*(0.195) -0.367**(0.187) -0.149(0.189) 0.193(0.245) -0.194(0.206) 0.033(0.280) -0.201(0.171) 
Excess water 0.189(0.124) -0.107(0.133) -0.031(0.140) -0.039(0.137) 0.164(0.180) 0.003(0.145) -0.113(0.162) -0.093(0.125) 
Water 
ownership 0.044(0.035) 0.021(0.036) -0.031(0.038) 0.015(0.039) -0.005(0.050) -0.038(0.041) -0.010(0.041) -0.032(0.037) 
Succession 0.540***(0.101) 0.301***(0.110) 0.258**(0.110) 0.257**(0.113) -0.259(0.158) 0.117(0.123) 0.322***(0.121) 0.254**(0.104) 
Past index 0.184(0.128) 1.482***(0.103) 1.627***(0.107) 1.641***(0.108) 1.623***(0.169) 2.286***(0.170) 1.455***(0.136) 1.364***(0.169) 
Constant -0.465(1.202) -1.454(1.291) -1.222(1.319) -2.642**(1.227) -0.825(1.804) -0.969(1.302) -2.370*(1.378) -2.130*(1.191) 
athrho -0.235*(0.128) -0.165(0.119) -0.310**(0.130) -0.090(0.133) 0.173(0.188) -0.292*(0.153) -0.357**(0.170) -0.380***(0.136) 
AIC 2031.481 1919.963 1855.112 1826.265 1432.839 1684.78 1658.27 1992.975 
BIC 2353.538 2242.021 2177.17 2148.323 1754.897 2006.763 1980.327 2315.033 
Observations 904 904 904 904 904 903 904 904 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Individual planned adaptation full model regression results, continued 2 
 Planned contractive adaptation index components 
VARIABLES Selling the farm Less irrigation Sell allocation Sell entitlement Sell land 
Farm debt -0.839(0.541) 0.808(0.569) -0.943*(0.501) -0.491(0.517) -0.115(0.489) 
Farm debt squared 0.831*(0.424) -0.467(0.439) 0.868**(0.392) 0.537(0.399) 0.428(0.384) 
Farmland value 0.932***(0.308) 0.012(0.323) -0.497*(0.278) -0.441(0.287) -0.054(0.270) 
Farmland value squared -0.255***(0.088) -0.022(0.092) 0.170**(0.080) 0.121(0.083) 0.007(0.079) 
Net farm income 1.683(2.852) 2.965(3.196) 2.957(2.666) 1.773(2.716) 2.672(2.570) 
Net farm income squared -11.544(10.638) -7.539(12.030) -18.517*(9.856) -7.212(10.252) -13.548(9.820) 
Number of insurances 0.036(0.048) -0.020(0.049) -0.087**(0.041) 0.020(0.042) -0.017(0.041) 
Off farm income -0.001(0.002) 0.001(0.002) 0.001(0.002) -0.002(0.002) 0.002(0.002) 
Productivity change 0.024(0.050) -0.291***(0.056) 0.002(0.046) -0.087*(0.046) -0.108**(0.044) 
Irrigation grant -0.005(0.135) -0.027(0.147) -0.299**(0.132) 0.075(0.135) 0.059(0.125) 
Climate change risk perception 0.312(0.221) -0.099(0.263) 0.177(0.200) -0.292(0.187) -0.011(0.187) 
Age 0.075**(0.037) -0.075**(0.035) 0.000(0.035) 0.018(0.037) -0.010(0.036) 
Age squared -0.000(0.000) 0.001**(0.000) 0.000(0.000) -0.000(0.000) 0.000(0.000) 
Low education 0.113(0.163) 0.284*(0.164) 0.035(0.152) -0.068(0.150) 0.334**(0.137) 
Male gender 0.362**(0.169) -0.067(0.175) -0.134(0.151) 0.012(0.165) -0.013(0.152) 
Number of employees -0.049**(0.020) -0.008(0.023) -0.027**(0.013) 0.021(0.017) -0.046*(0.027) 
Whole of farm plan -0.031(0.134) 0.189(0.145) -0.152(0.129) -0.087(0.132) 0.057(0.124) 
Historic net rainfall -0.000(0.000) 0.000(0.000) -0.000(0.000) -0.000(0.000) 0.000(0.000) 
Average historic water allocation 
factor -0.637**(0.255) 0.048(0.284) -0.359(0.241) 0.577**(0.259) -0.301(0.228) 
Historic temperature volatility 0.968(1.031) -0.035(1.112) 1.980**(0.986) 0.044(1.010) 2.347**(1.041) 
Application rate 0.022(0.015) -0.008(0.015) 0.002(0.011) -0.012(0.011) 0.002(0.012) 
Broadacre -0.520**(0.205) -0.452(0.276) 0.068(0.232) 0.056(0.218) -0.478**(0.222) 
Carry-over use between 2014-2016 0.056(0.139) 0.125(0.154) -0.116(0.129) -0.122(0.128) -0.041(0.126) 
Dairy -0.294(0.227) -0.143(0.295) -0.331(0.253) -0.017(0.237) -0.306(0.236) 
Farm Size -0.002(0.002) -0.001(0.002) 0.000(0.002) 0.000(0.002) 0.001(0.002) 
Livestock -0.412*(0.222) -0.335(0.279) -0.266(0.234) -0.142(0.232) -0.588***(0.224) 
Majority of farm area under 
drainage 0.004(0.141) 0.245*(0.144) -0.058(0.127) 0.251*(0.128) 0.047(0.121) 
Majority of farm area under drip 
irrigation -0.016(0.192) 0.226(0.222) -0.332*(0.195) -0.201(0.185) 0.027(0.176) 
Excess water 0.149(0.154) 0.281*(0.147) 0.473***(0.132) 0.557***(0.126) 0.459***(0.123) 
Water ownership -0.051(0.036) 0.032(0.048) 0.164***(0.040) -0.027(0.040) 0.074*(0.038) 
Succession -0.703***(0.123) -0.296**(0.137) -0.292**(0.119) -0.391***(0.117) -0.576***(0.119) 
Past index 2.101***(0.120) 1.163***(0.126) 1.630***(0.113) 0.259**(0.114) 0.409***(0.149) 
Constant -4.540***(1.342) 1.487(1.396) -2.449*(1.321) -1.517(1.381) -2.143*(1.297) 
       
athrho -0.122(0.146) 0.016(0.179) -0.144(0.138) 0.249*(0.130) -0.073(0.128) 
AIC 1724.867 1624.026 1840.938 1757.289 1904.403 
BIC 2046.925 1946.084 2162.995 2079.347 2226.461 
Observations 904 904 904 904 904 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  






Table C.13 Total planned adaptation index full model regression results, clustered and 
unclustered 











Farm debt 1.899**(0.742) 1.826(1.192) 1.486(1.206) 1.112(1.589) 
Farm debt squared -0.981*(0.570) -1.154(0.872) -0.957(0.955) 0.167(1.262) 
Farmland value -0.965**(0.443) -0.953(0.752) -0.930(0.769) -1.522*(0.780) 
Farmland value squared 0.275**(0.125) 0.304(0.209) 0.225(0.214) 0.423*(0.222) 
Net farm income 9.759**(4.186) 0.661(6.936) 24.222***(7.407) 10.975(7.672) 
Net farm income squared -40.599**(15.853) -16.734(26.076) -78.352***(27.917) -47.230*(28.502) 
Number of insurances 0.155**(0.064) 0.135(0.109) 0.272**(0.111) 0.047(0.113) 
Off farm income -0.006**(0.003) -0.006(0.005) -0.010**(0.005) -0.005(0.005) 
Productivity change 0.030(0.072) 0.147(0.115) -0.398***(0.128) 0.135(0.146) 
Irrigation Grant -0.452**(0.193) -0.156(0.326) -0.357(0.347) -0.605*(0.363) 
Climate change risk perception 1.252***(0.319) 2.391***(0.540) 0.128(0.522) 1.179*(0.627) 
Age 0.029(0.052) 0.039(0.087) -0.019(0.089) 0.022(0.100) 
Age squared -0.000(0.000) -0.000(0.001) 0.000(0.001) -0.000(0.001) 
Low education 0.309(0.228) 0.174(0.354) 0.641(0.501) 0.413(0.399) 
Male gender 0.688***(0.232) 0.306(0.436) 0.855*(0.447) 1.015**(0.397) 
Number of employees -0.004(0.024) -0.113(0.069) -0.002(0.017) 0.051(0.056) 
Whole of farm plan 0.306(0.187) -0.137(0.328) 0.168(0.343) 0.751**(0.350) 
Historic net rainfall -0.000(0.000) -0.001(0.001) -0.001(0.001) -0.001(0.001) 
Average historic water 
allocation factor 
-0.238(0.370) 0.159(0.574) -0.052(0.724) -0.725(0.670) 
Historic temperature volatility 1.118(1.613) 3.979(4.213) 5.345**(2.470) -2.166(2.666) 
Application rate -0.014(0.016) 0.004(0.046) -0.007(0.015) -0.071**(0.034) 
Broadacre -0.429(0.343) 0.088(0.601) -1.037*(0.603) -0.432(0.630) 
Carry-over use between 2014-
2016 
0.200(0.209) 0.045(0.341) 0.471(0.434) 0.233(0.369) 
Dairy -0.509(0.374) -0.042(0.623) -0.244(0.615) -1.099(0.676) 
Farm Size -0.000(0.004) 0.001(0.009) 0.006(0.004) -0.006(0.005) 
Livestock -0.741**(0.349) -0.493(0.595) -1.031*(0.607) -0.619(0.610) 
Majority of farm area under 
drainage 
0.060(0.189) 0.433(0.328) 0.274(0.311) -0.543(0.353) 
Majority of farm area under drip 
irrigation 
-0.792***(0.280) -0.437(0.586) -0.521(0.428) -1.395***(0.480) 
Excess water 0.278(0.203) 0.487(0.392) -0.049(0.346) 0.579*(0.342) 
Water ownership -0.024(0.069) -0.006(0.109) -0.100(0.118) -0.014(0.131) 
Succession 0.374**(0.174) 0.834***(0.290) 0.178(0.311) 0.084(0.335) 
Past index 0.569***(0.031) 0.514***(0.052) 0.686***(0.052) 0.521***(0.060) 
control function -1.249***(0.368) -1.791***(0.660) -0.421(0.674) -1.804***(0.675) 
Constant -0.399(2.038) -3.688(4.473) -2.524(3.147) 3.524(3.698) 
AIC 4079.092 1685.384 1113.403 1306.641 
BIC 4242.487 1817.793 1234.204 1430.466 
Observations 903 363 258 282 
R-squared 0.494 0.490 0.652 0.507 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table C.14 Planned expansive adaptation index full model regression results, clustered 
and unclustered 












Farm debt 1.224***(0.374) 1.316**(0.589) 0.287(0.649) 1.534**(0.692) 
Farm debt squared -0.789***(0.293) -0.832*(0.455) -0.365(0.497) -0.786(0.552) 
Farmland value -0.231(0.209) -0.226(0.336) -0.085(0.368) -0.688*(0.370) 
Farmland value squared 0.072(0.060) 0.074(0.096) 0.032(0.107) 0.179*(0.107) 
Net farm income 1.973(1.993) -3.387(3.200) 5.646*(3.388) 3.105(3.522) 
Net farm income squared -6.310(7.484) 13.322(12.008) -18.682(12.748) -12.588(13.277) 
Number of insurances 0.075**(0.031) 0.076(0.051) 0.093*(0.054) 0.027(0.057) 
Off farm income -0.004***(0.001) -0.003(0.002) -0.003(0.002) -0.006**(0.002) 
Productivity change 0.092***(0.034) 0.065(0.053) 0.001(0.060) 0.136**(0.064) 
Irrigation grant -0.196**(0.097) -0.257(0.159) -0.355**(0.157) 0.160(0.171) 
Climate change risk perception 0.543***(0.154) 0.818***(0.253) 0.461*(0.254) 0.416(0.274) 
Age -0.012(0.026) 0.048(0.042) -0.012(0.046) -0.069(0.046) 
Age squared -0.000(0.000) -0.001(0.000) -0.000(0.000) 0.000(0.000) 
Low education 0.027(0.111) -0.198(0.170) 0.093(0.239) 0.183(0.186) 
Male gender 0.391***(0.118) 0.583***(0.199) 0.342*(0.196) 0.383*(0.209) 
Number of employees 0.015(0.013) -0.035(0.037) 0.015(0.016) 0.056**(0.024) 
Whole of farm plan 0.124(0.097) -0.093(0.164) 0.103(0.158) 0.234(0.173) 
Historic net rainfall -0.000*(0.000) -0.001*(0.000) -0.001**(0.000) 0.000(0.000) 
Average historic water allocation 
factor -0.007(0.178) 0.416(0.290) -0.591*(0.313) -0.285(0.305) 
Historic temperature volatility -0.930(0.748) 1.346(1.933) 1.793(1.337) -1.996*(1.166) 
Application rate -0.001(0.009) 0.014(0.018) -0.002(0.011) -0.011(0.019) 
Broadacre 0.167(0.161) 0.409(0.295) -0.002(0.252) -0.057(0.274) 
Carry-over use between 2014-
2016 0.114(0.099) -0.011(0.161) 0.089(0.175) 0.232(0.180) 
Dairy 0.015(0.174) 0.015(0.298) 0.237(0.281) -0.031(0.308) 
Farm Size -0.001(0.002) -0.002(0.003) 0.004(0.003) -0.001(0.002) 
Livestock 0.094(0.166) 0.143(0.293) -0.022(0.283) 0.082(0.280) 
Majority of farm area under 
drainage 0.017(0.096) 0.229(0.159) 0.115(0.153) -0.282(0.171) 
Majority of farm area under drip 
irrigation -0.276*(0.142) 0.217(0.312) -0.122(0.221) -0.572***(0.221) 
Excess water -0.231**(0.104) -0.080(0.192) -0.272(0.173) -0.140(0.165) 
Water ownership -0.048*(0.028) -0.069(0.043) 0.006(0.049) -0.048(0.052) 
Succession 0.539***(0.086) 0.856***(0.136) 0.393**(0.153) 0.415***(0.155) 
Past index 0.506***(0.031) 0.499***(0.051) 0.598***(0.055) 0.402***(0.056) 
control function residual -0.555***(0.180) -0.780**(0.304) -0.346(0.298) -0.735**(0.306) 
Constant 1.041(0.965) -3.199(2.062) -1.177(1.669) 4.894***(1.625) 
AIC 8562.493 3575.3534 2388.619 2713.134 
BIC 9052.676 3972.582 2751.021 3084.609 
Observations 903 363 258 282 
R-squared 0.543 0.556 0.651 0.573 
Standard errors in parentheses 




Table C.15 Planned accommodating adaptation index full model regression results, 
clustered and unclustered 











Farm debt 1.091***(0.416) 0.382(0.648) 1.413**(0.719) 1.626**(0.813) 
Farm debt squared -0.742**(0.327) -0.288(0.503) -1.012*(0.551) -1.001(0.648) 
Farmland value -0.807***(0.233) -0.554(0.372) -1.066***(0.407) -1.096**(0.427) 
Farmland value squared 0.221***(0.067) 0.162(0.106) 0.282**(0.118) 0.323***(0.123) 
Net farm income 3.956*(2.220) -2.646(3.558) 11.047***(3.749) 4.876(4.082) 
Net farm income squared -16.629**(8.332) 4.057(13.316) -39.572***(14.118) -19.435(15.373) 
Number of insurances 0.091***(0.035) 0.131**(0.057) 0.051(0.060) 0.044(0.067) 
Off farm income -0.002(0.002) -0.002(0.003) -0.006**(0.003) -0.001(0.003) 
Productivity change -0.004(0.038) 0.056(0.059) -0.164**(0.066) 0.002(0.074) 
Irrigation grant -0.005(0.106) 0.182(0.174) -0.079(0.174) 0.011(0.197) 
Climate change risk perception 0.681***(0.174) 1.111***(0.284) 0.325(0.289) 0.487(0.317) 
Age 0.006(0.029) 0.048(0.046) 0.002(0.051) 0.004(0.053) 
Age squared -0.000(0.000) -0.000(0.000) -0.000(0.000) -0.000(0.000) 
Low education 0.092(0.124) 0.110(0.188) 0.046(0.264) 0.124(0.216) 
Male gender 0.174(0.131) -0.136(0.220) 0.359*(0.216) 0.473*(0.242) 
Number of employees 0.011(0.015) -0.037(0.041) 0.026(0.017) 0.011(0.027) 
Whole of farm plan 0.303***(0.108) 0.092(0.177) 0.287(0.180) 0.442**(0.199) 
Historic net rainfall -0.000(0.000) -0.000(0.000) 0.000(0.000) 0.000(0.000) 
Average historic water allocation 
factor -0.004(0.198) 0.084(0.318) -0.073(0.347) 0.045(0.354) 
Historic temperature volatility 0.054(0.830) 0.115(2.121) 1.178(1.467) -0.777(1.350) 
Application rate -0.015(0.010) -0.021(0.020) -0.001(0.012) -0.053**(0.022) 
Broadacre -0.241(0.179) -0.004(0.326) -0.391(0.279) -0.314(0.317) 
Carry-over use between 2014-
2016 0.145(0.110) -0.002(0.177) 0.201(0.192) 0.239(0.208) 
Dairy -0.258(0.193) 0.115(0.329) -0.010(0.311) -0.910**(0.355) 
Farm Size 0.001(0.002) -0.000(0.003) -0.001(0.003) 0.001(0.003) 
Livestock -0.339*(0.185) -0.251(0.324) -0.536*(0.314) -0.230(0.325) 
Majority of farm area under 
drainage -0.015(0.107) 0.134(0.177) 0.065(0.169) -0.200(0.198) 
Majority of farm area under drip 
irrigation -0.339**(0.159) -0.200(0.344) -0.077(0.248) -0.591**(0.257) 
Excess water -0.061(0.114) 0.012(0.213) -0.186(0.187) 0.022(0.189) 
Water ownership 0.000(0.031) 0.021(0.048) -0.066(0.054) 0.008(0.060) 
Social capital     
Succession 0.465***(0.096) 0.648***(0.151) 0.510***(0.169) 0.170(0.180) 
Past index 0.609***(0.030) 0.588***(0.047) 0.741***(0.052) 0.512***(0.060) 
control function residual -0.642***(0.202) -0.847**(0.341) -0.504(0.335) -0.625*(0.354) 
Constant 0.301(1.071) -1.949(2.260) 0.254(1.843) 2.106(1.879) 
AIC 8562.493 3575.353 2388.619 2713.134 
BIC 9052.676 3972.582 2751.021 3084.609 
Observations 903 363 258 282 
R-squared 0.493 0.494 0.641 0.482 
Standard errors in parentheses 




Table C.16 Planned contractive adaptation index full model regression results, clustered 
and unclustered 










Farm debt -0.205(0.365) 0.259(0.585) -0.183(0.650) -1.490**(0.638) 
Farm debt squared 0.390(0.287) -0.137(0.453) 0.441(0.499) 1.488***(0.511) 
Farmland value -0.025(0.205) -0.259(0.335) 0.307(0.369) 0.059(0.343) 
Farmland value squared 0.006(0.059) 0.084(0.095) -0.136(0.107) -0.002(0.099) 
Net farm income 2.441(1.950) 3.288(3.200) 5.350(3.402) 3.456(3.267) 
Net farm income squared -12.421*(7.320) -20.159*(11.970) -12.722(12.814) -16.347(12.307) 
Number of insurances -0.034(0.031) -0.096*(0.051) 0.048(0.054) -0.032(0.053) 
Off farm income 0.000(0.001) -0.001(0.002) -0.000(0.002) 0.002(0.002) 
Productivity change -0.136***(0.033) -0.071(0.054) -0.243***(0.059) -0.071(0.060) 
Irrigation grant -0.050(0.095) 0.049(0.158) 0.368**(0.160) -0.524***(0.159) 
Climate change risk perception 0.090(0.151) 0.377(0.251) -0.335(0.255) 0.253(0.254) 
Age 0.013(0.025) -0.049(0.042) -0.042(0.046) 0.060(0.043) 
Age squared -0.000(0.000) 0.000(0.000) 0.001(0.000) -0.000(0.000) 
Low education 0.247**(0.109) 0.305*(0.169) 0.544**(0.239) 0.112(0.173) 
Male gender 0.005(0.116) -0.289(0.198) 0.042(0.196) 0.157(0.194) 
Number of employees -0.019(0.013) -0.027(0.037) -0.034**(0.016) -0.005(0.022) 
Whole of farm plan -0.007(0.094) -0.166(0.159) 0.015(0.158) 0.232(0.160) 
Historic net rainfall -0.000(0.000) 0.000(0.000) -0.000(0.000) -0.001**(0.000) 
Average historic water allocation 
factor -0.161(0.174) -0.402(0.286) 0.391(0.313) -0.067(0.283) 
Historic temperature volatility 1.727**(0.730) 1.915(1.910) 2.641**(1.328) 0.294(1.083) 
Application rate 0.001(0.009) 0.010(0.018) -0.005(0.011) -0.009(0.017) 
Broadacre -0.266*(0.157) -0.206(0.293) -0.766***(0.254) 0.097(0.255) 
Carry-over use between 2014-
2016 -0.096(0.097) -0.025(0.160) 0.098(0.174) -0.209(0.166) 
Dairy -0.298*(0.171) -0.180(0.297) -0.681**(0.284) -0.044(0.286) 
Farm Size 0.000(0.002) 0.003(0.003) 0.004(0.003) -0.004*(0.002) 
Livestock -0.446***(0.162) -0.361(0.292) -0.666**(0.284) -0.249(0.260) 
Majority of farm area under 
drainage 0.050(0.094) 0.027(0.158) 0.223(0.153) -0.073(0.159) 
Majority of farm area under drip 
irrigation -0.131(0.139) -0.417(0.310) -0.085(0.222) -0.173(0.205) 
Excess water 0.615***(0.100) 0.719***(0.192) 0.540***(0.170) 0.558***(0.152) 
Water ownership 0.038(0.027) 0.073*(0.043) -0.038(0.049) 0.028(0.048) 
Succession -0.627***(0.084) -0.635***(0.135) -0.688***(0.153) -0.572***(0.145) 
Past index 0.231***(0.038) 0.255***(0.065) 0.169**(0.066) 0.284***(0.061) 
control function residual -0.068(0.175) -0.039(0.302) 0.146(0.298) -0.389(0.283) 
Constant -0.089(0.947) 2.440(2.042) 0.544(1.672) -2.035(1.515) 
AIC 8562.493 3575.353 2388.619 2713.134 
BIC 9052.676 3972.582 2751.021 3084.609 
Observations 903 363 258 282 
R-squared 0.239 0.261 0.340 0.354 
Standard errors in parentheses 




Table C.17 Planned compound adaptation strategy water trade 1 full model regression 
results 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Compound strategy water trade 1 
VARIABLES Buy entitlement Sell allocation Buy allocation 
Farm debt 1.395***(0.458) -0.966*(0.500) -0.002(0.553) 
Farm debt squared -0.928***(0.358) 0.872**(0.392) 0.062(0.448) 
Farmland value 0.234(0.275) -0.470*(0.276) 0.072(0.299) 
Farmland value squared -0.036(0.078) 0.164**(0.079) -0.015(0.086) 
Net farm income 3.590(2.497) 2.945(2.666) 1.627(2.992) 
Net farm income squared -8.540(9.209) -18.822*(9.895) -4.373(11.052) 
Number of insurances 0.123***(0.040) -0.080**(0.041) 0.016(0.044) 
Off farm income -0.003*(0.002) 0.001(0.002) -0.002(0.002) 
Productivity change 0.057(0.045) -0.006(0.046) 0.001(0.050) 
Irrigation grant 0.072(0.120) -0.282**(0.130) 0.128(0.147) 
Climate change risk perception 0.197(0.203) 0.165(0.176) 0.023(0.186) 
Age 0.006(0.032) -0.005(0.035) 0.087**(0.043) 
Age squared -0.000(0.000) 0.000(0.000) -0.001***(0.000) 
Low education 0.079(0.157) 0.020(0.153) 0.066(0.168) 
Male gender 0.348**(0.153) -0.123(0.150) 0.139(0.168) 
Number of employees 0.038*(0.020) -0.027**(0.013) 0.021(0.021) 
Whole of farm plan 0.117(0.123) -0.153(0.129) 0.256*(0.142) 
Historic net rainfall -0.001**(0.000) -0.000(0.000) -0.000(0.000) 
Average historic water allocation factor 0.417*(0.225) -0.372(0.241) -0.416(0.256) 
Historic temperature volatility -0.982(0.942) 1.992**(0.978) -0.385(1.168) 
Application rate -0.003(0.012) 0.002(0.011) -0.007(0.014) 
Broadacre -0.265(0.217) 0.018(0.231) -0.193(0.251) 
Carry-over use between 2014-2016 0.151(0.130) -0.103(0.128) 0.244*(0.146) 
Dairy -0.440*(0.238) -0.408(0.253) 0.230(0.272) 
Farm Size -0.001(0.002) 0.000(0.002) -0.000(0.002) 
Livestock -0.115(0.224) -0.328(0.234) -0.553**(0.261) 
Majority of farm area under drainage 0.205(0.125) -0.070(0.127) 0.385***(0.133) 
Majority of farm area under drip irrigation -0.221(0.187) -0.333*(0.194) 0.103(0.219) 
Excess water -0.340**(0.144) 0.482***(0.131) -0.404***(0.152) 
Water ownership -0.112***(0.037) 0.158***(0.039) -0.033(0.041) 
Succession 0.272**(0.111) -0.286**(0.117) 0.431***(0.135) 
past strategy 1.051***(0.126) 1.581***(0.110) 1.775***(0.120) 
correlation between 2 and 1   -0.246***(0.080) 
correlation between 3 and 1   0.555***(0.095) 
correlation between instrument and 1   -0.217(0.140) 
correlation between 3 and 2   -0.348***(0.081) 
correlation between instrument and 2   -0.137(0.115) 
correlation between instrument and 3   0.041(0.114) 
Constant -2.234*(1.243) -2.188*(1.300) -2.928*(1.547) 
AIC 3346.085   
BIC 4019.041   
Observations 904 904 904 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table C.18 Planned compound adaptation strategy water trade 2 full model regression 
results 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Compound strategy water trade 2 
VARIABLES Sell entitlement Sell allocation Buy allocation 
Farm debt -0.514(0.512) -0.869*(0.512) -0.030(0.538) 
Farm debt squared 0.563(0.396) 0.833**(0.401) 0.060(0.434) 
Farmland value -0.450(0.289) -0.558**(0.275) 0.121(0.294) 
Farmland value squared 0.124(0.083) 0.185**(0.079) -0.028(0.085) 
Net farm income 2.138(2.724) 3.107(2.669) 1.768(3.012) 
Net farm income squared -9.262(10.325) -18.997*(9.953) -5.414(11.285) 
Number of insurances 0.032(0.042) -0.082**(0.041) 0.010(0.045) 
Off farm income -0.002(0.002) 0.001(0.002) -0.002(0.002) 
Productivity change -0.085*(0.046) 0.002(0.045) -0.001(0.049) 
Irrigation grant 0.041(0.136) -0.269**(0.131) 0.151(0.153) 
Climate change risk perception -0.147(0.182) 0.163(0.180) -0.044(0.184) 
Age 0.027(0.037) 0.003(0.035) 0.074(0.045) 
Age squared -0.000(0.000) 0.000(0.000) -0.001**(0.000) 
Low education -0.071(0.151) 0.053(0.153) 0.053(0.169) 
Male gender 0.005(0.166) -0.133(0.147) 0.156(0.172) 
Number of employees 0.023(0.017) -0.026*(0.014) 0.016(0.019) 
Whole of farm plan -0.086(0.131) -0.162(0.129) 0.248*(0.141) 
Historic net rainfall -0.000(0.000) -0.000(0.000) -0.000(0.000) 
Average historic water allocation factor 0.623**(0.262) -0.434*(0.247) -0.451*(0.252) 
Historic temperature volatility -0.034(0.999) 2.266**(0.962) -0.403(1.152) 
Application rate -0.012(0.013) -0.000(0.011) -0.003(0.015) 
Broadacre 0.098(0.224) -0.002(0.225) -0.194(0.250) 
Carry-over use between 2014-2016 -0.123(0.127) -0.113(0.127) 0.282*(0.147) 
Dairy 0.017(0.241) -0.405(0.249) 0.181(0.268) 
Farm Size 0.001(0.002) 0.000(0.002) 0.000(0.002) 
Livestock -0.090(0.238) -0.342(0.227) -0.551**(0.253) 
Majority of farm area under drainage 0.223*(0.129) -0.076(0.128) 0.388***(0.133) 
Majority of farm area under drip irrigation -0.198(0.185) -0.351*(0.193) 0.136(0.219) 
Excess water 0.555***(0.127) 0.480***(0.132) -0.368**(0.158) 
Water ownership -0.033(0.039) 0.165***(0.039) -0.031(0.041) 
Succession -0.389***(0.116) -0.286**(0.118) 0.425***(0.137) 
past strategy 0.354***(0.110) 1.622***(0.107) 1.927***(0.121) 
correlation between 2 and 1 0.524***(0.084) 
correlation between 3 and 1 -0.101(0.085) 
correlation between instrument and 1 0.125(0.119) 
correlation between 3 and 2 -0.315***(0.081) 
correlation between instrument and 2 -0.136(0.118) 
correlation between instrument and 3 0.093(0.111) 
Constant -1.849(1.363) -2.630**(1.298) -2.590(1.579) 
AIC 3227.67   
BIC 3900.626   
Observations 904 904 904 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 




Table C.19 Planned compound adaptation strategy less irrigation full model regression 
results 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Compound strategy less irrigation 
VARIABLES Less irrigation Sell entitlement More dryland 
Farm debt 0.864(0.564) -0.512(0.521) 0.570(0.546) 
Farm debt squared -0.518(0.437) 0.558(0.402) -0.567(0.421) 
Farmland value -0.001(0.322) -0.452(0.287) -0.404(0.317) 
Farmland value squared -0.014(0.092) 0.122(0.083) 0.126(0.090) 
Net farm income 3.349(3.175) 1.346(2.733) -0.722(2.920) 
Net farm income squared -8.974(11.969) -5.425(10.272) 1.404(11.038) 
Number of insurances -0.019(0.049) 0.022(0.042) 0.001(0.050) 
Off farm income 0.001(0.002) -0.002(0.002) -0.002(0.002) 
Productivity change -0.298***(0.056) -0.092**(0.046) 0.006(0.051) 
Irrigation grant -0.047(0.147) 0.065(0.134) 0.012(0.136) 
Climate change risk perception -0.133(0.246) -0.215(0.169) 0.304(0.198) 
Age -0.075**(0.035) 0.021(0.038) 0.009(0.035) 
Age squared 0.001**(0.000) -0.000(0.000) -0.000(0.000) 
Low education 0.282*(0.164) -0.067(0.149) -0.023(0.175) 
Male gender -0.049(0.179) 0.016(0.166) 0.147(0.166) 
Number of employees -0.004(0.021) 0.019(0.016) 0.035**(0.016) 
Whole of farm plan 0.191(0.145) -0.068(0.133) -0.001(0.159) 
Historic net rainfall 0.000(0.000) -0.000(0.000) -0.000(0.000) 
Average historic water allocation factor 0.051(0.278) 0.566**(0.260) -0.164(0.279) 
Historic temperature volatility -0.200(1.106) 0.133(1.012) -0.208(1.099) 
Application rate -0.006(0.014) -0.012(0.011) -0.035*(0.019) 
Broadacre -0.429(0.273) 0.054(0.215) 0.712**(0.290) 
Carry-over use between 2014-2016 0.118(0.156) -0.128(0.127) 0.258*(0.142) 
Dairy -0.112(0.293) -0.013(0.236) 0.806***(0.311) 
Farm Size -0.001(0.002) 0.000(0.002) 0.001(0.002) 
Livestock -0.291(0.276) -0.148(0.229) 0.763***(0.288) 
Majority of farm area under drainage 0.249*(0.145) 0.231*(0.130) 0.116(0.141) 
Majority of farm area under drip irrigation 0.246(0.221) -0.196(0.185) 0.058(0.277) 
Excess water 0.258*(0.148) 0.543***(0.127) -0.114(0.165) 
Water ownership 0.029(0.047) -0.024(0.041) -0.010(0.042) 
Succession -0.295**(0.137) -0.377***(0.118) 0.296**(0.122) 
past strategy 1.130***(0.127) 0.274**(0.111) 1.480***(0.132) 
correlation between 2 and 1 0.361***(0.086) 
correlation between 3 and 1 0.116(0.088) 
correlation between instrument and 1 0.034(0.163) 
correlation between 3 and 2 -0.037(0.078) 
correlation between instrument and 2 0.183*(0.106) 
correlation between instrument and 3 -0.163(0.132) 
Constant 1.583(1.398) -1.666(1.387) -2.137(1.372) 
AIC 3072.948   
BIC 3745.904   
Observations 904 904 904 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 




Table C.20 Planned compound adaptation strategy more irrigation 1 full model 
regression results 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Compound strategy more irrigation 1  
VARIABLES Less dryland Buy entitlement More irrigation 
Farm debt 0.022(0.684) 1.254***(0.468) 1.006**(0.472) 
Farm debt squared 0.202(0.547) -0.823**(0.363) -0.707*(0.364) 
Farmland value -0.470(0.366) 0.146(0.272) -0.255(0.271) 
Farmland value squared 0.101(0.109) -0.013(0.077) 0.080(0.077) 
Net farm income -0.473(3.464) 3.393(2.502) 0.095(2.519) 
Net farm income squared 3.574(12.972) -7.903(9.288) -1.867(9.419) 
Number of insurances 0.063(0.057) 0.126***(0.040) 0.067*(0.040) 
Off farm income -0.002(0.002) -0.003(0.002) -0.002(0.002) 
Productivity change -0.184***(0.061) 0.060(0.044) 0.132***(0.045) 
Irrigation grant 0.213(0.151) 0.077(0.121) -0.220*(0.124) 
Climate change risk perception -0.041(0.232) 0.200(0.180) 0.232(0.180) 
Age -0.042(0.047) 0.007(0.033) -0.032(0.033) 
Age squared 0.000(0.000) -0.000(0.000) 0.000(0.000) 
Low education 0.374**(0.175) 0.122(0.154) -0.033(0.153) 
Male gender 0.359(0.295) 0.320**(0.153) 0.234(0.149) 
Number of employees -0.022(0.033) 0.038*(0.020) 0.014(0.014) 
Whole of farm plan 0.170(0.199) 0.144(0.122) 0.333***(0.127) 
Historic net rainfall 0.000(0.000) -0.001**(0.000) 0.000(0.000) 
Average historic water allocation factor -0.110(0.299) 0.428*(0.226) -0.054(0.223) 
Historic temperature volatility 1.096(1.265) -1.095(0.934) -0.328(0.903) 
Application rate -0.020(0.021) -0.005(0.013) 0.010(0.010) 
Broadacre 0.036(0.296) -0.278(0.218) -0.061(0.204) 
Carry-over use between 2014-2016 0.226(0.183) 0.135(0.127) -0.094(0.128) 
Dairy 0.173(0.327) -0.447*(0.235) -0.045(0.221) 
Farm Size -0.001(0.003) -0.001(0.002) -0.003*(0.002) 
Livestock -0.042(0.302) -0.137(0.223) -0.017(0.217) 
Majority of farm area under drainage -0.193(0.179) 0.235*(0.127) -0.145(0.123) 
Majority of farm area under drip irrigation 0.203(0.249) -0.214(0.186) -0.103(0.177) 
Excess water 0.176(0.178) -0.365**(0.147) -0.007(0.132) 
Water ownership -0.000(0.050) -0.108***(0.037) -0.074**(0.037) 
Succession -0.233(0.154) 0.265**(0.110) 0.493***(0.109) 
past strategy 1.585***(0.170) 1.044***(0.128) 0.838***(0.112) 
correlation between 2 and 1   0.043(0.087) 
correlation between 3 and 1   0.244***(0.086) 
correlation between instrument and 1   0.103(0.144) 
correlation between 3 and 2   0.393***(0.071) 
correlation between instrument and 2   -0.231*(0.122) 
correlation between instrument and 3   -0.234*(0.122) 
Constant -0.767(1.789) -2.084*(1.245) -0.072(1.198) 
AIC 3236.315   
BIC 3909.271   
Observations 904 904 904 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 




Table C.21 Planned compound adaptation strategy more irrigation 2 full model 
regression results 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Compound strategy more irrigation 2 
VARIABLES Solar More efficiency More irrigation 
Farm debt 1.034**(0.443) 0.611(0.495) 1.043**(0.468) 
Farm debt squared -0.738**(0.345) -0.207(0.394) -0.731**(0.361) 
Farmland value -0.199(0.259) -0.046(0.273) -0.302(0.273) 
Farmland value squared 0.065(0.074) -0.004(0.080) 0.092(0.077) 
Net farm income 4.452*(2.441) 0.846(2.670) 0.433(2.547) 
Net farm income squared -20.983**(9.277) -3.674(10.218) -3.089(9.504) 
Number of insurances 0.077*(0.039) 0.096**(0.039) 0.066*(0.040) 
Off farm income -0.001(0.002) -0.002(0.002) -0.002(0.002) 
Productivity change 0.053(0.043) 0.119***(0.045) 0.132***(0.046) 
Irrigation grant 0.130(0.116) -0.473***(0.127) -0.205*(0.123) 
Climate change risk perception 0.545***(0.166) 0.561***(0.172) 0.235(0.187) 
Age 0.032(0.033) 0.031(0.036) -0.035(0.033) 
Age squared -0.000(0.000) -0.000(0.000) 0.000(0.000) 
Low education 0.066(0.141) -0.090(0.142) -0.064(0.150) 
Male gender -0.193(0.138) 0.043(0.154) 0.203(0.150) 
Number of employees 0.026*(0.014) 0.033(0.026) 0.016(0.015) 
Whole of farm plan 0.233*(0.120) 0.199(0.122) 0.331***(0.126) 
Historic net rainfall -0.000(0.000) -0.000(0.000) -0.000(0.000) 
Average historic water allocation factor 0.259(0.215) 0.036(0.221) -0.076(0.216) 
Historic temperature volatility 0.137(0.909) -0.827(0.958) -0.354(0.872) 
Application rate -0.006(0.013) -0.015(0.013) 0.010(0.010) 
Broadacre -0.323(0.205) 0.141(0.225) -0.118(0.204) 
Carry-over use between 2014-2016 -0.073(0.123) 0.277**(0.124) -0.094(0.127) 
Dairy -0.292(0.211) 0.030(0.245) -0.097(0.220) 
Farm Size 0.001(0.002) -0.004**(0.002) -0.003*(0.002) 
Livestock -0.325(0.211) 0.152(0.226) -0.061(0.212) 
Majority of farm area under drainage 0.086(0.123) -0.001(0.127) -0.122(0.125) 
Majority of farm area under drip irrigation -0.207(0.172) -0.504***(0.186) -0.141(0.176) 
Excess water -0.089(0.125) -0.182(0.135) -0.003(0.131) 
Water ownership -0.032(0.036) 0.070*(0.036) -0.061*(0.036) 
Succession 0.236**(0.105) 0.386***(0.114) 0.463***(0.111) 
past strategy 1.418***(0.164) 1.138***(0.115) 0.817***(0.110) 
correlation between 2 and 1   0.348***(0.069) 
correlation between 3 and 1   0.130**(0.063) 
correlation between instrument and 1   -0.263**(0.120) 
correlation between 3 and 2   0.548***(0.079) 
correlation between instrument and 2   -0.268**(0.117) 
correlation between instrument and 3   -0.243*(0.130) 
Constant -2.092*(1.201) -2.404*(1.306) 0.017(1.172) 
AIC 3739.008   
BIC 4411.964   
Observations 904 904 904 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 




Table C.22 Planned compound adaptation strategy more irrigation 3 full model 
regression results 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Compound strategy more irrigation 3 
VARIABLES Sell entitlement More efficiency More irrigation 
Farm debt -0.484(0.519) 0.659(0.497) 1.023**(0.469) 
Farm debt squared 0.526(0.400) -0.254(0.396) -0.720**(0.361) 
Farmland value -0.471(0.291) -0.027(0.271) -0.298(0.273) 
Farmland value squared 0.130(0.084) -0.007(0.080) 0.092(0.077) 
Net farm income 1.391(2.742) 0.915(2.686) 0.612(2.547) 
Net farm income squared -6.642(10.345) -4.298(10.257) -3.923(9.487) 
Number of insurances 0.022(0.042) 0.099**(0.039) 0.067*(0.039) 
Off farm income -0.002(0.002) -0.002(0.002) -0.002(0.002) 
Productivity change -0.087*(0.046) 0.112**(0.045) 0.129***(0.046) 
Irrigation grant 0.069(0.136) -0.474***(0.127) -0.192(0.123) 
Climate change risk perception -0.085(0.177) 0.556***(0.171) 0.251(0.188) 
Age 0.019(0.037) 0.033(0.036) -0.037(0.032) 
Age squared -0.000(0.000) -0.000(0.000) 0.000(0.000) 
Low education -0.048(0.151) -0.062(0.144) -0.070(0.150) 
Male gender 0.023(0.167) 0.053(0.154) 0.200(0.149) 
Number of employees 0.023(0.016) 0.033(0.026) 0.017(0.015) 
Whole of farm plan -0.083(0.133) 0.197(0.122) 0.329***(0.127) 
Historic net rainfall -0.000(0.000) -0.000(0.000) -0.000(0.000) 
Average historic water allocation factor 0.571**(0.264) 0.008(0.224) -0.081(0.217) 
Historic temperature volatility 0.016(1.026) -0.892(0.943) -0.425(0.869) 
Application rate -0.011(0.011) -0.014(0.013) 0.011(0.010) 
Broadacre 0.084(0.220) 0.132(0.222) -0.101(0.203) 
Carry-over use between 2014-2016 -0.129(0.130) 0.298**(0.123) -0.095(0.126) 
Dairy 0.016(0.239) -0.008(0.242) -0.086(0.219) 
Farm Size 0.001(0.002) -0.004**(0.002) -0.003*(0.002) 
Livestock -0.111(0.235) 0.132(0.222) -0.044(0.211) 
Majority of farm area under drainage 0.245*(0.129) -0.004(0.127) -0.114(0.125) 
Majority of farm area under drip irrigation -0.198(0.186) -0.487***(0.185) -0.133(0.177) 
Excess water 0.550***(0.127) -0.183(0.136) -0.017(0.132) 
Water ownership -0.029(0.041) 0.069*(0.036) -0.063*(0.036) 
Succession -0.377***(0.117) 0.391***(0.115) 0.467***(0.111) 
past strategy 0.256**(0.114) 1.150***(0.118) 0.807***(0.110) 
correlation between 2 and 1   -0.135*(0.069) 
correlation between 3 and 1   -0.181***(0.070) 
correlation between instrument and 1   0.076(0.112) 
correlation between 3 and 2   0.552***(0.079) 
correlation between instrument and 2   -0.263**(0.117) 
correlation between instrument and 3   -0.252*(0.131) 
Constant -1.612(1.381) -2.384*(1.319) 0.120(1.163) 
AIC 3517.916   
BIC 4190.872   
Observations 904 904 904 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 




Table C.23 Planned compound adaptation strategy more irrigation 4 full model 
regression results 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Compound strategy more irrigation 4 
VARIABLES 
Change 
production More efficiency More irrigation 
Farm debt 1.080**(0.480) 0.659(0.495) 1.105**(0.465) 
Farm debt squared -0.809**(0.371) -0.249(0.396) -0.784**(0.358) 
Farmland value -0.389(0.257) -0.030(0.270) -0.307(0.271) 
Farmland value squared 0.088(0.074) -0.008(0.079) 0.095(0.077) 
Net farm income 1.869(2.523) 0.579(2.680) 0.530(2.543) 
Net farm income squared -7.421(9.395) -3.237(10.253) -3.854(9.504) 
Number of insurances 0.071*(0.040) 0.098**(0.040) 0.072*(0.039) 
Off farm income -0.003(0.002) -0.002(0.002) -0.002(0.002) 
Productivity change -0.074*(0.044) 0.109**(0.045) 0.127***(0.045) 
Irrigation grant -0.015(0.124) -0.488***(0.127) -0.217*(0.123) 
Climate change risk perception 0.414**(0.171) 0.637***(0.172) 0.306(0.191) 
Age 0.029(0.036) 0.044(0.035) -0.033(0.032) 
Age squared -0.000(0.000) -0.000(0.000) 0.000(0.000) 
Low education -0.002(0.141) -0.069(0.144) -0.091(0.150) 
Male gender 0.216*(0.131) 0.037(0.159) 0.218(0.150) 
Number of employees 0.039*(0.022) 0.035(0.026) 0.019(0.015) 
Whole of farm plan 0.202*(0.122) 0.181(0.122) 0.324**(0.127) 
Historic net rainfall -0.000(0.000) -0.000(0.000) -0.000(0.000) 
Average historic water allocation factor -0.213(0.216) 0.009(0.226) -0.064(0.217) 
Historic temperature volatility -0.432(0.921) -0.822(0.933) -0.328(0.872) 
Application rate -0.003(0.013) -0.014(0.013) 0.009(0.010) 
Broadacre 0.102(0.215) 0.138(0.220) -0.116(0.200) 
Carry-over use between 2014-2016 -0.081(0.122) 0.298**(0.124) -0.081(0.124) 
Dairy -0.104(0.227) 0.004(0.241) -0.089(0.216) 
Farm Size -0.001(0.002) -0.004**(0.002) -0.003*(0.002) 
Livestock 0.149(0.215) 0.159(0.222) -0.072(0.209) 
Majority of farm area under drainage 0.051(0.119) 0.004(0.127) -0.112(0.125) 
Majority of farm area under drip irrigation -0.373*(0.195) -0.460**(0.183) -0.121(0.176) 
Excess water -0.127(0.133) -0.179(0.135) 0.002(0.132) 
Water ownership 0.029(0.036) 0.067*(0.037) -0.063*(0.036) 
Succession 0.308***(0.109) 0.404***(0.115) 0.474***(0.111) 
past strategy 1.395***(0.103) 1.156***(0.118) 0.775***(0.110) 
correlation between 2 and 1   0.396***(0.076) 
correlation between 3 and 1   0.381***(0.070) 
correlation between instrument and 1   -0.194*(0.117) 
correlation between 3 and 2   0.545***(0.079) 
correlation between instrument and 2   -0.332***(0.121) 
correlation between instrument and 3   -0.298**(0.138) 
Constant -1.547(1.300) -2.772**(1.274) -0.126(1.164) 
AIC 3636.111   
BIC 4309.067   
Observations 904 904 904 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 





Table C.24 Planned compound adaptation strategy more irrigation 5 full model 
regression results 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Compound strategy more irrigation 5 
VARIABLES Buy entitlement More efficiency More irrigation 
Farm debt 1.276***(0.467) 0.675(0.498) 1.046**(0.471) 
Farm debt squared -0.840**(0.363) -0.254(0.397) -0.730**(0.361) 
Farmland value 0.143(0.272) -0.046(0.271) -0.303(0.273) 
Farmland value squared -0.013(0.077) -0.004(0.080) 0.090(0.077) 
Net farm income 3.409(2.519) 0.689(2.693) 0.065(2.546) 
Net farm income squared -7.973(9.350) -3.118(10.288) -1.755(9.470) 
Number of insurances 0.124***(0.040) 0.098**(0.039) 0.072*(0.040) 
Off farm income -0.003(0.002) -0.002(0.002) -0.002(0.002) 
Productivity change 0.058(0.044) 0.113**(0.045) 0.140***(0.045) 
Irrigation grant 0.081(0.121) -0.472***(0.127) -0.205*(0.123) 
Climate change risk perception 0.205(0.194) 0.588***(0.174) 0.289(0.192) 
Age 0.008(0.033) 0.035(0.037) -0.032(0.033) 
Age squared -0.000(0.000) -0.000(0.000) 0.000(0.000) 
Low education 0.120(0.154) -0.063(0.144) -0.043(0.151) 
Male gender 0.303**(0.151) 0.051(0.155) 0.178(0.149) 
Number of employees 0.040**(0.020) 0.033(0.026) 0.016(0.015) 
Whole of farm plan 0.133(0.122) 0.197(0.122) 0.328***(0.127) 
Historic net rainfall -0.001**(0.000) -0.000(0.000) 0.000(0.000) 
Average historic water allocation factor 0.425*(0.226) 0.011(0.224) -0.066(0.217) 
Historic temperature volatility -1.075(0.933) -0.842(0.942) -0.383(0.869) 
Application rate -0.005(0.013) -0.015(0.013) 0.011(0.010) 
Broadacre -0.269(0.220) 0.129(0.222) -0.099(0.205) 
Carry-over use between 2014-2016 0.138(0.128) 0.286**(0.123) -0.114(0.127) 
Dairy -0.444*(0.237) -0.003(0.242) -0.059(0.221) 
Farm Size -0.001(0.002) -0.004**(0.002) -0.003**(0.002) 
Livestock -0.132(0.224) 0.141(0.222) -0.026(0.214) 
Majority of farm area under drainage 0.229*(0.127) -0.004(0.128) -0.109(0.125) 
Majority of farm area under drip irrigation -0.218(0.186) -0.482***(0.184) -0.117(0.176) 
Excess water -0.361**(0.147) -0.185(0.135) -0.000(0.130) 
Water ownership -0.108***(0.037) 0.072*(0.037) -0.059(0.036) 
Succession 0.265**(0.111) 0.396***(0.115) 0.482***(0.111) 
past strategy 1.042***(0.126) 1.141***(0.118) 0.779***(0.110) 
correlation between 2 and 1   0.200***(0.074) 
correlation between 3 and 1   0.339***(0.069) 
correlation between instrument and 1   -0.231*(0.134) 
correlation between 3 and 2   0.539***(0.078) 
correlation between instrument and 2   -0.294**(0.122) 
correlation between instrument and 3   -0.284**(0.136) 
Constant -2.102*(1.247) -2.470*(1.319) -0.053(1.179) 
AIC 3616.968   
BIC 4289.925   
Observations 904 904 904 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 




Table C.25 Planned compound adaptation strategy more irrigation 6 full model 
regression results 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Compound strategy more irrigation 6 
VARIABLES Change production More efficiency More irrigation 
Farm debt 1.080**(0.480) 0.659(0.495) 1.105**(0.465) 
Farm debt squared -0.809**(0.371) -0.249(0.396) -0.784**(0.358) 
Farmland value -0.389(0.257) -0.030(0.270) -0.307(0.271) 
Farmland value squared 0.088(0.074) -0.008(0.079) 0.095(0.077) 
Net farm income 1.869(2.523) 0.579(2.680) 0.530(2.543) 
Net farm income squared -7.421(9.395) -3.237(10.253) -3.854(9.504) 
Number of insurances 0.071*(0.040) 0.098**(0.040) 0.072*(0.039) 
Off farm income -0.003(0.002) -0.002(0.002) -0.002(0.002) 
Productivity change -0.074*(0.044) 0.109**(0.045) 0.127***(0.045) 
Irrigation grant -0.015(0.124) -0.488***(0.127) -0.217*(0.123) 
Climate change risk perception 0.414**(0.171) 0.637***(0.172) 0.306(0.191) 
Age 0.029(0.036) 0.044(0.035) -0.033(0.032) 
Age squared -0.000(0.000) -0.000(0.000) 0.000(0.000) 
Low education -0.002(0.141) -0.069(0.144) -0.091(0.150) 
Male gender 0.216*(0.131) 0.037(0.159) 0.218(0.150) 
Number of employees 0.039*(0.022) 0.035(0.026) 0.019(0.015) 
Whole of farm plan 0.202*(0.122) 0.181(0.122) 0.324**(0.127) 
Historic net rainfall -0.000(0.000) -0.000(0.000) -0.000(0.000) 
Average historic water allocation factor -0.213(0.216) 0.009(0.226) -0.064(0.217) 
Historic temperature volatility -0.432(0.921) -0.822(0.933) -0.328(0.872) 
Application rate -0.003(0.013) -0.014(0.013) 0.009(0.010) 
Broadacre 0.102(0.215) 0.138(0.220) -0.116(0.200) 
Carry-over use between 2014-2016 -0.081(0.122) 0.298**(0.124) -0.081(0.124) 
Dairy -0.104(0.227) 0.004(0.241) -0.089(0.216) 
Farm Size -0.001(0.002) -0.004**(0.002) -0.003*(0.002) 
Livestock 0.149(0.215) 0.159(0.222) -0.072(0.209) 
Majority of farm area under drainage 0.051(0.119) 0.004(0.127) -0.112(0.125) 
Majority of farm area under drip irrigation -0.373*(0.195) -0.460**(0.183) -0.121(0.176) 
Excess water -0.127(0.133) -0.179(0.135) 0.002(0.132) 
Water ownership 0.029(0.036) 0.067*(0.037) -0.063*(0.036) 
Succession 0.308***(0.109) 0.404***(0.115) 0.474***(0.111) 
past strategy 1.395***(0.103) 1.156***(0.118) 0.775***(0.110) 
correlation between 2 and 1   0.396***(0.076) 
correlation between 3 and 1   0.381***(0.070) 
correlation between instrument and 1   -0.194*(0.117) 
correlation between 3 and 2   0.545***(0.079) 
correlation between instrument and 2   -0.332***(0.121) 
correlation between instrument and 3   -0.298**(0.138) 
Constant -1.547(1.300) -2.772**(1.274) -0.126(1.164) 
AIC 3636.111   
BIC 4309.067   
Observations 904 904 904 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 




Table C.26 Planned compound adaptation strategy land ownership 1 full model 
regression results 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Compound strategy land 1 
VARIABLES 
Buy land in 
different region Diversify Sell land 
Farm debt 1.243**(0.622) 0.988**(0.473) -0.121(0.488) 
Farm debt squared -0.756(0.465) -0.709*(0.372) 0.435(0.384) 
Farmland value -0.200(0.391) -0.316(0.283) -0.060(0.270) 
Farmland value squared 0.088(0.107) 0.113(0.082) 0.008(0.079) 
Net farm income -0.915(3.374) 2.405(2.558) 2.658(2.550) 
Net farm income squared 3.237(12.581) -9.877(9.659) -13.463(9.764) 
Number of insurances -0.002(0.050) 0.033(0.039) -0.017(0.040) 
Off farm income -0.004(0.003) 0.000(0.002) 0.002(0.002) 
Productivity change -0.026(0.058) -0.026(0.044) -0.108**(0.044) 
Irrigation grant 0.268*(0.146) -0.056(0.130) 0.055(0.125) 
Climate change risk perception 0.385(0.256) 0.459***(0.175) 0.004(0.177) 
Age -0.000(0.042) -0.003(0.037) -0.009(0.036) 
Age squared -0.000(0.000) -0.000(0.000) 0.000(0.000) 
Low education 0.245(0.188) -0.132(0.148) 0.334**(0.137) 
Male gender 0.155(0.192) 0.032(0.157) -0.010(0.152) 
Number of employees 0.006(0.016) 0.003(0.021) -0.046*(0.027) 
Whole of farm plan -0.003(0.165) 0.257*(0.136) 0.056(0.124) 
Historic net rainfall -0.001**(0.000) -0.000(0.000) 0.000(0.000) 
Average historic water allocation factor -0.130(0.281) 0.070(0.222) -0.307(0.228) 
Historic temperature volatility -1.115(1.513) 0.004(0.970) 2.343**(1.032) 
Application rate -0.054**(0.022) -0.009(0.014) 0.002(0.012) 
Broadacre 0.732***(0.269) 0.005(0.213) -0.480**(0.222) 
Carry-over use between 2014-2016 0.159(0.169) -0.058(0.128) -0.044(0.126) 
Dairy 0.574*(0.313) -0.315(0.235) -0.302(0.235) 
Farm Size 0.003(0.002) -0.001(0.002) 0.001(0.002) 
Livestock 0.497*(0.291) -0.337(0.225) -0.587***(0.224) 
Majority of farm area under drainage 0.009(0.159) 0.157(0.127) 0.046(0.121) 
Majority of farm area under drip irrigation 0.136(0.294) -0.364*(0.188) 0.024(0.176) 
Excess water -0.158(0.191) -0.026(0.140) 0.457***(0.123) 
Water ownership -0.037(0.043) -0.030(0.038) 0.075**(0.038) 
Succession 0.133(0.139) 0.254**(0.110) -0.572***(0.118) 
past strategy 1.362***(0.214) 1.630***(0.107) 0.415***(0.149) 
correlation between 2 and 1   0.055(0.088) 
correlation between 3 and 1   0.072(0.089) 
correlation between instrument and 1   -0.126(0.171) 
correlation between 3 and 2   0.006(0.075) 
correlation between instrument and 2   -0.256**(0.122) 
correlation between instrument and 3   -0.086(0.117) 
Constant -1.623(1.692) -1.180(1.320) -2.173*(1.292) 
AIC 3321.018   
BIC 3993.974   
Observations 904 904 904 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 




Table C.27 Planned compound adaptation strategy land ownership 2 full model 
regression results 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Compound strategy land 2 
VARIABLES Less irrigation Sell entitlement Sell land 
Farm debt 0.899(0.564) -0.423(0.513) -0.230(0.491) 
Farm debt squared -0.537(0.434) 0.495(0.397) 0.523(0.387) 
Farmland value -0.034(0.321) -0.497*(0.288) -0.043(0.265) 
Farmland value squared -0.005(0.091) 0.137*(0.083) 0.009(0.078) 
Net farm income 3.667(3.216) 1.794(2.738) 2.838(2.551) 
Net farm income squared -10.575(12.084) -7.490(10.230) -14.308(9.674) 
Number of insurances -0.013(0.048) 0.020(0.041) -0.017(0.040) 
Off farm income 0.001(0.002) -0.002(0.002) 0.002(0.002) 
Productivity change -0.302***(0.056) -0.091*(0.047) -0.110**(0.043) 
Irrigation grant -0.079(0.146) 0.054(0.134) 0.020(0.122) 
Climate change risk perception -0.060(0.249) -0.221(0.160) 0.014(0.164) 
Age -0.072**(0.035) 0.021(0.037) -0.011(0.036) 
Age squared 0.001**(0.000) -0.000(0.000) 0.000(0.000) 
Low education 0.325**(0.162) -0.056(0.147) 0.368***(0.135) 
Male gender -0.072(0.175) 0.018(0.166) -0.015(0.151) 
Number of employees -0.004(0.022) 0.019(0.016) -0.052**(0.025) 
Whole of farm plan 0.179(0.144) -0.098(0.132) 0.075(0.124) 
Historic net rainfall 0.000(0.000) -0.000(0.000) 0.000(0.000) 
Average historic water allocation factor 0.009(0.286) 0.544**(0.264) -0.322(0.220) 
Historic temperature volatility -0.259(1.081) 0.003(0.988) 2.318**(1.049) 
Application rate -0.004(0.013) -0.011(0.010) 0.001(0.011) 
Broadacre -0.433(0.272) 0.052(0.214) -0.516**(0.217) 
Carry-over use between 2014-2016 0.124(0.155) -0.113(0.129) -0.029(0.124) 
Dairy -0.088(0.291) -0.009(0.235) -0.337(0.235) 
Farm Size -0.001(0.002) 0.000(0.002) 0.001(0.002) 
Livestock -0.273(0.275) -0.135(0.229) -0.602***(0.220) 
Majority of farm area under drainage 0.245*(0.143) 0.244*(0.129) 0.040(0.121) 
Majority of farm area under drip irrigation 0.287(0.222) -0.197(0.185) 0.045(0.175) 
Excess water 0.236(0.149) 0.548***(0.128) 0.428***(0.126) 
Water ownership 0.028(0.046) -0.029(0.040) 0.074**(0.037) 
Succession -0.292**(0.137) -0.383***(0.117) -0.603***(0.117) 
past strategy 1.123***(0.125) 0.282***(0.108) 0.322**(0.140) 
correlation between 2 and 1   0.353***(0.082) 
correlation between 3 and 1   0.443***(0.083) 
correlation between instrument and 1   -0.014(0.165) 
correlation between 3 and 2   0.458***(0.074) 
correlation between instrument and 2   0.178*(0.097) 
correlation between instrument and 3   -0.095(0.107) 
Constant 1.564(1.410) -1.494(1.380) -2.042(1.325) 
AIC 3254.758   
BIC 3927.714   
Observations 904 904 904 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 




Table C.28 Planned compound adaptation strategy farm business full model regression 
results 
  (1) (2) (3) 






Farm debt 0.361(0.530) 1.053**(0.474) 0.993**(0.464) 
Farm debt squared -0.176(0.416) -0.779**(0.372) -0.691*(0.366) 
Farmland value -0.815***(0.312) -0.337(0.258) -0.230(0.283) 
Farmland value squared 0.219**(0.089) 0.074(0.074) 0.089(0.082) 
Net farm income 2.999(2.921) 1.994(2.501) 1.952(2.534) 
Net farm income squared -12.327(10.850) -6.566(9.345) -8.106(9.687) 
Number of insurances 0.082*(0.047) 0.066(0.040) 0.022(0.039) 
Off farm income -0.003*(0.002) -0.002(0.002) -0.000(0.002) 
Productivity change 0.060(0.048) -0.065(0.044) -0.024(0.045) 
Irrigation grant 0.042(0.129) 0.010(0.123) 0.026(0.129) 
Climate change risk perception 0.469**(0.208) 0.230(0.187) 0.459***(0.163) 
Age -0.006(0.034) 0.023(0.035) -0.000(0.036) 
Age squared -0.000(0.000) -0.000(0.000) -0.000(0.000) 
Low education -0.110(0.159) 0.012(0.151) -0.151(0.147) 
Male gender 0.107(0.166) 0.208(0.132) 0.016(0.157) 
Number of employees -0.010(0.015) 0.042*(0.021) 0.002(0.019) 
Whole of farm plan 0.412***(0.152) 0.188(0.123) 0.262**(0.131) 
Historic net rainfall 0.000(0.000) -0.000(0.000) -0.000(0.000) 
Average historic water allocation factor -0.297(0.227) -0.212(0.220) 0.079(0.222) 
Historic temperature volatility -0.252(1.032) -0.333(0.980) 0.269(0.952) 
Application rate -0.011(0.014) -0.002(0.012) -0.011(0.013) 
Broadacre -0.395*(0.223) 0.107(0.222) -0.014(0.212) 
Carry-over use between 2014-2016 0.230*(0.136) -0.035(0.125) -0.070(0.128) 
Dairy -0.216(0.234) -0.085(0.235) -0.348(0.235) 
Farm Size 0.003(0.002) -0.001(0.002) -0.001(0.001) 
Livestock -0.274(0.224) 0.131(0.222) -0.341(0.220) 
Majority of farm area under drainage -0.040(0.137) 0.036(0.121) 0.164(0.124) 
Majority of farm area under drip irrigation -0.190(0.206) -0.313(0.200) -0.405**(0.185) 
Excess water -0.004(0.144) -0.135(0.133) -0.040(0.139) 
Water ownership -0.038(0.040) 0.012(0.036) -0.036(0.038) 
Succession 0.123(0.122) 0.278**(0.109) 0.228**(0.109) 
past strategy 2.236***(0.173) 1.436***(0.100) 1.551***(0.102) 
correlation between 2 and 1   0.234***(0.078) 
correlation between 3 and 1   0.225***(0.076) 
correlation between instrument and 1   -0.300*(0.154) 
correlation between 3 and 2   0.598***(0.085) 
correlation between instrument and 2   -0.030(0.125) 
correlation between instrument and 3   -0.264**(0.114) 
Constant -0.858(1.292) -1.374(1.274) -1.421(1.288) 
AIC 3419.504   
BIC 4092.305   
Observations 903 903 903 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 




Table C.29 Planned compound adaptation strategy farm exit full model regression 
results 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Compound strategy farm exit 
VARIABLES Farm exit Sell land Sell entitlement 
Farm debt -0.812(0.535) -0.210(0.491) -0.586(0.514) 
Farm debt squared 0.820*(0.419) 0.482(0.384) 0.613(0.397) 
Farmland value 0.881***(0.305) -0.039(0.269) -0.453(0.287) 
Farmland value squared -0.244***(0.087) 0.009(0.078) 0.127(0.082) 
Net farm income 1.201(2.798) 2.200(2.603) 1.320(2.741) 
Net farm income squared -9.144(10.485) -12.174(9.860) -6.177(10.254) 
Number of insurances 0.035(0.048) -0.016(0.041) 0.022(0.041) 
Off farm income -0.001(0.002) 0.001(0.002) -0.003(0.002) 
Productivity change 0.015(0.050) -0.105**(0.044) -0.087*(0.047) 
Climate change risk perception 0.299(0.204) 0.074(0.204) 0.074(0.211) 
Age 0.073**(0.036) -0.009(0.036) -0.009(0.036) 
Age squared -0.000(0.000) 0.000(0.000) 0.000(0.000) 
Low education 0.120(0.163) 0.348**(0.163) 0.348**(0.138) 
Male gender 0.377**(0.169) -0.012(0.169) -0.012(0.151) 
Number of employees -0.053**(0.023) -0.041*(0.023) -0.041*(0.023) 
Whole of farm plan -0.007(0.134) 0.057(0.134) 0.057(0.123) 
Historic net rainfall -0.000(0.000) 0.000(0.000) 0.000(0.000) 
Average historic water allocation factor -0.583**(0.250) -0.292(0.250) -0.292(0.226) 
Historic temperature volatility 1.175(1.021) 2.302**(1.021) 2.302**(1.029) 
Application rate 0.022(0.015) 0.004(0.015) 0.004(0.012) 
Broadacre -0.529***(0.205) -0.462**(0.205) -0.462**(0.221) 
Carry-over use between 2014-2016 0.056(0.137) -0.025(0.137) -0.025(0.128) 
Dairy -0.308(0.226) -0.301(0.226) -0.301(0.236) 
Farm Size -0.002(0.003) 0.001(0.003) 0.001(0.002) 
Livestock -0.429*(0.220) -0.582***(0.220) -0.582***(0.225) 
Majority of farm area under drainage 0.005(0.139) 0.041(0.139) 0.041(0.120) 
Majority of farm area under drip irrigation -0.005(0.190) 0.027(0.190) 0.027(0.175) 
Excess water 0.160(0.154) 0.455***(0.154) 0.455***(0.125) 
Water ownership -0.053(0.035) 0.065*(0.035) 0.065*(0.036) 
Succession -0.727***(0.120) -0.563***(0.120) -0.563***(0.119) 
past strategy 1.944***(0.124) 0.444***(0.144) 0.307***(0.106) 
correlation between 2 and 1   0.392***(0.088) 
correlation between 3 and 1   0.273***(0.082) 
correlation between instrument and 1   -0.112(0.127) 
correlation between 3 and 2   0.481***(0.078) 
correlation between instrument and 2   -0.131(0.143) 
correlation between instrument and 3   0.058(0.121) 
Constant -4.480***(1.309) -2.147*(1.283) -1.468(1.372) 
AIC 3363.393   
BIC 4017.122   
Observations 904 904 904 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 





Table C.30 Planned compound adaptation strategy irrigation grant influence 1 full 
model regression results 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Compound strategy irrigation grant 1 
VARIABLES Buy entitlement Irrigation grant More irrigation 
Farm debt 1.251***(0.466) -0.618(0.471) 1.075**(0.468) 
Farm debt squared -0.819**(0.362) 0.570(0.365) -0.766**(0.362) 
Farmland value 0.152(0.273) 0.039(0.267) -0.258(0.273) 
Farmland value squared -0.015(0.077) 0.011(0.075) 0.079(0.077) 
Net farm income 3.261(2.511) -1.740(2.619) -0.021(2.540) 
Net farm income squared -7.457(9.335) 4.206(9.761) -1.458(9.470) 
Number of insurances 0.124***(0.040) -0.010(0.038) 0.066*(0.040) 
Off farm income -0.003*(0.002) -0.003(0.002) -0.002(0.002) 
Productivity change 0.061(0.044) 0.138***(0.047) 0.127***(0.045) 
Climate change risk perception 0.209(0.194) 0.034(0.184) 0.224(0.186) 
Age 0.007(0.033) -0.028(0.032) -0.028(0.032) 
Age squared -0.000(0.000) 0.000(0.000) 0.000(0.000) 
Low education 0.117(0.154) -0.097(0.153) -0.026(0.153) 
Male gender 0.309**(0.152) -0.139(0.156) 0.197(0.150) 
Number of employees 0.039**(0.020) 0.014(0.015) 0.015(0.014) 
Whole of farm plan 0.142(0.122) 0.231*(0.125) 0.320**(0.128) 
Historic net rainfall -0.001**(0.000) 0.000(0.000) 0.000(0.000) 
Average historic water allocation factor 0.432*(0.226) -0.109(0.247) -0.020(0.224) 
Historic temperature volatility -1.197(0.932) -3.875***(0.897) -0.162(0.887) 
Application rate -0.005(0.013) 0.001(0.011) 0.011(0.010) 
Broadacre -0.264(0.220) -0.004(0.210) -0.058(0.205) 
Carry-over use between 2014-2016 0.134(0.128) 0.125(0.130) -0.112(0.127) 
Dairy -0.447*(0.237) -0.262(0.216) -0.007(0.222) 
Farm Size -0.001(0.002) -0.003(0.002) -0.003*(0.002) 
Livestock -0.131(0.224) -0.174(0.220) -0.001(0.215) 
Majority of farm area under drainage 0.243*(0.127) 0.429***(0.126) -0.161(0.122) 
Majority of farm area under drip irrigation -0.210(0.187) 0.347*(0.189) -0.110(0.177) 
Excess water -0.364**(0.147) -0.160(0.135) -0.007(0.130) 
Water ownership -0.106***(0.037) 0.124***(0.042) -0.075**(0.036) 
Succession 0.266**(0.111) 0.089(0.110) 0.485***(0.109) 
past strategy 1.051***(0.127) 0.842***(0.112) 
correlation between 2 and 1   0.053(0.070) 
correlation between 3 and 1   0.338***(0.069) 
correlation between instrument and 1   -0.233*(0.134) 
correlation between 3 and 2   -0.100(0.071) 
correlation between instrument and 2   0.076(0.122) 
correlation between instrument and 3   -0.238*(0.127) 
Constant -1.989(1.253) 2.058*(1.158) -0.310(1.173) 
AIC 3716.53   
BIC 4360.645   
Observations 904 904 904 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 




Table C.31 Planned compound adaptation strategy irrigation grant influence 2 full 
model regression results 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Compound strategy irrigation grant 2 
VARIABLES Change production Irrigation grant More irrigation 
Farm debt 1.045**(0.478) -0.611(0.472) 1.151**(0.464) 
Farm debt squared -0.793**(0.371) 0.566(0.365) -0.836**(0.358) 
Farmland value -0.399(0.258) 0.041(0.268) -0.260(0.271) 
Farmland value squared 0.092(0.074) 0.011(0.075) 0.082(0.077) 
Net farm income 1.741(2.541) -1.657(2.618) 0.521(2.550) 
Net farm income squared -6.799(9.461) 3.911(9.752) -3.913(9.528) 
Number of insurances 0.071*(0.040) -0.009(0.038) 0.066*(0.039) 
Off farm income -0.003(0.002) -0.003*(0.002) -0.002(0.002) 
Productivity change -0.071(0.044) 0.138***(0.047) 0.116***(0.045) 
Climate change risk perception 0.373**(0.180) 0.020(0.188) 0.229(0.196) 
Age 0.028(0.036) -0.029(0.032) -0.033(0.031) 
Age squared -0.000(0.000) 0.000(0.000) 0.000(0.000) 
Low education 0.001(0.143) -0.100(0.152) -0.064(0.152) 
Male gender 0.223*(0.132) -0.137(0.156) 0.226(0.152) 
Number of employees 0.036*(0.021) 0.014(0.015) 0.018(0.015) 
Whole of farm plan 0.198(0.122) 0.229*(0.125) 0.321**(0.128) 
Historic net rainfall -0.000(0.000) 0.000(0.000) -0.000(0.000) 
Average historic water allocation factor -0.216(0.218) -0.104(0.247) -0.029(0.224) 
Historic temperature volatility -0.406(0.915) -3.870***(0.895) -0.078(0.887) 
Application rate -0.001(0.013) 0.001(0.011) 0.009(0.010) 
Broadacre 0.112(0.216) -0.009(0.210) -0.093(0.202) 
Carry-over use between 2014-2016 -0.082(0.123) 0.130(0.130) -0.088(0.124) 
Dairy -0.083(0.229) -0.270(0.217) -0.048(0.219) 
Farm Size -0.001(0.002) -0.003(0.002) -0.003(0.002) 
Livestock 0.154(0.218) -0.179(0.220) -0.066(0.212) 
Majority of farm area under drainage 0.057(0.120) 0.428***(0.126) -0.155(0.123) 
Majority of farm area under drip irrigation -0.349*(0.193) 0.339*(0.189) -0.121(0.176) 
Excess water -0.119(0.133) -0.155(0.135) 0.006(0.131) 
Water ownership 0.027(0.036) 0.123***(0.042) -0.075**(0.035) 
Succession 0.298***(0.109) 0.085(0.110) 0.473***(0.110) 
past strategy 1.428***(0.103) 0.831***(0.112) 
correlation between 2 and 1   0.005(0.071) 
correlation between 3 and 1   0.376***(0.071) 
correlation between instrument and 1   -0.164(0.122) 
correlation between 3 and 2   -0.110(0.072) 
correlation between instrument and 2   0.089(0.126) 
correlation between instrument and 3   -0.241*(0.138) 
Constant -1.542(1.281) 2.083*(1.157) -0.303(1.156) 
AIC 3754.728   
BIC 4398.843   
Observations 904 904 904 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Due to a geo-hydrological phenomenon near the town of Barmah (Barmah 
Choke), only around 7,000 ML/day can be transferred from the important 
upstream storages Dartmouth and Hume dam to the lower Murray 
catchment in New South Wales and Victoria (Zone 10 to 11, and Zone 6 to 
7) and the significant horticultural planting areas of Sunraysia and Riverland 
downstream (MDBA 2019c) 
Carry-over Arrangements which allow water entitlement holders to hold water in 
storages (water allocations not taken in a water accounting period) so that it 
is available in subsequent years (ACCC 2010) 
Counterparty risk The risk that a counterparty defaults on a contractual agreement (Pirrong 
2011) 
Delivery share The legal, and tradeable, right to have water delivered within an irrigation 
system, region or trust run by an irrigation infrastructure operator (Wheeler 
et al. 2014a) 
Financial investors Financial investors are individuals or businesses without land ownership 
who generate their income through trading or leasing water to other parties. 
Although most financial investors own large portfolios of water 
entitlements, some generate their income purely through water trading 
without owning entitlements.  
Inter-valley trade 
restriction (IVT) 
The maximum amount of water transferrable between two catchments, 
either due to hydrological or legal considerations (MDBA 2010c) 
Investors/agri-
corporates 
Investors/agri-corporates are individuals or businesses with large water 
entitlement and/or land ownership, generating their main income (in a 
normal year) through primary production 
Long-term average 
annual yield factor 
(LTAAY) 
LTAAY is the long-term annual average volume of water permitted to be 
taken for consumptive use under a water access entitlement. Currently all 
LTAAY figures are calculated using the long-term diversion limit 
equivalent factors, with these factors to be accredited in finalised state water 
resource plans (Cheesman and Wheeler 2012)  
Parking A contractual arrangement permitting the buyer to store their water 
allocation on the carry-over of the seller, usually from one water accounting 
period to the next (ABARES 2018) 
Risk premium The monetary premium a forward/option seller charges above the spot price 
to compensate for the extra risk they bear through the contractual 
arrangement (Gaydon et al. 2012) 
Spill risk The risk of losing carried over water in the event that a water storage is full 
and needs to release water for storage security purposes (Productivity 
Commission 2010) 
Spot price The market price of a given good/commodity on the day. This usually refers 
to the allocation price in the water market (Bayer and Loch 2017) 
Supply risk The risk associated with uncertainty in future water supply (Bjornlund 2006) 
Tagged Trading Water entitlement holders can establish a “tag”, changing the extraction 
location of allocations associated with an entitlement to a different 
region/zone than the zone of the entitlement (system of origin). Water 
extracted under a tag can only be used, not sold, and gets delivered through 
a “tagged trade”. This delivery can be exempt from inter-valley trade 
restrictions (MDBA 2010d) 
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Unbundling The legal separation of rights to land and rights to access water, have water 
delivered, use water on land or operate water infrastructure, all of which can 
be traded separately (ACCC 2010) 
Unregulated river 
system 
Rivers without major storages or rivers where the storages do not release 
water downstream (Wheeler et al. 2014a) 
Water allocation Also called temporary water, the seasonal allocation received by a given 
water entitlement (Wheeler et al. 2014a) 
Water entitlement Also called permanent water, a right to extract water from a 
watercourse/body every year, subject to climatic conditions. Some water 
entitlements provide access to carry-over. Water entitlements come in 
different securities, with high security yielding a full allocation in 90-95 of 
100 years, general security 42-81 of 100 years, and low security 20-35 of 
100 years. Supplementary and conveyance entitlements only yield water in 
flood years. Unregulated entitlements are in unregulated river systems 
(Cheesman and Wheeler 2012) 
Water forward A contractual arrangement whereby the seller guarantees to deliver a 
defined volume of allocation, for a predetermined price, at a predetermined 
point in time in the future to the buyer. The buyer guarantees to honour the 
contract (Bayer and Loch 2017) 
Water future Water futures currently do not exist in the MDB. Futures are similar to 
forwards in that the seller guarantees to deliver a defined volume of 
allocation, for a predetermined price, at a predetermined point in time in the 
future to the buyer. The difference is that futures are exchange traded: the 
central clearing house collects collateral deposits from the counterparties 
and guarantees contract delivery in case of counterparty default. For most 
futures, the difference between the spot price and price agreed in the future 
contract is credited/debited daily to the counterparties’ accounts (daily cash 
settlement) (Pirrong 2011) 
Water lease A contractual arrangement whereby the lease taker (lessee) receives all 
allocation attributed to a leased water entitlement. The entitlement remains 
property of the lease giver (lessor) (ABARES 2018) 
Water option A contractual arrangement whereby the buyer has the option, but not 
obligation, to deliver/have delivered a defined volume of allocation, for a 
predetermined price, at a predetermined point in time the future to/by the 
seller (Wheeler et al. 2013a) 
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Table D.2 Data sources and corresponding analyses 
Data source Year Observations Analysis Figures/Tables 
Irrigator telephone survey 2015-16 1,000 irrigators Entitlement ownership, entitlement 
ownership diversification, carry-




Semi-structured qualitative expert 
interviews 
2018-19 63 expert interviews (with mainly 38 of 
them used in this paper) 
Water ownership motivation and 
strategies, water trading strategies, 












BOM trade data (Murrumbidgee 
allocations and entitlements) 
Victorian Water Register trade data 
(Goulburn allocations and entitlements) 
H2Ox: private register data (forwards 
and parking) 
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Transfer of a water entitlement without any water allocation or carry-over 
volume as part of the transaction. The price reported to the water register 
only refers to the water entitlement itself. 
“Thin” market/ 
Illiquid market 
A market with only a few sellers and buyers, and a limited number of 
transactions. Water markets are often thin due to hydrological constraints to 
trade (Tisdell 2011) 
“Wet” water 
entitlement sale 
Transfer of a water entitlement which includes some volume of water 
allocation or carry-over. The price reported to the water register may contain 









These expressions mean largely the same. A bona fide transaction is 
between willing but not anxious buyer/seller, who have a reasonable period 
to negotiate the transaction with the property reasonably exposed to the 
market (Land Valuation Bill 2010 (QLD)). Forced transactions, e.g. from 
mortgagor default, or transactions between businesses under the same 
ownership are not bona fide or at arm’s length. 
Carry-over Arrangements which allow water entitlement holders to hold water in 
storages (water allocations not taken in a water accounting period) so that it 
is available in subsequent years (ACCC 2010) 
Impairment of an 
intangible asset and 
impairment testing 
If the market value of an intangible asset is lower than its book value, this 
gets accounted for as an impairment loss equalling the difference between 
the values. If the market value of an intangible asset is higher than the book 
value, no impairment or adjustment is made (AASB 2019b). Intangible 
assets get tested for impairment annually, or when there is indication that the 
asset may be impaired  
Long-term average 
annual yield factor 
(LTAAY) 
LTAAY is the long-term annual average volume of water permitted to be 
taken for consumptive use under a water access entitlement. Currently all 
LTAAY figures are calculated using the long-term diversion limit 
equivalent factors, with these factors to be accredited in finalised state water 
resource plans (Cheesman and Wheeler 2012) 
Overland flow 
entitlements 
Allows water extraction only when there is a flood that goes over the banks 
of the rivers and brings water onto the properties where the entitlements are 
held (Grafton and Williams 2019) 
Supplementary 
water entitlement 
Supplementary water, formerly known as off-allocation water, is surplus 
flow that cannot be captured, or ‘re-regulated’, into storages. When storm 
events result in flows that cannot be captured in storages, and the water is 
not needed to meet current demands or commitments, then regulated rivers 
become unregulated for a period of time. Supplementary water entitlement 






An entitlement to water from major infrastructure that is owned and 
operated by a Water Supply Provider. Supplemented entitlements have a 
higher reliability than unsupplemented entitlements (Hargraves et al. 2013) 
Unbundling The legal separation of rights to land and rights to access water, have water 
delivered, use water on land or operate water infrastructure, all of which can 
be traded separately (ACCC 2010) 
Unregulated river 
system 
Rivers without major storages or rivers where the storages do not release 
water downstream (Wheeler et al. 2014a) 
Unsupplemented 
water entitlement 
An entitlement to take water from higher level river flows (i.e. in excess of 
supplemented water allocation requirements) that is managed by the 
resource manager (Hargraves et al. 2013) 
Water allocation Also called temporary water, the seasonal allocation received by a given 
water entitlement (Cheesman and Wheeler 2012) 
Water entitlement Also called permanent water, a right to extract water from a 
watercourse/body every year, subject to climatic conditions. Some water 
entitlements provide access to carry-over. Water entitlements come in 
different securities, with high security yielding a full allocation in 90-95 of 
100 years, general security 42-81 of 100 years, and low security 20-35 of 
100 years. Supplementary and conveyance entitlements only yield water in 
flood years. Unregulated entitlements are in unregulated river systems 
(Cheesman and Wheeler 2012) 
Zero price trade Trades submitted to the water register with a AUD$0 price. While there are 
legitimate instances of zero price trades (for example, the transfer of an 
entitlement between trading zones by the same owner), it seems common 
practice for sellers to deliberately misreport the price of trades as zero 
dollars (MDBA 2019m) 
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Table E.2 Land and water entitlement valuation legislation 
Act/Bill State(s) and relevance for water entitlement 
valuation 
Land Valuation Bill 2010 QLD: value of rural land is the unimproved 
value of the land in a “bona fide” transaction, 
water allocation (entitlement) value is part of 
the land value. 
Natural Resources Management Act 2004 SA: amended in 2009 for unbundling of water 
from land, makes no provisions for water 
entitlement valuation, allows for a caveat to be 
put on a water entitlement, makes no provisions 
for forced water entitlement sales. 
Rates Act 2004 ACT: value of rural land is the unimproved 
value of land in a transaction at “reasonable 
terms”, no separate provision for water 
entitlements. 
Valuation of Land Act 1916 NSW: value of rural land is the unimproved 
value from a transaction at “reasonable terms” 
by “bona fide” seller/buyer, value of water 
access licence (entitlement) included in land 
value (not used since unbundling), water access 
licence value assessed excluding allocation (not 
used since unbundling).  
Valuation of Land Act 1960 VIC: value of rural land is value of sale by 
“genuine seller” in “ordinary circumstances" of 
comparable properties, valuation can include 
every information the valuer deems relevant to 
take into account.  
Valuation of Land Act 1971 SA: value of rural land is the unimproved value 
realised by “reasonable” sale for comparable 
properties, no separate provision for water, land 
valuation necessary every five years. 
Water Act 1989 VIC: introduced water trade, determines 
valuation of water shares (entitlement) needs to 
be done by a valuer, dictates the order of 
distributing the proceeds of a forced water share 
sale between the interest holders, determines the 
method to calculate and exit fee in an irrigation 
district, enables mortgages on water shares and 
defines the rights of the mortgagee. 
Water Act 2000 QLD: mentions market value of water allocation 
(entitlement) for compensation purposes, makes 
no provisions for water allocation valuation, 
allows for a caveat to be put on water allocation, 
makes no provisions for forced water 
entitlement sales.  
Water Act 2007 Commonwealth: unbundled water from land, 
mentions “market value” of water entitlements, 
method to determine change in “market value” 
subject to “regulations”. 
Water Management Act 2000 NSW: developed water access licences 
(entitlements), makes no provision for the 
valuation of water access licences, allows for a 
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caveat to be put on an access licence, 
determines the order of distributing the proceeds 
of a forced water access licence sale between 
the interest holders. 
Water Resources Act 2007 ACT: makes no provisions for water entitlement 
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